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2ABSTRACT
Sub-Saharan Africa entered the 1980s faced with a crisis of 
unprecendented proportions. The economies of the region which 
were already in decline by the late 1970s, were in danger of 
collapse. The severity of the crisis was also reflected in 
rising indebtedness, social decay and political instability. To 
tackle it, African leaders met at an extraordinary economic 
summit in Lagos in 1980 and adopted a common strategy which 
became known as. the Lagos Plan of Action. The crisis in Sub- 
Saharan Africa/part of a general world-wide economic recession 
stemming from a period of economic decline in the leading 
industrial economies. As a result, the leading industrialised 
countries and international institutions designed strategies to 
tackle the crisis both at the global level and in the 
developing countries such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa. For 
Africa, the strategy adopted by the World Bank and the IMF was 
that of structural adjustment.
The orthodox approach of the World Bank generated controversy 
as to its suitability to the African situation. This 
disagreement was a reflection of conflicting political 
interests as well as power relations both internationally, and 
within African states. This thesis analyses the impact of the 
politics of structural adjustment programmes in Africa, with 
special reference to Ghana and Nigeria between 1983-1990. The 
arguement is that orthodox structural adjustment has failed to 
reverse the decline in Africa largely because of continuing 
disagreement between African governments and international 
institutions over the content and direction of adjustment.
The study is presented over eight chapters. The introductory 
chapter sets the agenda. Chapter one covers the international 
dimension of the African crisis, while chapter two looks at the 
internal dimension. Chapter three contains a detailed analysis 
of the international politics of structural adjustment.
Chapters four and five discuss the adjustment programme in 
Ghana and its impact on the country’s political economy. The 
Nigerian experience is similarly examined in chapters six and 
seven. The conclusion, chapter eight, addresses the issues 
behind the failure of orthodox adjustment in Africa and makes 
recommendations•
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Introduction
The 1980s saw the elevation of economic issues as the major 
item on the agenda of international relations. As the decade 
came to a close, economic matters, particularly between the 
North and the South, became more important than the cold war 
between East and West, These economic issues centred on how to 
arrest the decline in the world economy in general, and 
particularly in the developing countries where the crisis was 
severe; and to generate recovery and growth in all economies. 
The debt crisis and the severe external imbalances which 
afflicted most of the developing countries from the early 
1980s, and the measures which the major industrial countries 
took to tackle these problems, gave them a distinct flavour of 
a struggle between the North and the South for power in the 
world economy reminiscent of the situation in the first half of 
the 1970s,
However, the senario in the 1980s was quite different in the 
sense that the Third World did not have the power to confront 
the Western powers as they did in the 1970s. While in the 1970s 
the perceived power of the Third World persuaded the West to 
pay lip-service to demands for a new international economic 
order, in the 1980s despite Southern resentments, they could 
not refuse the offers made to them by the North but had to go 
along. In this respect, it was the South which struggled to
17
cope with its loss of influence on international developments. 
In particular, the enduring disagreements over the structural 
adjustment programmes implemented under the supervision of the 
IMF and the World Bank in Sub-Saharan Africa, reflects this 
brand of North-South relations. It is this struggle for the 
control of the adjustment process in Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
impact on the recovery programmes which is the subject of this 
study.
However, structural adjustment is itself not a new phenomenon 
in the management of economic crisis. The Bretton Woods 
arrangements for the post-war international economy had 
envisaged that a country could experience such external 
imbalances and provided for ways to resolve them. The Bretton 
Woods system provided that once a country had balance of 
payments problems, it was incumbent on the country in question 
to take the necessary steps to restore balance. It was assumed 
that these imbalances were temporary and could be corrected by 
the prompt adoption of the required reform measures. For 
instance, in the final analysis a country might be required to 
devalue its currency to make its products more competitive 
internationally. While this would make locally-produced goods 
cheaper, it would make imports more expensive and thereby 
restore balance to the external sector. There was also the 
provision that a country could borrow from the IMF to tide it 
over the crisis. This arrangement was subsequently modified to 
include conditionalities and other measures designed to ensure
18
compliance. Thus, under Bretton Woods, the burden of adjustment 
was borne by the country concerned.
Since the Bretton Wooods arrangements were essentially 
designed to meet the needs and interests of the major 
industrial countries, it was assumed that such balance of 
payments problems would be few and far in-between. However, the 
problem of external imbalances in Sub-Saharan Africa is very 
different from what the Bretton Woods arrangements envisaged. 
For the most part, these imbalances remained permanent and 
enduring in the region. Therefore, when structural adjustment 
programmes were introduced in the region in the 1980s, it 
became something new. In this sense, structural adjustment was 
new in terms of the scale of implementation which covered 
thirty-three countries in the region. Another sense in which 
structural adjustment presented a new problem was that it 
raised the issue of sharing the burden of adjustment between 
African countries and the international community. This issue 
of was made even more important in the political struggles 
between the major industrial countries and the developing 
world, by the unprecedented levels of indebtedness among these 
countries.
The question of sharing the burden of adjustment has caused 
significant political disagreements between the leading 
industrial countries and the debtor countries over how the 
latterfs economies should be adjusted. In the case of Sub-
19
Saharan Africa, this is reflected in the controversy which 
followed the adoption and implementation of structural 
adjustment programmes supported by the IMF and the World Bank. 
This is the major point of division between the two Bretton 
Woods institutions and their major owners on the one hand, and 
the OAU, the ECA and other interest groups on the other. The 
issues involved relate to the appropriateness of these reform 
programmes as the solution to the African crisis. This study 
investigates the political interests which have shaped and 
influenced the implementation of structural adjustment 
programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the impact they 
have had on these countries.
The importance of this subject is demonstrated by the large 
and growing literature on it. The literature on structural 
adjustment can be broadly categorised into those writings which 
promote an orthodoxy based on the revival of the Bretton Woods 
system, or at least on its belief in strict market disciplines 
on the one hand, and a number of approaches which are seen as 
alternatives to the orthodox school, on the other.(1) The 
orthodox approach set the pace in this debate and its triumph 
was underlined by the implementation of orthodox reform 
programmes in Africa and the intellectual and financial support 
of the IMF and the World Bank, and the political support of the 
Group of Seven (G-7). The other approaches are largely a 
reaction to the claims of orthodoxy, questioning the
20
appropriateness of orthodox adjustment programmes or aspects of 
them, as solution to the crisis in Africa.
The orthodox prescriptions for Africa which were launched with 
the publication by the World Bank of the Berg Report in 
1981,(2) were initially concerned with protecting the integrity 
of sovereign debt and short-to-medium term stabilisation 
measures which had evolved under the Bretton Woods system. The 
reforms included devaluation, fiscal and monetary policies, 
export-oriented growth, trade liberalisation, price de­
regulations, the expansion of the market and the drastic 
reduction in the involvement of the state in the economy. These 
reform measures put the burden of adjustment on reforming 
countries as the rescheduling of debts and the giving of 
programme-tied aid was made conditional on these countries 
meeting performance criteria set by the IMF and the World Bank. 
For the most part, these programmes were designed to run for 3- 
5 years at a time. The involvement of the World Bank and the 
IMF in their implementation, generated bitter debates and 
disagreements throughout the 1980s. The disagreements centred 
on the pace and sequencing of the reforms in opening economies 
to international markets, the appropriate roles of the state 
and the market in promoting national development, sharing the 
cost of adjustment both domestically and internationally, and 
the appropriateness of adjustment measures in aiding the 
attainment of development and other national objectives.
21
The alternatives to the Bretton Woods orthodoxy range from 
structuralist to a variety of heterodox programmes.(3) The 
structuralist position is essentially that the IMF and the 
World Bank-supported adjustment programmes are unsuitable for 
developing economies like those in Africa because they are 
structurally different from the advanced industrial economies 
to which these measures are better suited. It is also claimed 
that the structural problems of the developing economies would 
require more not less intervention by the state, to remove 
them. The orthodox programmes are seen as destabilising and /or 
instruments of recolonisation. The heterodox position is a 
middle course between the state and the market. It argues that 
some economic problems are better tackled by state intervention 
than by market mechanisms. For instance, that direct wage and 
price controls have proved to be more suited to tackling 
inflation at low cost for economic growth. An appropriate mix 
of market solutions and state intervention rather than the 
wholesale use of market mechanisms alone as the adjustment 
programmes in Africa demonstrate. A variant of this heterodox 
approach which is associated with Unicef has concerned itself 
with the consequences of orthodox adjustment for the lower 
income and vulnerable groups. The concern for the 
distributional effects of orthodox adjustment has led 
proponents of this approach to call for ’adjustment with a 
human face1.(A)
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All these positions reveal that structural adjustment is a 
contested and complex issue, no one approach provides all the 
answers* The answer must be in adopting a more comprehensive 
approach which combines the essential elements of the various 
approaches on offer. However, there is a dimension - the 
political-which has been given little emphasis in the 
literature. Yet politics are critical to the resolution of the 
crisis in Africa. The political factors which lie behind the 
dominance of orthodox adjustment such as the question of power 
relations in the quest to exercise control over the 
international economy need to be analysed in the light of their 
implications for the outcome of the recovery programmes in 
Africa.
The ideological commitment of the major powers in the G-7 to 
market principles as the basis of operating the world economy 
and carrying out reforms in developing economies such as those 
of Africa, is an important element of this political dimension 
which requires greater attention. Another issue is the 
political conflict over the agenda of structural adjustment 
between the major economic powers and the Bretton Woods 
institutions on the one hand, and the developing countries and 
institutions such as the OAU on the other. The domestic 
political situation in African countries also merits attention. 
These are so essential to the outcome of the adjustment process 
in Africa that they should not have been excluded. This is the 
gap which we intend to fill in this study, to investigate how
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these factors have combined to determine the nature and outcome 
of structural adjustment programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa.
This research aims to assess the performance of SAPs by 
analysing their impacts on the countries which have implemented 
them. In this regard, the performance of the programmes will 
be tested in the light of a number of issues which include:
(a) The impact of the macroeconomic measures on the economy, 
specifically, the effect on the output of food for dosmestic 
consumption; the effect of liberalisation policy on domestic 
production and consumption; on the level of domestic savings 
and investment; on industrial production and output of import 
substitutes; and on the performance of the export sector.
(b) The impact of measures on the financial sector, such as on 
the level of inflation; on the level of flow of external 
resources in support of SAPs ; the inflow of foreign 
investment; and whether trade policy and exchange rate policy 
are complimentary. (5)
(c) The effects on the distribution of the benefits and burden 
of adjustment on the population; the level of support or social 
opposition to SAP; the perceptions of the people on the role of 
the IMF and World Bank in the adjustment process, that is 
whether SAP is seen as an external imposition; and its impact 
on human development.
(d) The capacity of the governments to cultivate the necessary 
political support without being re; pressive; the extent to 
which the ruling elite identify with and support the adjustment
24
programmes; and the role of the state In this process,In terms 
of democratic governance.
(e) The theoretical validity of the IMF/World Bank analysis of 
the African crisis and the strategy of orthodox adjustment; and 
wether or not It compliments the African goal of self-sustained 
development.
The conceptual frame adopted In this research Is one which 
sees SAP as a pressure for globalisation (or
Internationalisation of production) imposed by the predominance 
of capital. The reality of this globalisation means:
(1) that any crisis of the capitalist system will be a crisis 
of the international division of labour, thus especially, a 
North-South crisis;
(2) that the alternatives of the day will be 
transnationalization or autonomous development ...(6)
The current global crisis now takes place at the levels of the
periphery trying to resist the’exigencies of the logic of
transnationalisation1, the resistance of the working class at
the centre, and the conflict between the strategies of capital
and the national states. The response of capital to the
crisis, Samir Amin argues, has necessarily been drastic:
This includes the overcoming of the South by compradorization 
(witness the end of the North-South dialogue and the emergence 
of a Northern bloc confronting the South, as at Sixth UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Belgrade in 
June 1983; the undermining of the Workers’ Movement in the 
Centre by unemployment, and of the inter-class movement by 
inflation (winning the middle classes to the right); and the 
submission to the American counter-offensive which seeks to 
reestablish the hegemony of the United States and consequent 
instrumentalization of the IMF...(7)
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The ruling elite in the South is now caught in the dilemma of 
pursuing their national desires or submitting to 
*compradorisation*, that is, to become mere instruments or 
agents of the West in the expansion of the market system in its 
new form, without being able to exercise any sovereign 
authority in taking decisions on their economies. During the 
relatively favourable conditions under Bretton Woods Mark 1,(8) 
the ruling elite in the South was able to win some concessions 
from the international economic system. The ruling elite has 
even been able to carry out a measure of development (such as 
import-substitution industrialisation) by seeking to break out 
from the international division of labour. The present crisis 
has revealed the weaknesses of the ruling elite’s attempts at 
development. This is seen in terms of the deficits, external 
debt and erosion of popular support. The crisis thus provides 
an opprtunity for recompradorization of the South, by forcing a 
capitulation from the bourgeoisie. This is being done through 
SAP. The success of SAP as a global offensive against the 
Third World,
... would lead to the recompradorization of bourgeoisies 
in the South and logic of monopoly capital’s strategies 
for transnationalization.(9)
In our analysis of Africa’s relations with the world economy 
through the implementation of SAP, we shall treat the internal- 
international divide as artificial because of the integration 
of these economies into the world economy. This means that we 
see factors originating from the world economy as linked to the 
internal phenomena which they generate or exacerbate. There
i
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will be greater emphasis on the fundamental structures of the 
African crisis rather than on the effects. These fundamental 
structures relate not only to the economic but to the social 
and political as well. They are also linked together in their 
operations and thereby tend to affect each other. For instance, 
the political aspect of the African crisis such as the 
structures and working of the state, have tended to cause or 
exacerbate a given crisis as much as either the economic or 
social structures. Thus, a discussion of the structures of the 
crisis is by implication, also a discussion of the politics. 
This enables the discussion to be presented with the aid of 
statistical data. The data used in reporting this research are 
drawn from sources with an authoritative and proven record of 
reliability, in view of the unavailability and often 
unreliability of African statistical data. This does not mean 
that data processed by African governments and their agencies 
are not used. It only means that the data used here are drawn 
from a variety of sources including African, to give a complete 
picture of the situation being studied.
Also, because our subject of study is evolving and continually 
changing, much use has been made of sources from various 
institutions and governments or their agents, who are closely 
involved in the adjustment process in Africa. These include 
sources from the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, ECA, OAU and 
other institutions which have also done some work on the 
subject. The works of individual scholars and officials in
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this area have also been used. We have also used press 
bulletins and reports on the subject. However, because of the 
level of sensitivity of African governments especially our 
case study countries, Ghana and Nigeria, to the subject of 
structural adjustment, interviews have been conducted with 
individuals linked to the governments only to a limited extent. 
Instead, we have relied on the public statements by officials 
involved in the implementation of SAPs and publications on the 
subject by government institutions such as the central banks 
and ministries of finance.
Sub-Saharan Africa is a diverse region with the 45 countries 
which make up this region varying interms of size, natural 
resource endowments population, physical characteritics, etc. 
This diversity raises the problem of using the experiences of 
two countries such as Ghana and Nigeria to make analyses, 
generalisations and draw lessons and conclusions which are 
applicable to the region as a whole. Notwithstanding this 
diversity, Ghana and Nigeria are in many ways representative of 
the situation in Africa in that they contain elements of the 
diversity which make up the region. In comparative terms,
Ghana is a small African country with a largely monocultural 
economy dependent on export earnings from cocoa. Ghana is also 
a good example of the African economy in which the state plays 
a dominant role. Usually, this takes the form of some 
socialist experiment in which the state is assigned the role of 
agent of development.
28
On the other hand, Nigeria is a very large country with a
large population. It is also a rich oil exporting country,
classified as a middle-income economy. Nigeria provides an
example of the African mixed economy, in which there is a
significant and active private sector but with the state
controlling the ’commanding heights’ of the economy such as the
oil sector, banking and finance, iron and steel and
infrastructural development. Even though the involvement of
the state pervades all areas of the economy, it tends to be
more open and market oriented than economies such as that of
Ghana. Most African economies fit one or the other of those
two broad categories.
However, both Ghana and Nigeria share with the other African
economies similar weaknesses and conditions as identified by
the World Bank and other institutions involved in the
development process in Africa like the ECA. As the Wass Report
has correctly observed:
... we believe that the similarities of the problems 
throughout the Sub-Saharan region are more striking and 
important than the differnces. The region as a whole 
is plagued by deep and persistent problems. All Sub- 
Saharan countries are greatly affected by volatile 
commodity prices and climatic factors. All are at an 
early stage of development and have, by world standards, 
very low income per head. (10)
Furthermore, the orthodox adjustment measures imposed on all 
Afican countries as well as the conditionalities and cross­
conditionalities are similar. The coordination between the IMF 
and the World Bank in supervising structural adjustment in 
Africa, make it possible to study the impact of this process on
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Ghana and Nigeria as cases which are representative of the 
African experience. Thus, the similarity in kind, of these 
economies should to a large extent make valid lessons and 
conclusions drawn from their analysis to the region as a whole.
However we do recognise the possibility that some Sub-Saharan 
countries could be integrated into the new division of labour 
at a higher level than the rest. For instance the logic of 
profit might require the relocation of certain industries which 
are labour-intensive and require unskilled or semi-skilled 
labour. This should happen if the cost of production in the 
Newly Industrialised Countries threaten profits. Already, many 
of the NICs have joined the high-tech club of nations through 
their production of micro chips, computers and the like. Such 
developments certainly recommend countries like Nigeria, Ivory 
Coast, Zimbabwe and Kenya to play the role which the NICs were 
doing in the 1970s. Industries like textiles, component 
manufacture and assembly, etc, would then be done in these Sub- 
Saharan countries. The rest of the region will supply raw 
materials, thanks to the export-oriented strategy of growth 
that the IMF and World Bank have imposed through SAP. The 
African crisis itself did not develop over night, even though 
it reached catastrophic proportions in the 1980s. It has a 
long history which needs to be investigated not only to gain a 
proper understanding of the current crisis but also to 
demonstrate the appropriateness or otherwise of SAP as a 
solution.
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The issues raised here are discussed and presented over eight 
chapters. In the first chapter, we discuss the scale of the 
crisis which engulfed Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s. This for 
instance, explains the fact that the social dimension of the 
crisis such as the health situation appears in this chapter and 
not in chapter two. This is discussed in relation to the 
changing international economic environment, especially the 
contribution of the world economic system to this crisis. The 
manner in which African economies are linked to the world 
economy especially the economies of Europe, has meant that each 
time these economies are in recession those of Africa are also 
thrown into serious crisis. In this respect also, when the 
European economies adjust to a recession such as was done in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, African countries had to adjust 
in similar direction. This is the link between structural 
adjustment in Africa and the international economy. This 
chapter therefore covers the international dimension of the 
African crisis.
Chapter two looks at the internal dimension of the crisis in 
Africa. The economic, political and social factors which are 
largely internal but interacting with external factors to cause 
the crisis, are identified and analysed. This analysis of the 
external and internal dimensions of the crisis is not only to 
demonstrate the scale of the problem, but also to show whether 
or not orthodox adjustment programmes sufficiently address the 
problem. This is what informs the discussion of the external
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factors behind the African crisis such as the debt crisis and 
the role of multinational corporations, in this chapter and not 
in chapter one.
The third chapter attempts a detailed analysis of the 
international politics of structural adjustment. This involves 
a review of the debate within the international development 
community; especially the Western position as articulated by 
the World Bank and the IMF; the African position which has been 
articulated through the OAU and the ECA; and the studies 
carried out by other institutions and individuals on the 
subject. The debate reveals the political complexity of the 
adjustment process, a complexity which is likely to put the 
entire process in jeopardy if ignored. All these themes are 
applied to our two case study countries over the next four 
chapters. The reform process in Ghana is discussed in chapters 
four and five. We look at the domestic situation with regard to 
the causes of the crisis and the political struggles waged by 
the various groups in the country to influence the direction of 
structural adjustment. In the fifth chapter, we analyse the 
impact of the reform programme on the country. The Nigerian 
case study is presented in the same pattern as that of Ghana, 
in chapters six and seven. Chapter eight is the conclusion to 
the study, it draws all the arguements together, draws 
conclusions and makes recommendations.
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Chapter 1.
The African Crisis, the International Economy and Structural 
Adjustment in the r9ft0s.
The sudden and drastic deterioration in the international 
economic environment at the turn of the decade of the 1980s 
unleashed a development crisis of unprecedented scale on the 
developing countries of the South. It also rekindled the 
economic and political conflict between the rich nations of the 
North and the poor ones in the South, over the control of the 
international economy and its use to promote development • In 
the 1970s this conflict centred on the demand by the Third 
World for a New International Economic Order which would 
guarantee the development of the South by limiting the power of 
the North to obstruct it. The North - South dialogue which 
resulted from this was an attempt to narrow the differences 
between the North and the South and get them to cooperate to 
their mutual advantage. However, the crisis which set in at 
the beginning of the 1980s radically altered the situation.
The situation in the 1980s developed out of an environment 
in which the first oil price rise of 1973-74 had created 
financial surpluses for Opec countries and led to a large 
expansion of the volume of international loans. The situation 
was helped by the expansion of the Euro-currency markets, the 
recycling of Opec surpluses and the excess liquidity in the
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international banking system created by economic recession in 
industrial countries. The major banks were eager to lend to 
developing countries, many of whom were experiencing persistent 
trade imbalances and fiscal deficits. Encouraged by the 
favourable terms of the loans, especially the very low real 
rate of interest on these loans, most countries went on a 
borrowing spree to finance their development.
However, the second oil price rise of 1978-79 and the 
recession in the industrial economies plunged the world economy 
into deeper recession and created for the developing countries 
crises of catastrophic proportions. As a result, global 
inflation rose sharply as did interest rates;Third World debts 
soared because of the rise in interest rates. The policies 
which the industrial countries adopted to fight the recession 
caused the international trading and financial environment to 
deteriorate and trigger off the crisis which engulfed the Third 
World in the 1980s. For instance, the American prime rate and 
the London Inter Bank Offer Rate, to which floating interest 
rates were tied, rose significantly. The US Prime rate was 21 
per cent by the end of 1980. Consequently, most of these 
countries experienced severe financial problems because 
commercial banks stopped lending new money and the result was 
an international debt crisis . This situation was accompanied 
by a rapid deterioration of conditions in the developing 
countries which put the lives of their peoples at risk. Thus, 
there was a sense of urgency to adopt measures which would
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reverse the decline and put these countries on the right path 
to achieve growth.
The global recession raised such questions as; how it 
should be tackled, who should re-write the rules governing the 
world market, what direction reform of the world economy as 
well as of individual economies should take and the extent of 
burden-sharing. The summit of leaders of the major industrial 
countries and representative leaders of the Third World, which 
took place in late 1981 at Cancun, Mexico was the last 
opportunity for both sides to agree on these issues. In the 
event, that did not happen. The leading industrial nations 
which were now run by conservative governments, ideologically 
committed to the market, made clear their intention to see to 
the restructuring of the world economy in the direction of the 
market. Thus, if the recession was a problem which needed to 
be urgently tackled, it also offered an opportunity to the 
Industrial nations to re-write the rules of the market to 
protect and maximise their position of advantage and power, in 
much the same way as the developing countries had sought to 
change things to their own advantage in the 1970s. The 
difference of course, was that in the 1970s the West had to pay 
lip-service to the needs of the developing countries, but in 
the 1980s, they clearly had no such need. The dominant position 
of the industrial countries in the world economy guaranteed for 
them the right to determine the nature of reforms to be 
undertaken both at the global level and within the crisis-
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ridden developing countries*
As a result of the hostile international economic climate 
and the debt crises, the industrial countries imposed orthodox 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on African and other 
developing countries. The SAPs were placed under the 
supervision of the IMF and the World Bank and they required the 
debtor countries to carry out structural reforms such as trade 
liberalisation, export orientation, fiscal austerity, 
devaluation, credit ceilings, interest rate adjustment and 
other institutional reforms. The proponents of SAP hoped that 
the reforms would induce development based on the market 
system and also protect their own economic, political and 
strategic interests. Thus, SAP is as much a political 
instrument as it is ecomomic and therefore clearly linked to 
the international economy and the African crisis. In this 
chapter, we discuss the scale of the African crisis in the 
1980s, its relationship with the international economy and with 
structural adjustment. We show that the implementation of 
structural adjustment programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
politically convenient for the major industrial economies as 
much as it is politically and economically imperative, for 
Africa. However, there is disagreement over the form and 
content of adjustment.
The Scale of the African Crisis in the 1980s
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The African continent is currently undergoing a severe
crisis of unprecedented proportion in the post-colonial history
of the continent. This crisis became very critical in the
1980fs and it pervades all areas of life in sub-saharan Africa.
This critical condition of African countries is aptly captured
by the Khartoum Declaration when it says:
that the crisis that confronts the African continent 
is one that affects the total human condition of the 
continent and its people, men and women alike. It is 
a crisis that challenges the very survival of the African 
people •••• It is a crisis that threatens to overwhelm 
Africa, and in extremis, to reduce them to the helpless 
gaze depicted in the starving faces of Africa’s children 
in the international media.(1)
The picture is of a major catastrophe and the 
statistical evidence is overwhelming . African countries are 
poorer today than they were at independence in the 1960.
Africa has twenty-seven of the World’s forty-one poorest 
nations. A greater majority of Africans have been made 
absolutely poor in this decade(1980's). Per capita incomes, 
the GDP, social services such as education, health, etc, have 
declined and continue to do so. For instance, per capita 
income for sub-saharan Africa declined by about 3.4% per annum 
between 1980 - 1986.(2) There is every indication that these 
trends will continue even into the next decade.(3) Since 1980, 
several African countries have witnessed increased infant 
mortality and crude death rates. Most countries in the region 
cannot feed themselves and this has increased the level of 
malnutrition.
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This trend of decline is also seen in the export
performance of Sub-Saharan Africa, As the Advisory Group to
the UN Secretary-General on Financial Flows for Africa has
correctly observed:
Sub-saharan Africa is the most commodity-dependent region 
in the world,,. Primary commodities play a decisive role
in the economic fortunes of all the countries in the
region.(A)
This has meant a drastic fall in the levels of export revenue
since 1980, because about 90% of all export from Sub-Saharan
Africa are primary commodities,(5) Related to this decline in 
exports has been the most serious problem of the now 
irreversible fall in the prices of these commodities in the 
international markets. In 1986, for instance, the export 
earnings of the region fell by $19 billion that is, about a 
third of its $64 billion income the previous year. (6) This 
downward movement of prices has meant that the terms of trade 
of African countries have continued to deteriorate whether or 
not "their exports have been concentrated in agricultural 
commodities, non-fuel minerals, or oil itself..."(7) Even 
where some countries have tried to increase their exports to 
off-set the falls in commodity prices, this has not been helped 
by the depreciating value of the dollar in recent times. The 
overall picture of African commodity exports can be seen from 
Table 1.1 The immediate implication of this is that these 
countries have had their imports drastically reduced. With 
most of these countries being heavily dependent on imported 
manufactures, oil and even food, such decline in earning has 
definitely contributed to the crisis.
Table 1.1 Trends in major commodity exports from sub-Saharan Africa
Regions share
of world export In ?^£2!!l_p5
Value of exports of the comraodii (1980 = 100)
(Millions of US $) ty (%) ----------------------
Dollars Reala
Commodity
1977
1978
1980
1981
1984
1985
1980
1981
1984
1985 1985 1986 1985 1986
Crude Petroleum 11929 25540 19352 8.4 11.0 90.8 46.2 105.5 44.5
Coffee 3127 2571 2452 25.2 21.8 81.7 100.0 94.8 96.2
Cocoa 2030 1791 1534 70.8 61.2 86.6 79.5 100.5 76.4
Copper 1188 1914 1033 21.0 15.3 64.9 62.9 75.4 60.5
Timber 642 1052 777 6.3 5.3 69.1 88.1 80.1 84.7
Cotton 632 625 724 7.5 9.5 75.3 58.3 87.4 56.0
Iron Ore 317 474 492 10.6 12.0 85.0 82.4 98.7 79.2
Tea 292 278 199 18.1 26.4 74.4 74.3 88.8 71.5
Sugar 367 574 400 4.2 7.0 14.1 21.0 16.4 20.2
Bauxite 90 318 413 31.9 48.9 76.5 86.9 88.8 83.6
Tobacco 282 402 375 11.0 10.7 87.0 • • 101.0 • •
Natural rubber 138 169 170 3.2 4.2 56.9 78.2 66.1 56.0
Hides and skins 96 138 181 7.4 6.6 87.5 75.9 101.6 73.0
Manganese ore 130 140 129 64.2 73.2 88.2 78.6 102.4 75.6
Groundnut oil 174 76 124 25.5 43.4 110.0 66.3 127.8 63.7
Zinc 89 48 41 2.0 1.4 102.9 99.1 119.5 95.3
Groundnut 126 92 34 12.8 7.8 95.2 60.4 110.5 58.1
Adapted from United Nations; Financing Afriac's Recovery! Re-port of the Secertary- 
General Advisory Group on Finacial Flows for Africa, 1988 P9
a Dollar price deflated by United Nations index of unit value of manufactured exports 
of industrialised countries.
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Another factor which has farther complicated the situation 
for Sub-Saharan African countries is the decline in all other 
capital flows in the 1980s, A majority of states in the region 
are heavily dependent on external capital flows for financing 
their development programmes. The decline in this important 
source of capital has added more pressure on these desperate 
countries. Foreign direct investment, for instance, is 
reported to have fallen from $1.5 billion in 1981 to $400 
million annually since 1984. Official flows on non­
concessional terms also fell significantly as can be seen from 
Table 1.2. And even though the IMF is supposed to be the 
lender of last resort, the decade of the 1980s has seen the IMF 
become a net recepient of resources from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This unusual activity of the IMF in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
demonstrated in Table 1.3.
The African crisis is not only an economic crisis as has 
been presented above. It is fundamentally, a crisis of 
underdevelopment,(9) which means it is basically structural and 
historical. And even though underdevelopment is mainly an 
economic phenomenon, the crisis facing Africa today manifests 
itself in serious social and political problems as well. The 
social situation in Africa deteriorated considerably in the 
1980s. This was manifested in sharp declines in living 
standards, incomes, employment levels, health, nutritional and 
educational standards. Poverty became widespread, covering 
both urban and rural areas and affecting between 50 and 70 per 
cent of the population by 1987 - 88. Many people were unable
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Table 1.2
THE IMF, THE NOR LD BANK AND EXTERNAL TRANSFERS 
TO AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, 1980-90
($US millions)
1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
IMF
Gross disburse­
ments*
Repayments and- 
interest**
Net transfer
1217
487
730
1618
739
879
952
993
-41
738
1172
-434
735
1689
-954
678
1541
-863
1033
1495
-462
865
1593
-728
733
1265
-562
IDA
Disbursements 
Repayments and 
interest 
Net transfer
424
21
403
637
44
593
778
56
722
881
79
802
1400
94
1306
1681
111
1570
1697
128
1569
1700
126
1574
-
IBRD
Disbursements 
Repayments and 
interest 
Net transfer
400
328
72
708
438
270
832
527
305
647
616
31
898
865
33
998
1073
-75
581
1306
-725
835
1226
-391
-
IMF/IDA/IBRD
Total Net Transfers 1205 1742 986 399 385 632 382 455 -
Other Net Transfers 
(Long-term Debt): 
Multiateral** 
Bilateral*** 
Private
707
1657
2818
664
2295
270
442
1925
-1667
487
472
-2648
650
1210
-1132
709
1194
-213
672
630
-434
607
945
-428
430
-1818
Total Long Term- 
Debt Related- 
Transfers 
Grants***
Direct Foreign 
Investment
5657
3057
20
4092
2844
882
1727
3422
494
-856
4514
1059
2067
4823
460
3185
5030
1167
1712
6567
687
2307
6570
2301
657
TOTAL NET TRANSFERS 6573 7485 4419 2779 5209 6763 7511 8692 -
•Purchases
••Repurschases and charges. Publicly guaranteed,and unguaranteed, excluding 
direct foreign investment , ( ♦projected) ♦♦Excluding Grnts 
♦♦♦Excluding technical assistance
Sources Derived from World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1990-91, pp.130-133.;
quoted in G.K. Helleiner, "External Resource Flovs to sub-Saharan Africa 
in the 19906*, June 1991 p.4.
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Table 1.3
NET FLOW OF IMF lending to sub-Saharan Africa/ 1980-1987
Billions of dollars)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Flovs identified 
in detail Regular 
Credit tranches 261 525 494 819 626 311 92 332
Extended facility 211 920 126 168 -11 -44 -234 -158
Special facilities 
Trust Fund 384 5 -1 -14 -61 -106 -181 -176
Structural Adjust­
ment (SAF) _ 63 292
Compensatory Fin­
ancing -19 323 175 340 -95 -150 -195 -172
Buffer stock Fina­
ncing _ 1 6 2 -8 4
Oil facility -118 -105 -60 -10 - - - -
Total identified 
net flow 720 1668 736 1309 461 3 454 546
Other net use of 
Fund credit 4 8 12 1 5 3 8 17
Total net flow 715 1660 748 1308 456 - 446 529
Memorandum item: 
Net financial 
transfer 627 1513 461 983 58 426 895 894
Source: IMF Iternational Financial Statistics and data supplied by IMF 
and World Bank. (Flovs calulated in SDRs were converted to dollars at 
yearly average exchange rates) In Report of the UW...P 12 
including flovs to countries for which a breakdown by facility of the 
use of Fund credit is not supplied.
Total pur<Ases minus repurchases and Fund charges.
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even to meet their basic food needs because of the drastic fall 
in incomes, as the region!s per capita incomes fell at an 
annual rate of 3.4 percent between 1980 and 1986.(10). Wages 
were unable to guarantee basic needs in food and services and 
there was a fall in employment levels.
The 1980s witnessed significant declines in employment due 
to reduction in development investment, employment freezes and 
massive retrenchments. Thus, the African region was reported 
to have lost an estimated 1.5 million permanent jobs per year 
between 1985 and 1987. Also in 1985, 22 million people were 
estimated to be unemployed and the number of underemployed was 
put at 95 million. The level of youth unemployment was even 
worse, at between 65 and 75 percent in 1987. Associated with 
this was the high level of graduate unemployment, put at 4 to 5 
million in 1987.
Another dimension of the social crisis was the poor state 
of health, nutrition, housing and education. This was an area 
which was properly funded in the 1970s but was now subjected to 
severe budget cuts. The result for the region as a whole was 
dtsasterous, for instance, the share of health and education 
in government expenditure fell from 25.2 percent in 1986 to 
23.1 percent in 1987. This was further reflected in low life 
expectancy, high infant mortality, malnutrition and the 
prevalence of preventable diseases. The health situation 
deteriorated so much that there were epidemics of diseases like 
cholera, yellow fever, etc.,in about 32 African countries.
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Another serious health problem which affected many African 
countries in the 1980s is the Aids epidemic. Even though 
African leaders considered it a political embarrassment to 
admit to its existence, aids is now a serious problem for many 
countries in the region. In countries such as Uganda, Zimbabwe 
and Cote d 1 Ivoire,to mention only a few, the spread of the 
disease has grabbed international headlines and attention. In 
education, the achievements of the 1970s in expanding 
opportunities were being reversed, with the annual growth in 
school enrolment falling from 8.1 per cent in 1970 - 1980 to 
3.9 percent in 1980 -1987.
The incidence of crime, violence and other forms of social 
tension such as communal and religious conflicts, increased in 
many African countries. The level of political tension also 
increased as the vocal urban population, workers and university 
students confronted the governments over the deteriorating 
situations in their countries. The struggle to protect their 
jobs or stop the declines in the health and education sectors 
often took the form of strikes and demonstrations against the 
governments for adopting the stabilisation measures which were 
eroding their living standards. Consequently, governments were 
forced to battle for legitimacy and to maintain political 
stability. This has made the threat of social and political 
instability very real in Africa today. Political turmoil and 
instability arising from the growing inequalities occasioned by 
this crisis have become widespread.
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Another factor which has contributed to the emergence of
the African crisis in the 1980s is the prolonged global
capitalist crisis or recession since 1979, It is important to
note that Africa’s relationship with the capitalist centre of
the world economic system is one of vulnerability at the best
of times. Adverse economic developments in these countries
have therefore deepened the African economic crisis. This
situation in which Africa’s fortunes are tied up with that of
Western Europe and North America has made it easier for the
latter to pass on the burden of their recession to Africa, as
in the spread of a virus so that when the West sneezes, Africa 
a
catchesAcold. This was clearly demonstrated by the effect of 
the rise in interest rates in the West on Africa.
For instance, when the developed countries decided in the 
late 1970s that the basic issue was the control of inflation, 
they introduced recessionary macroeconomic policies which were 
based primarily on monetary policy instruments. As a result, 
this slowed down economic activity in the industrialised world 
and inturn depressed international prices for commodities by 
reducing demand. Also, the unprecedented rise in interest 
rates pushed up the cost of debt servicing and further 
depressed commodity prices by raising the cost of stock­
holding. Thus, the cost of structural reforms and the control 
of inflation in the industrialised West was borne by the 
developing countries. This is partly how the development of
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Europe is said to deepen the crisis of underdevelopment in 
Africa.
One of the major impacts of this prolonged recession on 
these advanced capitalist countries is the decline they began 
to witness when their rate of GDP growth per capita fell to 1.6
per cent between 1981 and 1985 from around 3 per cent per year
between 1976 and 1980.(11) The response of the OECD countries 
to this recession also helped to ex&Cevbate the African crisis. 
Some of the measures taken tended to pass on the burden of the 
recession to the Third World countries. A familiar feature of 
the trade policies of these countries is the erection of
protectionist walls against foreign imports, mostly from
developing and poor countries such as those in Africa. This 
new protectionism which took the form of Voluntary Export 
Restraints (VERs), Orderly Marketing Arrangements ( OMAs), the 
Muti-Fibre Arrangment (MFA) and similar restrictions compounded 
the difficulties which developing countries had in responding 
to the changing external environment. The exports affected by 
these measures included processed tropical and agricultural 
products, textiles, steel, petrochemicals, automotive parts and 
electronics. Even the most efficient producers among the 
developing countries were prevented entry into the OECD market 
(Table 1.4).This has tended to create the all-familiar 
situation of glut in the supply of Third World commodities on 
the world market. Prices have fallen drastically as a result. 
Virtually all commodities on which most of these countries
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Table 1.4
Developed Country Tariff Rates on Selected Commodities
Product
European
Economic
Community Japan
United
States
Coffee
Cocoa
Cotton
Sisal
Iron
Copper
Manganese
Aluminum
Wood
Paper
Rubber
Leather
Tobacco
Green roasted 5.0 0.0 0.0
Coffee extracts 18.0 17.5 0.0
Cocoa beans 3.0 0.0 0.0
Powder and butter 12.2 4.9 0.3
Chocolate 27.0 27.4 6.5
Raw cotton 0.0 0.0 1.9
Cotton yarn 6.0 3.6 6.8
Cotton fabrics 10.0 5.9 7.4
Cotton clothing 13.7 13.2 8.8
Fibers 0.0 0.0 0.1
Cordage 11.7 7.7 2.3
Iron ore 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pig iron 2.2 4.3 1.5
Steel ingots 5.7 5.0 2.5
Mill products 4.9 5.2 4.4
Special steels 5.3 4.9 3.2
Copper ore 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unwrought copper 0.0 4.8 1.0
Wrouqht copper 6.0 6.8 2.6
Manganese ore 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ferro-manganese 2.0 4.8 1.7
Bauxite 0.0 0.0 0.0
Alumina 5.7 4.9 0.0
Unwrought aluminum 5.8 8.5 0.0
Wrought aluminum 9.7 11.7 2.9
Rough wood 0.0 0.0 0.0
Plywood 2.8 4.6 6.3
Wood manufactures 5.1 4.1 5.3
Wood pulp 0.0 0.0 0.0
Paper perparations 0.0 2.1 0.0
Paper products 9.4 4.6 3.5
Natural rubber 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rubber products 5.3 4.8 5.3
Hides ana skins 0.0 0.0 0.0
Leather 3.9 6.2 3.7
Leather goods 11.7 11.0 14.4
Unmanufactured 0.0 55.0 18.0
Manufactured 54.5 16.8 12.1
a. SITC 841.1-Textile clothing, not knit.
SQUECg: The World Bank; Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.
1981, pl58
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depend for their external earnings have suffered this fate 
recently.
Another strategy has been to adopt economic measures which 
are contractionary.This involves raising interest rates and 
even running huge budget deficits as is the case with the 
United States. Also, in the case of the United States, not 
only has she maintained high defence expenditures, high 
interest rates and huge budget deficits, she has also 
deliberately allowed the value of the dollar to fall and remain 
weak in relation to other major currencies. The Third World 
countries have had to pay for this through reduced export 
earnings and rise in their foreign debts. The situation is 
such that the poor countries are paying for the recovery in the 
advanced capitalist countries through the export of 
capital.(12)
A further complicating factor in the African crisis is the 
attitude of conservative governments in the United States, 
Britain and West Germany to the economic crisis of Third World 
countries generally. These countries have insisted that the 
crisis in the Third World be solved only through the recovery 
of the OECD economies and the impostion of monetarist and 
neoclassical solutions. Their scheme has reduced the flow of 
concessional resources to these poor countries to aid their 
recovery. This attitude would seem to have influenced the 
level of Official Development Assistance in the 1980s (Table
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1.5). This level of assistance was far below the needs of these 
countries both individually and as a group. The Wass Committee, 
for instance, made a conservative estimate of the need of the 
region for help "to be $5 billion a year over and above what, 
in the middle of 1987 when we began our work, they were 
expected to receive in the rest of the decade."13
These factors combined to deepen the African crisis. This is 
represented by what is now known as the African debt crisis.
The debt problem in Africa is represented by the accummulation 
of huge loans and interest payments falling into arrears which 
cannot be repaid. This African debt, accummulated mainly since 
1974 was estimated to be a staggering $200 billion in 1986,(
14) and $218 billion by the end of 1987.( 15) When compared 
with the debts of some Latin American countries like Brazil, 
Mexico and Argentina, the African debt may look rather small. 
But when we take into account the fact that a majority of 
African states are the poorest in the world, the magnitude of 
this debt crisis is then better appreciated. It can also be 
seen from the number of countries in the region that are 
constantly visiting the Paris or London Clubs to have their 
debts rescheduled. "In 1986 alone, of the 18 developing 
countries that renegotiated for debts rescheduling at the Paris 
Club, 13 were African countries..." (16)
Another way of assessing the magnitude of the debt crisis 
is, in relation to the value of exports or GDP. It is
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Table 1.5
NET DISBURSEMENTS OF ODA FROM ALL SOURCES, BT INCOME GROUP, 
TO COUNTRIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1980,1985-89
$million at 1988 prices and exhange
rates
Countries 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Lies of which:
Ethiopia............ 1,289 975 785 1,022 709
Tanzania............ 770 854 956 982 927
Mozambique.......... 563 706 808 872 766
Sudan............... 1,737 1,176 973 937 767
Kenya............... 670 572 615 809 976
Zaire............... 491 560 674 576 643
Senegal............. 455 697 688 572 658
Zambia.............. 507 574 461 492 391
Ghana............... 305 454 396 469 549
Somalia............. 542 633 634 441 444
Mali................ 599 468 398 429 475
Niger............... 483 381 398 373 299
Malawi.............. 172 245 301 366. 398
Uganda.............. 283 245 299 364 401
Madasgascar.......... 300 404 367 324 323
Burkina Faso......... 301 356 313 298 287
Zimbabwe............ 376 291 321 279 269
Guinea.............. 177 226 240 278 350
Chad................ 277 204 213 264 241
Rwanda.............. 283 260 263 252 241
Togo................ 177 218 137 199 184
Central African Rep... 167 173 190 197 191
Mauritania........... 320 323 236 195 197
Burundi............. 214 229 224 188 200
Benin............... 146 178 152 164 249
Botswana............. 151 128 167 151 164
Nigeria............. 49 73 74 120 342
Lesotho............. 144 109 117 108 119
Sierra Leone......... 115 114 73 102 100
Guinea-Bissau........ 90 91 116 99 103
Dj ibouti............. 124 142 113 93 80
Cape Verde........... 114 138 94 88 77
Gambia.............. 76 125 105 82 95
Liberia.............. 145 121 84 69 59
Comoros............. 73 57 58 53 44
Equatorial Guinea.... 31 33 49 45 42
Myotte............... 32 35 42 43 44
Swaziland............ 39 43 49 38 29
St.Helena............ 19 17 22 27 48
Sao Tome £. Principe... 20 21 18 24 31
Total............... 12,824 12646 12214 12586 12514
continued
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NET DISBURSSEMENTS OF ODA FROM ALL SOURCES, BT INCOME GROUP
 continued
$ million at 1988 prices and exchange rates
Countries 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
LMCs of which
Cote d'Ivoire  298 190 230 274 439 13
Cameroon........ 376 242 278 229 284 474
Angola.......... 77 148 178 167 168 141
Congo  128 94 125 152 90 92
Namibia......... 0 9 19 18 23 45
Total........... 879 683 831 840 1,004 1,165
UMICs of which:
Reunion......... 702 584 624 616 608 707
Gabon........... 82 96 103 90 106 133
Mauritius....... 47 49 79 74 60 58
Seychelles  31 36 41 29 23 20
Total........... 862 765 847 810 797 920
UNALLOCATED...... 276 734 486 552 646 726
OVERALL TOTAL  11,7771 15,007 14,811 14,416 15,035 15,325
Source: DAC, 1990, p. 230, quoted in G.K. Helleiner; 
" External Resource Flows to sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s", June 
1991, p.12
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estimated that as a proportion of the value of exports,
Africa's external debts as a whole rose from 85,3 percent in 
1975 to 167 percent in 1982 and further to 223.5 percent in
1984. Also in 1984, the debt service ratio stood at 22.3
percent.(17) The escalating debt crisis has considerably- 
worsened the balance of payments problems of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. They are finding it impossible to meet their external 
obligations let alone import the critically needed capital 
goods and spare parts to keep their industries running and 
promote development. Many of the countries in the region are 
therefore fighting for survival. As the leaders of the OAU put 
it:
In the majority of our countries, the question
is not that of a liquidity crisis but of solvency ...
The escalating debt burden has progressively grown 
from bad to worse, to a point where the magnitude of the 
debt and debt-service obligation have threatened the very 
foundation of our economies.(18)
From the period of the second oil shock in 1979 and the 
subsquent global recession, the question of how to resolve the 
economic crisis in the Third World became prominent on the 
agenda of international relations. It was undoubtedly 
conducted within the context of the North-South divide, with 
the South calling on the North to provide the resources for 
Southern recovery and the North urging the South to instead 
tighten its belt and reorder its own house. The failure of 
these poor countries to get needed Northern support to tackle 
their economic crisis led African countries to adopt their 
strategy of crisis management. This came in 1980 in the form
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of the Lagos Plan of Action which laid out a programme of 
economic development for Africa during the last two decades of 
the 20th century. As a clear sign of frustration and 
disappointment with Northern attitudes over the crisis and the 
wider issue of changing the global economic system, the Lagos 
Plan of Action deliberately adopted the strategy of self- 
relia$:e as a solution to the crisis facing the continent. It 
was to involve:
1. The use of Africa’s vast resources to meet the 
aspirations of the people
2. A change from total reliance on export of a 
few raw materials to a growth path based on a 
combination of natural resources, entrepreneurial, 
managerial,and technical resources,and the restrue 
turing and expansion of the domestic market
3. The mobilisation of Africa’s human and material 
resources for industrial development the outside 
contributions being only supplementary to domestic 
efforts, and
4. The promotion of African economic integration in 
order to create a continent-wide frame-work for economic 
cooperation for development based on collective self- 
reliance. (19)
On the other hand, the advanced capitalist countries 
favoured the strategy recommended by the World Bank’s 
Accelerated Development in Sub-saharan Africa: An Agenda for
Action.This and other subsequent Bank publications advocated 
the strategy of orthodox structural adjustment for African 
countries. (20) It was essentially committed to making African 
countries adopt short to medium term structural reforms to 
resolve their crisis. These reform measures included the 
restraint of public and private demand; aligning the use of 
resources with available internal and external resources ; 
flexible exchange rate arrangements; increases in real interest
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rates; incentives for export expansion; rationalisation of 
public sector investment programmes; tighter revenue 
collection; privatisation of state enterprises; removal of 
subsidies; liberalisation of external and internal trade 
including the deregulation of prices of agricultural products, 
etc. (21)
It was also aimed at promoting greater reliance on market 
mechanisms and fuller integration of these countries into the 
new international economy, which is itself being increasingly 
run by market forces. Since then, it is this strategy of 
strutural adjustment which has won the contest, being the 
instrument of the most powerful group of states in the 
international system • The imposition of orthodox structural 
adjustment programmes is therefore a reflection of the global 
distribution of power and the determination by the powerful 
western nations to ensure the dominance of the market in the 
world economy.
Since the pubilication of the Accelerated Development in 
Sub-saharan Africa, the World Bank and the IMF have jointly and 
severally supervised the implementation of structural adustment 
programmes (SAP) in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the end of 1987, 
about 30 Sub-Saharan countries were implementing structural 
adjustment programmes or were expected to resume them with the 
Bank, the Fund or both.(22) However, the evidence so far seems 
to indicate that the economic crisis has deepened since SAP was 
adopted by these countries.(23) Part of the explanation is that
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the African crisis and SAP are closely linked to the nature and 
operation of the capitalist world economy today. Therefore, to 
properly grasp the logic, dynamic and the impact of SAP in 
Africa, it is necessary to look at the international economy 
and the contradictions it generates.
The International Economy And The African Crisis.
The international economy has always operated to the 
disadvantage of African economies because of the terms on which 
these economies were incorporated into this economic system.
The incorporation of Africa at the periphery of this economy 
ensured that the centre’s development created underdevelopment 
for the periphery. Through the relations of unequal exchange 
and expxopftation of surplus value, the periphery was constantly 
drained of its economic surplus which could have been used to 
promote development. In this sense, the global economy has 
been a source of crisis for African countries. (24)
The post-war global economic system, or what some have 
refered to as Bretton Woods Mark 1(25) did not alter the 
colonial relations of unequal exchange with Africa. It also 
continued with the international division of labour imposed on 
the world during the colonial period in which Africa assumed 
the role of primary commodity producer as well as residual 
market for manufactured goods from the industrialised 
countries. It set up a financial system based on fixed stable
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exchange rates among the major currencies with the dollar as 
the new international currency. Also, an international trade 
regime for manufactures based on the principle of economic 
liberalism was established. However, the interests of the 
developing countries were ignored at Bretton Woods and their 
position has since been subordinated in the system and 
perpetuated by the decision-making structures of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. Thus, the trade regime excluded the 
products which were most important to developing countries, 
especially agricultural products. Therefore, while the fortunes 
of manufactured products soared, the prices of raw materials 
remained cheap. The countries which produced manufactured 
goods prospered and those which produced only raw materials 
became poorer, but a division of labour thus emerged.
Within this arrangement, Africa assumed a measure of 
importance as a major supplier of raw materials for Northern 
industries. Coupled with the expansion of the global economy, 
this measure of importance was demonstrated by the nature of 
response given by the industrial countries to the economic 
problems of African states. This ranged from aid to investment 
in extractive industries as a strategy of promoting economic 
development. Other measures included the creation of price 
stabilisation, compensat ory finales, and other schemes to help 
these countries during the periods of low commodity prices and 
declining terms of trade. Foreign loans were also used to aid 
this process.
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On their part, African and Third World countries 
demonstrated this notion of their importance to the industrial 
survival of Northern countries through their vociferous demands 
for higher prices and reform of the international economic 
system. The decade of the 1970?s witnessed a rising tide of 
economic nationalism in these countries,witness the rise of 
commodity cartels to protect the prices of their raw materials. 
Also within this period, they used every international forum, 
especially the United Nations system, to demand a New 
International economic order.Such was the optimism among these 
countries about their importance to Northern industrial 
countries until the global economy began to experience serious 
economic crisis in the late 1970s.
These economic shocks have brought in their wake, major 
structural changes in the world economy,the end of the Bretton 
Woods era,(26) and the emergence of a resurgent Bretton Woods 
Mark II(27),or the New International Division of Labour.(28)
The new system is represented by the internationalisation of 
the production process,a situation which was much in evidence 
in the 1960s but had matured in the 1970s. Production is 
therefore no longer a national process. This could mean the 
relocation of entire industries from industrialised to 
developing countries, especially those requiring cheap 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour. (29) Also, international 
investment is now more dominant than international trade. (30) 
And most of this investment is today carried out within the
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developed countries and some Newly Industrialised Countries as 
is the case
"With U.S and other Western investment in Japan,
Taiwan and South Korea plus Pacific investment 
in the US and EEC. Despite the protectionist rhetoric, 
the longterm trend is towards increased inter-OECD in 
vestment". (31)
Other features of the new division of labour which are
also interrelated include:
free and fluctuating exchange rates along with 
indigenisation and nationalisation have encouraged 
portfolio rather than direct foreign investment; 
unstable and increasing costs of petroleum have 
encouraged the development of alternative sources 
of fuels to oil and gas; new technologies have led to an 
expanding global service sector and a decreasing 
emphasis on colonial-type commodity production. (32)
Africa’s position in relation to this new division of labour
is, again, one of extreme disadvantage. Not only is it denying
the continent the inflow of resources needed for development,
Africa is being fully integrated into the system in a
subordinate manner. And in view of Africa’s current crisis
situation,
It would thus be inappropriate to expect other than a 
a marginal incorporation of Africa into the interna­
tional division of labour as a provider of raw 
materials - nor, it should be added, are Africa’s 
resources likely to be used for its own economic 
development in any significant quantities over 
the foreseeable future. (34)
However, for the two Bretton Woods institutions, (the IMF 
and World Bank), this structural trasformation of the world 
economy has also meant a shift in their function. As Harris 
has argued:
With this change and the accomplishment of converti­
bility for the major currencies, the IMF’S role since 1971 
has been different. It has become almost exclusively
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concerned with balance of payments credit to Third world 
countries and, through conditionality, with the re­
orientation of their economic policies as a whole. At 
the same time, the World Bank has shifted from project 
finance to Structural Adjustment loans which relate 
to restructuring the Third World countries* economies 
on a broad scale.(35)
The change from Bretton Woods Mark II has not affected the 
fact that the IMF, the World Bank and the new system are still 
subject to US pressure and influence and committed to free 
trade and movement of capital. The Fund and Bank therefore 
help to create, regulate and support a "World System where 
Multinational Corporatons,trade and capital move without 
restrictions from national states." (36). These institutions 
are therefore said to be serving the interests of international 
capital by helping to consolidate its power over poor 
nations.In relation to Africa,while this crisis unfolded in the 
1980s, these two institutions have made the continent a central 
concern as can be seen from the various financing facilities 
that have been put in place since 1979. This also raises the 
issue of the connection between the African crisis, the 
international division of labour and the Structural Adjustment 
programmes being implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa under the 
supervision of the IMF and the World Bank.
Structural Adjustment and the International Division of Labour
From the foregoing, it is argued that structural 
adjustment as it is being implemented in Africa aims to
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redefine the role of these countries in the international 
division of labour. It is a process of realigning the 
economies of these countries to meet the needs of a post­
industrial world economy. This research therefore deals with 
the logic as well as the contradictions of structural 
adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa within the context of the 
emerging international division of labour. In doing this, 
certain questions must be addressed to grasp what structural 
adjustment has in store for African countries. What are the 
implications of structural adjustment (even with growth) for 
African development? Who gains from structural adjustment? To 
what are these economies being adjusted? What is the actual 
impact of structural adjustment on African economies? What 
are the implications of the involvement of the IMF and the 
World Bank with structural adjustment for national 
independence? The marginal role reserved for Africa in the new 
international division of labour clearly suggests that SAP may 
not aid the development of Africa. It may only consolidate 
this new relationship between Africa and internatioanal 
capital now operating as a consortium.(37)
The success of the realignment of Africa*s role is 
determined by the price that the continent may be expected to 
pay through the costs of structural adjustment. The human 
condition should therefore be one of the major determinants of 
the success of structural adjustment since the human being is 
the focus of development. A major obstacle to the attainment
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of development In Africa has been the poor quality of her human 
resources. It Is Impossible to generate development with a 
population that is unskilled and untrained, unhealthy, and 
poor. Therefore, to be adjudged as a success, structural 
adjustment has to cause significant improvements in the living 
conditions of the people, their health, education, incomes, and 
the like. It is only then that they are equiped to play a 
significant part in the development process.
The logic of SAP is underlined by an interplay of factors: 
political, economic and strategic objectives are built into it. 
In this context,SAP may be seen to aim at maintaining American 
hegemony and the dominance of the industrialised capitalist 
countries by preserving the international financial system on 
which this is based. To do this, the political leadership and 
hegemony of the United States or indeed that of the West in 
general has to be preserved. Thus during the eight years of 
the Reagan administration, this objective was pursued on a two- 
track basis:on one track, the US acted to restore its 
leadership position over even her allies, and on the other, 
there was pursuit of collective western hegemony under the G-7.
It was done through the Reagan administration’s obsession 
with restoring America’s respect and power in the world. The 
Reagan years in the White House were therefore marked by 
growing belligerant and cold war rhetoric in the west with the 
support of conservative governments in Britain and West
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Germany. The 1Atlanticist1 tendency implied the subordination 
of North-South relations and intra-west relations to East-West 
relations. The new offensive against the East helped to 
conceal the new war on the South in the process of re­
establishing American hegemony.(38) This aggressive policy of 
re-establishing its hegemony was influenced by the decline in 
this American hegemony in the 1970s as Susan George has 
argued.(39) A catalogue of events can be cited to indicate 
this decline in American hegemony. It began with the defeat in 
Vietnam,and continued with the emergence of Marxist-Leninist 
regimes in Mozambique and Angola in 1975.
In the case of Angola, the military involvement of the 
United States did not stop the establishment of a regime it 
desparately wanted to prevent. There was also the humiliating 
experience in Iran after American embassy staff in Teheran were 
held hostage between 1979 and 1981. A military action to 
release the hostages ended in a fiasco. There was what could 
certainly be seen as communist expansionism by the Soviet Union 
into Afghanistan in 1979 and also Nicaragua. The inability (as 
it was seen by right- wing politicians in the United States) to 
prevent this expansion of Soviet hegemony gave the impression 
of weakness and decline on the part of the United States.
The challenge to American hegemony was visible on the 
economic front. The 1970s was certainly the decade of the 
demand for a New International Economic Order. The Third World
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became very vocal about this, all In an attempt to alter the 
global balance of economic and political forces in their 
favour. In the 1980s, the preoccupation has been about South- 
South cooperation which seemed to pose a threat to the hegemony 
of the United States. Even within the OECD, there have been 
serious disagreements. The disagreement over the Soviet gas 
pipeline to Western Europe as well as the whole issue of 
economic relations with the East, is just one in a series of 
economic wars between Europe and the United States. The 
global crisis provided the opportunity for these issues to be 
resolved by preserving a world economic system which not only 
takes into account the transnationalization of production but 
also preserves American / Western hegemony.
Others have asserted, that this necessitated the launching
of an offensive against the Third World, to bring them into
line with the new division of labour. It is here, critics
insist, that structural adjustment assumes its significance, as
an offensive, a strategy for recolonization,(40) a Financial
Low Intensity Conflict (FLIC) (41) against Africa and the
third world.The objective of this offensive is aptly put by
Susan George that:
FLIC does however, help to prevent the Third 
World from dictating its terms from 
challenging the political balance of forces in
the world. When creditor nations and
institutions wage FLIC, they are not engaged 
in a 1linear activity1 comparable with 
traditional war in which debts are contracted, 
mature and are paid off. They are, rather 
carrying out a process without any forseeable 
end, one that allows the North to keep a check
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upon any pretensions to real independence on 
the part of the South and to ensure privileged 
access to the Souths resources, and to its 
industrial capacity, on the cheapest possible 
terms,(42)
The use of the IMF and the World Bank as the instruments 
of structural adjustment in Africa is seen as a logical step in 
this recolonisation or compradorization process of SAP. The 
role of those institutions as instruments of the expansion and 
preservation of global capitalism as well as American / Western 
hegemony is evidenced by the way in which they have been used 
since the early 1980s to impose SAPs on indebted countries by 
making them the only source of finance. But they are presented 
as neutral, politically and ideologically by the western powers 
and major shareholders who are quick to emphasise the economic 
nature of their activities. The IMF, it is asserted, is noted 
for disregarding the sovereignty of third world countries. Its 
activities in the Third World by way of the conditionalities 
and performance criteria it dictates to these countries is 
often seen as an attack on their independence. Its perceived 
role as debt collector or the International Ministry of Finance 
has won it the hatred of the peoples of the Third World and 
even some of its leaders. Former President Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania was compelled to castigate the IMF in these very 
strong terms:
I do not know whether there are now people who honestly 
believe that the IMF is politically or ideologically 
neutral. It has an ideology of economic and social 
development which it is trying to impose on poor 
countries irrespective of their clearly stated policies. 
And when we reject the IMF conditions we hear threatening 
whispers ... without accepting our conditions you will not 
get our money and will get no other money. Indeed , we
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have already had hints from some quarters that money or 
credit will not be made available to us until we have 
reached an understanding with the IMF. When did the 
IMF become an International Ministry of Finance?
When did nations agree to surrender to it the power of 
decision-making? It is this growing power of the IMF and 
the irresponsible and arrogant way in which it is being 
wielded against the poor that forced me to make these 
(unusual) remarks. The problems of my country and other 
Third World countries are grave enough without the 
political interference of IMF officials. If they cannot 
help, at the very least they should stop meddling.(44)
This role of the IMF and World Bank as instruments of the
imperialist recolonisation of Africa is said to be demonstrated
by the policies which they have imposed on Africa under
Structural Adjustment Programme. The main features of SAP
include currency devaluation,removal of subsidies, cuts in
public expenditures,liberalisation of foreign trade,
encouragement of commodity exports, increase in domestic
interest rates and restraint in monetary expansion. There is
also deregulation in internal markets, privatisation of public
enterprises and increase in producer prices for farmers. Also,
the power of the IMF and World Bank over these countries is
derived from operating on a country-by-country basis and
conditionalities and cross-conditionalities imposed under SAP.
Therefore, adjustment here means reorienting African economies
towards the market system of production such that they can be
fully integrated into the world economy on terms laid down by
the West. SAP aims to integrate them into the new division of
labour of the capitalist world economy, but whatever the
intention, this will leave them in a marginal role.
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For African countries, this conflict of interest between 
them and the western powers on the direction of structural 
adjustment had serious implications for recovery and growth in 
the region. The marginal position of Africa in the world 
economy recommends a different approach to these problems than 
the one set out by the IMF and the World Bank. This is because 
even though all these changes in the world economy have 
affected all developing countries, it is the African countries 
which have fared worse. In this respect, even though these 
reform programmes are ordinarily suitable, Africa has unique 
problems and is different from other developing areas. This 
lends Africa to a different treatment and it should therefore, 
not be subjected to the same reform conditions as the others. 
This difference is reflected in factors internal to Africa, 
which have helped to cause underdevelopment and pose a major 
obstacle to recovery and development. These factors are 
peculiar to Africa and any attempts to solve the crisis must 
involve a clear understanding of how they combine to perpetrate 
underdevelopment. This is the task we undertake in chapter two.
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Chapter 2
A Profile of the African Crisis
The analysis of the African crisis has often been beset by 
serious disagreements between two opposing perspectives: the 
liberal-neoclassical perspective and the structuralist. While 
the neoclassical perspective explains the causes of the African 
crisis by emphasising factors that are internal,such as 
excessive government intervention in the economy, 
mismanagement,inefficiency, weak private sector, etc. The 
structuralist position is largely the opposite, because it lays 
more emphasis on external factors such as the structures of 
unequal relationships,exchange,exploitation,etc,as the causes 
of the crisis. This disagreement has often also led to 
different strategies being put forward as solutions to the 
crisis which engulfed Africa in the 1980s. An example of this 
situation is the IMF/World Bank strategy of structural 
adjustment which lays greater emphasis on internal reforms, and 
the African position as contained in the Lagos Plan of Action 
for example, which emphasises the need for external reforms as 
well.
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However,the position which we take here is that this 
disagreement need not be there because,to fully understand the 
African crisis,the internal and external dimensions should be 
seen as two sides of the same coin. That is,while it is 
inconceivable to explain the African crisis without addressing 
the external dimension,it is incomplete to do so without 
looking at the internal weaknesses as well. We also take the 
position that it is the kind of dialectical relationship which 
has existed between the two historically,that has perpetuated 
the crisis. This relationship was constructed and maintained 
around the principle of comparative advantage between Europe 
and Africa. It was a relationship which imposed product 
specialisation on Africa in which it was left to produce raw 
materials for European Industries,and exchanged these with 
European manufactures. This was the beginning of an unequal 
relationship which was essentially put in place through the 
European colonisation of Africa.
Also,this historical development led to the integration of 
Africa into the capitalist world economy on very unfavourable 
terms. For,being the weaker party in this relationship,Africa 
was bound to lose because comparative advantage on this basis 
has been proven to be harmful to weak economies.(1) It stif'les 
any attempts at industrialisation and national development 
generally. Indeed, free trade based on comparative advantage 
has always been favoured by the powerful countries who stand 
most to gain. This was the position(of power) of the United
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States in particular,and the western countries in general,when 
they based the post-war world economy on free trade principles. 
The system enables the powerful countries to manipulate the 
world economy to their advantage.
It is in this sense that the African crisis has been defined 
as a crisis of underdevelopment because it reflects this 
relationship and is also linked to the problems which have 
afflicted the world economy in its current state of crisis and 
transformation. And all the constituent parts of the global 
economy are affected by this crisis and the restructuring 
(especially of accummulation) it has brought about at the 
global level. However,the constituent parts of the world 
economy are unequally affected by the generalised crisis, since 
this is dependent on the degree of their integration into the 
capitalist world economy. Thus, those in a strong position tend 
to manage better than countries in a weak position in the world 
economy. The industrialised capitalist countries have been able 
to absorb the shocks of the global crisis because of their 
dominant position which enables them to survive sometimes by 
exporting their troubles to the periphery.
This is not to be understood as a conspiracy by the 
industrialised capitalist countries to hurt African economies. 
The point is that because of the importance of the economic 
links between the major industrial economies and Africa for her 
development, the manner in which the western economies have
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responded to any crisis has affected Africa directly. For 
instance, because the western economies are the main consumers 
of Africa's raw materials as well as sources of aid and other 
services, their policies in times of crisis are often enough to 
cushion them against such problems but they cause even more 
damage to African economies. The decision to reduce the 
consumption of raw materials often means a loss of much needed 
foreign earnings for Africa. Also, the decision to raise 
interest rates in order to control inflation in the developed 
countries often increases the charges which African countries 
have to pay for services such as shipping, insurance and the 
like, as well as increase the debt burden. It is in this sense 
that the industrialised countries are said to transmit the cost 
of recession to the weaker African countries.
However, the neo-classical perspective gives a different 
explanation for Africa's weak position in the international 
economy. It maintains that an interdependent world economy 
based on free trade, specialisation, and an international 
division of labour, is mutually beneficial to both developed 
and developing economies alike. With trade serving as an engine 
of growth, the developed economies are able to transmit 
development to the less developed ones by giving them access to 
capital, technology and world markets.(2) Therefore, the 
weakness of economies such as those in Africa and their failure 
to develop can be traced to domestic problems in them rather 
than the operation of the international market system. These
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domestic problems are also defined as policy inadequacies, 
three of which are considered to be critical by the World Bank 
as:
First, trade and exchange rate policies have overprotected 
industry, held back agriculture, and absorbed much 
administrative capacity. Second, too little attention has 
been paid to administrative constraints in mobilizing and 
managing resources for development; given the widespread 
weakness of planning, decision-making, and management 
capacities, public sectors frequently become overextended. 
Third, there has been a consistent bias against agriculture 
in price, tax, and exchange-rate policies.(3)
Nevertheless, Africa*s position in the world economy has 
remained weak for most of the post-war period. The extremely 
weak position of Africa in the world economy means that it has 
been more adversely affected by the crisis, when its economic 
performance is compared with other parts of the world (Table 
2.1). It is significant that while Africa*s performance 
compared favourably with those of other developing countries in 
the period 1965-73, it has declined since 1973 while other low 
income countries performed well. A number of reasons explain 
this situation, in addition to other domestic factors which are 
discussed later in this chapter. First, the mid-1970s coincided 
with the period of *aid fatigue* or the drying up of the flow 
of concessional aid to Africa from the developed economies 
which were themselves hit by the recession induced by the oil 
price increase in 1973-74. Secondly, the oil price increase hit 
African countries hardest because most of them import all their 
energy resources for which they had to pay more than they 
earned from their exports. Therefore, they had to borrow
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Table 2.1: Economic Performance of Developing and Industrial Countries
Country Group and Indicator 1965-73 1973-80 1980-86
1986-95 
High Low
Industrial Countries
Growth-GDP per capita 3.7 2.1 1.6 3.9 2.0
Real Inderest Rate a) 2.3 1.3 5.9 2.5 4.6
Inflation Rate b) 6.1 10.1 1.7 2.7 3.3
All Developing Countries
Growth-GDP per capita 3.9 3.2 1.5 3.9 2.0
Growth of Exports 4.9 4.7 4.4 7.3 3.6
Primary Goods 3.7 1.2 1.3 3.6 2.2
Manufactures 11.6 13.8 8.4 10.3 5.1
Low Income Countries
Goowth of GDP per capita 2.9 2.5 5.4 4.8 2.8
Growth of Exports 2.0 4.7 5.4 7.5 3.9
Primary Goods 1.7 2.8 3.1 2.6 1.6
Manufactures 2.4 8.2 8.4 11.3 6.0
Sub-Saharan Africac)
Growth of GDP per capita 3.6 0.3 -3.4 0.7 0.0
Growth of Exports 15.0 0.1 -1.9 3.9 2.0
Primary Goods 15.3 -0.1 -2.2 3.3 1.8
Manufactures 7.5 5.6 4.0 9.6 4.4
Notes: a) Average six month dollar-Euro currency rate deflated by the
GDP leflator for the United States.
b) Industrial Countries' weighted GDP deflator expressed in 
dollars.
c) Excluding South Africa.
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1987. Quoted in Commonwealth 
Secretariat , 1987: "Reinforcing International Support For African Reco­
very And Development", p.29
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heavily to finance their widening external imbalances. And 
thirdly, unlike South Asia which limited itself to acquiring 
concessionary development aid, most African countries borrowed 
heavily from non-concessional sources and set the stage for the 
debt crisis of the 1980s. This explains the negative economic 
performance for Africa in the period 1980-86.
Even though the crisis began to manifest itself from the early
1970s, the roots are traceable to the structure of the African
political economy and its history. The crisis has been evident
through "Mass poverty, food shortage, low productivity, weak
productive base and backward technology", as well as through
balance of payments deficits, inflation, unemployment, the debt
burden, etc.(A) Therefore, in proferring solutions , it is
necessary to first understand the nature of the crisis, its
causes and manifestations. It will also involve distinguishing
between causes and effects so that solutions proferred do not
end up curing the symptoms instead of the disease. The way to
proceed is by investigating the structure of the African
political economy which, in interaction with other factors
created the African crisis and also sustains it. Therefore,
An appropriate framework for such a structural analysis 
should be grounded, first of all, on the examination of 
the enabling and disenabling factors- domestic and 
external, historical and contemporary- which have shaped 
and continue to sustain Africa!s underdevelopment.(5)
The domination and indeed the dependence of African economies 
should be seen as the effect of the process of their
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integration, through colonialism, into the capitalist world
economy. Colonialism "joined African economies to the western
capitalist economies in what was essentially an organic
relationship",(6) This was done by the construction of
capitalist relations of production through monetisation,
colonial trade and investment. The monetisation of the African
economy through taxation and wage-labour tied these economies
to those of the colonial powers. In effect, the colonial
monetary system became an extension of the one in the
metropole. As Ake argues,
What needs to be noted is the nature of the colonial 
monetary system as a cause, as well as an effect, of 
the integration of African economies into Western 
capitalism. The process of monetisation went hand in 
hand with the spread of capitalist relations of 
production, particularly because it led to the 
proletarianisation of the African peasant as well as 
some African entrepreneurs... The monetary system 
not only helped to create a capitalist economy, but 
also a capitalist economy structurally dependent on 
foreign economies.(7)
Trade was equally a vehicle for extending capitalism into 
Africa. It not only helped to create tastes for western 
consumer goods, among other things, but also it stimulated 
primary commodity production. Essentially, this trade which was 
conducted on principles of Ricardian comparative advantage, 
promoted an unequal form of complementarity or interdependence 
between the African economies and the metropolitan economies. 
Thus,
Trade created interdependence through complementarity 
by encouraging specialisation in the primary production 
of raw materials needed by the metropole, while the 
metropole specialised in manufacture. This specialisation 
was not simply one of Commodities1 produced; it was also
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reflected In the division of labour.(8)
Foreign investment under colonialism reinforced this unequal 
interdependence between the African economies and the western 
economies. Investment was often done only in areas that were 
profitable and complementary to the metropolitan economy. This 
explains the concentration of the little investment available 
in the production of raw materials for industries in the 
metropole. Since profitability and complementarity to the 
metropolitan economy determined foreign investment,colonialism 
created an economy which was characterised by 
disarticulation.(9) This disarticulation was reflected in the 
lack of forward and backward linkages between the various 
sectors of the economy. These sectors existed separately but 
were linked in their separateness to the economy of the 
metropole.
For instance, the kind of link between industry and 
agriculture where each serves the needs of the other to their 
mutual development, did not exist in the African economy. The 
agricultural sector did not produce raw materials for the 
domestic industrial sector just as the industrial sector did 
not produce tools for the improvement of productivity in the 
agricultural sector. This situation was out of place with 
experience in other regions of the world where development took 
place only because industry and agriculture had operated with a 
high degree of complementarity. Indeed, the different sectors
82
of the economy were significantly transformed by the 
integration of their activities such that agriculture itself 
became an industry. In this area, Africa*s situation is 
different from other parts of the Third World where some degree 
of integration has taken place between agriculture and 
industry.
This has not been the case in Africa,where agriculture, 
especially cash crop agriculture,has continued to feed western 
economies by producing raw materials exclusively for their 
industries. The same situation obtains in the minerals sector 
where minerals such as copper, phosphate, oil, etc, are 
produced and exported almost in their pure raw state to the 
western economies. Essentially, the African economy comprised 
different sectors which were relatively autonomous and depended 
on external rather than internal demand for their expansion and 
growth. The sectors penetrated by foreign capital within this 
situation also became apart of the international capitalist 
economy, though only in a subordinate position.
To this was added the market imperfections and the monopolist 
tendencies of the colonial economy. As a result of this, the 
African economy became a client of the European economy by 
producing what it does not consume and consuming what it does 
not produce. For instance, Africa is a major supplier of raw 
materials such as cocoa beans, coffee beans, bauxite, copper, 
phosphate rock, etc, to the EEC, the USA, and Japan. These are
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commodities which do not go directly into domestic consumption 
but are exclusively for export. In that respect, the continent 
is producing not only what it does not consume, but also what 
it does not need. On the other hand, the continent is unable to 
produce a significant proportion of what it consumes such as 
manufactured consumer goods, capital and intermediate goods, 
and even food. These are imported almost exclusively from the 
countries to which the raw materials are exported. This is what 
constitutes the paradox of Africa producing what it does not 
consume and consuming what it does not produce. There was also 
the effective presence of international capital in Africa 
through the various trading and manufacturing monopolies, such 
as the United Africa Company (UAC) and similar big companies 
throughout the region.
Another important level of disarticulation and a factor in the 
underdevelopment of Africa is the imperfect integration between 
the capitalist and pre-capitalist systems of production. Since 
it was introduced during the colonial period, the capitalist 
mode of production has remained an enclave in Africa. It has 
failed to take root in an environment still dominated by 
various forms of pre-capitalist production systems. This pre­
capitalist system is the African peasant mode of production, 
and it has been a source of hinderance to capitalist 
development or for that matter to socialist development, on the 
continent. The African peasant mode of production differs 
significantly from other peasant modes elsewhere in the Third
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World. For instance, African peasants have more control over 
land which is communally held, compared with their counterparts 
in Latin America and Asia. This enables them to exercise 
control over what they produce, that is the freedom to switch 
from cash crop to subsistence agriculture, a freedom not 
available to peasants elsewhere. As a result, African 
agriculture has remained at the subsistence level, and has not 
been transformed into an industry integrated into the rest of 
the economy. Thus,the African economy has maintained a dual 
structure in which there is an externally generated capitalist 
enclave which is modern and formal, and the rural 
peasant/informal sector which is responsible for over 80 per 
cent of national employment and economic activity in general.
In line with the experience of the developed world, 
development is dependent on the expansion of productive forces. 
This inturn requires the replacement of inefficient pre­
capitalist forms of production with modern and efficient forms. 
In the African situation the contact between capitalism and the 
peasant economy should have resulted in the transformation of 
the peasant sector and its incorporation into the capitalist 
production system. This is because the peasant society is
••.essentially self-limiting, backward, and 
operating in a framework and logic that limits 
the expansion of productive forces.(10)
However, the contact between capitalism and the peasant society
has remained largely at the commercial exchange rather than at
the production level. The peasant economy was therefore able to
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remain relatively autonomous and operate according to its own 
internal logic.
This is the main difference between the experience in Africa 
and the situation in Asia and Latin America. In Africa, the 
relative availability of land to all through communal ownership 
has enabled the peasant societies to easily withdraw from cash 
crop production and remain socially and economically 
independent of outside forces. But in Asia and Latin America 
where the peasants are for the most part effectively denied 
access to the same means of production and subsistence, there 
was a significant expansion of capital and capitalist 
development. As in Europe, the labour force created through 
landlessness was deployed to other areas of the economy such as 
manufacturing. The result is that while the economies of Asia 
and Latin America were transformed with some becoming the 
NICs,the African economy has remained backward. This is also 
partly the reason why Africa is affected in a different way 
than other Third World countries, by the same international 
economy.
The basic structures of the colonial economy survived into the 
post-colonial period in Africa. Structurally, the post-colonial 
African economies are still disarticulated and or 
incoherent.They are dependent, have narrow resource base and 
monopolistic tendencies.(11) These structures also mutually 
reinforce each other in their operation and constitute the most
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fundamental causes of Africa’s underdevelopment and 
retrogression. It is instructive to look at how these 
structures cause underdevelopment, and their built-in 
resistance to change.
Disarticulation is still dominant in the African economy and 
is reflected in such areas as enclave or lopsided development 
in the sense of urban bias and rural neglect. It is also seen 
in the predominance of subsistence and commercial activities, 
and the neglect of the informal sector.(12) Most exports are 
still monocultural, there is little industrialisation, and 
there are no linkages between the various sectors such that 
even the transport system reflects this situation. In the 
transport sector, the colonial legacy has survived. Instead of 
an integrated system linking all parts of the country in order 
to generate greater economic contacts and activity, roads and 
railways were constructed to link sea ports with raw material 
and mineral producing areas of the hinterland mainly for the 
evacuation of these products. Such commodity-producing areas 
have usually attracted all the infrastructural development to 
the exclusion of the other areas.
The chaotic nature of infrastructural development is a factor 
in the lack of economic development. After three decades of 
independence, not much has changed in this area. For, as Ake 
has argued,
Disarticulation tends to be self-perpetuating ...
private investors more interested in profit than
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in intersectoral integration naturally tend to 
concentrate investments in the enclaves which 
offer economies of scale and also the availability 
of infrastructures, support services, and easier 
access to markets. The policy-makers often have 
a vested interest in further development of the 
enclaves because of personal convenience and also 
because of the pressure to show results quickly •
The need to secure forign exchange earnings for 
development projects is another powerful pressure for the 
maintenance of the African economy in the state of 
disarticulation.(13)
There is also an organic link between disarticulation and
dependence in the African economy, because they both resulted
from the integration of Africa into the capitalist world
economy. These vertical ties between the various sectors of the
African economy on the one hand and the metropolitan economy on
the other,have led to its openness, disarticulation and
dependence.(14) This integration into the world economy not
only led to disarticulation and dependence, but also their
mutual reinforcement:
For instance, dependence entails external control, 
which inhibits the ability of the national leadership 
to undertake the restructuring of the economy 
necessary to reduce disarticulation. The dependence 
of African economies perpetuates their disarticulation 
by making it easier for metropolitan economies to 
maintain the international division of labour 
which consigns Africa to primary production and 
retards industrialisation.(15)
Arising from this openness and external dependence is the 
problem of the narrow resource base of African economies. The 
narrowness of the resource base has meant that Africa cannot 
diversify and integrate her economy due to the external demands 
for mainly primary products and the need to earn foreign
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exchange to promote development. Also, the narrowness of the
resource base means that Africa Is unable to exercise any power
over critical areas of economic decision making
Such as localisation of ownership and control, 
export promotion, import substitution, restrictions 
on foreign investment, imports and repartriation 
of profits.(16)
This reinforces disarticulation, deepens dependence and lack of
industrialisation, because of
the structural dependence of the manufacturing 
sector on imported factor inputs such as capital, 
skilled manpower, technology and finance as 
well as spare parts and even raw materials.(17)
The factors enumerated above are complemented by the existence 
of market imperfections and monopolistic tendencies in the 
African economy. This is seen in the form of multinational 
corporations(MNCs) and their activities. The MNCs contribute to 
the dependence and disarticulation of African economies by 
reinforcing the vertical ties established by colonialism 
between Africa and Europe. The parastatals on the other hand 
are not only dependent on foreign management and capital and 
therefore, not able to challenge the MNCs and their almost 
predatory activities. Instead, they have introduced more 
rigidities and inefficiencies into the economy. Thus, the 
private sector in Africa is very small, the product and factor 
markets are fragmented. It is these structural characteristics 
interacting with other factors, external and internal, to the 
African economy that have led to underdevelopment and the 
crisis in Africa since the early 1970s.
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The External Factors In the African Crisis
The external environment, arising out of the integration of 
Africa in the world economy under western dominance and based 
on unequal relationship and surplus exploitation, has 
contributed greatly to the African crisis. This vertical 
relationship has generally been maitained around trade, aid and 
investment, among others. Other generalised periodic crises in 
the global economy have also adversely affected the fortunes of 
African states.(18)
With regard to trade, quite apart from the fact that the 
prices of both African exports and imports have not been 
determined by them, the prices of their commodities have 
continued to decline over the years even though those of 
imports continued to rise. This added to Africa’s poor economic 
performance during the 1970s and the 1980s as their terms of 
trade worsened, traditional exports declined as did both price 
and quantities, just as imports jumped up also in both price 
and volume (19) as Table 2.2 shows. The falling revenue 
situation resulted in large trade deficits (Table 2.3).
The falling demand for African primary commodities by the 
western capitalist countries, their major trading partners has 
also compounded the problem of declining export earnings. The 
major recession in these western economies since the mid-1970s 
forced a decline in both demand and price for commodity exports
Table 2.2. Commodity Trade: Volume and Prices
(annual
Volume
average growth rate in percent) (annual average
Sub-Saharan Africa World growth rate in
1961-70 1970-82 1961-70 1970-82
percent) 
1961-70 1970-82
Fuels
Petroleum 32.9 3.3 12.1 1.5 -2.6 20.1
Minerals and
metals Copper 2.7 -0.3 3.2 2.6 9.5 -7.2
Iron ore 25.8 -5.1 8.5 0.7 -4.4 -4.6
Bauxite 18.5 20.5 6.4 1.8 6.1 1.8
Phosphate rock 20.1 2.2 8.0 1.3 -2.3 1.7
Manganese ore 11.4 -3.4 5.9 -1.2 -6.4 -0.6
Zinc -1.6 -2.9 5.6 0.9 2.7 -3.9
Tin 3.8 -8.5 1.9 -0.1 3.0 4.1
Lead 17.4 1.5 9.4 -12.8 5.1 -0.9
Food and beverages
Coffee 4.3 -1.0 2.3 0.9 0.3 1.8
Cocoa -0.4 -1.2 0.5 -0.2 4.9 3.0
Sugar 4.4 1.2 1.2 3.1 -5.3 -2.7
Tea 9.5 4.0 2.4 2.1 -4.5 -2.8
Groundnuts(meal) 6.3 -4.6 1.1 -6.4 0.6 -4.1
Groundnut oil 5.4 -7.1 3.3 -0.4 0.1 -4.0
Beef 9.8 -7.0 5.6 4.6 6.8 -4.1
Palm oil -9.7 -6.7 4.1 11.5 -2.3 -3.2
Bananas -2.2 -6.6 4.9 1.0 0.1 -1.1
Maize 8.1 -6.9 7.1 8.6 -0.2 -4.2
continued
Table 2.2. Commodity Trade: Volume and Prices continued
Nonfood
Timber 5.1 -2.3 6.0 1.8 0.6 3.6
Cotton 6.0 -4.0 0.8 0.9 -1.7 -1.9
Tobacco -6.0 4.7 1.6 2.6 3.0 -1.2
Rubber 2.7 -3.8 2.9 0.9 -4.6 0.0
Hides and skins 0.5 1.5 3.9 2.6 0.3 • •
Sisal -1.8 -9.7 -1.7 -9.8 -8.4 0.1
Source: World Bank ( 1984 ) Toward Sustained Development . .., p.68
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Table 2.3 Sub-Saharan Africa's Trade Balance, 1970 ($■)
Country Current Account Balance
Chad
1970
2
19
19
Mali -2 -113
Burkina Faso 9 -
Somalia -6 -117
Niger - -
Gambia 1 -47
Ethiopia -32 -196
Zaire -64 -375
Malawi -35 -78
Uganda 20 -256
Rwanda 7 90
Tanzania -36 -268
Benin -1 -
Central African Republic -12 -268
Guinea - -
Madagascar 10 -369
Togo 3 -152
Ghana -68 83
Kenya -49 -509
Sierra Leone -16 -158
Sudan -42 -248
Mauritania -5 -252
Liberia - -79
Senegal -16 -
Lesotho - -50
Zambia 108 -252
Zimbabwe - -706
Botswana - -61
Swaziland - -69
Ivory -38 -15
Mauritius 8 -43
Nigeria -368 -7,324
Cameroon -30 -525
Congo - -320
Gabon -3 680
Source: World Bank (1984) Tovard Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa, P.69. Quoted in Bade Onimode (1988) P. 191
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not witnessed since the Great Depression.(20) The rate of 
growth of these developed market economies fell from the 
average of 3.1 per cent a year in the 1970s to 1.4 per cent in 
1980, 1.6 per cent in 1981, and was negative in 1982. Their 
imports also fell from over the same period and triggered the 
fall in the prices of the main commodities exported by the 
developing countries(excluding oil) by 21 per cent in real 
terms between 1980 and 1982. However, even though developed 
countries began to recover by 1983, with an average annual 
growth rate of 3.5 per cent and volume of imports growing by 
around 8 per cent a year, this did not increase their demand 
for raw materials from the developing countries as was the case 
in the 1970s. This time, the recovery was more modest and 
inflation remained modest.
The policies of these western countries with respect to Third 
World commodities have exacerbated the problem of falling 
prices. Such policies as cutting down their consumption of 
these commodities as was seen in energy conservation measures 
worked to drive down the prices of these commodities. Apart 
from oil, most of the other commodities of interest to African 
countries recorded declines in their prices. For instance, 
copper prices recorded a decline in annual average growth rate 
from 8.8 per cent in 1960-70 to -18.7 per cent in 1970-80, and 
continued to decline in the 1980s. Other commodities like iron 
ore, sugar, groundnuts, tea, cotton, timber, all recorded 
decline in prices.(21) There was also a shift in the direction
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of substitutes made possible by scientific advancement. Thus, 
Third World commodities began to face stiff competition from 
synthetics as in the case of glass fibre for copper in 
telecommunications. Today, many African commodities, both 
agricultural and non-agricultural are threatened by these 
substitutes.
The economic crisis in Africa was further fueled by the oil 
price increases first in 1973, and then in 1979. This 
development hit the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries 
very hard since they are mainly oil-importers. It meant that 
they had to spend more of their scarce resources on oil imports 
instead of goods needed to promote development. The dramatic 
increase in oil prices not only consumed the export earnings 
of many African countries, it also imposed debts on them as 
they resorted to borrowing in order to finance energy imports 
and even other imports. This worsened the deficit crisis which 
had already set in with the declining commodity prices. It also 
led to the accumulation of debts by these oil-importing 
countries.
A related factor is increasing protectionism by the OECD 
countries. This has been done through both tariff measures such 
as the EEC!s common agricultural policy. And since these 
African countries are usually dependent on only one or two 
commodity exports, and with the various international commodity 
agreements not able to stand the pressure of market forces,
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there has been an over-supply of these commodities resulting in 
the collapse of prices. The oil glut of the 1980s which 
resulted in petroleum prices falling from about $30 in 1982 to 
around $12 by October 1988, (22) is a case in point.
Another contributory factor was foreign aid. Foreign aid was 
expected to boost the development efforts of African countries 
through the supply of the much needed factor inputs. There is 
no doubt that foreign aid could be useful in promoting 
development if properly directed and used as well as being in 
steady supply. The reality of non-concessional aid in 
particular, was different in the sense that it became a poison 
to Africa*s development efforts. Very often, foreign aid was 
supplied with many destructive ‘strings* attached as it was 
used by donors to simply sell their goods to the recipient 
countries.
// In most cases, the aid given went to finance white elephant capital intensive industries and large-scale commercial farms. 
Also, these investments usually turn out to be inappropriate 
and end up providing the avenue for second hand and out-dated 
machinery which requires the continued use of foreign experts 
and spare parts at considerable cost to the countries 
concerned. The army of aid agencies dealing with Africa often 
taxed the limited administrative resources of recipient 
countries. With the average of over 50 aid agencies from 
various bilateral and multilateral sources involved in a
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country, there is usually a constant flow of personnel from 
these agencies to a country all competing for the attention of 
a few over-worked officials. This often limits the 
effectiveness of aid to the continent because of the 
administrative costs involved.
Another burden which comes with aid is the number of projects
which recepient countries have to cope with. For instance,
Kenya was reported to have been burdened with 600 projects from
60 donors in the early 1980s; Malawi had 188 projects from 50
donors; Lesotho had 321 projects from 61 donors; and Zambia had
614 projects from 69 donors.(23) As a result of all these
factors, donors have been able to influence development
priorities in Africa to their own advantage. As the Advisory
Group to the UN Secretary-General on Financial Flows for
Africa, observed in this regard;
Donors have not always contributed to aid 
effectiveness either. Many of them tend to 
pursue their own interests or to have their 
own views of development priorities. What 
African countries need is not always what 
donors want to give to them.(24)
The obstructive policies of aid donors were complemented by 
the steady decline in the flow of concessional aid to Africa. 
The gradual drying up of the flow of aid became particularly 
evident during the period of so-called *aid fatigue* in the 
1970s. But it was also a period when private bank lending was 
on the increase as OPEC surplus earnings were being * recycled* 
to enable oil importers pay their energy bills as well as other
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imports. All these measures helped to create the debt crisis 
and capital flight whose contribution to the exacerbation of 
the African crisis is very significant and needs to be probed 
further.
Multinational Corporations and the African Crisis
Multinational Corporations are agents of capitalist 
development around the world because of their global network of 
activities. As giant conglomerates which control enormous 
amount of capital and technological expertise, they are able to 
take development to all parts of the world. They can inject 
both capital and technological expertise into a country. This 
monopoly which the multinationals have over capital and 
technology as well as their control of the world market has 
made them considerably attractive to Third World governments 
for whom foreign exchange is essential for internal development 
and for survival in the world economy. The multinationals have 
therefore been welcomed by the developing countries to 
participate in their development programmes through direct 
investment and joint ventures.
The home governments of the multinationals have also promoted 
the role of these corporations as the main sources of 
investment and development. This is demonstrated by the 
dominant and expanding role of private capital investment in
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the relations between the industrialised countries and the 
developing world over the last three decades. Thus, the 
multinationals have emerged as a powerful global force in the 
world economy. Their monopoly control of technology and 
capital, and the fact that they operate on a global scale 
across national boundaries has given them this power. This has 
inturn given them the ability to dominate economic and social 
life in the Third World where they have sometimes become a law 
unto themselves. A good example is the power of Lonrho in 
countries such as Zambia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana, and the 
personal relationships which its chairman, Tiny Roland, has 
developed with many African rulers.
However,inspite of their potential for promoting development , 
the multinationals have generated much distrust from most of 
these countries (especially by workers, students, and other 
urban-based groups in Africa) because the experience has been 
largely disappointing. The development objectives of many 
countries have often conflicted with those of of the 
multinationals and that has not helped the interests of these 
countries. The objective of most developing countries is to 
attract private foreign investment and the technology of the 
multinationals for their internal development. The realisation 
of this objective requires that the activities of 
multinationals in these countries be controlled and integrated 
into national development plans, or at least the cooperation of 
the multinationals. But the power and the global scale of the
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operations of these multinationals do not make them amenable to 
any form of interference and control by Third World countries. 
This has been the experience of many African countries, despite 
the enthusiasm of their governments to attract the 
multinationals to invest.
The multinationals operate according to a different objective: 
to maximise profit and minimise risks and losses. In doing so, 
they do not allow host countries to interfere with their 
activities, so they have adopted several strategies to keep 
host countries at bay. For instance, the globalisation of 
production has made it easy for multinationals to direct and 
redirect capital from one subsidiary to another, relocate 
production or carry out cost-saving measures. Multinationals 
are able to manufacture, assemble, and finish products in 
different countries. Therefore, they tend to locate their 
production in countries which offer cheap labour and favourable 
labour policies, and generally, a good climate for investment. 
The multinationals have found these ideal conditions in the 
NICs of south east Asia where they invested heavily. The rest 
of the developing countries have had to contend with the 
disruptive activities of multinationals and the crises they 
induced in their economies.
African countries have been among the worst affected by the 
activities of the multinationals. Unlike the Asian NICs whose 
experience with the multinationals has been beneficial because
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they have managed the relationship well and have developed as a 
result; in Africa the multinationals have obstructed the 
continent’s development efforts. This is mainly because in 
Africa, it is the state which has not managedthe relationship 
with the multinationals well. This failure is reflected in the 
nature of investments by multinationals in the region which 
have largely been in assembly and extractive industries. Thus, 
investment by multinationals in Africa have mainly tended to 
reflect their global strategies rather than the development 
needs of the region. It is in this sense that they are linked 
to the development crisis in Africa. In Africa, the 
multinationals have gone for maximum profits and minimum risks 
but have defied any attempts to integrate them into local 
economic structures. Thus, the multinational corporations are 
not only the modern mechanism through which the disarticulation 
and external dependence of African economies are maintained, 
but are also responsible for the low resource base of these 
economies through their promotion of capital flight. They have 
penetrated and throughly dominated all sectors of the African 
economy. They are in such profitable areas as trade, banking 
and finance, consultancy, extraction of raw materials(oil,etc) 
even the import-substitution industries.
The multinationals dominate the African economy in several 
other ways. One of these is through majority ownership. Most of 
these multinationals have financial control over their African 
subsidiaries and this has given them leverage to dominate and
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exploit. They also control the market in Africa as well as the 
general trade with the outside world. As a result of this 
process, there is a widely held perception in certain quarters 
that,
African countries were subjected to outrageous 
plunder by TNCs as they attempt to industrialise 
or improve their existing modest industries.
The demand for modern means of production and 
technology accounts by value for 40 per cent 
of the imports of African countries.•• the 
import of technology implies that TNCs must 
come with it as consultants, managers, 
experts, technicians, etc. And this happens 
generally at exhorbitant fees.(25)
Moreover, these ac tivities of the multinationals have had
negative consequences for Africa and thereby contributed to its
underdevelopment and decline. One such consequence is the
elimination of local entreneurship through market imperfection
and monopoly.
The multinationals have also obstructed technological research 
and development in Africa. Their controlof technology is an 
important element in this dominance. The concentration of 
research and development in the industrialised countries 
"constitutes the dominant source of technological backwardness 
of African and other underdeveloped countries."(26) Thus 
technology transfer is a one-sided process whereby the 
multinationals have either brought in advanced technology which 
does not serve the needs of Africa;or they have completely 
blocked any transfers of technology. This is because
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subsidiaries of these corporations in Africa merely package 
products imported from parent companies.
With regard to the manufacturing sector, subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations also do routine assembly of 
manufactured components such as Completely Knocked-Down (CKDs) 
for cars, electronics, business machines, etc. These tasks were 
simple and did not result in any transfer of technology. Such 
skills that are transfered by the multinationals are as a 
result, simple enough to enable the workforce to assemble and 
package the various manufactured components. The technology 
needed to fabricate and produce goods was hardly transfered. 
This owed more to the global strategy and network of the 
multinationals which determine the spread of operations and the 
kind of skills to be transfered. Another area in which 
technology transfer has been blocked by the multinationals is 
their use of patents. About 90 per cent of all patents granted 
by the multinationals to developing countries actually go to 
their subsidiaries.
Also, multinationals have become the chief agents of capital 
flight from Africa and the Third World generally. This net 
export of capital from Africa to the western countries is 
carried out by the multinationals through the repatriation of 
super profits, transfer pricing involving both the under­
invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports, mark-up and 
imported inflation, unequal exchange, inflated contracts,
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technology rents, etc. The seriousness of this level of capital 
flight Is demonstrated by the Nigerian experience between 1970 
and 1980(Table 2.4). This level of capital flight has often 
involved the active collaboration between the multinational 
corporations and banks, and the ruling elite in these 
countries.(27)
Yet in making these huge profits, the multinationals have had
to mobilise support and resources locally in their host
countries. This means that their growth and dominance has been
subsidised partly by poor countries like those in Africa. This
subsidy has been given in the form of protection, low-interest
credits, special tax concessions, low salaries for workers,
etc. The result of this for the host countries is that
.•.local entrepreneurial groups are expropriated, 
traditional and not so traditional economic 
activities are disrupted, unemployment and 
underemployment are generated, national 
decisioon-making centres are eroded, 
balance-of-payments problems are aggraveted, 
huge foreign debts are accumulated, and 
property and income are increasingly concentrated.(28)
However, the scenario under discussion reflects a situation 
where the multinationals have been able to determine the terms 
of their activities. It reflects a failure by such countries to 
manage multinationals to achieve their own development goals.
In many cases this failure is inevitable because many of these 
countries are too weak to take on the multinationals which are 
richer and able to exact considerable influence around the 
world. But, if multinationals are properly managed, a country
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Table 2.4 Flov of Payments on Foreign Direct Investment 
in Nigeria, 1970/80 (US $ M)
Year Outflow Inflow Net Outflow
1970 -385.0 +205.0 -180.0
1971 -475.5 +285.8 -189.7
1972 -609.1 +305.1 -304.0
1973 -937.0 +373.1 -563.9
1974 -610.9 +275.4 -335.5
1975 -627.7 +471.7 -156.0
1976 -579.6 +339.4 -240.2
1977 -783.4 +439.0 -344.4
1978 . -408.8 +212.8 -196.0
1979 -205.4 +310.1 -104.7
1980 -875.9 +600.0 -275.9
Total -6,498.3 +6,817.4 -2,680.9
Source: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations
Transnational Corporations in World Development, A Third
Survey, jjew York, 1983, p.289. Quoted in Bade Onimode 
( 1988) p.84
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can do better from the activities of these multinationals. For 
instance, countries like China and Malaysia have been able to 
secure favourable agreements with multinationals.
The State and the Internal Dimension of the Crisis
The state in Africa has largely been a contributor to the
development crisis on the continent. The post-colonial state in 
Africa is by nature incapable of playing a developmental role, 
and this is evidenced from its performance after 30 years of 
independence. This is because in Africa, the state has no roots 
in the society, it is essentially juridical by definition 
rather than an authoritative centre of power. The post-colonial 
state owes its origin to colonial rule, when it was set up to
serve the interests of the colonising power. This it often did
without necessarily cultivating legitimacy since it was the 
representative of a government which enjoyed legitimacy at 
home, accountable to the people, and had monopoly over the 
coercive machinery in the society. In Africa, the post-colonial 
state has neither had that legitimacy nor monopoly over the 
coercive machinery in the society. Another factor defining the 
character of the state is the dominance of a pre-capitalist 
economy on the continent. Consequently, the state has become 
authoritarian and a patrimonial-bureaucratic entity lacking in 
Weberian rationality and therefore incapable of generating 
capitalist transformation of the productive forces.
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Thus, as an actor, the state has become a burden on society
and has played a contradictory role in the development process.
This dilemma of the African state has been put thus:
...as an actor in the international arena, it 
was besieged, in its relation to society it 
was set apart; and as an executor of policy 
it was overloaded.(29)
The result of this is the rise of what has been variously 
described as corporatism, and crony statism(30)in state-society 
relations. Thus, the state has had to fight for space for 
itself, to control and structure interest articulation in 
society. It has tended to determine or create interest groups 
and limit their freedom to operate, and generally to extend its 
hegemony over all competing social forces. This situation has a 
number of implications which place severe limitations on 
development•
At the political level, there has been the predominance of the
political over everything else. In this regard, Thomas Callaghy
has observed that
As political rather than economic logics prevailed, 
the dominant form of political economy became a 
crony statism consisting of three inter-related 
characteristics: (1)clientalist networks used to 
build support through the extraction and distribution 
of rents, (2)expansion of state size, including the 
creation of an extensive parastatals sector, and 
(3)purchase of primarily urban support via state 
welfare services and subsidies.(31)
The result was that the bureaucracy expanded without increasing
efficiency and the state imposed a heavy burden on society
because of the huge amount of resources required to maintain
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it. The state generated these resources in a predatory manner 
by following the colonial tradition of extracting surplus from 
peasant producers or mineral wealth under the centralised 
control of the ruling elite. The ruling elite have used the 
spoils of the state to reward allies and establish control over 
hostile social forces. Thus, the post-colonial ruling elite in 
Africa created a situation in which "patrimonial, rentier,and 
prebendal forms of politics and administration defined the 
political economy".(32)
However, the ruling elite have also lacked the unity required 
to assure it of clear domination over other social groups. As a 
result of the fierce intra-class struggles within the ruling 
elite for control of the state, the African society has been 
subjected to authoritarian personal rule, arbitrariness, 
maladministration, systemic corruption and political 
instability. In the process, the state was used to enrich the 
ruling elite and their associates, both domestic and foreign. 
This was underlined by the nature and scale of the role of the 
state in the running of the economy. Through the state, they 
controlled foreign exchange acquisition and allocation by 
administering exchange rates, import controls, and import 
licence. A large parastatals sector covering practically every 
area of economic activity, was created. It was corruptly 
administered, inefficient, weak, and heavily dependent on 
import substitution activity.
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On the whole, the state pursued irrational and unproductive 
economic policies. There was often no intermediate and capital 
goods sector, while attention concentrated on commercial and 
service forms of activity, investment in real estate, and 
consumption. Even the private sector,such as existed, which was 
largely foreign, was very much dependent on the state for the 
profits that it extracted. In most cases private investment in 
long-term production was made very difficult by the unstable 
economic and political situation generated by the state. As a 
result,foreign private capital responded by investing in only 
the extractive industry (like mining) or the service sector 
which brought quick returns that were mostly repatriated. 
However, as far as long-term productive investment was 
concerned, foreign capital either took an exit or refrained 
from coming in, preferring instead to go to other parts of the 
world where the climate for such investment was conducive.
Thus, Africa has largely been by.,-passed by foreign capital for 
other regions of the Third World such as South East Asia where 
the political and economic climate has been favourable for 
investment.
Moreover, Africa differs from other parts of the Third World 
both in its failure to adapt the modern state system as well as 
develop a state-wide civil society. In Asia and Latin America, 
the modern state system evolved over a relatively long period 
of time. During this period of evolution, unifying religions, 
civil societies, self-confident cultures, and other unifying
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tendencies were developed. In contrast, African states were 
created by European colonialism largely by aggregating 
different societies, political systems, religions, and cultures 
into single larger territories. There was no attempt under 
colonial rule, to encourage the integration of the various 
peoples into national communities with all the attributes which 
have helped other parts of the world to develop.
All the attempts by African governments to redress this 
situation ended in most cases, in spectacular failure. The 
various programmes of nation-building which were implemented 
caused more division and alienation instead of bringing people 
together. As a result, African societies have remained 
heterogeneous without any shared set of values which could be 
used to promote development. Thus, for Africa, in place of a 
shared self-confident culture, there are often many self- 
confident cultures in competition with each other. In place of 
a unifying religion there are universal religions which are 
locked in conflict with each other. These problems have been 
reflected in the many civil wars, inter-ethnic and religious 
conflicts which have plagued the continent since independence. 
The instability generated by these problems have continued to 
obstruct efforts at development. In this respect, Africa 
differs significantly from other parts of the Third World 
(South Korea, for example) whose development was helped by 
their traditional values.
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Certain other domestic factors, some of which have resulted 
from the structures of the African economy, have interacted 
with the external factors discussed above and the structures of 
underdevelopment to deepen the crisis in Africa. It is 
instructive to assess their place in perpetuating this crisis, 
since that has a bearing on the kind of solutions that are 
proferred. A major factor in this regard is the adoption of the 
neocolonial model of development, which leads to inappropriate 
policies and other institutional weaknesses.
This development model, also known as the modernisation model
or more appropriately (by Susan George) as the fmal-
development* model, has sought to mould Africa in the image of
west European countries. Consequently, there has been the
conscious attempt to imitate the western path to development.
What makes this model inappropriate and harmful to African
efforts at development is that,
It mimics without understanding and copies without 
controlling. Lacking roots in the local culture or 
environment, it quickly droops and withers if not 
sustained by transfusions- of foreign capital, 
technology and ideas. It goes for growth, usually 
without asking, fGrowth of what? For whom?1 
Industrialisation is frequently its centre piece, 
sometimes export agriculture relying on industrial 
inputs.(33)
In addition, the need for sectoral linkages, especially 
between industry and agriculture was ignored as was food 
security and small-scale peasant agriculture. This model is 
outward-looking and costly, relying instead on imports and
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neglecting local resources and skills in the rush to
industrialise at all cost.(34) Usually, the industrial strategy
adopted is that of import substitution and this has created
serious obstacles to industrial development in Africa. One of
these is the persistent wrong priorities and resource
mlsallocation. As Bade Onimode has observed,
An important aspect of these defects relates to 
industrial composition with respect to the 
manufacturing of semi-luxury and luxury 
consumer goods, the chronic shortage of 
essential manufactured goods, and the 
virtual absence of the capital-goods 
manufacturing sub-sector of heavy industries.(35)
A related problem with this industrial strategy has been the 
massive import of raw materials and spare parts thereby 
creating import dependence and balance of payments deficits. 
This also means that there is very low value added and the 
technology imported is inappropriate to the local environment. 
Moreover, the multinationals have usually ended up controlling 
these import-substitutbnindustries and have used them to drain 
resources by the imposition of capital-intensive technology and 
transfer-pricing. A situation of structural crisis has 
therefore persisted in this area. It is no wonder that Africa’s 
performance in manufacturing has been very disappointing as its 
share of world manufacturing has not grown since 1960 and was 
only 0.06 per cent in 1973.(36)
The attempt by the state to control the rest of society in 
Africa has also created another major obstacle to development.
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The concentration of political and economic power in a few
hands, the patronage and privilege, all at the expense of the
majority who continue to be marginalised, disadvantaged and
deprived, has denied the state legitimacy. Instead,
•••the popular classes see the state both as 
unreliable oppressor(inefficient capitalist) 
and as an unpredictable "godfather” whose 
generosityCsocial services) cannot be taken 
for granted.(37)
The weapon which the populace has used in response to this is 
to withdraw or disengage from the state which they see as 
alienating. This also involves withdrawing from the formal 
economy which is under the control of the state. It is not only 
the peasants who withdraw from the state, the lumpen elements 
in the urban centres have also exited. This can be seen in the 
size and vibrance of the informal market within the urban 
areas.
The withdrawal also takes different forms depending on the 
section of the population involved. For those people who are in 
some kind of state employment, the strategy has been to 
corruptly use their positions and to engage in moon-lighting. 
The professional group and others who are able to withdraw from 
the state by literally leaving the country to seek greener 
pastures elsewhere. A common form of withdrawal has been the 
rise of the informal sector or parallel economy to that run by 
the state. This is essentially an underground economy of black 
markets, smuggling and other forms of illegal economic
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activities. The final form of disengagement has been the 
retreat to narrow communities and solidarity groups such as 
ethnic and religious groups which now became the focus of 
loyalty. The peasants generally disengage from cash crop 
production to subsistence crops. Therefore, in the light of the 
issues discussed here, the state has been unable to create a 
stable environment conducive to development, or mobilise the 
people and resources to achieve a transformation of the 
productive forces. Thus, the post-colonial state in Africa has 
been unable to play a developmentalist role the same way as the 
state has done in South East Asia, for instance.
The neglect of small-scale peasant agriculture and the pursuit 
of other inappropriate agricultural policies such as low farm 
gate prices and the emphasis on cash crops, led to steady 
decline in agricultural production. This along with the adverse 
developments with regards to Africafs export crops, negatively 
affected performance in this sector (Table 2.5). Africa*s 
dependence on rain-fed agriculture also adversely affected food 
production from the early 1970s, due largely to persistent 
drought and bad weather conditions (Table 2.6). As production 
declined, food imports began to rise in the 1970s until Africa 
lost the ability to feed itself in the 1980s.(38) The 
structural rigidities in the economy have also helped to 
reinforce these conditions as the environment is being 
destroyed through drought, deforestation, desertification, soil 
erosion and the like. At the same time, Africa has maintained a
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Table 2.5 Sub-Sabaran Africa's Export of Major crops: Grovth and Shares
Average annual Change 
in Volume (%)
Sub-Saha ran Africa's 
Share of World Exports 
(%)
Commodity
Beverages:
Cecea
Coffee
Tea
1961-63
+0
1969-70
1969-72
1980-82 1961-63 1969/71 1980/82
0.2
3.4
9.0
-0.3
- 0.2
4.1
79.9
25.6
8.7
75.9
29.3
9.3
69.3
25.9
Cereals:
Maize -1.9
Wheat 1.2
Rice 0.7
Other Cereals -6.0
Ooils and Seeds: 
Ground nut oil 2.2 
(shelled) -6.1
Oil seed cake 
and meal 5.3
Palm kernel 
oil 8.9
Palm Kernels -6.2
Palm oil -8.6
Sesame Seed 3.8
Other
Bananas -1.7
Cotton 5.6
Rubber 3.0
Sisal -2.1
Tobacco -3.1
Sugar 3.2
-5.1
•16.2
•12.5
13.3
- 6.0
■13.9
-3.8
-1.3
-9.6
-5.1
- 6.2
-5.4
-3.5
-2.9
-8.7
6.6
1.4
2.5 
0.1 
0.9 
4.1
53.8
85.5
9.5
55.2
90.4
55.0
68.6
10.9 
10.8
6.8
60.7
12.1 
4.7
1.4 
0.1 
0.8
1.4
57.6
69.1
8.3
54.8
82.2
16.4 
75.3
6.5
15.5 
6.8
59.7 
8.2
5.6
9.3 
0.0 
0.1 
2.5
27.8 
18.0
2.2
21.6
75.8
3.0
40.7
3.0 
9.2
4.4 
60.4
11.8 
4.8
Source: World Bank (1984) Toward Sustained Development in Sub-
Saharan Africa, p.80-1 Quoted in Bade Onimode (1988) p.155
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Table 2.6. Decline in Agriculture and Food Production, 1960/82
Country
Average
volume
annual growth rate of 
of production (percent)
Average annual growth 
total production per 
(percent)
rate o 
capita(
Food
Total
agriculture Food
Total
agriculture
1960-70 1970- 82 1980-80 1970-82 1960-70 1970-82 1960- 70 1970-
1. Chad -0; 3 2.4 0.2 2.1 -2.2 0.4 -1.7 0.1
2. Mali 1. 3 2. b l.b 2.7 -1.2 -0.2 -0.9 0.0
3. Burkina Faso 3.2 2.4 3. b 2. b 1.2 0.4 1. b O.b
4. Somalia 2. b 1.0 2.8 1.0 0.0 -l.b 0.0 -l.b
b. Niger 2.7 4.1 2.7 4.0 -0.7 0.8 -0.7 0. /
fa. Gambia,The 4.3 -1.0 4.3 -1.0 2.1 -4.1 2.1 -4.1
7. Ethiopia 2.9 1.7 3.0 l.b O.b -0.3 0.6 -U.b
U. Guinea-Bissau • • 0.7 . . 0.7 . . . . . « . .
y . Zaire 4.3 1 . 3 4.1 1.2 2.3 -2.7 2.1 -1.7
10. Malawi 4.9 2.9 4.7 3. b 2.0 -0.1 l.b O.b
n . Uganda 3.4 1.7 3.4 O.b 0.4 -1.0 0.4 -2.1
12. Rwanda 4. b 3. b 4. b 3.7 1.9 0.1 1.9 0.3
13. Burundi 4.6 1.6 4.6 1.7 3.2 -U.b 3.2 -U.b
14. Tanzania b. b 2.1 b.O 1.0 2.7 -1. 3 2.2 -2 . 3
ID. Benin 3.2 2.6 3.8 2.4 0.6 -0.1 1 . 2 -U. 3
lb. Central African Rep. O.b 1.9 1.3 l.b -O.b -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
17. Guinea 2.7 l.b 2.7 1.4 1.2 -O.b 1.2 -0.6
18. Madagascar 2.7 1.7 2.7 1.6 O.b -0.9 O.b -1.0
19. Togo 5. b 2.3 b. 4 2.3 2.4 -0.3 2.3 -0.3
20. Ghana 2.6 -0.2 2.6 -W. 2 0.3 -3.1 0.3 -3.1
21. Kenya 3.6 2.0 3.3 2.7 0.4 -i .y 0.1 -1. 2
72. Sierra Leone 3.7 1.2 3.6 1.2 2.0 -U.b 1.9 -0.8
23. Mozambique 2.3 -1.0 2.0 -1.4 0.2 -b. 1 -0.1 -b. b
contined
Table 2.b ....continued
24. Sudan 5.4 2 .y b . 4 l.b 3.1 -0.3 3.1 -l.b
2b. Mauritania 2.1 1.4 2.1 1.3 -0.2 -o.y -0.2 -1 .0
2b. Liberia 0.4 3.0 3.3 2.1 -2.7 -O.b 0.1 -1.4
27. Senegal -0.4 l.b -0.3 1.3 -2. b -1 . 2 -2 . b -1.4
2b. Lesotho 0.1 0.2 0.4 -0.2 -i .y -2.1 -l.b -2. b
29 . Zambia 3.5 1. b 3.1 1.7 • o.y -1 . 3 O.b -1.4
30. Zimbabwe 1. b l.b O.b 2 . 2 -2.0 -l.b - 2 .y -1.0
31 . Botswana o.y -2.0 o.y -2.0 -1.7 -b.O -1.7 -b.O
32. Swazi land b.b 3.y b.b 4. b b.y 0.7 b . 7 1 . 3
33. Ivory Coast b . 2 b.O b.b b.O 1.4 1.0 1.7 0. 1
34. Mauritius l.b O.b l.b o.y -0.7 -O.b -0. / -O.b
35. Nigeria O.b 2. b 0.4 2.4 -2.0 -0.1 -2.0 -0.2
3b. Cameroon 4. b 2. 1 4 . b 2.0 2 . b -o.y 2.7 -1.0
37. Congo,People's Rep. -2 . b o.y -2.7 o.y -b. 1 -2.0 -b.o -2.0
3b. Gabon 3.3 0.7 3.3 O.b 2 .y -0. / 2 .y -O.b
3 y. Angola 2. b 0.4 3.0 -3.0 0.7 -2.0 o.y - b . 4
Sub--Saharan Africa 2.5 1.7 2.5 1.4 0.2 -o.y 0.2 -1.1
Source: World BanJc: Toward Sustained Development In Sub-Saharan Africa, iyb4 p.//
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high population growth rate thereby adding to the problem of 
development. This population explosion and related problem of 
urbanisation and rural-urban drift has added to the crisis of 
underdevelopment•
Another major obstacle to development in Africa is political 
instability and civil strife. This has deprived the affected 
areas of a conducive environment in which to plan and 
successfully implement development. The reality today is that 
in areas such as the Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Angola, 
Mozambique, etc, food cannot be grown even if there is good 
rainfall due to the prevailing security situation. On the other 
hand, there is worsening refugee problem arising out of this 
situation and adding to the crisis on the continent.
A related problem is the massive military expenditures which 
African states have continued to maintain. Most countries, 
including the poorest and those not under any obvious military 
threats have continued to run very high defence budget 
allocations in most cases higher than those of the social 
sector.(39) For instance, the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute(SIPRI) estimated that in 1983 Africafs 
military expenditure was 6 per cent of its GDP, while in 1986, 
military expenditure was nearly $14 billion.(40) The 
involvement of external powers in regional conflicts like 
Southern Africa, Chad, Ethiopia,etc, has raised the level of
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military spending considerably through the military aid given 
by the major powers.
The fact that the military aid is provided on commercial terms 
has added significantly to the drain in scarce resources. As a 
result, the ratio of defence spending to total expenditure has 
remained high for the region as a whole, and for some countries 
the ratio is even higher (Table 2.7). This has contributed to 
the crisis in Africa by maintaining tension and diverting the 
meagre resources away from meaningful development.
Table 2*7 Military Spending 
(percentage of total government expenditure)
1980 1981 1985 1986
Sub-Saharan Africa 12.1 11.7 10.0 -
Ethiopia 30.0 34.0 34.6 32.0
Uganda 25.2 31.2 15.6 26.3
Zimbabwe 25.0 20.5 15.2 16.3
Somalia 19.2 22.7 - -
Burkina Faso 17.0 18.4 19.2 18.3
Kenya 16.4 10.7 8.7 10.6
Senegal 16.8 11.8 10.8 10.6
Sudan 13.2 12.3 12.2 10.2
Source: The World Bank; Sub-Saharan Africa:From Crisis to 
Sustainable Growth; 1989, p.168.
There is also the factor of official corruption of the ruling 
class mainly by using the state as an instrument of capital 
accummulation on a very large scale. Most African countries are 
far too poor for the scale of looting perpetrated by their 
rulers. They have usually colluded with multinational
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corporations and banks to loot their national treasuries and 
staCK the loot away in western countries.(41) At home, this 
elite has used the state as an instrument of primitive 
accummulation by promoting policies which have devastated their 
national economies and transfered wealth into their hands and 
abroad. This can be seen in the import content of their 
economic policies, unproductive investments using inflated 
contracts, inefficient institutions and administratiion, etc. 
All these helped to perpetuate and reinforced the structures of 
underdevelopment in Africa, as we have already seen.
With the situation discussed above, the decline which Africa 
began to experience was only to be expected. It was only a 
matter of time before many of the economies began to collapse 
as the 1980s have revealed. Meanwhile, from the 1970s, per 
capita income began to decline (Table2.8) and it did so by more 
than 12 per cent in real terms between 1970 and 1985.(42) Urban 
unemployment which was estimated at 10.8 per cent in 1975 rose 
up to 30 per cent by the early 1980s, and from an 
underemployment rate of 37-39 per cent in 1975, it climbed to 
over 58 per cent by the mid-1980s.(43) Mass poverty has 
increased in the continent as people are poorer today than they 
were in 1960. All these factors have combined to create the 
African debt crisis.
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Table 2.8 Annual Percentage Change of Per Capita Income in
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-83
Country Group 1960-70 1970-80 1981 1962 1483
Low income countries 
Middle Income oil
1.5 -0.9 -1.9 -2.5 -0.3
importers 
Middle income oil
1.5 1.2 0.6 -0.7 -3.4
exporters 1.1 1.6 -6.7 -4.7 -7.3
Total 1.3 0.7 -4.0 -3.3 i (jj • GO
Source: The World Bank(1984), Towards Sustained Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa p.10; and quoted Bade Onimode, Opcit p.156,
The African Debt Crisis and Structural Adjustment
The problem of indebtedness is another major factor in the 
crisis of development in Africa. A problem which assumed a 
crisis proportion in its own right, the African debt is related 
to the development crisis on the continent both as a cause and 
as an effect. As a cause, the accummulation of large debts has 
generated crisis in the external sector of the African economy 
and has consequently blocked efforts to promote development. As 
an effect, it is the product of all the factors discussed above 
as the causes of the development crisis in Africa. Thus, it was 
the resultant external inbalances and the high level of 
indebtedness which forced African countries into adopting 
necessary stabilisation measures.
121
The major external creditors were also made to adopt 
structural adjustment as the strategy for resolving the crisis 
in Africa, following the debt crisis of 1982. To that extent, 
the debt crisis is also related to structural adjustment as it 
is to the crisis of development in Africa. It is this link 
between the debt crisis and the development crisis in Africa on 
the one hand, and the structural adjustment programmes on the 
other. It is not in the scope of this study to discuss the 
management of the debt crisis. However, since international 
debt crisis management and structural adjustment do overlap, 
all the discussion will be in this context.
The announcement by Mexico that she was unable to meet her 
obligations towards her creditors in respect of the huge debts 
she owed, immediately transformed the debt problem into 
everybody’s, both creditor and debtor. Not only did this 
development reveal the extent of the exposure of western banks 
in the Third World. Most importantly, the possibility of Third 
World debtors defaulting on their debts even if involuntarily, 
potentially threatened the international financial system with 
collapse. The power and dominance of the western countries in 
the international economy was built on this financial system 
and also sustained by it. It was therefore in their own 
interest as much as that of the debtors to stem the crisis. For 
these countries, another interest lay in preventing debtor 
nations from either defaulting or even forming a debtor’s 
cartel to press for a transformation of the system on which
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their power and wealth was based. In the event, emergency 
measures were undertaken to manage crises situations on a case- 
by-case basis. More permanent measures were to follow later.
The management of the debt crisis by the creditors was 
concerned mainly with "maintaining the intergrity of sovereign 
debt contracts and of the international financial system".(44) 
This was underlined by the prominent role given to multilateral 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank in the 
management of the debt crisis. However, the style of debt 
management adopted was dependent on whether the debt owed was 
to commercial or offial creditors. Commercial debt was owed by 
the middle income countries and mainly in Latin America. For 
instance, these countries also classified as the Baker-15 or 
the World Bank’s group of 17 Highly Indebted Countries(HICs), 
owed a total of $512 billion at the end of 1988 and $363 
billion of this was owed to banks.
For this category of debtors, a number of strategies were 
pursued under the supervision of the Bretton Woods institutions 
to tackle the debt crisis. The first phase was the ’involuntary 
concerted lending programmes* put in place under the leadership 
of the IMF between 1982 and 1985.(45) These programmes were 
conditional upon the debtor countries adopting austerity- 
oriented stabilisation measures. This was followed by the Baker 
Plan which shifted the responsibility for lending to the World 
Bank. It was aimed at reviving growth in the debtor countries
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through adjustment between 1985 and 1988. And In April 1989, 
the Brady plan was put In place with the objective of achieving 
a systematic reduction In debt. The target of debt reduction 
was 20 per cent and this was to be achieved largely through 
volutary means.
With most of Sub-Saharan Africa, the problem has been that of 
official debt, that Is debt owed to the governments of the 
developed countries and the multilateral agencies. The 
countries in this category are thirty-two low-income countries 
in the region, even though they have been joined in that 
clasification by Nigeria which used to be a middle-income 
country. However, this demotion of Nigeria has not affected its 
position along with that of Cote d*Ivoire on the league of the 
17 HICs. These two countries are the most indebted in the 
region, with a share of about 40 per cent of the debt owed by 
the region as a whole. For this region, the strategy of debt 
management was slightly different from that used for the HICs, 
though the objective was the same. Here, there was a mix 
between discipline and encouragement through rescheduling and 
new concessional money. On the emergence of the debt crisis in 
1982, the IMF moved swiftly to impose more discipline in 
economic management and external debt management, through 
structural adjustment programmes. Funding has been provided 
mainly by the IMF, IDA(the World Bankfs soft-loan window) and 
the Paris Club(OECD) bilateral creditors).
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Since the African debt crisis did not emerge overnight, it is
instructive to trace its origin to the colonial venture the
same way we have traced the structures of underdevelopment to
this period. Here, the creation of the debt problem started
with the application of the classical theory of
underdevelopment in the 1950s which held that the shortage of
capital was the major cause of backwardness in Africa.(46) The
colonial governments therefore encouraged the inflow of capital
into their colonies to stimulate development. The possibility
of a debt crisis seemed to have been handled by the colonial
powers by guaranteeing all loans, encouraging investment by
foreign private enterprises, etc. It was also assumed that the
weak nature of African economies would avoid accummulating
debt.(47) Due to these measures, borrowing was controlled to
the extent that at
••.independence in 1962, the debt incured by 
the whole of African countries was registered 
to be 4 billion US dollars and the debt service 
ratio represented around 2 per cent of their 
export earnings.(48)
However, after Independence, changes began to take place with 
regard to indebtedness. The adoption of the *mal-development* 
model or strategy of modernisation fueled the accummulation of 
debt• Thus,
The desire to modernise their countries made 
them call for capital from the World Bank through 
investments on collective infrastructures. At 
the same time exporting groups pushed their 
governments to support bilateral aid programmes 
with export credit financing systems devised 
in the rich countries. Commercial banks and 
international capital markets followed suit.(49)
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Also, the developed countries siezed this opportunity to 
promote their own businesses and economic interests. The 
imported capital went towards developing primary economic 
infrastructures like electricity, roads, railways, etc., and 
thus set the basis for the debt crisis in these economies which 
were externally oriented.This weakness was further exploited by 
forcing the recepient countries to import the technology and 
export materials of the donors. As this process interacted with 
the structures of underdevelopment, there was shortage of 
capital and export credits were extended to those countries to 
continue to buy western goods in the name of modernisation. In 
this way debts were accummulated by African countries.
The surge in lending to the Third World as a whole was 
witnessed in the 1970s, largely due to the excess liquidity in 
the international financial system. The sudden increase in the 
price of petroleum by Opec in 1973 created excess liquidity for 
the Opec countries. The industrialised economies also 
experienced a slow down and had excess liquidity which needed 
to be invested. The Third World became the major recepient of 
the loans which were now easily available from several sources. 
The very low interest rates on these loans encouraged many 
countries to borrow massively, some even from commercial banks. 
The level of lending from private sources increased towards the 
end of the 1970s as banks and export credit agencies took 
extraordinary risks in lending to African countries. There was 
also a shift towards short term lending. This process is
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reflected by the weight of commercial bank lending to Nigeria 
and Cote d fIvoire, two countries which are also classified as 
HICs.
For the low-income countries which constitute the majority of 
countries in the region, the main source of indebtedness is 
official (both bilateral and multilateral) lenders. The 
bilateral creditors are mainly OECD countries while the 
multilateral creditors are the IMF and the World Bank. The 
proportion of official debt to Sub-Saharan Africa fell between 
1970-80, from 65 per cent in 1970 to 48 per cent in 1980 
because of the surge in private lending over the period. 
However, the situation was significantly reversed in the 1980s 
with the proportion of official debt for low-income 
Africa(excluding Nigeria) standing at 78 per cent in 1988 or a 
total debt of $76 billion. On the whole, official debt has been 
a significant element in the region’s debt and development 
crisis. This significant change has been attributed to the 
following factors:
(i) a faster relative rate of growth as various 
multilateral agencies, in particular the World Bank 
and the regional development banks stepped up their 
lending progammes sharply in the 1970s;
(ii) a sharp decline in non-concessional bilateral 
lending by export credit agencies in the aftermath 
of the debt crisis;
(iii) an increasing shift from soft loan to grant 
financing by bilateral aid agencies in the 1980s 
coupled with some debt cancellation; and
(iv) an explicit preference on the part of 
developed countries to rely more heavily on the 
IMF and World Bank in plugging the gap left by
the withdrawal of commercial banks in the 1980s.(50)
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Apart from the factors discussed above as the causes of the 
region’s mounting debt, another source of the debt crisis was 
the rise in interestrates. While low interest rates on loans 
had encouraged many countries to incur massive debts in the 
1970s, it was the drastic rise in interest rates triggered off 
by the second oil price rise of 1978-79 which transformed the 
situation into a crisis. The oil price rise and the recession 
it had induced in the industrial economies also resulted in 
rising inflation. The industrialised countries elected to fight 
the inflation by raising interest rates, to which floating 
interest rates for debts were tied. This development 
automatically increased the level indebtedness in the region by 
billions of dollars overnight.
The sources of African indebtedness outlined above led to the 
explosion of the debt crisis in the 1980s, from modest 
beginnings in the early 1970s (Table 2.9). Thus, the size of 
the Sub-Saharan African debt grew from $5.8 billion in 1970 to 
a staggering $200 billion in 1987. The debt service payments 
also rose from $465 million in 1970 to $1980 and $9.6 billion 
by 1986. There was also a corresponding rise in the debt 
service ratio from 5.4 per cent in 1970 to 16.7 per cent in 
1980 and 35.8 per cent in 1986.(51) Thus, bilateral debt in the 
region grew ten times while the scheduled debt service grew 
more than twenty times. However, the multilateral debt service 
has escalated rapidly, exceeding the bilateral debt service by
Table 2.9 External debt of Sub-Saharan African Countries* 1980-85 (in US $ bn)
As a
%
1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1985
Total 55.357 63.117 68.019 76.894 78.219
total
85.590
Long Term Debt 5.753 43.910 49.189 55.393 61.461 62.046 67.979 79.4
Short Term Debt 9.480 10.498 8.628 10.344 10.914 11.603 13.5
Use of IMF Cred. 0.106 1.966 3.428 3.997 5.088 5.258 6.008 7.0
Official Credit, 
(outstanding and 
(disbursed) 3.536 24.409 27.094 30.308 34.983 37.342 42.286 49.4
Multilateral 0.842 8.503 9.801 11.485 12.997 14.579 26.810 19.6
IBRD 0.590 2.548 2.854 3.327 3.876 4.633 5.005 5.8
IDA 0.225 2.571 3.089 3.752 4.350 5.045 6.024 7.0
Bilateral 2.694 15.905 17.292 18.823 21.986 22.763 25.476 29.7
Private Credit, 
(outstanding 
and disbursed) 1.898 16.655 18.862 21.689 23.049 21.067 22.813 26.6
Suppliers 0.750 3.395 3.728 3.809 3.511 3.207 4.447 5.1
Financial Mark. 0.711 13.246 15.131 17.869 19.530 17.849 18.351 21.4
Growth of Total
Debt (% p.a) - - 14.0
00•["* 13.0 17.21 9.4 -
1 Excluding South Africa
Sources Based on World Bank, World Bank Tables, 1986/87 p.31. Quoted In 
Commonwealth Secretariat 1987, "Reinforcing International Support For African 
Recovery And development," p.30
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about 40 per cent, or 37 per cent the region*s total debt 
service burden.
The debt crisis of the 1980s was not only reflected in the 
size of debt accummulated, but also in the inability of African 
states to meet their debt service obligations. Their export 
earnings continued to decline as trade deficits rose from $679 
million in 1970 to $4.6 billion by 1984.(52) The generalised 
inflation in the world economy increased the import bill and 
encouraged the accum ulation of debt. The structural 
orientation of the African economy towards the world economy, 
and dependence on foreign exchange and foreign capital meant 
that African countries had to resort to further external 
borrowing to try to solve the larger economic crisis. A trap or 
vicious cycle had thus been created with respect to debt as was 
the case with the cycle of underdevelopment discussed above. It 
is in this sense that the debt crisis in Africa is an aspect of 
the crisis of underdevelopment in the region.
However, as we discussed in the previous chapter, there was a 
significant decline in most sources of external financial flows 
to Africa in the 1980s when the crisis became severe and the 
need for external finance dire. This situation called for a 
solution that would address the crisis in economy generally 
including the debt problem. This time too, there was urgency in 
the situation. There had to be a departure from the Cancun-type 
strategy of solving the Third World economic crisis. The debt
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crisis changed all that, especially since the Mexican crisis of 
1982. It is in this sense that a link can be made between the 
debt crisis in Africa and the programmes of structural 
adjustment in the 1980s.
The debt crisis, along with the structures of 
underdevelopment,adversely affected Africa*s development 
efforts. The African economy was threatened with retrogression, 
as the declines in performance, which set in during the 1970s, 
continued unchecked. Even in cases where progress was achieved 
in the 1970s such as education, health and other areas, there 
was now a stark possibility of a reversal of these gains. This 
alarming development called for immediate action and 
eventually, a lasting solution. In response to this demand, 
solutions were proferred by African countries as well as their 
western creditors, including the World Bank and the IMF. The 
internationalisation of the African and Third World crisis has 
generated a lively, sometimes acrimonious debate in the 
development community with participants proferring different 
solutions which are often influenced by their interests.
In the light of all this activity and debate, the crucial 
issue remains the extent to which the solutions proferred 
adequately address the African crisis and their capacity to 
have a positive impact on the situation. This is the point we 
take up in the next chapter. What we have done here is to 
provide an analysis of the African crisis as the background
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against which the appropriateness or otherwise of structural 
adjustment as advocated by the World Bank and the IMF should be 
measured.
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Chapter 3
The International Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa
The ever mounting African debts as well as the inability 
of these countries to service these debts, was a strong 
indication of the magnitude of the crisis into which Africa 
would find itself in the 1980fs and beyond. Arising out of 
some in-appropriate policies which were undertaken in the 
1970*s such as borrowing to finance projects, and most 
importantly, the world recession which set in as a result of 
the second oil shock in 1979, the impending severe crisis 
confronted all concerned with development in Africa. Unlike 
the first oil shock in 1974 which was accompanied by a rise in 
commodity prices and lending on easy terms, the second shock in 
1979 led to the opposite effects. Commodity prices collapsed, 
world interest rates rose and lending dried up, all of which 
created negative balances in external accounts and increased 
debts. Also, as recovery became difficult to achieve even in 
Western economies (Africa*s major trading partners and 
creditors), the situation on the African continent became 
desperate.
Efforts were initiated by both creditor and debtor 
countries to arrest the crisis and stimulate a recovery. 
However, disagreements developed between the creditor and
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debtor countries on the causes of the crisis and how it should 
be resolved. Once again, this area of North-South economic 
relations became a subject of intense political debate and 
activity which saw each side advocating a position suitable to 
its interests. The international politics on the resolution of 
the African crisis is what today exists in the form of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Africa under the
supervision of the World Bank and the IMF. Despite the 
existence of an African view on how the crisis should be 
handled, it is the World Banky^dominated development thinking in 
Africa in the 1980*s. Its position of influence, arising from 
its extensive involvement in Africa in the past, gave the World 
Bank great advantage in the political process of resolving the 
economic crisis .
The World Bank's past roles in Africa as the major 
project-lender, mobiliser of external finance, and provider of 
advice and technical assistance; now gave it an influential
position as the "pusher of policy reforms", as seen in its 
Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) and other policy-based loans 
introduced in the 1980's. Its major shareholders, who are also 
Africa's other major creditors,found it convenient to use the 
World Bank to push through the kind of policy reforms approved 
by them. In practice, what has happened is that the World Bank 
has worked closely with IMF (through the Baker Plan)and the
Paris Club to implement SAPs in Africa. The World Bank has
been so successful in influencing African governments to adopt
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structural adjustment programmes without attracting the kind of 
hostility which the IMF usually does,that most bilateral donors 
have been convinced to channel a significant amount oftheir aid 
for Africa through it. Even Nordic countries now channel all 
their aid to Africa through the World Bank. This degree of 
Northern unity on how to handle the crisis in Africa can be 
seen in the persistent conditionalities and cross­
conditionalities and performance criteria which the IMF and the 
World Bank attach to their structural adjustment facilities or 
loans to Africa as well as on debt-reschedulings carried out by 
the Paris Club.
It is this influential (even powerful) position of the 
World Bank as the institution Africa which has more experience 
then other development agencies in dealing with Africa’s 
development problems, which persuaded African governments to 
request the Bank to undertake a study of the crisis situation 
on the continent and recommend way to tackle it. The outcome 
of this exercise was the imposition of the World/IMF-sponsored 
SAPs on African countries despite their initial hostile 
reaction •
In this chapter, we investigate the political basis on 
which SAPs were designed and implemented in Africa. The 
difference in approach to the crisis adopted by the Western and 
the African states are also contrasted and discussed within the 
context of the growing transformation of the international
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economy which is affecting the fortunes and interests of the 
Western economies differently from those of Africa, The role 
and significance of the involvement of the Bretton Woods 
institutions in Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa is 
also addressed in the light of both their roles in the World 
economy and in its transformation. The debate which the World 
Bank (and IMF) SAPs have generated is also reviewed. The 
issues raised are discussed and alternative policy 
prescriptions are considered.
The African Response to the Economic Crisis
By the end of the 1970 fs the secular declines which 
African countries had experienced were quickly turning into a 
major economic crisis in the 1980*s. The situation was made 
worse by the sudden adverse developments in the World economy. 
These included the dramatic escalation in energy prices in 
1979, which led to generalised world inflation, worsening terms 
of trade, huge debts and balance of payments deficits. From 
this point, the outlook for the 1980*s was very bleak as 
Africa*s crisis became pervasive. This situation clearly 
alarmed African leaders and they set about formulating the 
strategy to handle the crisis. While they requested the World 
Bank to study the situation and advise them on how to handle 
it, they also carried out their own analysis and came up with 
their own strategy of dealing with the crisis. This came in 
the form of the Monrovia Strategy, and led to the Lagos Plan of
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Action which was adopted at a Special OAU Summit on the African 
economic crisis in April 1980. The Lagos Plan of Action also 
became Africa fs regional approach to what was seen as the 
economic decolonisation of the continent as well as the basis 
for its reconstruction and development•(1)
This African analysis recognised the immediate causes of 
the crisis to include the collapse of the commodity markets and 
deteriorating global economic environment, the debt crisis and 
the widespread and persistent drought of the 1980's. However, 
these were seen as the result of Africa's
Underdevelopment and economic backwardness; its failure to 
achieve a clear break from its unenviable colonial 
economic inheritance and pursue instead a normative 
development path. Therefore, until a structural adjustment 
that will install a self-reliant and internally generating 
process of development can be achieved Africa will 
continue to move from one crisis to another.(2)
In contrast to the World Bank's Berg Report,the Monrovia 
Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) emerged from a 
theoretical foundation which was embedded in an African 
economic nationalism and influenced by the failure to achieve a 
new international economic order (NIE0). The frustration 
encountered in the struggle for a world economic order which 
would give justice to Third World countries, recommended to 
Africa a different route to economic survival. The authors of 
this approach
...argued for a complete departure from the past and the 
substitution of an inward-looking development strategy for 
the inherited externally oriented one.But even more
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significant is the fact that we were putting forward a 
strategy that does not suffer from the limitations of 
foreign ideologies. This new strategy also puts the 
development of the domestic market rather than dependence 
on foreign markets at the heart of Africa’s development 
effort•(3)
In this sense, the LPA is a rejection of the existing 
wisdom on how these countries were promoting development. A 
different set of factors was now to be used to facilitate 
reconstruction and development. Thisshift away from the 
modernisation paradigm , is forcefully justified by Adedeji :
We had moved the discussion of engineering socio-economic 
change away from the usual parameters of trade gaps, 
savings gaps, investment gaps,growth rates in GDP, and per 
capita income, and instead concentrated attention on 
natural resource availability, local entrepreneurship, 
skilled manpower, technology, the domestic and intra- 
African markets, and the quality of life...we have argued 
as forcefully as we could that the central concern of 
development must be individuals,not abstracts such as GDP, 
per capita growth rates,or investment and savings gaps.(4)
Thus, the African approach laid emphasis on the need for 
continental cooperation and self-reliance. In the Monrovia 
Declaration the leaders committed themselves, to (a) national 
and collective self-reliance; (b) self-sufficiency in food 
production and supply; (c) the development and maintenance of 
control over Africa’s natural resources and environment; (d) 
the development of human resources in entrepreneurship, 
technical manpower and technological capabilities; (e) the 
development of transport and communication, and regional 
internal industrial base, among others.(5) It was these broad 
objectives which the LPA sought to implement eventually on a
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continental basis. That is why the LPA gives priority to such 
areas as the development of the most important sectors, skills 
and training and institutional development.
The LPA set aside for implementation priority sectors such
as the development of food and agriculture (chapter 1). Other
sectors include the setting up of new industries (chapter 2);
transport and communication in chapter 7; development and
control of natural resources (chapter 3); the protection of the
environment, and similar issues. Also considered under separate
heading was the issue of training and skills. This involves
human resource development which is considered in Chapter 4;
the employment of science and technology in development
(Chapter 5); and the training of women to enable them to
participate in development in Chapter 12. The LPA also gives
priority to institutional development with the major area
Of
including the building up and strengthening^ economic co­
operation and the setting up of the new institutions (Chapter 
8). Measures to develop and strengthen trade and financial 
institutions are contained also in Chapter 7. The important 
area of statistical data forms the subject of Chapter 13. 
Here, the planning and collection of statistics is to be 
strengthened while the population variable is to be integrated 
into the planning process. External economic relations and 
negotiation geared towards the realisation of a just 
international economic order, is taken up in Chapter 9.
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The point should be made that the LPA is a long-term
strategy which broadly provides a set of key priorities to be
attained by the year 2000 when a continental common market is
expected to be in place.(6) However, it was long on goals and
short on specifics, and therefore did not outline any short­
term measures to resolve the crisis. It is perhaps implied 
that any short-term measures taken must be consistent with the 
long-term objectives of self-reliance of the LPA. Besides, any 
specific mechanisms which African leaders might have had for 
implementing the LPA had to be acceptable to the Western 
countries and financial institutions on which Africa relied for 
the funds needed to generate recovery. The absence of specific 
mechanisms of implementating the LPA was a reflection of the 
need to secure the support of external donors and creditors.
 The Western Response to the African Crisis
The response of the World Bank to the request by African 
members of its board for advice on how to resolve the worsening 
crisis, formed the initial position of the Western 
industrialised countries to the situation. It was consistent 
with the position taken at the Cancun summit in 1981 at which 
the industrialised Western countries insisted that Third World 
countries should re-order their domestic environments as a 
means of getting out of their economic mess. This position was 
constructed in a report released by the World Bank in 1981
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entitled; Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa; An 
Agenda for Action.
Also known as the Berg Report (after its principal 
author), it saw the African economic crisis as one of stagnant 
or declining production seen in such areas as the GDP. It is 
also manifested in internal and external economic imbalance 
where budget deficits persist as is the case with external 
accounts and high debt-service obligations. The crisis was 
further reflected in the agricultural sector where per capita 
production has been on the decline. There is a deepening food 
dependency, and the continent’s share of the world trade in 
agricultural commodities has also fallen. The Berg Report 
further saw the crisis as an institutional one in which 
government decision-making capacities have grown weaker. This 
is often seen in decisions on investment, expenditure for 
development projects, industrial policy and the like, where 
there is much inefficiency, waste, lack of coherence and 
corruption in state-owned parastatals.
The Berg Report traced the sources of this crisis to 
factors that are external, structural and domestic policy 
deficiencies. (7) The structural factors are said to have 
evolved from historical, geographical, political and climatic 
circumstances.
, These include underdeveloped human resources, the economic
disruption that accompanied decolonisation and post
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colonial consolidation, climatic and geographic factors 
hostile to development, and rapidly growing population.
(8)
The external factors mainly had to do with higher energy
prices, the stagnation in industrialised countries which slowed
down the trade in primary products and led to adverse terms of
trade and poor economic performance. These, the Berg Report
argues, have been exacerbated by domestic policy deficiencies,
of which three are critical. First, trade and exchange 
rate policies have over-protected industry, held back 
agriculture and absorbed much administrative capacity. 
Second, too little attention had been paid to 
administrative constraints in mobilising and managing 
resources for development; given the widespread weakness 
of planning, decision-making, and management capacities, 
public sectors frequently become over-extended. Third, 
there has been a consistent bias against agriculture in 
price, tax, and exchange rate policies. (9)
On the basis of this analysis, the Berg Report advocated 
policy reforms of a structural nature. Notable among them 
were: "(1) more suitable trade and exchange-rate policies; (2) 
increased efficiency of resource use in the public sector; and 
(3) improvement in agricultural policies." (10) The emphasis 
is therefore on domestic structural reforms even though it has 
been admitted that external factors played a part in causing 
the African crisis. However, recognising that these policy 
reforms were likely to attract formidable opposition within 
African countries, due to the hardships that would result from 
their imposition on the population, the Berg Report urged the 
donor community to significantly increase aid to African 
countries to cushion them against these expected obstacles.
146
The measures recommended by the Berg Report were 
contractionary and would involve massive retrenchment of 
workers, removal of subsidies on the prices of essential 
services and consequently massive price rises. In political 
terms, these were expensive measures for African countries to 
introduce, because powerful domestic interests would be hurt, 
and governments are usually sensitive to opposition from these 
groups. For instance, government is the main employer of 
labour as well as the provider of social services in Africa. 
And the local urban populations depend on the government for 
better amenities than rural dwellers. The jobs and the 
subsidised amenities enjoyed by the urban populations would be 
under attack from the reform measures, thereby making the 
situation politically explosive for governments. African 
countries would therefore require assistance to handle this 
problem as the Berg Report rightly argued. The assistance that 
was to be given for this purpose was to be tied to policy 
reform in recipient countries. This was how the structural 
adjustment programmes or economic recovery programme (ERP) 
currently going on in Africa under the supervision of the World 
Bank/IMF, was introduced as a political issue in the economic 
relations between Africa and her Western creditors.
The publication of the World Bank document created much 
controversy, not least in Africa where it was initially viewed 
with suspicion. This was largely because the Berg Report was 
seen as diametrically opposed to the LPA. For instance, while
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the Lagos Plan of Action alms to build self-reliant economies
in Africa, the World Bank document
appears dedicated to making the African countries as 
efficient as possible in their present roles as suppliers 
of primary commodities and importers of manufactured 
goods. (11)
It is this point that Elliot Berg himself seems to confirm when 
he says that the strategy recommended by the report "involves a 
fuller integration into the world economy, with renewed 
attention to exports and a review of the level and nature of 
industrial protection. (12)
Furthermore, while the Lagos Plan lays more emphasis on 
external factors as the causes of the African crisis, the World 
Bank treats them as peripheral and emphasises domestic factors 
instead. The LPA talks of promoting an internally-oriented 
development strategy which relies on local resources, while the 
Berg Report counters with externally-orientated growth through 
increased agricultural exports, financial inflows and the like. 
There is also a significant disagreement between the LPA and 
the Berg Report on the role of the state in economic 
development. The Lagos Plan of Action gives the state a 
significant role, while the Berg Report advocates curbing the 
role of the state. The significant level of incompatibility 
between the two documents at the time clearly reflected the 
conflicting interests of their sponsors.
However, from 1982 the international situation changed 
considerably enough to force African countries into line with
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the position of the World Bank document. A major contributory 
factor was the Mexican financial crisis of September 1982. The 
announcement by Mexico that it would be defaulting on its 
international interest payment created immediate panic among 
creditors and this led to a significant reduction in lending to 
the Third World. This shrinkage in external capital flows left 
the World Bank and the IMF as the only sources of external 
credit. Yet the World Bank and the IMF were already insisting 
on debtor countries undertaking the policy reforms designed by 
these institutions as a precondition for access to their loans 
as well as any subsequent assistance. The Western creditors 
endorsed these new policy reform conditions of the Bretton 
Woods institutions and used them in their dealings with the 
debtor countries through the Paris club on debt rescheduling. 
While there has been some movement on debt rescheduling with 
the Paris Club since the Toronto terms were agreed in 1988, the 
fact that such rescheduling is conditioned on the adoption of 
structural reforms by debtor countries, makes it difficult. 
Even bilateral aid programme had incorporated into them these 
reform conditions.
This development had a sobering effect on African 
countries which were now also in desperate need of external 
finance and debt relief. Left with no room to manoeuvre, the 
loud criticisms which welcomed the publication of the Berg 
Report from African lenders were silenced and replaced with a 
willingness to accept the reform conditions imposed by the
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World Bank and the IMF, A clear reflection of this change can 
be seen in the acceptance of the World Bank position that 
domestic policy deficiencies significantly caused the crisis, 
as well as their willingness to implement the said policy 
reforms, (13) This shift towards the Western position by 
African countries is also reflected in such documents as 
Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990. 
Even the United Nations Programme of Action for African 
Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990 (UNPAAERD) which 
was also adopted in 1986 as a mark of international solidarity 
with Africa, was essentially a concession to the Western 
position as was the APPER. Under this, African countries 
committed themselves to implementing structural reform measures 
in return for additional financial support promised by the 
international community.
On the side of the World Bank, these developments enabled
it to give the impression of a consensus with African countries
on how to tackle the crisis. It now sounded as though its
position had shifted from that which attracted controversy and
criticism in 1981, to being an advocate of "development with
growth". The harsh criticisms it levelled on African countries
in the Berg Report were also toned down in its subsequent
publications. (14) However, in reality it had not changed or
shifted its position because,
Policy reform, which had been the keynote of the initial 
study,remained the dominant focus throughout this unusual 
series of reports. Although the Banks gently shifted from 
unilaterally prescribing policy reform to the position
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that is merely pushing for changes which the Africans 
themselves had already decided were needed, the over­
riding impression gleaned from the series is that the 
World Bank is far more sold on the efficacy of policy 
reforms than are the Africans, (15)
The success of the Western creditors in handling the
Mexican crisis in 1982 strengthened their hand in dealing with 
the rescheduling of Third World debts elsewhere. They also 
successfully resisted the pressure put on them to treat Third 
World indebtedness as a threat to the international financial 
system which required an international strategy to resolve. 
Instead, they insisted on a case-by-case approach to the debt 
problem and imposed conditionality before agreeing to
reschedule any debts. Consequently,they also successfully
resisted the idea of debt-forgiveness or its conversion into 
grants or even the provision of any new money to these 
countries.
All new proposals that they put forward wereaimed at
getting the debtor countries to service their loans and subject 
their economies to market forces. These proposals therefore 
sought to preserve the power of the creditors in the World 
economy by maintaining the burden of adjustment on countries of 
Africa and the Third World. A detailed assessment of their 
proposals on handling the economic crisis in Third World
countries clearly reveals this preoccupation with sustaining 
the structural adjustment programmes even if the need to
mitigate the adverse effects of the programmes is now
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recognised* (16) Very often, these proposals did not go far in 
this direction either in their content or their implementation.
One example of this Western response to the economic 
crisis in the Third World is the Baker Plan. This Plan, 
launched by the then Secretary of the US Treasury, James Baker, 
at the annual World Bank/IMF conference in October 1985, was a 
significant shift in the US position on the debt crisis. For 
the first time the US admitted that such a crisis existed. 
(17) Otherwise, it merely reinforced the existing Western 
strategy of dealing with the debt crisis through the IMF and 
the World Bank. The Baker Plan further legitimised IMF 
conditionality and committed its implementation to the IMF and 
the World Bank through their joint operation of the Structural 
Adjustment Facility (SAF). Essentially, the Baker Plan 
proposed the following:
(i) Commercial banks should loan another $20 billion 
over a three-year period (1986-9) to the fifteen largest 
debtors;
(ii) Official multilateral financial institutions should 
increase their lending by 50 per cent above 1985 levels to 
$9 billion during the same period, with the World Bank 
making the biggest effort; this makes a total of $29 
billion, or under $10 billion a year;
(iii) the $2.7 billion/IMF Trust Fund should be used as a 
new borrowing facility for the poorest (mostly African) 
countries with annual per capita income below $550. (18)
The debtor countries were expected to adhere to very hard 
conditions in return for this assistance. These included the 
liberalisation of trade; removal of controls that hamper 
foreign private investment; the reduction of government
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involvement in the economy; and increase in exports. 
Compliance with these conditions was essential if debtor 
countries were to have access to this new facility. The 
consequence of non-compliance with these conditions was clearly 
spelt out in the warning issued by Mr. Baker in his Seoul 
speech that,
Countries which are not prepared to undertake basic 
adjustments and work within the framework of the case-by- 
case debt strategy, co-operating with the international 
financial institutions, cannot expect to benefit from this 
three-point program. Additional lending will not occur. 
Efforts by any country to 'go it alone1 are likely to 
seriously damage its prospects for future growth. (19)
However, the Baker Plan did not succeed in reviving growth 
with adjustment in debtor countries, during the period it was 
in operation between 1985 - 1988. Inspite of the fact that the 
World Bank assumed more responsibility for providing new 
finance, this was not forthcoming. The continuing use of 
conditionalities and performance criteria prevented the debtor 
countries from receiving new money in adequate amounts to 
revive growth. Also, the Baker Plan did not ease the debt 
burden of debtors; only Cote d'Ivoire, Morocco and Nigeria were 
included in the plan, and it was severely criticised for this 
shortcoming. One notable critic was Senator Bradley of the 
United States who unveiled his own plan in 1986. The failure 
of the Baker Plan to provide debt relief was attacked by 
Bradley:
Since the Baker Plan calls for new loans instead of 
interest-rate and debt relief, it creates more debt, not 
less. This will increase the already precarious exposure 
of banks to a possible default. And adding to the debt 
burden of these countries will discourage new investment
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and increase capital flight. In other words, the Plan 
prolongs the policies that created the debt crisis in the 
first place. (20)
And even though Bradley has attacked the Baker Plan this 
way and has even advocated debt relief and forgiveness, he 
agrees with Baker on a free-market approach and conditionality 
to tackle the debt problem. Bradley has thus taken this 
position not because of the effects the Baker Plan would have 
on the Third World, but also the suffering that would be 
visited on the North, especially the United States. One of 
Bradley*s main concerns was to stem the tide of massive exports 
of Third World goods to the US, which he saw as unwanted and 
harmful competition. He therefore advocated the kind of 
assistance to the Third World which would generate internal 
growth rather than turn them into major US competitors as they 
try to export more in order to meet their debt obligations. He 
thus proposed that debtor countries be granted relief each year 
for three years in this form:
- three percentage points of interest-rate relief on all 
outstanding debt owed to banks and governments;
- 3 per cent write-down and forgiveness of principal on 
all outstanding loans;
- $3 billion worth of project and/or structural adjustment 
loans from multilateral lending institutions, particularly 
the World Bank. (21)
The Bradley proposals did not impress the major creditors 
who have continued to resist the idea of debt-forgiveness or 
conversion into grants. The creditors, acting through the IMF, 
World Bank and the Paris Club, continued to insist on the path 
of structural adjustment in debtor-countries* economies as the
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chief means of managing the debt crisis• However, the apparent 
failure of the Baker Plan and the worsening debt situation in 
the developing countries forced a change of attitude in the 
creditors towards the question of debt relief and debt- 
forgiveness, resulting in some movement on it.(22) This came 
in the form of the Brady initiative, unveiled by US Treasury 
Secretary Nicholas Brady in April 1989. The Brady initiative 
was the first attempt by the creditors to achieve debt 
reduction systematically. The target of debt reduction was set 
at 20 per cent overall, even though for half of that amount 
reduction was to be done voluntarily. The target of 20 per 
cent reduction has been seen as unrealistic, too little and too 
late, in view of the worsening debt situation in the developing 
countries. It is instructive to look at the logic and 
objectives of structural adjustment to understand the interests 
behind the position taken by the various groups of countries 
involved in the politics of structural adjustment. Furthermore 
the involvement of the World Bank and the IMF with SAPs in 
structural adjustment needs to be critically investigated to 
reveal the extent to which they serve the interests of 
creditor-countries at the expense of the economic recovery and 
development of Africa. This way, the cover of neutrality under 
which they operate can be removed for the interests which they 
serve to be clearly brought out.
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The Bretton Woods Institutions and Structural Adjustment in 
Africa
Africa has now been made a major target of World Bank and 
IMF activities as a result of the crisis which has persisted in 
the 1980*s. So much is this involvement that the presence of 
these Bretton Woods Institutions is as pervasive as the crisis 
afflicting the continent today. The institutions and the 
economic crisis now seem to co-exist as two sides of a major 
problem in Africa. The involvement of the World Bank and the 
IMF in Africa goes far back to the colonial era, even though 
this has intensified in the 1980s. Before the 1980s an 
institution such as the World Bank was involved in programmes 
which were aimed at alleviating poverty and promoting growth. 
This was the case with the Bank’s Agricultural Projects (ADPs) 
and even infrastructural development. The IMF mainly concerned 
itself with the balance of payment surveillance. But these 
activities were on a small scale compared to the situation 
since 1979. For example, IMF credit to Sub-Saharan Africa 
between 1970 and 1978 accounted for only 3 per cent of its 
financing facilities. (23) But this rose significantly in the 
1980s with most of it directed towards supporting the 
structural adjustment programmes as we show below.
From this modest involvement, the IMF significantly 
stepped up its activities as the crisis unfolded in the 1980s. 
Many Fund financing facilities such as the standby arrangement
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(SBA) and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) were increasingly 
used to provide credit to Sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of 
the Standby arrangement which usually runs for one year, it has 
been adapted or used in conjunction with other facilities to 
make loan arrangements longer. Thus, from a modest SDR 0,15 
billion amount of credit made available to Africa at the end of 
1977, it rapidly increased to SDR 4.4 billion at the end of 
1984, and peaked at SDR 4.7 billion at the end of 1985 before 
declining to SDR 4.5 billion one year later. (24) By 1986 when 
the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) was introduced, the 
IMF was already a major creditor to Africa but it was also a 
major recipient of resources from the continent.
The World Bank also shifted its area of activity away from 
the medium- and long-term project lending to policy leading 
since 1979. This came with the introduction of Sectoral 
Adjustment loans (SECALs) in 1979 and Structural Adjustment 
Loans (SALs) in 1980. The use of these two types of credit 
facilities was to support comprehensive policy and 
institutional reforms both within a sector and ifl the economy 
as a whole. Conditionality was attached to them, with the use 
of SECALs requiring an agreement of "specific monitorable 
program..." and SALs, an agreement on "effective stabilisation 
program". (25) This development also led to a steep rise in 
the level of World Bank lending under both arrangements. For 
instance, out of a total of 52 SECALs committed in the period 
1979 to 1986, 25 were granted to Sub-Saharan Africa. (26) The
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SAL has also been widely used because of Its quick disbursing 
nature and also that It is used directly to support government 
budgets, imports, as well as debt-servicing.
Moreover, when account is taken of the fact that the 
global crisis of the 1970s has transformed the international 
economy into a trans-national system it becomes very clear how 
significant the Berg Report was. What is unique about trans­
nationalisation the structuralists argue, is,the emergence of 
a system more powerful than national government and 
"overlapping national states de facto and even de jure", (27) 
and the fact that the US economy remains a hegemonic part of 
this system. As Osvaldo Sunkel has asserted,
The interests of trans-national capitalism require the 
restructuring of both the world economy and its core, the 
United States economy, so that they can become mutually 
compatible and functional to the further progress of the 
trans-nationalisation process. The aim would be the 
elimination (or renovation) of those branches of the 
United States economy which are no longer internationally 
competitive... On the other hand, structural adjustments 
are being pressed on developing countries which would 
encourage them to concentrate on internationally 
competitive branches and open up to the more efficient and 
dynamic science-and-technology-based industries and 
services located mainly in the United States, but also in 
other home countries of TNCs. (28)
The internationalisation of production has meant that 
accumulation has become the dominant determinant of such issues 
as the level of industrialisation in the Third World (29) and 
also the movement of investment. The internationalisation of 
production has also increasingly meant that African countries 
are unable to pursue their interests when these run counter to
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the logic of accumulation which determines the movement of
capital . The implication of this is that to have an
international economy operated by market forces in the context
of the current crisis,
... national adjustment at the state or sub-state level in 
the Third World is seen as much more important than global 
adjustment, or more plainly, movement towards a New 
International Economic Order. (30)
It is in this respect that the World Bank’s Strategy of 
Structural Adjustment as argued in the Berg Report has 
recommended among other things, the pursuit of recovery through 
export-led growth and curbing of the role of the state in the 
economy. To this extent, the Berg Report was a significant 
representation of the position of the major Western economic 
powers on the global crisis. Also, it has been argued that 
this World Bank document prepared "the way for the
unprecedented seizure by the donor community of the levers of 
policy in the beleaguered nations of Africa." (31) And that 
the choice of the Bretton Woods institutions to supervise SAPs 
in Africa was therefore, necessary. Furthermore, it is also 
observed that the IMF and World Bank are safer political 
instruments to use because of the influence they wield in the 
international financial system. As financial institutions 
which operate as business outfits themselves, they have
experience in dealing with, and have influence on, the Third 
World countries; a situation that has been helped by their
perception as politically neutral bodies. Moreover, their 
dominant role in the World economy since 1945 makes them
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appropriate instruments to be used in addressing the current 
crisis.
The Bretton Woods institutions are therefore said to be 
more concerned with the goal of constructing a "World system 
where capital and trade flows are free from national controls 
and the role of national states in finance and investment is 
cut back." (32) That the need for national growth is treated 
as secondary, even though adjustment programmes are imposed as 
necessary prerequisites to enable these debtor countries to 
achieve viable growth.
To help the institutions attain the above objective, so 
the argument runs, they have acquired the power todictate the 
policies of debtor states through the need to secure the 
approval of the IMF as a precondition for access to external 
finance from both official and private sources. Furthermore, 
they are seen as taking advantage of the vulnerable position of 
these countries, "because balance of payments financing and the 
external financing of development projects and programmes are 
necessary requirement for individual countries1 development 
strategies". (33) With all other sources of external finance 
now unavailable, African countries have been left at the mercy 
of the IMF and World Bank as the only sources of external 
finance and relief even though their terms are difficult. The 
use of cross-conditionality between the World Bank and the IMF 
is seen by some critics as an evidence of this situation.
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The term conditionality refers to the macro-economic 
policies which countries have to meet in order to qualify for 
loans from the IMF and other international sources. Usually, 
the World Bank also attaches the same conditions which the IMF 
has imposed on a given country, for its own loans such as the 
SALs. When conditions are imposed on the same country by 
either of these institutions in addition to those of the other, 
it is described as cross-conditionality. The IMF and the World 
Bank have often applied the same conditions on a country if 
they are both involved with structural reforms.
Backed by its charter which proclaims the IMFfs 
objectives,among others, to * seek the elimination of exchange 
restrictions that hinder the growth of world trade1; the Fund, 
Harris asserts, has had the power to operate the World economy 
towards this overriding goal of the growth and development of 
world trade. This means that states which have lost their 
purchasing power or credit worthiness must be helped to regain 
it so that they can continue to buy in the market. As has been 
argued,
Countries that consistently import more than they export 
needed financial help so as not to withdraw from trade.
No loans, no purchases. IMF intervention not only 
maintains them as participants in world markets but also, 
through adjustment programmes, forces them to increase 
that participation, even if this is demonstrably against 
the best interests of the people concerned. (34)
The process of ensuring the continued participation of 
these poor and heavily indebted countries in the world market
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has been by promoting the policy of growth through trade. 
Thus, "between 1980 and 1988, thirty-three African countries 
had concluded Standby Arrangement Facilities and twelve had 
Extended Fund Facility from the IMF and fifteen had Structural 
Adjustment loans from the World Bank".(35) To adequately assess 
the impact of the SAPs on Africa1 s economies, it is necessary 
to first look at the debate on the theoretical foundation of 
these policies as well as their contents. It is to this debate 
that we now turn.
 A Review of the Structural Adjustment Debate
The release of the Berg Report by the World Bank in 1981 
kindled an intense debate over how best to tackle the economic 
crisis in Africa in the 1980s. As an antithesis to the African 
position expressed in the Lagos Plan of Action, it naturally 
attracted angry criticism and even condemnation from 
Africa.(36) Also, as the position supported by the powerful 
industrial capitalist countries, the World Bank document easily 
took the centre stage and effectively dislodged the LPA from 
the agenda of the development debate. The failure of African 
governments to take the action needed to implement the LPA 
helped to push it to the sidelines. In reality, without 
massive external assistance towards its implementation,the LPA 
was no more than a declaration of intention or a dream • 
African states were hardly in a position to act on the LPA,
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because they lacked the resources to do so. In contrast, the 
Berg Report contained clear and specific policy measures which 
could be Implemented relatively easily, and had the full 
support of the major economic powers. The Berg Report was 
therefore transformed Into the major policy document on 
tackling the African Crisis. For this, it received much more 
attention (some critical) from many quarters. It is in this 
context that the debate is assessed. We look at the kind of 
issues which have been raised and the areas of agreement and 
differences.
The debate is mainly between the orthodox school on the
one hand and a variety of alternative explanations on the
other. The Bretton Woods institutions and their major
shareholders like the USA, Britain, Japan and West Germany have
been the exponents of orthodoxy which they have been
implementing through SAPs in Africa. Challenging this position
is a body of critics which includes structuralists, officials
from African countries, staff of international institutions,
non-governmental organisations, etc. The debate has been
bitter sometimes, and the focus has mainly been on:
... the pace and sequencing of measures to open economies 
to international markets, the appropriate roles and limits 
of states and markets in promoting growth and other 
national objectives, and the allocation of transitional 
costs. (37)
The theoretical basis of the orthodox IMF/World Bank type 
of Structural Adjustment is to be found in classical economic
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theory and monetarism. The basic argument here is that,
••.output, employment, and prices (including wages, 
interest rates and the exchange rates) are best determined 
by the free play of market forces, and that prices are the 
most effective instruments for the efficient allocation of 
resources. The argument is, of course, based on the 
assumption that economic structures are time invariant and 
sufficiently flexible so that demand and supply changes 
respond promptly to market signals. (38)
Thus, the African economic crisis has been analysed as 
originating from the fact that "the level of domestic 
consumption relative to domestic production capacity is too 
high". (39) In other words, a country in this position is said 
to be living above its means, and this leads to huge budget 
deficits, external imbalances and indebtedness. Therefore, the 
only way to tackle this problem of excessive aggregate domestic 
demand caused by excessive credit expansion, is through a 
general squeeze in domestic aggregate demand. This is further 
necessitated by the terrible economic state in which these 
countries have found themselves in the 1980s. In the external 
environment, they have experienced declining export commodity 
prices; increases in world interest rates, and the virtual 
drying-up of foreign financial inflows. This resulted in 
increased cost of borrowing, increased scarcity of foreign 
exchange in the domestic economy, high rates of inflation and 
the like. It is further argued that countries in this situation 
need to recover their credit-worthiness by attaining a new and 
sustainable external asset equilibrium.
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The Structural Adjustment programme Is seen as the best
approach towards resolving this crisis. In this respect,
therefore, adjustment has been defined
As the adaptation of consumption patterns, the 
reallocation of resources and the changes in factor 
accumulation necessary to recover sustained growth in the 
face of a more adverse external environment. (AO)
It is expected that adjustment will improve the current account
position through expenditure reduction by curtailing domestic
consumption of goods which can be traded internationally, and
by expenditure-switching policies that change the prices of
these goods relative to non-traded goods. This way, imports
are reduced and exports increased, thereby improving the trade
balance. The reduction in domestic demand will also be done
through monetary credit squeeze.
The IMF and the World Bank have supported Structural 
Adjustment programmes either separately or jointly in about 
thirty-three African countries. Since 1980 the IMF has 
supported adjustment programmes in Africa through upper-credit 
tranche standby arrangements, extended facilities, Structural 
Adjustment facility, and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
facility. Initially, these arrangements were seen as balance 
of payments support measures intended to last between one to 
two years. Since the mid-1980s when these institutions began 
to accept the idea of adjustment with growth, the period of 
support scheme was extended. The IMF mainly focussed its 
attention on the reduction of deficits in the current accounts
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balance of payments and the elimination of deficit financing. 
The World Bank also complemented the activities of the IMF by 
concerning itself with the reduction in size of the public 
sector as well as improving managerial efficiency; the 
elimination of price distortions in the economy; the 
liberalisation of trade, export promotion and domestic savings.
The degree of co-operation between the IMF and the World 
Bank is represented by the conditionality and cross­
conditionality which they impose on countries as the price they 
have to pay in order to have access to external loans. This 
conditionality has been extended by the World Bank into 
sectoral, institutional and other micro-economic levels before 
it gives SECALs and SALs to countries. This conditionality 
translates into the following policy instruments;
(a) exchange rate adjustment, mainly through devaluation;
(b) interest rate policy designed to promote domestic
savings and appropriate allocation of resources;
(c) control of money supply and credit;
(d) fiscal policy aimed at reducing government expenditure
deficits financing;
(e) trade and payment liberalisation, and
(f) deregulation of prices of goods, services and factor
inputs. (41)
Translated into action these policies are mainly trying to 
promote the greater use of market forces such as the creation 
of more open trade regimes and environment that permits the 
free flow of foreign private capital. It means that the 
currency must be devalued severely to stimulate exports by 
making them cheaper in foreign currency, and reduce imports by
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making them more expensive in local currency. Also real 
interest rates are used to help mobilise domestic savings by 
making borrowing very costly. These interest rates are also 
expected to be competitive internationally enough to encourage 
foreign capital inflows. (42) Prices are to be freely 
determined by the forces of supply and demand, and that means 
that subsidies must be abolished. There should also be a 
reduction in the role of the state in the economy through 
privatisation of parastatals. More incentives should be given 
to the private sector such as wage-freeze and the like to make 
it more attractive for capital to stay. It is these policies, 
as implemented by the IMF and the World Bank, with the support 
of their sponsors that have generated intensive debate 
throughout the 1980s as to their relevance to the African 
crisis.
The IMF-World Bank SAPs have been subjected to severe 
criticisms and even outright condemnation by many commentators. 
(43) This is in spite of the apparent agreement on all sides 
that African economies need Structural Adjustment. (44) There 
has been a measure of consensus on such issues as getting 
prices right, and even exchange rates. (45) However, the 
fundamental question which critics have asked is to what norm 
African economies are being structurally adjusted. (46) This 
and other areas have been taken up in the criticisms of SAP.
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The significant point that has been made about the norm to
which African economies are being adjusted is the view that
IMF/World Bank SAPs contain in them the ideological preference
for market forces. The transformation of the global economy to
a stage in which production has been internationalised and
accumulation and the movement of capital also likewise
affected, has raised the need to create a market-orientated
international economy. The free market orientation of SAP is
to give international capital freedom of mobility without state
intervention. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary
system in the early 1970s, the IMF has been involved in the
construction of a free market-orientated international economy.
It is the objective of SAP to integrate African economies to
the World economy this way. As Laurence Harris has argued:
The international economy is not a free market economy 
where trade and capital movement are dictated by relative 
prices, market interest rates and free exchange rates. 
Although such variables do have a major influence they do 
so within a framework where market forces are fractured 
and controlled by states and multinational corporations, 
and this absence of laissez-faire has been the rule since 
the beginning of the capitalist world market. Thus, the 
IMF’s objective, reflected in the conditions imposed on 
borrowers and requiring them to ’liberalise1, is not so 
much to return those countries to a normal relationship 
with the international economy, it is not in fact to 
correct ’distortions* from the norm or, in the wider view, 
to maintain a free market international system. It is, 
instead, to construct such a system. (47)
In the same vein, the short-term character especially of 
IMF SAP, it has been argued, cannot solve Africa’s structural 
problems, (48) even though the variables used may have long­
term impacts on these economies. The need to go beyond day-to-
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day crisis management and adopt long-term goals has been 
emphasised. (49) Likewise it has also been argued that because 
of the structural problems facing Sub-Saharan African 
economies, their capacity to adjust is low and SAPs might not 
be expected to work well. That there are even theoretical 
reasons for this expected failure of the adjustment programmes. 
(50) The view that SAP measures are not suited to tackling 
Africa*s problems but rather for more advanced economies, is 
held in high quarters in Africa. (51)
The pursuit of internal monetary balance and exchange rate
adjustment as the central concern irrespective of the causes of
disequilibrium in payments has also been attacked. (52) As
Loxley has observed:
Domestic demand restraint can be expected to have little 
impact either by way of reducing import expenditures or by 
freeing up local goods for expanded export earnings 
because the substitutability of traded for non-traded 
goods is generally quite low in SSA; imports do not 
compete with goods produced locally, while exports are not 
usually consumed locally to any significant degree. The 
possibilities of improving the balance of trade through 
expenditure switching are, therefore, quite limited. (53)
The choice of export-orientated growth as an SAP measure
has received critical attention. It was attacked on the logic
of the ’fallacy of composition*, as it was argued that prices
of primary commodities on world markets would be smaller not
greater. Elliot Berg responds to this criticism by accepting 
that "not all countries will follow counsel to expand primary 
exports..", (54) and the World Bank has since abandoned its
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emphasis on primary commodity exports as a central component of
structural adjustment. While maintaining that industrialisation
is the way to enhance export earnings, Nyirabu has observed in
this regard, (the logic of this is brought out in detail in our
case studies) that
efficient import-substitution and efficient export 
promotion are not alternatives, but necessary complements, 
if we are ever to regain external balance. (55)
However, Africa unlike the NICs of Asia, cannot 
successfully pursue export-orientated industrialisation because 
of such factors as high costs of skilled labour due to 
scarcity, lack of wage restraint and appropriate labour laws, 
and poor infrastructures compared to these countries. On the 
whole, Africa lacks the factors which have been critical in 
helping the NICs attain rapid industrialisation. These factors 
include;
geographical location to facilitate quick movement of 
whole factories by trans-national corporations; political 
stability| pre-existing technological infrastructure from 
earlier ISI, coupled with full utilisation of capacity; 
the role of the state as guarantor of investment and as 
active participant. (56)
This has led to some people arguing that SAP will merely
consolidate Africafs marginal position in the new international
division of labour as a raw material producer.
Even on agriculture where there is agreement that this 
sector should lead economic recovery, unlike the World Bank, 
emphasis is laid on food production. This position has been 
justified on the grounds that increased food production would
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help save scarce foreign exchange; it would prevent changes 
taking place in food preferences as well as minimise dependence 
on food aid,(57) On pricing policy, several scholars have 
argued that price incentives will not increase exports, because 
there is hardly any room for expenditure switching and also 
because non-price factors often play a more crucial role in 
export expansion. Peasants, it is also argued, are more likely 
to increase production in response to incentive goods such as 
health, education, rural water supply and the like, rather than 
to higher prices which do not improve their income terms of 
trade, (58) And that a focus on prices alone may only worsen 
inflationary pressures. (59)
A related area is that of liberalisation of trade, which,
it has also been argued, will not aid towards economic recovery
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, trade liberalisation simply
opens up weak economies to powerful external economic forces to
dominate. As Reginald Green has argued,
Trade liberalisation rests on the assumption of relatively 
full employment globally and nationally. Clearly neither 
the world economy nor Sub-Saharan African economies in any 
way approximate to full employment. Protection and 
import-license allocation can promote higher domestic 
output than a liberal trade regime if they lead to full 
employment of domestic plants, raw materials and labour 
which would otherwise be unemployed... At present in 
Africa wholesale removal of industrial protection would 
mean wholesale de-industrialisation, not selective 
restructuring of the sector. (60)
Furthermore, it has been argued that credit policy only 
sets in inflationary pressures when used as an instrument of
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demand management. Even if it succeeds in improving the 
current account position, it is deflationary and will severely 
reduce investment and also the Capital Stock. (61) Also the 
establishment of positive real interest rates compounds the 
problem by causing inflation and even recession when these 
rates become a significant part of the total cost of 
production. Wage-demands are certain to result from such a 
development thereby pushing inflation higher. Savings, which 
are expected to rise because high interest rates have made it 
more profitable to save and more expensive to borrow, may not 
actually do so. (62)
Devaluation has been declared to be of dubious value in an
African economy undertaking it as part of SAP. Critics are
sceptical about the orthodox argument that devaluation
stimulates exports and reduces imports by making them more
expensive in the local currency as well as the local
substitutes, while exporters are made cheaper. They assert
that in the end, devaluation does not improve output, it
instead deflates the economy by reducing critical imports.
Large-scale devaluation harms the economy more.
Furthermore, devaluation has a direct impact on inflation 
through increase in the domestic costs of imported inputs 
and/or reduces the quantities of inputs which are imported 
at higher prices, thus leading to under-utilisation of 
industrial capacity. (63)
As for the claim that the kind of devaluation demanded by the 
IMF will reduce the activities of the parallel and illegal
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markets; reduce leakages through smuggling; favourably impact
on manufacturing balance; restore budgetary balance and
increase the official foreign exchange resources; (64) it is
argued that the African situation does contradict its validity.
For instance, smuggling does not occur not only to get
convertible currency but also to get around the controls
imposed by governments on the import of luxury goods. Also, as
Singh has found in Tanzania,
... with respect to the Parallel market for the foreign 
exchange, the primary determinant of demand in this market 
is the desire of a section of business community and other 
rich Tanzanians to repatriate some of their wealth abroad. 
The exchange rate of this market is not therefore 
determined by the underlying health of the economy or 
current account considerations, but by reasons of capital 
flight. (65)
The legitimacy of conditionality has also been questioned. 
Here, it is asserted that conditionality and cross­
conditionality, performance criteria and the class nature of 
conditionality have tended to erode the sovereignty of 
reforming countries. Not only does conditionality open these 
states to interference in their economic policy-making process 
from the IMF, the World Bank and Paris Club, it is also used to 
satisfy the political interests of the most powerful members of 
these institutions. Thus, countries carrying out structural 
adjustment are having to surrender the right to take long-term 
economic decisions to devote most of the time and resources on 
day-to-day crisis management to fulfil conditionalities, cross­
conditionalities and performance criteria before they can have 
their debts rescheduled or new loans given. Conditionality is
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also opposed for what Is described as Its class nature because
often it is the well-to-do who implement the austerity measures
that receive relief exemption while the majority of the people
who did not contribute to the debt crisis are made to bear the
burden of adjustment, (66) John Loxley observes that
Fund programs make no attempt to guarantee employment 
levels nor to preserve or extend the provision of basic 
needs. They often have their most negative effects on 
low-income urban dwellers by raising unemployment, by 
cutting subsidies and government spending, and by raising 
inflation while restraining wage adjustments. But the 
rural poor may also be affected adversely by cuts in 
spending and may benefit little from changes in the 
internal terms of trade, (67)
Privatisation has also been a subject of contention. The
privatisation component of SAP it has been argued, will not
necessarily improve the performance of the hitherto inefficient
public enterprises. Instead, it will only "tighten the grip of
imperialist monopoly capital over the African economies". (68)
Furthermore, the critics argue that the assumption that the
private sector is superior to the public sector is not only
without any theoretical foundation, it is also incorrect to
argue that the indigenous private sector in Africa is strong
enough to take over and efficiently run state enterprise. They
point to the fact that
In African countries, where this generally is not true, 
privatisation could lead to the take-over of these public 
enterprises by trans-national corporations thereby 
deepening further their external dependence. What is 
worse is the substitution of the profitability criterion 
for the social welfare criterion in vital areas such as, 
Water Supply in a continent where the majority of the 
population has no access to portable water. (69)
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On the basis of the criticisms made above and the fact 
that SAPs normally put less emphasis on the supply side, it is 
argued that they will not achieve the goal of economic recovery 
and development in Africa. It is also asserted that it is 
difficult to conceive how African economies can recover through 
SAP, a programme which is fundamentally deflationary, because 
an economy which is experiencing declining per capita incomes 
cannot be expected to recover from its crisis if all that SAP 
does is deflate the economy. To reverse trends such as this 
there must be growth in per capita incomes. This will 
necessitate the fundamental revision of SAPs as they operate in 
Africa today.
Some of these criticisms of the SAPs were bound to have an 
influence on the IMF and the World Bank. The status of the 
critics would also have been a significant influence on the 
Bretton Woods institutions. As we have seen, some of them were 
influential academics,institutions which were closely involved 
in the development process in Africa, and African officials who 
were involved in the implementation of SAPs in their own 
countries. Thus, the Bretton Woods institutions were put on 
the defensive by these criticisms. The World Bank seemed to 
confirm, on 8 March 1989,this when it issued (with the UNDP) a 
report in defense of SAPs in Africa entitled, Africa's 
Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s • The World Bank's claims 
in this report drew a prompt critical response from the ECA 
thereby reflecting the sharp divisions between the IMF/World
175
Bank on the one hand and the OAU/ECA on the other, on the 
issues of SAPs • The ECA study was published in April 1989 
under the title Statistics and Policies: ECA Preliminary
Observations on the World Bank Report, Africafs Adjustment and 
Growth in the 1980s. We review the two positions here to 
demonstrate the rather acrimonious tone which the debate on 
SAPs had now assumed.
The World Bank report set out to show that the SAPs were
working well in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in those
countries where the reforms were seriously implemented. (70)
In its upbeat assessment of the situation in Africa, the report
began by disagreeing with the common view of Africa "as a
continent in unrelenting decline". It argued that
On closer examination, however, the statistics commonly 
reported mask a more complex, less dismal picture. When 
recent trends are put in the longer perspective of the 
past 15 to 20 years - or when Sub-Saharan Africa is 
disaggregated into important country groups, including 
those that have, or have not, pursued significant policy 
reforms - the crisis seems less precipitous, and the road 
to recovery more obvious and more manageable. (71)
The World Bank also did not agree that external conditions 
were hostile to Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, it argued that 
the region had in fact been more favoured by global conditions 
than other parts of the developing world. Thus, the sharp drop 
in the region*s export earnings, financial flows, terms of 
trade, and capacity to import, since 1980 was seen as a return 
to the long-term trend rather than a persistent decline. 
Therefore, though export earnings fell, this was not drastic
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and most of the decline came from falling oil prices; the 
region’s overall terms of trade were higher by about 15 per 
cent than in the early 1970s; and African non oil exporters 
have been better off than other developing regions, because 
tropical beverage prices remained relatively high. Moreover, 
Africa was said to have had more favourable access to 
industrial country markets than other developing regions; and 
receives more official foreign assistance and debt relief 
relative to its GDP and population than other regions. The 
World Bank concluded on the basis of this that Africa’s crisis 
could not be satisfactorily explained as a result of hostile 
external environment.
The Bank saw domestic factors as the obstacles to 
adjustment. These domestic problems included high population 
growth, structural rigidities, and institutional weaknesses, as 
well as poor policies. Also, Africa’s export growth is behind 
other regions; its non-oil export volumes have stagnated and 
manufactured exports have not grown; the market for primary 
commodities has shrunk and half of its 1970 world market had 
been lost by 1983. Other domestic constraints include 
government controls and restrictions; high exchange rates and 
over-valued currencies; weak and inadequate infrastructure; low 
rates of domestic savings and investment; weak manufacturing 
sector and limited technological options.
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Despite these problems which the Bank enumerated, it still
asserted that there were signs of a turn around. The region’s
GDP was said to have grown more than 2.3 per cent a year
between 1985 and 1987. The Bank even argued that the GDP
growth was better at 2.9 per cent when the five oil-exporting
countries were excluded. Agriculture was said to have strongly
improved with the annual rate of growth for 1985-88 tripling
the average over the previous fifteen years. These
improvements have been attributed by the World Bank to the
implementation of SAPs by African governments. The World Bank
asserts that governments which sustained strong reform
programmes succeeded in improving their economic situation.
These countries were also rewarded by donors with increased aid
and debt relief, while countries which did not pursue reforms
did not do well and saw a decline in net ODA. The Bank asserts
categorically that
... When the performance of reforming countries is 
compared with that of non-reforming countries, there is 
evidence that the combination of reforms and added 
assistance has led to higher agricultural growth, faster 
export growth, stronger GDP growth, and larger investment 
- this is despite the less favourable terms of trade 
facing the reforming countries. (72)
The ECA challenged these World Bank conclusions on a 
number of issues. (73) The Bank report was criticised for 
adopting a narrow perspective by limiting itself to observing a 
few economic indicators in order to prove that countries with 
strong reforms and without shocks performed better than others. 
The classification of countries into those with strong, weak
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and no reform programmes was criticised as arbitrary. The ECA 
report also takes issue with the Bankfs use of 1985 as the 
starting line of its assessment when SAPs have been in place 
since 1960; and not in line with the practice in other World 
Bank reports such as its Adjustment Lending (1988). The Bank 
report is said to be very misleading in its underlying 
assumptions, the compilation and analysis of data, its failure 
to include a data set for all countries so that conclusions can 
easily be checked. Furthermore, on the issue of data, the ECA 
has argued that the pitching of Sub-Saharan African oil- 
exporters against Sub-Saharan African oil-importers as the 
World Bank report has done is one-dimensional reasoning. Along 
with the use of varying base years for indicators even within 
the same table by the Bank report, the ECA has questioned the 
accuracy and validity of the statistical tables in Chapter Six 
of the Bank report.
Another objection which the ECA made to the Bank report 
was what it saw as the report’s simplified approach to Africa’s 
crisis. The Bank’s assertion that Africa’s crisis is "less 
precipitous" is seen as under-playing the persisting 
vulnerability of African economies due to dependence on 
international commodity and financial markets, official 
development assistance, etc. The Bank is also criticised for 
not treating the impacts of SAPs on social conditions, the 
social costs, and the welfare of the majority of people, in its 
report. This omission by the World Bank is seen as surprising
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because other findings such as the Khartoum Declaration, the
report of the UN Secretary-General on the mid-term review of
the Implementation of UNPAAERD in 1988; findings of the ECA, 
UNICEF and ILO as well as their conclusions clearly show that 
orthodox SAPs have not only ignored the human dimension but 
also worsened the well-being of the majority of the population.
Moreover, the findings of the World Bank report are said
to be at variance with the evidence presented by the Bank in 
two previous reports (Beyond Adjustment 1988 and Adjustment 
Lending 1988). The ECA has asserted that its own re­
compilation and analysis of World Bank GDP data reveals a 
different picture than the one presented in the Bank report. 
According to the ECA, its
... compilation shows that during 1980-1987 the 
performance of Sub-Saharan African countries with strong 
SAPs was the worst of any group; a negative annual average 
growth rate of -0.53 pre cent contrasted with a positive 
2.00 per cent for countries with weak structural 
adjustment programmes and a relatively strong positive 
rate of 3.5 per cent for non-adjusting countries in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. The aggregation of these three growth 
rates amounts to a 0.24 per cent average growth rate from 
1980-1987 for all Sub-Saharan countries. (74)
Therefore, the ECA accuses the World Bank of manipulating data
in order to prove a predetermined position. Essentially, the
report is seen as a political attempt by the Bank to put a
brave face on SAPs which were already proving a failure in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
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The seriousness of the disagreements on the impacts of 
SAPs in Africa following the response of the ECA to the World 
Bank report led World Bank President, Barber Conable, to call a 
high-level meeting between officials of the UN, IMF, World Bank 
and African institutions. The meeting managed to achieve a 
truce, and a communique issued at the end of the meeting on 10 
May 1989 put emphasis on:
- closer consultation between the UN, African regional 
organisations and the Bank and IMF on all important 
issues;
- the necessity for Africa to continue on the difficult 
course of reform;
- the necessary broadening of the adjustment process to 
integrate social and human dimensions and long-term 
objectives;
- commitment to the UN Programme of Action for African 
Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD), particularly 
its sectoral priorities;
- the importance of institutional capacity building. (75)
This new understanding by these institutions not only to 
disagree but also to work towards a consensus, seemed to be 
reflected in the subsequent publication of documents by both 
the ECA and the World Bank. The ECA launched a report 
outlining the African position on how the crisis should be 
tackled, in July 1989, entitled African Alternative Framework 
for Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic 
Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP). The AAF-SAP advocates a 
move beyond short-term adjustment and seeks a transformation of 
the structures of the economies responsible for the crisis. It 
therefore suggests general policy directions and specific 
policy options for countries to adapt to their local situations 
in the process of transformation.
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The AAF-SAP expresses these policy directions and 
instruments in three modules. (76) The first module relates to 
the generation of factor products; and this is directed at 
enhancing production and efficient use of resources; at greater 
and efficient domestic resource mobilisation; at improving 
human resource capacity; scientific and technological 
development; and vertical and horizontal diversification. The 
second module stresses the allocation of factor income which 
involves creating a pragmatic balance between the public and 
private sectors; a conducive environment for sustainable 
development; shifting the use of resources away from non­
productive areas; and improving the pattern of income 
distribution among different social groups and households. 
Finally, the third module is on the expenditure of income and 
it aims to attain food self-sufficiency; the reduction of 
import dependence; re-aligning consumption patterns with 
production patterns; and the management of debt and debt- 
servicing.
The World Bank on its part published a rather conciliatory 
document in November 1989, entitled Sub-Saharan Africa; from 
Crisis to Sustainable Growth. This document was the result of 
consultations between the Bank andmany organisations and 
individuals in Africa. Basically, the Bank called an end to 
its disagreements with other organisations like the ECA whose 
arguments it now accepted. The Bank now advocates a strategy 
of sustained and equitable growth. (77) This strategy requires
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the creation of an enabling environment in terms of 
infrastructures and incentives for efficient production; 
building capacities of people and institutions; investing in 
people; slowing population growth; attacking poverty; better 
education and health care for the people; greater regional co­
operation between African states; etc. This Bank study is a 
significant departure from the earlier report which caused 
considerable anger and disappointment in Africa and the United 
Nations. It has tried to combine its orthodoxy and the ECA/OAU 
emphasis on recovery and transformation.
Conclusion
From the debate on the efficacy of IMF/World Bank SAPs in 
Africa, there has emerged a consensus that there should be a 
heterodox* approach to adjustment, or 1 adjustment with 
growth*. It is too early to say whether this consensus will 
lead to any change in policy in African countries. In other 
words, adjustment must create conditions conducive to recovery 
and development instead of worsening the crisis. Some writers 
have therefore argued that for adjustment to contribute to 
recovery, the current hostile international environment must be 
changed. (78) It means also that the level of external 
assistance should improve to provide new resources for 
development,(79) although whether it will infact do so is 
questionable.
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There is also agreement on the need to ease the debt
burden before adjustment can be expected to lead to recovery.
Perhaps the most important obstacle to economic recovery in
Africa today is the debt problem, (80) The problem of debt-
servicing, the hard terms of rescheduling and the flexible
interest rates are all continuing to make African countries
lose more resources on debt-management. With African countries
losing more resources this way than they are able to attract
from outside, it is difficult to achieve any external balance
in their accounts and at the same time promote growth. It also
follows that adjustment should emphasise supply expansion
...[more than] traditional Fund programs, would avoid 
shock treatment and provide for more gradual, longer-term 
adjustment with more sensitivity to distributional 
issues...(81)
It has also been argued that SAP should rely less on 
market forces but instead blend them with direct control and 
regulation. Further, it should be long-term enough for these 
countries to achieve recovery and growth. The point is that 
in Africa, development can only be guaranteed if the state 
plays a significant role. This is largely how the states that 
are today known as NICs developed. They did so through very 
strong protectionist walls erected and maintained by the state 
whose participation in the economy was very significant. The 
opening up of African economies to hostile competition from 
advanced countries through liberalisation of trade and exchange 
rates, privatisation and the like, will only reverse the 
development process.
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The resolution of the economic crisis in Africa today is 
therefore better envisaged through the adoption of a heterodox 
strategy in economic policy-making. With attention firmly put 
on the goal of self-reliant and self-sustained development, a 
mixture of policies should be adopted in the short-to-medium- 
term to get to this goal. These policies should be a mixture 
of export-oriented growth and national/regional inward-looking 
economic integration. Each variety should receive attention 
and emphasis from time to time only when it is in the interest 
of the state concerned to do so. This approach is also 
necessitated by the fact that the IMF and the World Bank are 
trying to change Africa*s development paradigm from 
socialist/mixed economy to a market economy. These
institutions are not carrying out adjustment in Africa in the 
classical western sense. (82)
In the chapters that follow, we conduct a study of the 
SAPs in Ghana and Nigeria in the light of the debate reviewed 
above. The success of the SAPs will no doubt be evaluated on 
the basis of the propositions set out in the Introductory 
chapter. However, we shall also assess the extent to which the 
issues raised by the IMF and the World Bank on the one hand, 
and their critics on the other, are reflected in the situations 
in Ghana and Nigeria.
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CHAPTER 4
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN GHANA
When Ghana became independent in 1957, it was seen as a 
model of what an independent African country should be. It was 
one of the most prosperous countries on the continent, with 
cocoa, gold and timber underlining this prosperity as the main 
sources of its exports and wealth. The wealth generated by 
cocoa (which accounted for over two-thirds of export earnings) 
and timber and gold enabled the post-independence government of 
Kwame Nkrumah to embark on the ambitious programmes of 
developing Ghana and an active role in international affairs.
The Nkrumah government was able to achieve significant 
successes in both its African (indeed international) and 
domestic objectives. Ghana's prosperity enabled her to play an 
active role in the political development taking place on the 
African continent in a way no African country had done at the 
time. Ghana became the patron of many independence movements in 
Africa as was evidenced from the presence of these movements in 
Ghana as well as the assistance given to them to fight for 
independence in their various territories. Ghana also became a 
diplomatic centre and major proponent of African unity. The
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number of Pan-African meetings which took place in Ghana during 
Nkrumah's period in office and the material support given to a 
number of independent African countries underlined the 
prosperity and the willingness of the country to take on such 
heavy responsibilities.
On the domestic front, Nkrumah's government was able to 
promote development to a significant level. The government 
rapidly expanded educational and health services by 
establishing hospitals, clinics, schools and universities 
across the country. Nkrumah also established extensive 
economic infra-structure like transport and communications, 
energy, etc. The legacy of Nkrumah in this area was very 
impressive:
substantial nationalization and the state control of 
crucial sectors (banking, insurance, import/export, the 
internal distributive trade and gold-mining) occurred. 
There was also an exceptionally high rate of capital 
investment in industry, agriculture and social 
infrastructures, financed primarily through state 
appropriation of cocoa surplus but also through the 
expansion of the tax revenue base of the state; a major 
expansion of the cocoa exports (over 200 per cent between 
1959 and 1965) and significant re-orientation of external 
trade; and finally, in spite of continued dependence on 
imports, a major shift in the composition of imports from 
consumer to capital goods and raw materials. In these 
areas Ghana's achievements were unparalleled in Black 
Africa (1).
However, this process contained within it seeds of crisis 
and collapse, and Ghana started a long march towards decline 
after only four years of independence. Thus, as one scholar 
put it,
194
... just as Ghana pioneered political independence from 
colonial masters in Africa, so also has she pioneered a 
set of self-destructive economic policies which many more 
recently decolonized African countries have followed (2), 
The country drifted uncontrollably from the time of Nkrumah
through the coup which brought the National Liberation Council
(NLC) to power in 1966 to that which installed the Provisional
National Defence Council (PNDC) in power on 31 December 1981.
Several factors, both fundamental and 'propagative*, combined
to cause the crises which Ghana has experienced for over two
decades. Fundamental factors refer to the structures of the
economy which tend to promote excessive external dependence and
hinder self-reliant development. Those factors which tend to
propagate this crisis include an adverse external economic
environment, external debt, balance of payments and budget
deficits, corruption and other domestic structural distortions
which we identified in Chapter 2.
This chapter examines the nature of the crisis that has 
engulfed Ghana since the 1960s, and the factors responsible for 
the decline. The attempts to reverse the decline in the post­
independence period are also reviewed. The two phases of the 
structural adjustment programme implemented by PNDC between 
1983 and 1989 are discussed. Such a review of the background 
to the economic stagnation as well as the process of reversing 
it helps us to contrast the current reform programmes with 
those of the 1960s and 1970s, and to ease the task of assessing 
the impact of current adjustment programmes.
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DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT, CRISIS AND STABILISATION
Fundamentally, the Ghanaian economy was prone to serious
crisis because of the structural weaknesses inherent in it.
Like any African country, Ghana did not inherit an integrated
economy at independence. The way it was integrated into the
world economy did not produce a coherent economy; it created an
economy based on raw material export and the import of
manufactured goods. As Ray has observed,
Ghana had been engulfed by the world economy, but not 
totally transformed by it. The export of primary products 
such as cocoa, gold and timber dominated Ghana's economic 
activity (4).
A monocultural economy of this nature is always in danger
of being thrown into crisis either by external pressures such
as falling commodity prices, or the fall in domestic output due
to low producer prices, over-valued exchange rates and the
like. It is this dependence on single crop exports that makes
peripheral economies like Ghana's inherently prone to crisis,
whether this is measured in foreign exchange, shortage, budget
deficits or by some other means. Already in the case of Ghana,
serious economic problems emerged by 1960 when a trade deficit
of 35 per cent was recorded. Nkrumah's response came in 1961
when he replaced the Five Year Plan of 1959-1964 with the Seven
Year Development Plan of 1961. Through the 1961 Plan, he
imposed a Socialist Solution on the deteriorating economic
situation which centred on:
(i) a redirection in infrastructural development from 80 
per cent to 63 per cent
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(ii) increase in industrial and agricultural investment 
from 20 per cent to 37 per cent and 
(iii) emphasis on labour as the major element on national 
investment and development (5).
The Nkrumah government sought to reduce dependence on
cocoa and diversify the economy by expanding the role of the
state in it. As a result industrialisation was made a major
goal of policy. The industrialisation strategy that was adopted
as a result of this was that of import substitution. It was
envisaged that the state, and foreign capital would collaborate
to push Ghana towards industrialisation. The state was expected
to eventually become more dominant in the economy. The
strategy was that
Industrialisation would commence with light consumer 
industry on the basis of data furnished by existing 
foreign trade data (sic), and would take the form of (a) 
export valorisation on the one hand and (b) local 
substitution of imported commodities on the other. Light 
industry operations were expected to lead cumulatively to 
the establishment of a basis for heavy (producer - goods) 
in industry (6).
This drive towards industrialisation led to an immediate 
expansion of the public sector into manufacturing. State-owned 
industries were established in all areas ranging from bakeries 
to marble factories. In all, about 600 industries were planned 
for this period, but only 150 were completed by 1966 when the 
Nkrumah government was overthrown. The new industries tended 
to be grandiose and more expensive than those built before this 
period. For instance, the total cost of the three government 
factories commissioned in 1965 at £13.5 million, was more than
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three times the investment in all the state factories in 
existence in June 1961 (7), Moreover, most of these
enterprises were financed partly by suppliers' credits but the 
costs exceeded the foreign exchange savings from substituting 
locally made products for imports. Most of these projects were 
also overpriced and poorly designed.
The Nkrumah government also introduced exchange controls 
and made import licensing central to the management of the 
economy in order to control the outflow of scarce foreign 
exchange. Yet the government became a major consumer of 
foreign exchange. For instance, central government expenditure 
on new machinery and equipment imported in 1965 was 34 per cent 
higher than in the fiscal year 1960-61. The government's 
investment in new buildings and construction which had major 
imported components rose by 66 per cent over the period. Also 
in 1965, the public sector's share of gross fixed capital 
formation was 66 per cent compared with the 20 per cent in 
1958. Other sources of drain on foreign exchange were the 
importation of consumer goods, luxury goods and even raw 
materials and agricultural equipment. All these strained the 
current account considerably (Table 4.1).
TABLE 4.1
Ghana's Foreign Trade Deficits and Total Balance of
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Payments Deficits on Current Account: 1960-65
£ Million 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Imports
Consumer goods 64.7 70.6 55.9 51.3 40.8 54.9
Raw and semi-finished
materials 30.9 39.5 33.0 39.5 41.4 50.3
Capital equipment 28.0 26.7 21.3 32.3 32.4 48.3
Fuel and lubrication 5.9 6.0 6.5 7.2 7.0 6.5
Total Imports 129.5 142.8 116.7 130.3 121.6 160.0
Total Exports 116.0 115.1 115.0 108.9 114.6 113.4
Trade Deficit 13.5 27.7 1.7 21.4 7.0 47.6
Estimates of Total Deficit
on Current Account 33.5 52.7 28.3 45.8 33.6 74.5
Source: Ghana, Economic Survey(s), 1961, 1966; quoted in J D 
Esseks "Economic Policies" in D. Austin and R. Luckham (eds): 
Politicians And Soldiers in Ghana 1966-1972. London (Frank 
Cass) 1975 P. 57.
The Nkrumah government also mismanaged the economy in 
other respects. One way in which this mismanagement was 
carried out was through deficit financing. Deficit actually 
set in by 1961 when it was £37 million and continued to widen 
with the enormous expansion in public expenditure. The 
government resorted to borrowing from the banks to make
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subsidies available to the public enterprises whose 
expenditures had tripled, and to finance its budgetary
deficits. There was a rapid expansion in money supply as the 
state sector pumped more money into the economy. Thus, the 
average volume of cash and bank deposits available to both the 
government and the public increased by 46 per cent between 1963 
and 1965.
The government also continued to peg the producer price of 
cocoa, because this gave the government most part of the 
earnings from cocoa which it used in financing its huge
development plan. As a result of this, cocoa producers were 
exploited by the government and this discouraged production and 
led to large-scale smuggling of cocoa to Togo and Cote d'Ivoire 
where prices were higher. The state also squeezed out the
private sector by its entry into the distributive sector of the 
economy as well. For instance, in 1961 a state agency pushed 
all private buyers and four large co-operatives out of the 
internal marketing of cocoa. A year later the government took 
over the trading firm AG Leventis, thus extending its 
distributive network and monopolising the importation of basic 
consumer items such as milk, rice, flour, sugar and tinned 
fish. This growing role of the government in the economy 
culminated in the strategy of import substitution in which
industries were set up to produce goods which were usually 
imported.
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However, the experience with import substitution is that
unless the process is carefully managed, it can intensify the
disarticulation in the economy and hinder industrialisation.
This was the situation that Nkrumah created in Ghana: his
strategy of import-substitution industrialisation created more
dependence on imports of capital and consumer goods. By the
late 1950s this dependent industrialisation was consuming 80
per cent of planned government investment. Nkrumah also
borrowed heavily to finance this ambitious programme. By 1965,
the whole experiment was in danger of collapse as funds dried
up because of the fall in cocoa earnings and indebtedness. As
Hutchful has argued, while other factors such as mismanagement
contributed to the economic crisis that set in by 1965,
A central element in this was the kind of 
’industrialisation* attempted in Ghana, emphasising 
imports of plant, machinery, semi-finished materials, 
management and technical services, and high cost credits. 
First, given its high import content, this kind of 
industrialisation may actually accelerate rather than 
relieve pressure on balance of payments; at best it 
results not so much in a decline in absolute import levels 
as in a shift in the composition of imports. Second, 
export valorization, combined with import substitution, 
merely preserved the inherently disarticulated character 
of the economy, with the export on the one hand of semi­
processed, raw materials and the import on the other of 
raw or semi-finished industrial inputs. Little 
integration of national industry and domestic agriculture, 
a necessary condition for transforming other areas of the 
local economy, actually took place. Third, to the extent 
that most industrial activity* was in fact simple 
terminal stage processing (assembly activities, etc) the 
bulk of the value was already embodied in the imported 
semi-finished materials. ’Manufacturing* was thus unable 
to generate the value necessary for accelerated 
accumulation and transformation... (5),
The fundamental weaknesses in the Ghanaian economy, the
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mismanagement by the Nkrumah government, and the fall in cocoa 
prices by about 66 per cent during 1962/1966 plunged the 
country into crisis. The fall in the price of cocoa from 1961 
threw government finances into confusion. The government 
responded by running down the reserves which were exhausted by 
the end of 1965. It also resorted to credit and barter trade 
with Eastern European countries as well as borrowed extensively 
from other sources including the West. As a result, a huge 
national debt was built up amounting to 60 per cent of the GDP
by 1965, with foreign debt amounting to 30 per cent of the GDP
by the time the government was overthrown in 1966. Of this 
foreign debt, 70 per cent ($415 million) was medium term and 
very expensive.
The government further responded to the decline in its
finances by launching an austerity budget in fiscal year 1961- 
62. As part of the austerity measures a purchase tax and a
compulsory savings scheme was imposed, forcing all salaried 
workers to give up 5 per cent of their earnings as loans to the 
government • In addition to the excessive administrative 
controls imposed on the economy this exacerbated the crisis. 
Corruption took its toll mainly through import license 
racketeering and the inefficiency and wastefulness of the 
parastatals. Inflation soared as shortages of basic items 
which were usually imported, became common. All sections of 
the economy, including industry and agriculture, and public
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services suffered because imports had fallen. As a result , 
the black market, or Kalabule emerged and living standards 
fell. The worsening economic situation led workers to 
undertake various strike actions to protest against the 
declining living standards.
Along with this expansion of the state sector the
government went on to concentrate power both at the centre and 
in Nkrumah, that is in the person and office - and the two 
became indistinguishable- of the President himself. The 
Republican Constitution of 1960 was a major instrument of this 
centralisation of power. The Independence Constitution before 
it had provided for some form of local autonomy exercised
through the Regional Assemblies in an effort to encourage the 
development of consensus politics by giving people greater 
representation. These Regional Assemblies were abolished by
the Nkrumah government and replaced by local authorities which 
were powerless and put under the control of the Convention 
People*s Party (CPP) functionaries. The Socialist experiment 
in Ghana under the CPP was modelled after Stalinist regimes in 
the Eastern bloc countries.
These Stalinist tendencies were reflected in the merging 
of party and government and the attempt by the CPP to organise 
and control the rest of society. The passing of the Preventive 
Detention Act was a significant step in this move towards
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Stalinism. The Act was used to destroy the political 
opposition in the march towards the one party state. Other 
sections of the population were forcibly made to join the CPP. 
Thus the United Ghana Farmers Council (UGFC) was declared the 
only farmers* organisation in Ghana and affiliated to the CPP. 
The Industrial Relations Act made the Trade Union Congress 
(TUC) the only legal trade union organisation and also 
affiliated to the CPP. Other party organs included the 
National Council of Ghana Women, the Young Pioneers and similar 
groups.
The Republican Constitution introduced by Nkrumah 
therefore effectively rendered the people of Ghana powerless 
and transferred all power to Nkrumah as executive president and 
also a member of parliament. From then on, he went on to 
develop a personality cult and personalised rule. In 1961 
Nkrumah moved in on the CPP and took over the post of General 
Secretary in addition to his post as Life Chairman of the 
party. As the CPP became more isolated from the people like 
Nkrumah himself and began to fracture, he attacked those he 
accused of involvement in inner party squabbles. He also 
removed the old party leaders whom he accused of corruption, 
and threw some of them into detention while others were forced 
to escape into exile. His authoritarian rule attracted growing 
violent opposition with several attempts made on Nkrumah*s 
life. He responded to this by acquiring more power which he
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used to crush the opposition. By the time the one party state
was declared in February 1964, Nkrumah and the CPP had
significantly lost the mass following which they enjoyed in the 
early years after independence.
These political and economic problems completely engulfed 
Ghana. The government was left with little room to manoeuvre. 
It was in desperate need of resources to continue to finance 
its expensive socialist programme almost from its inception. 
The loss of revenue from cocoa and the general mismanagement of 
the economy combined to make Ghana insolvent by early 1966. 
Ghana clearly needed the goodwill of foreign creditors, 
suppliers and the like, to help her out of the crisis. But the 
goodwill that was there had been overspent even with Ghana*s
friends in the Eastern bloc. By the end of 1965, Ghana had
exceeded the limits of import surpluses allowed within the 
bilateral agreements with a majority of her ten Eastern bloc 
partners. The West refused to bail out the Nkrumah government 
when approached. With the pressure intensifying from within 
and externally, the Nkrumah government had to do the 
unthinkable.
These pressures forced the Nkrumah government to invite 
the IMF/World Bank to help it re-negotiate the external loans, 
in 1965. In its preliminary report, the IMF/World Bank 
observed that the Ghana economy was severely overstrained and
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recommended a period of consolidation. The kind of 
consolidation that the IMF/World Bank recommended Ghana to 
undertake involved budget cuts and reduction of the size and 
role of the public sector; restoration of the private sector to 
prominence; dismantling exchange rate controls, liberalising 
trade and imposing austerity including a cut in the producer 
price of cocoa. While the Nkrumah government agreed with most 
of the IMF/World Bank recommendations, it was still not willing 
to abolish the dominant role of the state in the economy. This 
led to disagreement between the two sides and it took a 
military coup on 22 February 1966 to break the deadlock.
The military coup which overthrew the Nkrumah government 
replaced it with a military junta under the name of the 
National Liberation Council (NLC). The new military government 
got the immediate recognition and support of the western powers 
who had helped to get rid of the ’socialist* government of 
Kwame Nkrumah. The IMF returned to Ghana with a stabilisation 
programme which, in addition to what the Nkrumah government was 
asked to do, now required the junta to reduce economic 
relations with Eastern Europe, sell off state enterprises, give 
a prominent role to foreign private capital and devalue the 
Cedi by 30 per cent (9). The NLC accepted the stabilisation 
programme and gave the IMF supervising power over the Ghana 
economy by having to obtain the approval of the IMF before 
carrying out any policy changes.
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The stabilisation programme covered the period 1966-68, 
The NLC was mainly concerned with budget balancing rather than 
transforming the economy away from the kind of structures which 
brought about the crisis. For instance, state budgeting 
expenditure was cut by about C60 million in 1966-67 over 1965; 
strict limits were imposed on bank credit and wage increases 
were kept at 5 per cent. The policy in agriculture was to 
discourage large-scale farms, limit the state sector to 
extension services, research the provision of infrastructure 
and encourage small scale farmers through credit and other 
services. In industry, the preoccupation was with the 
withdrawal of the state sector by selling off assets or the 
joint ownership with private investors. The foreign private 
sector was encouraged to expand by the offer of attractive 
incentives. There was also greater liberalisation of trade 
generally and the encouragement of export-oriented production.
The NLC virtually reversed all the policies of the Nkrumah 
government. Not only did the junta denounce socialism and 
sever diplomatic relations with Eastern European countries, 
many state enterprises were also privatised. All projects 
being handled by the Eastern bloc countries were abruptly 
brought to a halt. Those that were completed, like the 
reinforced concrete panel factory built at the cost of NC 2.3 
million, were abandoned. The Tarkwa gold refinery which was 90 
per cent completed at the time of the coup was also abandoned,
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a move which was influenced by the opinion of the World Bank 
that the ore could be more cheaply refined abroad,(10) The 
mining sector was sold to foreign companies like Lonrho, the 
UAC gained control of the textile industry through its takeover 
of the Chinese integrated textile mill at Juanpong. In 
agriculture, the cocoa storage silos were abandoned and never 
used, the agricultural projects like the large state farms were 
transferred to private hands while the machinery remained 
abandoned, some still uncrated. All these were done to 
implement the stabilisation programme, even at the cost of such 
a level of waste in plant and the labour force that was 
displaced.
However, in spite of the stabilisation programme, or 
perhaps because of it, the junta were unable to solve the 
political and economic problems. The programme did not resolve 
the structural contradictions that led to the crisis, it rather 
deepened the foreign control of the Ghana economy. The 
programme failed to meet the desired objectives and conditions 
deteriorated further. There was growing unemployment as 
workers were retrenched; over 66,000 lost their jobs between 
1966 and August 1968 (11). Devaluation also produced opposite 
results as exports declined and imports increased. Cocoa 
exports actually fell from 557,000 tonnes in 1964-65 to 334,000 
tonnes in 1968-69. Public sector investment fell in this 
period, and private investment did not materialise. Real per
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capita GNP also fell from C 142 in 1965 to C135 in 1969 as 
living standards were depressed; government revenue also fell
(12), By the time the stabilisation programme was ending, 
Ghana was already facing renewed balance of payments crisis.
The junta then passed on the crisis-ridden economy when they
handed over power to the government of Dr. Busia in 1969.
The Busia government continued with the economic policies 
of the NLC. It placed emphasis on such things as private
sector growth and a further general liberalisation of the
economy. For all the efforts of the government in implementing 
these policies, success was very elusive. The economy did not 
improve and the decline continued, especially in the external 
sector (Table 4.2). Thus, by 1971-72, another IMF stabilisation 
programme was introduced. At this time Ghana’s external debt
stood at US$189.7 million with the debt service payments
amounting to $50.4 million. The stabilisation programme was
virtually the same as that under the military government of the 
NLC. However, the higher devaluation which was carried out in 
December 1971 spelt doom for the government. The Busia
government devalued the Cedi by 78 per cent against the dollar. 
Three weeks later, there was a military coup in January 1972. 
The coup brought Col. Acheampong and the National Redemption
Council(NRC) to power. But they also had to face the problems 
that the devaluation of the Cedi was expected to tackle.
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TABLE 4.2
Ghana*s Imports and Exports 1965-71
1965 1966 1967
£ Million
1968* 1969* 1970* 1971*
Imports
Consumer goods 54.9 38.8 42.9 37.0 43.7
(food) - - - (20.8)(22.5)(32.5)
Raw and semi­
finished goods 50.3 43.0 50.0 50.6 57.9
Capital equipment 48.3 38.3 29.9 31.9 33.8
(Machinery & tran 
sport equipment) - - - (35.0)(38.6)(44.2)
Fuel & Lubricants 6.5 5.2 7.7 8.7 9.4
Total Imports 160.0 125.3 130.5 128.2 144.8 171.0 184.0
Total Exports 113.4 95.7 123.4 139.5 162.0 199.5 158.5
Trade Deficit or 
Surplus -46.6 -29.6 -7.1 11.3 17.2 28.5 -25.5
Sources: Ghana, Economic Survey, 1968, p. 44; Ibid., 1969, pp. 
35-37; and Standard Bank, Annual Economic Review, Ghana, 
October 1971, p.2 and Standard Bank Review, April 1972, p. 15; 
quoted in J D Esseks Ibid p. 58
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* The 1968-71 figures have been converted from New Cedis at the 
exchange rate £ equals NC 2.45, For 1965-67 the rate was £ 
equals NC2.
The coming to power of the Acheampong Government brought 
with it further economic disaster . Not only did the regime 
reverse the policies it inherited, it could not put in place a 
better alternative strategy for solving the deteriorating 
economic situation. Instead it organisedthe looting of the 
country and its resources on a massive scale. Having used 
Busia*s devaluation of the Cedi in December 1971 as a major 
excuse to take over power, the new government immediately 
reversed the situation by revaluating the Cedi and thus undid 
by about two-thirds the effects of the previous devaluation
(13). The IMF-sponsored stabilisation programme of the Busia 
government was also repudiated and external debts were 
unilaterally rescheduled and cancelled.
The implications of these acts were that the Acheampong 
government would have to resist devaluing the Cedi and that it 
must rely on the inadequate resources available in the country. 
It also meant that just as it was politically embarrassing to 
have to devalue the Cedi, the military government could not 
borrow externally for similar reasons. The only option left 
was to embark on a self-imposed programme of self-reliance to
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tackle a stagnation that would not go away. This was what the 
government unsuccessfully attempted to do from 1972 to 1975.
This programme of self-reliance included such elements as 
comprehensive import controls through the import licensing 
system, domestic price controls, large internal borrowing to 
finance the budget and reliance on export earnings. The 
governments stance on the outstanding debts enabled it to 
renegotiate a favourable long-term debt settlement with a ten 
year grace period from 1974. Thus, disbursements of foreign 
loans declined sharply and the debt service ratio fell from 7.2 
per cent in 1971 to 3.3 per cent in 1975 (14). However, this 
was made possible only at the expense of an inflationary budget 
policy as substantial budget deficits were largely financed by 
internal borrowing from the banking system. Clearly the 
country was living beyond its means as the Acheampong regime 
vainly tried to maintain a high standard of living acquired 
during the period of large external borrowing, on very 
inadequate domestic resources. Along with the high level of 
mismanagement the economy further deteriorated and generated 
more crises for the regime.
From 1975 the situation steadily worsened. The 
introduction of administrative controls over imports and 
domestic prices, as well as their poor and inefficient 
implementation helped to expand the Kalabule economy. The
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scarcity created by the regime's economic policies led to 
various forms of corruption, cheating, smuggling, and all types 
of Illegal transactions which are found In a black market. The 
Kalabule economy involved the diversion of goods from official 
to unofficial channels, or purchasing goods at controlled price 
and selling them at a higher unofficial price. There was also 
the evasion of price controls, tax, over-invoicing of imports 
and under-invoicing of exports. Added to this was the 
unbridled corruption of the Acheampong regime. The leading 
members of the regime engaged in smuggling and encouraged it; 
they also engaged in the corrupt allocation of import licenses 
(15). Ghana's export earnings were also misused and diverted 
into channels which made little contribution to national 
economic well-being.
All these activities increased the pressure for stagnation 
in the economy. For instance, from 1972 the budget deficit 
under Acheampong rose more than ten-fold to over C2 billion on 
1977-78, with 70 per cent of it each year being financed by 
borrowing from the Bank of Ghana (16). Inflation became the 
major problem. It was running at between 100 per cent and 115 
per cent. The money supply in the economy rose by an average 
of AO per cent. From 1975, domestic production suffered from a 
serious shortage of imported inputs, as a direct result of the 
mismanagement of the import licensing system. As the 
excessively import-intensive industrial sector lacked foreign
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exchange, existing industries operated at between 20 to 30 per 
cent of installed capacity., Exports also declined 
significantly because of the inflation and exchange rate 
policy. Even cocoa, the life line of the economy, could not 
reap the high price on the world market because of these 
economic conditions. Another added effect of the economic 
stagnation was that it encouraged the emigration of skilled 
Ghanaians to other parts of the world in search of better 
living conditions. This resulted in the loss of about 2 
million skilled people to other countries in the 1970s.
The deteriorating economic situation under Acheampong 
generated political instability which threatened his regime.
He tried to deal with the growing unrest in several ways. 
Predictably, his regime became repressive in dealing with the 
growing discontent. He also significantly increased wages 
which only increased the inflationary pressures on the economy. 
However, the concentration of power in the hands of Acheampong 
and his henchmen also became the target of the people*s anger 
and attack. The strikes and demonstrations against the 
government increasingly demanded the ending of military rule 
and a return to a democratic civilian rule. As the strong 
tactics of the government failed to silence the growing demands 
on it to go, it soon ran out of options to keep it in power.
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Therefore, in a final desperate political act to remain in 
power, General Acheampong introduced the idea of a Union 
government (Unigov) for Ghana. This was his compromise 
solution which was intended to get the military and civilians 
to share power. He justified this in the need to avoid further 
military intervention in politics and to ensure political 
stability. He put the Unigov idea to test in a referendum in 
early 1978. However most Ghanaians were resolutely opposed to 
Unigov and worked hard to stop it. In a referendum which was 
hotly contested and widely seen as a fix by the people, the 
Unigov was accepted by a narrow margin of 51 per cent for and 
49 per cent against. In spite of this victory at the 
referendum, the Unigov issue was to prove politically fatal for 
Acheampong. The outcome of the referendum only helped to 
strengthen the opposition against him, and he was quickly 
forced out of power by his colleagues in the Supreme Military 
Council•
He moved to tackle the economic crisis by announcing a 
liberalisation programme in early 1977. Under the programme, 
specified firms in key productive sectors including food 
processing, beverages, soaps and detergents, textiles, 
pharmaceuticals, agricultural machinery and spare parts for 
vehicles were no longer subject to import restrictions and 
controls for certain other firms were also modified. However, 
the ability to service this liberalisation programme was
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dependent on the availability of a reasonable level of foreign 
exchange. In June 1978, General Acheampong belatedly announced 
the adoption of a freer exchange rate policy in a move designed 
to provide more incentives to exporters and to reduce pressure 
on the limited foreign reserves. He did not stay to implement 
it as he was forced out of power and replaced by Lt. General 
Akuffo, in July 1978. The kleptocratic rule of Acheampong and 
his colleagues left Ghana in poor economic state (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Summary of Economic Performance in Ghana, 1972-78
Year Total Budget
Deficit
(C million)
Increase 
in govt, 
spending 
(%)
Change 
in GDP 
(%)
Inflation 
Rate (%)
Index No's of 
Exports & Im­
ports by vol.
Exports Imports
1972 -153.4 8.8 2.6 10.0 73.7 44.5
1973 -154.9 34.5 2.9 17.5 66.8 53.0
1974 -356.7 53.5 6.9 18.4 55.1 71.5
1975 -623.8 41.3 -12.7 29.7 56.4 62.0
1976 -870.6 28.2 - 3.7 53.3 59.1 59.7
1977 -1478.3 49.9 2.7 116.3 48.7 62.0
1978 -1906.5 15.6 4.2 173.7 40.1 51.4
Sources: Various; quoted in Jeff Haynes (1989) "The 
International Dimensions of the Sub-Saharan African Debt 
Crisis: A Case Study of 'A Success Story’", P. 7.
By the time General Akuffo came to power all the factors
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discussed above, compounded by higher price of petroleum 
imports, combined to set the stage for the third IMF adjustment 
programme in 1978-79. This stabilisation programme was 
designed to reduce the rate of inflation by half, correct price 
distortions, strengthen the balance of payments and to lay the 
basis for sustained growth of production and exports (17). The 
Akuffo administration also devalued the Cedi by 58 per cent in 
relation to the dollar as part of the stabilisation. Public 
expenditure cuts and currency reforms were undertaken. For 
instance, ten old Cedis were made equivalent to seven new Cedis 
for the first C5,000 bank notes held and to 5 new Cedis for 
amounts in excess of C5,000.
The continuing economic pressures forced the government to 
seek IMF support in the form of a stand-by credit arrangement 
of $68 million and a $30 million Trust Fund facility as a part 
of the stabilisation programme. However, this process was 
interrupted by the coup which brought Fit. Lt. Jerry Rawlings 
to power on June 4, 1979. The Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC) dealt ruthlessly with corruption and 
mismanagement in Ghanaian Society, before handing over power to 
an elected civilian government in September 1979. The new 
People*s National Party (PNP) government led by Hilla Limann 
inherited the stagnating economy left behind by seven years of 
military rule.
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The new government was immediately preoccupied with 
arresting the decline. Their strategy was to try and restore 
stability in the economy. In an austerity budget drawn up in 
December 1979, the Limann Government set the task of 
rehabilitating industry, agriculture and infrastructure, 
conserving and increasing foreign exchange by exploiting local 
resources and promoting enterprises with export potential. 
Priority was given to agricultural development to achieve self 
sufficiency in food and to develop agro-industries (18). The 
government also sought the assistance of the IMF and World Bank 
in its attempt to tackle the huge economic problems inherited 
from the military. In the meantime, the problems became
r
persistent. Inflation was still running high, increase in 
money supply was still up to 40 per cent of total expenditure 
and the exchange rate remained fixed at C2.75 to the dollar.
This encouraged smuggling to continue on a massive scale, 
especially to Ivory Coast where the cocoa was bought in hard 
currency. The black market value of the Cedi was ten times 
lower than the official rate, infrastructure deteriorated, 
there was a severe shortage of basic goods and inflation 
averaged over 50 per cent in 1979 and 1980 before moving up to 
100 per cent in 1981. There was also severe pressure on 
international liquidity. By 1981, the economy was slowly 
grinding to a halt and life became more difficult. The 
crippling situation was aptly captured by a joke that was made
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about the ’Ghanaian miracle*, that is, the miracle was how 
anyone was able to survive on a minimum daily wage of C12 when 
a loaf of bread cost C15.
The Limann government took some measures to deal with 
these problems. Producer prices for a number of key 
commodities were raised in 1980 to boost production. The 
government also made progress in the repayment of international 
debts as can be seen from the $53 million debt service which 
was met in 1980. In the meantime, the government decided to 
allocate import licenses in line with the foreign exchange 
available. The 1981 investment code was intended to encourage 
foreign investment in the economy by liberalising the 
conditions for foreign participation in such sectors as 
agriculture, mining, export, industries and tourism. Also to 
prevent widespread civil unrest arising from the worsening 
economic situation, the government took some ad hoc measures 
such as increasing the minimum wage by 300 percent to C12 per 
day; liberalising the import of goods for anyone with the 
foreign exchange, and agreeing to the distribution of 15 
essential commodities through the trade unions and the co­
operatives. However, this wage increase raised the public 
sector wage bill by Cl billion, a bill which was already 
consuming 40 per cent of total government expenditure. This 
almost undid the efforts of the government to stabilise the 
economy.
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Despite these economic pressures, the Limann government 
refused to devalue the Cedi as demanded by the IMF through its 
conditionalities. The IMF was insisting on performance 
criteria which included: curtailing credit growth, especially 
in the public sector; cuts in government spending including a 
reduction in the size of the civil service; increasing interest 
rates; raising agricultural producer prices; improving the 
collection of revenue and a substantial devaluation of the 
Cedi. In return, Ghana could get an immediate SDR 100 million 
from the IMF, an extended fund facility of $1 billion of three 
years and SDR 80 million from the IMF’s compensatory fund while 
a structural adjustment loan would be forthcoming from the 
World Bank (19).
The Limann government did not want to implement those IMF 
policies • It argued that an economy like Ghana’s which was 
systematically plundered by successive governments for more 
than a decate needed a gradual approach to things so as to 
avoid upheavals. Limann further argued that in Ghana, 
devaluation had tended to promote coups and solved nothing as 
the three previous devaluations clearly showed. Limann*s 
minister of Finance, George Benneh, graphically made this point 
when he said,
If a patient is critically ill, after the doctor has made 
the diagnosis he has to prepare the patient 
psychologically before administering a heavy dose of 
whatever he prescribes. If he doesn’t, the shock might 
just kill the patient (20).
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The Limann government found itself boxed into a corner by
having to take decisions that would endanger the survival of
the government. On the one hand, it was clear that if they did
not take drastic measures to stop the economic rot, it would be
impossible to guarantee stability in the country. On the other 
hand, it was too weak politically to be able to take tough 
decisions on the economy. The PNP government came into office 
with a majority of only one seat in the national assembly and 
it soon faced damaging opposition from an alliance of the other 
parties. There was also a destructive internal power struggle 
within the PNP which rendered the government virtually 
ineffective in dealing with vital national issues.
Consequently the government and the country drifted 
hopelessly without any sense of direction. The Limann 
government was also rightly worried about Fit. Lt. Jerry
Rawlings, who not only refused the offer to go abroad for
further studies after his retirement, but was also going around 
reminding the government that it was on probation. From then 
on, a cat and mouse chase started between the government and
Rawlings. Rawlings for his part was looking out for any
mistakes by the government that he could capitalise on and he 
desperately hoped that the Limann government would take the 
unpopular route to devaluation to hasten their overthrow (21).
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In the end, the Limann government was unable to halt the 
deteriorating economic situation and was also unable to survive 
it. The statistics revealed the desperate state of affairs as 
well as a horrifying future* For instance, the gross domestic 
investment which had fallen by an average of 3*2 per cent per 
year between 1960 and 1970, fell by a further 6.2 per cent 
between 1970 and 1980. For the period 1970-1980, the GDP fell 
by 0.1 per cent per year, the GNP fell by 1 per cent per year 
and industrial and agricultural production also fell by 1.2 per 
cent. Also, the wholesale price index rose from 100 in 1975 to 
796.4 in 1980, while the consumer price index went up from 100 
in 1975 to 1,335.4 in 1980 (22). The smuggling and Kalabule 
continued to flourish, and foreign exchange shortages were so 
critical that capital projects were stopped and infrastructure 
deteriorated.
The situation became so bad , and the government so
disorganised, weak and unable to take charge that a power
vacuum seemed to exist ready to be filled by anybody. The
extent to which the Limann government was no longer in charge 
of the country was brought out by two incidents in 1981; the 
first was the demonstration by police recruits against the non­
payment of their salaries. It was not only unusual for the 
police to engage in a public demonstration against the 
government, it was even worse when the police used force on
their own colleagues to break up the demonstration. The second
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incident was the inability of the government to pass the 1982 
budget in parliament.
The vacuum was easily filled by a coalition of radical 
groups like the June Four Movement, National Democratic 
Movement, the Peoples Revolutionary League of Ghana, the Trade 
Union Congress, the National Union of Ghana Students, and the 
military, when they overthrew the Limann administration on 31 
December 1981. It should be noted that even though the Limann 
government was overthrown through a military coup, the role of 
the military in the pre-coup period was obscured by the role of 
Fit. Lt. Rawlings. The shadow of the military hung over the 
Limann government throughout especially as a result of 
Rawlings' warning at the end of his three months in government 
in 1979 that the new government would be closely watched 
throughout its term.
When Rawlings refused the Limann government's offer to 
settle in exile after he left office and instead went on to 
become the chairman of the June Fourth Movement, the military 
became involved in the power game in an indirect sense. To 
that extent, they were part of the anti-Limann coalition which 
succeeded in staging a popular uprising against the government. 
A new government, the Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC) was formed in the new year. It was the PNDC that 
attempted to tackle Ghana's economic stagnation more seriously
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than the previous governments. The process of reversing the 
economic stagnation in Ghana led the PNDC to embark on a 
structural adjustment programme or as it is known in Ghana, the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP).
The PNDC and the politics of Economic Recovery
The 31 December coup, also referred to as a revolution by 
its leaders, was popularly welcomed by Ghanaians after a 
disappointing two years under Limann • The emergence of Fit. 
Lt. Jerry Rawlings who still enjoyed popular support for his 
brief three months in office in 1979, at the head of the PNDC, 
also added to the credibility of the new government. At the 
beginning, the PNDC was radical, populist and anti-imperialist 
in its orientation owing to the strong representation of left- 
wing elements. The PNDC pledged itself to work towards the 
redistribution of wealth, social justice and grass-roots 
democracy. Accordingly, structures were set up to involve the 
people in government. The most notable of these were the 
National Defence Committee, Worker Defence Committees and 
Peoples Defence Committees to get the workers and peasants 
fully involved in the task of economic reconstruction and 
development. These structures were enthusiastically used by 
the people.
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On coming into office the PNDC took a number of emergency 
measures to improve supplies. Students were used to transport 
cocoa to the ports from the hinterland where they had been held
up for years due to poor transport facilities. A vehicle
rehabilitation unit was established to ease the chronic 
shortage of serviceable transport. The government also took 
steps to reduce the budget deficit and its use of the banking 
system to finance the shortfall. Essential oil imports were 
sought from Libya with the hope that it would relieve a 
situation in which nearly a third of the country*s export 
earnings was spent on oil imports. The PDCs and WDCs were
expected to be vigilant and prevent or stop any corrupt 
practices that they discovered. An anti-corruption crusade was 
waged by the regime against people who were alledged to be 
involved. The peoples courts that were set up after the 
’revolution* tried alleged offenders, confiscated properties 
and jailed convicted persons.
However, it was clear that while the emergency measures 
were important, it was necessary to tackle the more fundamental 
problems in the economy. Increased production was seen as a 
major factor in the route to recovery, and therefore, people 
needed to be geared up to produce more of the goods that would 
aid recovery in the most efficient manner. But for this
increased production to take place a variety of equipment, 
spare parts and raw materials needed to be made available. The
225
Ghana economy, with its characteristic dependence and lack of 
integration, required that these elements had to be imported. 
The foreign exchange to do this was not there and the PNDC knew 
that a lot of capital was needed to rehabilitate the
infrastructure and productive capacity. In response to this
need for foreign exchange to revamp the economy, the PNDC 
approached the socialist and radical countries for aid and did 
not get as much as was required since the recession of the
1980s also badly affected even the countries of the socialist 
bloc.
At the same time, a National Economic Recovery Commission 
which had Dr Kwesi Botchwey, PNDC secretary for Finance and Dr 
J.S. Abbey as chairman and member worked on a new Economic 
Recovery Programme (23). The PNDC (or the Rawlings faction of 
it) was hoping to use the programme to lay the economic
foundation of a national democratic revolution. It therefore 
expected
to restore incentives for production of food, 
industrial raw materials and export commodities and 
thereby increase their output to modest but realistic 
levels,
to increase the availability of essential consumer 
goods and improve the distribution system;
to increase the overall availability of foreign 
exchange in the country, improve its allocation 
mechanisms and channel it into selected high priority 
activities;
to lower the rate of inflation by pursuing prudent 
fiscal monetary and trade policies;
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to rehabilitate the physical infrastructure of the 
country in support of directly productive activities;
to undertake systematic analysis and studies leading 
towards a major restructuring of the economic
institutions in the country (24).
The PDNC approached the West and the IMF for capital in
mid 1982. Negotiations with the IMF for aid to finance the 
recovery programme started at this point. It seems that the 
PNDC did not hold a common position on how to resolve the 
economic problems facing the country (25). This difference in 
position within the PNDC was revealed at the meeting of the 
PNDC convened in September 1982 to discuss the ERP (26). At 
the meeting, Dr. J.S. Abbey presented the programme drawn up by 
the National Economic Recovery Commission and this led to a 
stormy debate as the left wing members of the PNDC vehemently 
opposed it because of what they saw as the unacceptable hand of 
the IMF in it. Since the radical members maintained that they 
were not consulted before the programme (which they referred to
as the Abbey Report) they pressed for a new programme this time
with inputs from all recognised interest groups. The 'Abbey 
Report' was defeated after a vote and an alternative economic 
committee was set up to draw up another programme. The 
opponents of the 'Abbey Report' were given one week to present 
an alternative programme (27). It is instructive to look at 
the 'alternative' programme of the left wing elements in the 
PNDC and see the extent to which it differed from the 'Abbey 
Report'. It is to this that we now turn our attention.
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They opened their position with the argument that a
programme of economic reconstruction in Ghana must be based on
a concrete study and analysis of the problems confronting each
sector of the economy in both their national and international
aspects. Such a programme must also be based on clearly
defined political objectives. While recognising the dilemma
which the government faced in addressing the economic crisis,
they argued that with the level of despondency among the
working classes a new programme requiring further sacrifices of
them would be difficult to sustain. However, ' . the severity
UtouU.
of the economic crisisy^require further sacrifices from the 
working people in the short term. And to create the necessary 
political conditions for the launching of the programme they 
proposed, a firm and decisive action needed to be taken to 
revive and sustain the enthusiasm of the masses of the people. 
A number of measures was therefore needed to be taken in the 
light of the foregoing (28).
The first course of action to be taken was to set up a 
three man Technical Secretariat to review the allocation and 
utilisation of import licenses, going back three to five years 
so as to collect taxes and other charges properly due. The 
logic here was that the most blatant abuses in the management 
of the Ghanaian economy as well as the largest source of 
illegal wealth, was the import trade. This would also elicit 
the support of the people for the revolution, once the wealth
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amassed by the compradors, defined loosely as the ruling elite, 
from import license racketeering was attacked. In carrying out 
this political campaign, a computerised list of importers, 
import license allocations, turn-over taxes paid, etc, running 
a few years back and prepared by the PNP government, was 
retrieved (29). In addition, the strategy should be to drive a 
wedge between compradors (who should be punished) and 
manufacturuers (who should be won over), by getting them to 
register their business dealings with the government.
Alongside this campaign against compradors, it was 
suggested that steps be taken immediately to improve the supply 
of basic necessities such as soap, kerosene, matches etc. They 
recommended the setting up of a three-man committee to liaise 
with the Ghana National Procurement Agency, the Food 
Distribution Corporation, the Ghana National Trading Company 
and other commercial firms and manufacturers and ascertain the 
stock available and expected arrivals for equitable 
distribution in consultation with PDCs and WDCs. In addition, 
a new incomes policy should be brought in with the 1983 budget.
On the import/export trade, the Alternative' programme 
recommended that import trade become a state monopoly in order 
to curb what was seen as needless drain on Ghana's foreign 
exchange resources through over-invoicing and under-invoicing 
of imports and exports. The PNP government was blamed for not
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doing much in this respect, especially in view of the radical
provision under Article 148 of the 1979 constitution that:
•••• any person not being a citizen of Ghana who does not 
bring into Ghana foreign capital of such amount as may be 
specified by/or under an Act of Parliament for the purpose 
of establishing a business in Ghana shall not engage in 
the import or export trade or in any industry (30).
They argued that available data showed clearly that many 
foreign companies and nationals who were engaged in various 
types of businesses, had reaped enormous profits transferrable 
in foreign exchange even though they brought little or no 
foreign exchange into the country initially. They cited the 
example of Standard Bank which made C54 million in 1980/81 as 
evidence of this phenomenon. As part of this nationalisation 
of import-export trade, they recommended that a number of 
national trading companies be incorporated under the companies 
code to take charge of import/export trade. This state 
monopoly of foreign trade, it was argued, had the advantage of 
eliminating the corrupt practices of the old system, 
particularly with the vigilance of WDC's (31).
The report also called for a diversification of Ghana's 
foreign trade away from the current excessive dependence on the 
West where about 80 per cent of her imports came from, and the 
same volume of exports went to. This over-dependence was seen 
as both politically and economically "disingenuous”. 
Therefore, to achieve a more balanced geographic and political 
diversification, a computerised list of imported merchandise by
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country of origin was to be submitted to the embassies of 
socialist countries in Ghana for them to indicate the goods 
they were willing to supply by volume and value (32). On 
domestic trade, it recommended the banning of wholesale trade 
to all foreign firms and nationals. In this attempt to 
nationalise wholesale domestic trade, expatriate businesses 
were to be required to provide such information as dates of 
their incorporation, evidence of foreign exchange investments 
and compliance with foreign exchange regulations. The Bank of 
Ghana and the Ghana Trust Holdings Ltd were expected to collect 
any compensation due as penalties for default.
For retail trade, the recommendation was for the 
establishment of a nationwide chain of co-operative shops
(Peoples shops) to ensure popular control over the distribution 
of basic goods. The shops were to be supervised by
distribution committees elected by the people in their PDCs. 
Essential commodities such as soap, matches, cigarettes, 
cooking oil, gari, rice, maize, sugar, milk, candles and 
lanterns were to be sold only by the peoples shops. To avoid 
the unpleasant failures of the price controls imposed during 
the Acheampong days, the peoples shops were to be guided by "a
strict set of strict punishments for infringements of these
rules” (33).
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The issue of higher prices of domestic commodities 
(especially food) than imported ones was also addressed. They 
argued that the phenomenon of cheap imports and expensive 
domestic substitutes conferred huge unearned incomes on those
who had access to import licenses on imported goods. This was
why manufacturing houses and dealers were preoccupied with 
imported items rather than buying domestic substitutes. Unlike 
the pro-structural adjustment group in the PNDC, the left did
not seem to link this problem to the exchange rate of the Cedi
or the administrative allocation of import licenses. Their 
solution assigned an even greater role to the state.
They maintained that any recovery programme must aim to 
reduce dependence on imports. They recommended the re-pricing 
of imports as a part of the short-term economic package. The 
"major aim is to increase domestic production through the 
elimination of the large incentives to import competing 
commodities which undermines domestic production activity”
(34). Domestic production was to be given incentives and 
support by restraining costs and through repair and maintenance 
of transportation, infrastructure, marketing and storage 
facilities, timely and adequate supply of inputs like 
fertilizers, insecticides and planting materials. However, the 
criteria on which such support would be given to the production 
of such domestic items would be the demonstration of 
comparative advantage; contribution to the attainment of food
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security; and contribution to the integration of the economy
(35). It was recognised that these measures would cause 
hardship, and the burden should therefore be borne more by the 
well-to-do. The success of the recovery programme itself was 
seen as ultimately depending on:
(a) the mobilisation of additional external resources to 
ensure improved economic activity, employment 
generation and effective mobilisation;
(b) a well designed rationing plan at least for basic 
commodities which would ensure fairness in 
distribution and at stipulated prices with the full 
involvement of the PDCs; and
(c) a well-planned political mobilisation effort (36).
Project loans were to be sought for the entire minerals 
sector, timk£Tand large scale agriculture, in the same way a 
medium-term loan was obtained for Ashanti Goldfields 
Corporation. Additional funds were to be raised by permitting 
Ghanaian nationals resident abroad to maintain bank accounts in 
convertible foreign currency. The Bank of Ghana was to open 
these accounts which would be interest-bearing, for those who 
applied. As opposed to the Sawlings/Botchwey recovery 
programme which was expected to run on for years, the left 
within the PNDC favoured a short-term recovery programme. 
Their argument was that it was difficult to sustain the 
enthusiasm of the masses for a five-year programme especially 
if very little was achieved in the first year. Instead, they 
proposed what they saw as modest and easily achievable goals 
that would still sustain the enthusiasm of the people.
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It was in this light that they proposed a crash 
agricultural programme of one year to increase the supply of 
selected staples and vegetables like maize, cassava, yams, 
groundnuts, pepper, tomatoes etc. Under this programme farmers 
were to be provided with subsidised inputs on the condition 
that they sold "an agreed proportion (preferably 80 per cent) 
of their output to the state at fixed prices; the remainder may 
be sold on the free market" (37). For manufacturing 
industries, attention was to be paid to certain essential 
commodities like soap, edible oil, drugs, tyres, dry cell and 
car batteries, agricultural implements etc. However, while the 
PNDC left was determined to avoid IMF conditionalities like 
devaluation, removal of subsidies, trade liberalisation, etc, 
it was not clear how they would increase the country*s export 
earnings in order to support the volume of import's required by 
the import-dependent industrial sector. This also raises the 
question of the extent to which they really comprehended the 
kind of situation the economy was in.
However, as the rift between Rawlings and the radical 
elements in the PNDC (JFM and PRLG) widened after their 
confrontation over the *Abbey Report*, political developments 
in other areas not directly related to the economy moved them 
towards an eventual break up in their coalition. One such 
political development was the embarrassing case (to the 
government) of the abduction and murder of three judges between
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30th June and 3rd July 1982, The swift manner in which PNDC 
chairman Jerry Rawlings had gone on radio to accuse anti­
government dissidents operating from abroad for the abduction 
even before the charred bodies of the three judges were found, 
fuelled public outcry and anger which was to remain for a long 
time. The June Four Movement on its part issued a release 
immediately condemning the murders and demanded an inquiry in 
order to bring the culprits to justice. A meeting of the PNDC 
on 28th October 1982 where these murders were discussed 
(specifically the alleged role of Capt. Kojo Tsikata in them) 
ended abruptly and in disagreement. The in-fighting within the 
PNDC had by now gone too far.
On 29th October 1982, there was an alleged coup attempt. 
The JFM leadership in the PNDC had told workers in Accra that 
day that there had been a misunderstanding in the PNDC and 
Rawlings was nowhere to be found; that in the meantime, Sgt. 
Alolga Akata-Pore and Chris Atim (both PNDC members) were in 
control of the situation (38). The situation was however 
resolved after Rawlings and the JFM leadership had been called 
together by workers to explain the confusion which they had 
created. From then on, the split in the PNDC was imminent as 
each side worked to out-manoeuvre the other from power. 
However, Rawlings used the situation to his advantage when he 
accused the JFM leadership in the PNDC and National Defence 
Committee, of deliberately trying to subvert the government.
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Rawlings addressed the Accra workers on the matter thus:
Two weeks ago on the morning of Friday October 29, 1982, 
at a meeting of the IZCC-WDC of Accra, the leaders of the 
Accra EDC were fed with a baseless story about a change of 
Government. In point of fact, we are having to deal with 
a tight-knit group of subversionists. In addition to this 
we also have a strong element of conspiracy which has
indirectly and unsuccessfully tried to peddle the minority
extremist views. (39)
When Dr Kwesi Botchway declared, on 20 October 1982, that 
Ghana was opening discussions with the IMF in order to obtain 
credit to implement the economic recovery programme, the 
Rawlings group in the PNDC had effectively parted ways with the 
left-wing elements who had helped him to power. The JFM
leadership together with workers and students continued to 
campaign against the ERP which the government was embarking 
upon with the help of the IMF. They argued that IMF demands 
such as devaluation, removal of subsidies on social services 
like health, education, transport, etc. would harm the people 
more instead of solving the problem. The political break with 
Rawlings was yet to come. It came finally when another coup 
attempt took place on 23 November 1982. The leadership of the 
JFM in the PNDC ended up as the losers. They were arrested and 
harassed into exile, leaving the way clear for Rawlings to 
implement his economic recovery programme (ERP). (AO)
With the exit of the JFM and PRLG members from the PNDC 
Rawlings may have had his way clear to implement the ERP, but 
he also lost his constituency (the workers, students and
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perhaps the rank and file of the JFM, PRLG and other groups) to 
oppose the ERP. After prolonged negotiations with the IMF 
during which the PNDC's proposals for longer repayment periods 
for debts, postponement of interest charges; conversion of 
debts into grants, and access to concessional soft loans were 
rejected by the Fund, (41) the first phase of the economic 
recovery programme (ERPI) came into effect in 1983.
 The Economic Recovery Programme I. 1983-85
The ERP was essentially similar to previous IMF 
stabilisation measures, and what the Fund had tried to get the 
Limann government to implement without success. The elements 
of the ERP were also similar to IMF structural adjustment 
programmes implemented elsewhere in the third world. The 
recovery programme aimed to promote export-led growth, 
liberalisation of the economy, reliance on market forces, 
greater role of the private sector and reduction in the role of 
the state, etc. Thus, the objectives of ERPI included:
(a) the arrest and reversal of over a decade of 
precipitious decline in production in all sectors of 
the economy, particularly agriculture, including 
cocoa;
(b) the control over the factors fuelling the fires to 
hyper-inflation in the economy (reaching 116% in 1977 
and 1981) through the restoration of financial 
discipline;
(c) the rationalisation of the exchange rate in order to 
stimulate export and to curb the consumption of
237
luxuries and make the scarcity of foreign exchange a 
factor in its official pricing;
(d) improvement of the tarnished image of Ghana in 
international financial circles through effective 
external debt and foreign exchange reserve 
management, and thus restoring confidence in the 
economy with overseas banking and suppliers 
establishments;
(e) rehabilitation of the ruined productive and social 
infrastructure, and above all;
(f) mobilisation of the necessary domestic and external 
resources to restore the living levels of Ghanaians, 
(42)
The successful negotiation of a credit package of over 
$300 million and a seal of approval for its ERP from the IMF, 
the door to multilateral credit agreements with the West was 
now open to the PNDC. The West (mainly through the IMF and 
World Bank) gave full support to Ghana's efforts at structural 
adjustment. The PNDC on its part got down to the serious task 
of faithfully implementing its own part of the agreement in 
1983. This implementation began with the 1983 budget announced 
in April. A new currency pricing system was introduced rather 
than a formal devaluation. It operated by means of a variable 
surcharge on imports of between 750 per cent and 990 per cent 
of the official rate of C2.75 - $1.00. A variable bonus was 
also given for exports of between 750 per cent and 990 per 
cent. Under this system, imports of crude oil and other 
essentials such as raw materials, agricultural machinery and 
clinker attracted the lower surcharge of 750 per cent. All 
other payments were subject to the higher rate with some
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attracting a further 5 per cent foreign exchange transfer tax. 
The bonus of 750 per cent of the export price was to be paid 
for major agricultural commodities and exports of raw 
materials. Other sources of foreign exchange like
manufacturers, processed timber, tourist receipts and 
expatriate remittances were to be paid the higher rate of 990 
per cent. (43) In October 1983, this devaluation was formally 
adjusted to the official rate of C30 = US$1.00.
Other measures introduced included cuts in public
expenditure to tackle the huge budget deficits of the past.
Producer prices, especially for cocoa were raised from 012,000 
per tonne to 020,000 per tonne in April 1983. Interest rates 
were also raised in October 1983 by 3 - 5 per centage points. 
(44) Prices were also deregulated and this led to large price 
increases of social services. For instance, road transport 
fares went up 165 per cent, kerosene by 1400 per cent, premium 
gasoline by 1179 per cent and regular by 1195 per cent. Other 
services like the rail, postal, water and electricity also had 
huge price increases. (45) However the minimum wage was also 
increased from C12 to C21. These changes did not go down well 
with the people. The situation was made worse by the 
unprecedented drought of 1983 which led to the failure of
crops. Bush fires also destroyed whatever crops were produced 
and thereby aggravated the food crisis in the country. The 
expulsion from Nigeria of about one million Ghanaians severely
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strained the resources available and exacerbated the crisis in 
the economy.
In 1984, the ERPI was pursued with greater vigour by the 
government. The budget was therefore designed within the
framework of the ERP. It aimed to restrain inflation,
rationalise prices, expand production and exports, among other 
things. The tax administration and enforcement were
strengthened to increase government revenue. The budget 
deficit was also reduced by about 2.2 per cent to bring down 
inflation. The Cedi was further devalued to C38.5 = $1.00 in 
August 1984. The government also reaffirmed its commitment to 
follow a flexible exchange rate policy and the progressive
elimination of price distortions. Interest rates were raised a 
further 2 per cent on the 1983 levels. In 1984, nominal wages 
and salaries were raised by 40 per cent, with the daily minimum 
wage going up to C52.50 in December from C35 in 1983.
The level of incentives was also raised to encourage
investment in the private sector and increased exports. The 
new investment code was made more attractive to foreign 
investors as it guaranteed the security of investment and the 
freedom to remit profits and repatriate capital. Most of the 
foreign exchange was channelled towards export-oriented and 
import-substituting industries. The most pressing need in the 
industrial sector was to significantly improve capacity
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utilisation. The import programme allowed manufacturers to 
retain 20 per cent of their export proceeds for financing 
essential imports. The import licenses for such essential 
imports were issued automatically. The Cocoa Marketing Board 
was allowed to retain 10 per cent of its export earnings. For 
gold, between 35 and 40 percent could be retained. (46) To 
increase cocoa production, producer price was raised to C30,000 
per tonne in May 1984 from C20,000 per tonne. In 1984, 
attention was also paid to the rehabilitation of infrastructure 
and transport systems, largely with foreign aid which came 
mainly from the World Bank.
However, while the ERP enjoyed the support of the West and 
led to a significant inflow of resources from these countries, 
at home it faced mounting opposition. The workers in 
particular, had used the political power that they had through 
the EDCs and the Interim Management Committees (IMCs) to 
obstruct the ERP. Workers had used their new found power in 
the IMCs to even run their factories. This situation was 
clearly unacceptable to both the IMF and World Bank and they 
did not hesitate to ask the PNDC to eliminate the political 
influence of the workers as a condition for the disbursement of 
the badly needed foreign capital. The PNDC continued to harass 
the workers in their WDCs since the coup attempt in October 
1982. In December 1984, both the WDCs and IMCs were abolished. 
The PDCs/WDCs were replaced by Committees for the Defence of
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the Revolution (CDRs) and their political role was down-graded. 
Also on 3 December 1984, the Interim Management Committees were 
replaced by Joint Consultative Councils (JCCs). The JCCs were 
now to act as advisory bodies, to managing directors, thereby 
effectively ending the participation and influence of workers 
in the PNDC government. From then on, the government could 
carry out the ERP with the active support of the multi-national 
corporations and the IMF/World Bank.
The aim of the 1985 budget had been to increase the 
momentum of the ERP; to strengthen the share of development 
expenditure; increase the capital base of selected state 
enterprises; and provide increased resources to the social 
sectors. (47) Some of the macro-economic targets set for 1985 
included a 5.3 per cent increase in real GDP, a 16 per cent 
rise in the dollar value of exports, a 37 per cent increase in 
dollar value of imports, the lowering of inflation by half to 
20 per cent and the budget deficit of 2 per cent of the GDP. 
The fiscal measures taken emphasised domestic resource 
mobilisation and significantly increased capital expenditures. 
Planned revenues were therefore increased by more than 75 per 
cent, taxes on imports were increased to contain demand while 
taxes on domestic goods and services on selected income were 
reduced. Capital expenditures were raised to 25 per cent of 
total expenditures compared to 17 per cent in 1984. The budget 
deficit was also held to about 5 per cent of the GDP. (48)
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Other measures include a further devaluation of the Cedi 
by 56 per cent to C60 = $1.00 in October 1985. Interest rates 
were also increased to 12 per cent as the 12 month deposit rate 
and 23 per cent maximum lending rate. Incentives in aid of 
production and exports were taken in a number of areas. The 
producer price of cocoa was raised from C30,000 per tonne to 
C56,000 per tonne, a 90 per cent increase which was expected to 
give producers 50 per cent of the world market price. Free 
seedlings and spraying materials were distributed by the Cocoa 
Board (CocoBod). The producer price for cotton was increased 
by 100 per cent to C110,000 per tonne, tobacco by 50 per cent 
to C125,000 per tonne, while maize was bought at the guaranteed 
minimum price of CIO,000 per tonne. The share of export 
earnings to be retained in foreign exchange was increased. The 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation was allowed to retain 45 per 
cent of its export earnings, while State Gold Mining 
Corporation was allowed 35 per cent. Timber and other exports 
were allowed 20 per cent, and cocoa still retained 10 per cent. 
Such retained export earnings could be used to import spare 
parts and settle external financial obligations. (49)
While wages were raised again in 1985, retrenchments were 
carried out in fulfilment of creditor demands. State-owned 
enterprises were being commercialised or prepared for eventual 
disvestiture. A new investment code was also introduced in 
July 1985 to attract foreign investment. The benefits
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accorded by the new investment code were
exemption from payment of duties on imported essential 
plants, equipment and accessories, attractive depreciation 
and investment allowance and income tax rebates, and 
permission to maintain external accounts in which 25 per 
cent of foreign exchange earnings may be retained for 
import of equipment and inputs and for payment of 
dividends and remittances abroad. The investment code 
offers Government guarantee against expropriation and 
provides for arbitration in case of investment disputes. 
(50)
On the whole, there was greater commitment on the part of 
the government to implement ERP in spite of the strong internal 
opposition to it by the people who were bearing the brunt of 
the hardship the programme had brought on them. By now, it was 
clear that the survival of the ERP was bound up with the 
survival of Rawlings and his government. The enthusiastic 
support that was given to the programme by Western countries 
and multilateral institutions was like essential blood 
transfusion to keep the patient alive. Thus, ERP survived its 
first phase because the Rawlings goverment also had survived to 
keep it going, a situation very much dependent on vital western 
support for the ERP through essential foreign aid. The second 
phase of the ERP and indeed the future economic health of Ghana 
was to continue to depend on this equation.
The Economic Recovery Programme II, 1986-88
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With the success of ERP I in reversing the situation from 
the near total economic collapse of the period between 1981 and 
1983, the ERP II sought to consolidate the gains of ERPI. This 
meant that the macro economic policies of the previous years 
would be continued and this time, to lay a firm foundation for 
sustainable self-reliant growth and long term balance of 
payments viability. Specifically, the goals of the ERP II were 
to:
(a) sustain economic growth at between 5 to 5.5 per cent 
a year over the medium term;
(b) increase the level of public investment from about 10 
per cent of national income to 25 per cent by the end 
of this decade;
(c) increase domestic savings from about 7 per cent at 
the end of the ERP I to about 15 per cent by the end 
of the decade;
(d) further improve the management of resources in the 
public sector;
(e) effectively mobilise the resources thus generated to 
improve the social and overall well-being of the 
people of Ghana, particularly the under-privileged, 
deprived and vulnerable. (51)
The ERP II aimed to give adequate incentives for increased 
cocoa production in view of Its importance to the economy. The 
farmer was to be given an increased share of the world market 
price for cocoa to encourage continued production and 
discourage smuggling. Also, the operating cost of the cocoa 
board was to be substantially reduced from the equivalent of 30 
per cent of the world market price per tonne for the 1986/87 
crop year to 15 per cent in 1988/89. The Cocoa Board was
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therefore to be limited to purchasing, marketing and extension 
service while its staff strength would be cut accordingly. For 
agriculture in general, more attention was to be paid to the 
small scale farmers by giving easier access to inputs. In the 
other areas such as forestry, timber, mining, etc, emphasis 
would continue to be on rehabilitation and modernisation to 
increase production. In industry, the strategy would be to 
strengthen industrial growth by maximising the utilisation of 
existing capacity. raw materials and spare parts were to be 
made readily available. Other measures to be taken included 
greater deregulation of prices, removal of subsidies, more 
devaluations etc.
In the years 1986 to 1988, other measures were also taken 
by government to attain the goals of the ERP II. In 1986 for 
instance, the retrenchment and redeployment of workers 
continued as part of the cost-cutting exercise which creditors 
demanded. Another cost-cutting measure was the educational 
reforms which were to be implemented nationally from the 
1987/88 year. The reform was the establishment of the junior 
secondary school. Under this most children were to have access 
to primary education at the primary and JSS level, while about 
25 per cent were expected to go to senior secondary. Higher 
fees were also charged in schools and hospitals, while student 
loans were introduced to tertiary institutions. These measures 
led to sustained opposition from the National Union of Ghana
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Students (NUGS) and from then on the universities suffered 
frequent disruptions through closures. The other measures such
as keeping public expenditure down, were also intensified.
Further deregulation was carried out and the value of the Cedi 
continued to fall.
In 1987 the dual foreign exchange sustem was replaced by a 
unified auction system which was now to determine the 
applicable rate for all transactions within the economy. Non- 
traditional exports were encouraged by a further increase in 
the foreign exchange retention scheme from 20 to 35 per cent. 
Licensed dealers other than banks were authorised to set up 
"bureaux de change" to buy and sell foreign currency. There 
was a 25 per cent across-the-board increase in wages and
salaries with the new minimum wage rising from C90 to C112. 
This was however offset by the increase in petrol price from 
C150 to C190 per gallon of premium. Tax measures included the 
reduction of corporate tax for manufacturing firms from 50 to 
45 per cent; the reduction of import duty rates on priority
imports of basic raw materials from 30 per cent (in 1985) to 15 
per cent; while other raw materials and capital goods had their 
rates reduced to 20 per cent from between 20 and 30 per cent. 
(52).
In addition to the commitment to further the objectives of 
ERP II, the 1988 budget also paid attention to the problems of
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adjustment as they affect the poorer sections of the society. 
A Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of 
Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was slated for implementation from 1988. 
PAMSCAD had an initial budget of $85 million pledged by foreign 
donors to run over three years. PAMSCAD involved the use of 
labour-intensive methods to carry out projects. These range 
from infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance in the 
cities, to urban upgrading through the provision of roads, 
water supply and public sanitation. Other projects under this 
programme, include rural feeder roads; community-initiated 
self-help projects in health, education, housing and 
sanitation; resettlement of redeployees in agriculture, credit 
scheme for small scale enterprises; grants to women’s groups; 
non-formal education etc. (53) All these projects were 
intended to provide employment for those workers retrenched 
from the public service and also the under-employed and 
unemployed.
The government also addressed the problem of housing in
1988. It decided to encourage the development of real estate 
to ease housing shortages in the urban areas. While the 
government was committed to providing houses from its own 
resources to the tune of Cl.25 billion and also reduced 
corporate tax for real estate companies from 55 per cent to 45 
per cent to get them to provide more houses. The health sector 
also received attention with the decision to expand the primary
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healthcare programme and to rehabilitate specialist and all 
regional hospitals. Transport and communication rehabilitation 
received renewed emphasis. The privatisation of public 
enterprises was also continued in 1988 when 32 state owned 
enterprises were offered for divestiture by the Divestiture 
Implementation Committee. The devaluation of the Cedi was 
given another boost by the coming into operation of privately 
owned Foreign Exchange Bureaus (FOREX) from February 1988. In 
1989, all foreign exchange and import controls were removed, 
making it easier for those with the money to buy foreign 
exchange and import any goods of their choice. This policy of 
deregulation of prices was extended to agriculture, especially 
with the distribution of fertilizer which was privatised.
In all, Ghana has been more committed and consistent in 
implanting its structural adjustment programme than most other 
African countries which have gone that route. So much was this 
commitment to the programme that Ghana*s ERP was held out by 
the West through IMF and World Bank as a model of the success 
of structural adjustment which other countries should emulate. 
As a result of this, the West was also more generous with Ghana 
in providing aid to support the structural adjustment process 
than with other African countries. This support was underlined 
by the pledges that were usually made at the Paris Consultative 
Group Meetings of donors in support of structural adjustment. 
However, the critical question to ask in the light of this is
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the extent to which the implementation of the ERP has led to 
the desired effects of reversing the economic collapse which 
threatened Ghana by 1983, and the creation of growth and 
development in the economy as ERP II was committed to doing. 
This is the question which engages our attention in chapter 
five where we discuss the impact of the structural adjustment 
programme on Ghana.
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CHAPTER 5
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN GHANA
There is a lack of consensus in the assessments of the 
impact of structural adjustment on African countries, the same 
way as there were divergent views on the appropriateness of 
adopting the strategy of structural adjustment to resolve the 
African crisis in the 1980s. Ghanafs experience is a typical 
example of this situation for obvious reasons. For not only 
has Ghana been most consistent in implementing structural 
adjustment, it has also been held out by its sponsors as a 
shining example of the success of the structural adjustment 
programme (SAP). In Africa this claimed success has been hotly 
contested by those who think that the experience under SAP has 
been anything but successful. Within Ghana this disagreement 
on the impact of the ERP has been between the Government and 
its allies in the business community such as the multinational 
companies on the one hand and the workers, students, churches, 
and other political opposition groups such as the United
Revolutionary Front (URF), on the other. From outside, the two
sides have been supported by the views of the IMF, World Bank
and the Consultative Group on Ghana, which have hailed the 
success of the ERP. The views of the opponents of the ERP at 
home have been echoed by many scholars outside Ghana, and
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institutions such as the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 
and the Organisation of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU).
At the end of the first phase of the ERP in 1986, the 
achievements of the programme were greeted with generous 
praises mainly from its western sponsors. It was considered 
significant that two decades of economic decline and stagnation 
could be stopped by the implementation of a structural 
adjustment programme and at a time when similar programmes were 
failing elsewhere in Africa. The IMF, the World Bank and the 
PNDC therefore had cause to be satisfied. Indeed, since that 
time, aggregated figures have shown significant improvements in 
the economic conditions of Ghana. For the government and its 
partners in the implementation of the ERP, this was a 
vindication of their position on how to bring about economic 
recovery to Africa’s battered economies. Those opposed to the 
programme of economic recovery reject these claims of success 
and point to the cost of adjustment to the economy and people, 
among other things.
However, the initial euphoria over success attained was 
soon replaced with a sombre mood by both government and donors. 
Even in 1986, a donor official was reported to have remarked 
rather cautiously that "Ghana can now be said to be out of 
intensive care. But the convalescence is likely to be long and 
tedious..." (1) The World Bank, in particular, has constantly
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expressed the fear that despite the achievements attained, the 
adjustment process might fail eventually unless it is properly 
managed. (2) And as one Bank official has observed, the 
success of the ERP "does not mean that Ghana has turned the 
proverbial corner. Far from it. Ghanafs problems have not 
diminished in their intensity. Widespread poverty, disease and 
illiteracy continue to blight the country." (3)
The government has also been forced by such diverse
factors as the sustained political opposition to the ERP at
home and economic difficulties, domestic and external, to admit
that things are not well with adjustment process. In his 1990
State of Nation broadcast, Fit. Lt. Rawlings made a dramatic
admission of the failures of the adjustment process. He told
Ghanaians that,
... I should be the first to admit that the Economic 
Recovery Programme has not provided all the answers to our 
national problems. In spite of all the international 
acclaim it has received, the effects of its gains remain 
to be felt in most households. Many families continue to 
experience severe constraints on their household budgets, 
notwithstanding the vast improvements in the supply of 
goods and services on the markets today. There are many 
who have found it difficult during the past holidays to 
manage a modest celebration with a chicken for a meal, a 
new dress for a child or bottle of schnapps for the folks 
back home. Meanwhile, we are now thinking of how to meet 
our rents, the next term’s school fees and other routine 
expenses..." (A)
The foregoing discussion clearly demonstrates that the 
success of structural adjustment in Ghana must be assessed by 
looking not only at the impact on macro-economic indicators but
257
also the Impact on Ghanaians. The extent to which the 
objectives of the adjustment programme have resulted In the 
desired improvements in the economy is relevant in judging the 
success or failure of the programme. The state of health of 
the economy generally, after the implementation of the 
adjustment policies is also a useful indicator of the degree of 
success attained. At the same time, it is relevant to query 
the success so far attained by looking at the costs of the ERP 
to the economy and the people. Indeed, to what extent is this 
success dependent on good weather and large volumes of Western 
funds?
In this chapter, therefore, we assess the gains of 
structural adjustment to the economy of Ghana in line with 
programme objectives. We also look at the sectors which have 
benefitted from the programme. The 1 other side* of the success 
attained is also discussed and we reveal the rather prohibitive 
costs that have had to be paid in order that improvements could 
be recorded in the macro-economic indicators. Here, we look at 
how the programme has failed to generate improvements in the 
economic, social and political life of the people. We look at 
how social groups like workers and peasants have fared under 
the structural adjustment regime. Also, why has economic 
liberalisation not been complemented by political 
liberalisation? Indeed, what are the prospects of sustained 
development in the long-term under the structural adjustment
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policies operating today? These are some of the issues taken 
up here.
The Gains of the Economic Recovery Programme
The success of the economic recovery programme in halting 
and even reversing the economic collapse which was imminent by 
1983, is beyond dispute. The macro-economic indicators 
significantly improved from their absolute negative levels in 
1983 to real positive growth in all the subsequent years during 
the implementation of the ERP. The government’s commitment to 
the adjustment programme and the support of the programme’s 
external sponsors in the form of high levels of the much-needed 
external funding, were crucial in generating the gains recorded 
as a result of the ERP. With regard to external funding, Ghana 
has received on average, $530 million annually, more than any 
other African country implementing the structural adjustment 
programme.
The most visible signs of improvement in the economy are 
in infrastructures. At the beginning of the ERP, this sector 
had literally disintegrated. The rehabilitation process has 
been very successful. The railways, the roads,
telecommunications and energy supply have been rehabilitated 
and extended widely under the ERP. New roads, especially
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feeder roads have been constructed and many rural communities 
are now accessible. Electricity generation has significantly 
improved and is now reaching many parts of the country. 
Communication between Ghana and the outside world, especially 
by telephone has become possible. In virtually all sectors 
there are programmes of rehabilitation or reform. Several 
abandoned projects were re-started again, a sign of the 
seriousness with which the government has undertaken the 
programme of recovery.
Elsewhere, the recovery measures adopted also led to some 
improvements. For instance, the severe scarcity of goods on 
the market before the introduction of the ERP was replaced by a 
significant improvement in the supply of goods. The 
introduction of financial discipline also significantly 
improved the budget deficit situation with, for example, a 
surplus of 0.1 per cent of GDP being recorded in 1986 and 
rising to 0.4 per cent in 1987. There were also modest gains 
in revenue generation and the rate of domestic savings. There 
was also strong recovery in other sectors such as industry, 
manufacturing, agriculture and minerals, imports and exports 
(Table 5.1). There was a consistent growth in the GDP for six 
years from 1984 at an annual average of more than 5 per cent. 
This was at a time when population was growing at 3.2 per cent 
annually. As a result of the rehabilitation carried out under 
the ERP, manufacturing made modest recovery in output and
260
capacity utilisation which was as low as 10 per cent before the 
reform programme was introduced.
Table 5.1: Selected Economic Indicators 1984-89
Growth Rates (% per annum)
Inflation GDP GDP 
per cap
Agriculture
•
Industy Services
1984 39.6 8.6 5.8 9.7 8.7 6.9
1985 10.4 5.1 2.4 0.7 17.6 7.5
1986 24.6 5.2 2.5 3.3 7.6 6.6
1987 39.8 4.8 2.1 - 11.5 9.4
1988 31.4 6.2 3.5 3.6 11.4 7.9
1989 25.0 6.2 3.4 4.9 7.4 7.0
Source: Republic of Ghana, The Budget Statement and Economic 
Policy for 1990, p.l; and quoted in Kwesi Johan "Structural 
Adjustment and Industrial Underdevelopment in Ghana", 1990, p.5
Furthermore, the value of imports recovered significantly 
during 1983-89 from $539 million in 1983 to $1.0906 billion in 
1988 and $1.1082 billion in 1989. (5) The improvement in the 
imports position was largely due to adjustment-supported
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funding from the IMF and the World Bank. This situation also 
had the added effect of creating a much improved balance of 
payments position in the late 1980s, especially in 1988 and
1989. (6) The export sector also recovered very strongly,
especially the traditional exports such as cocoa, gold, 
diamonds and timber. The output of cocoa rose from a low of 
158,000 tonnes in 1983 to 230,000 tonnes in 1986 and to 300,000 
tonnes in 1989. Timber exports also showed the same high 
degree of recovery with export volumes rising from 189,000 
cubic metres in 1983 to 372,000 cubic metres in 1987. There 
were strong recoveries in the mineral sector, particularly in 
gold and diamonds. On the whole, export performance in the 
1983-1989 period grew steadily as Table 5.2 shows.
Other areas of improvement in the economy include a 
consistent growth in per capita income of over 2 per cent per 
annum (7). Inflation also showed some decline although it was 
still in double figures, at 30 per cent in 1988 and 25 per cent 
in 1989. Also, Ghana was now able to carry on with the 
repayment of its international debt arreas, a significant 
improvement from a situation in which the country was unable to 
service its debts at the beginning of the 1980s. On the whole, 
there is a clear revival in economic activity on a larger scale 
than before the ERP was introduced. This success can be 
attributed to the exceptionally high level of reform-linked 
support in funding by the IMF and the World Bank (over $3
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billion). It is this reform-based funding and the commitment 
with which the reform measures were implemented which combined 
to bring about the improvements in physical infrastructures and 
macroeconomic indicators.
Table 5.2.
Export - Commodity Performance, 1983-1989
Commodity Unit 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Cocoa f000 tonnes 158 175 210 230 250 288 300
Timber Cubic metres 189 180 225 - - - -
Gold '000 grams 8.6 9.3 10.6 9.0 10.2 11.6 -
Diamonds *000 carats 336.6 342.0 600.0 599.2 442.0 215.9 -
Manganese *000 tonnes 175.0 268.0 307.0 350.0 253.6 230.9 -
Bauxite n w 70.4 48.5 169.5 204.0 195.0 287.2 -
Sources: Jeff Haynes. "The International Dimensions of the Sub- 
Saharan African Debt Crisis; A Case Study of A Success Story1" 
1989, P.13; Quarterly Digest of Statistics (Accra Statistical 
Service) vol. VI No. 4 December 1988; West Africa, various 
issues
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However, when we look beyond these macro-economic
indicators at the impact of structural adjustment on Ghana, the
acclaimed successes tend to pale into insignificance. For one
thing, the growth rates recorded as indicated above are from
very low bases and as long as they continue they are
significant, otherwise they are insufficient to sustain the
momentum of growth. Moreover, the constraints of the global
economy are still there. It is in this sense that the
improvements in the growth figures raise a number of issues:
The first concerns the dynamics of the recovery programme 
and its potential to succeed; the second deals with its 
capacity to then propel the economy beyond the limited 
objective of Recovery1 on to the path of dynamic and 
autonomous development and growth. First its potential 
for success: the emphasis on (i) an export sector 
dominated not by manufactured but primary commodities; and 
(ii) a massive infusion of aid, concessionary type of 
official development aid particularly assumes a large 
measure of flexibility, openness and, above all, growth in 
the Western economies (Ghana’s main trading partners and 
donor countries). (8)
Another issue is when we look at the price of this success 
story, or the economic as well as other costs of the ERP, this 
success is put in doubt in a fundamental way. It then becomes
clear that at best, the performance of the economy under the
a
ERP is mixed. Otherwise/ there is/(strong ground to conclude
that the adjustment programme has been harmful to the economy 
of Ghana in a fundamental way. Evidence indicates that the 
economy is not in a stronger position than it was before the
crisis set in over two decades ago. The majority of the
population, as we show later in this chapter, has lost out in
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the process, economically, socially and politically, A 
balanced assessment of the success of the ERP must therefore 
involve an investigation of these issues. The issues include 
the extent to which the ERP has adversely affected the economy 
and its prospects for self-sustained growth and development in 
the longer-term; and the effects of the ERP on Ghanaians.
The ERP and the cost of success
In spite if its achievements, the ERP does not seem to 
have put the economy of Ghana in the kind of shape which will 
enable it to attain self-sustained growth and development. It 
does not seem to have altered the old structures of dependence 
and underdevelopment in any fundamental way. In certain 
respects, these structures have been reinforced by the export- 
oriented growth strategy of the ERP. For example, there has 
been increased over-reliance on traditional exports and 
dependence on external aid for essential imports to feed 
domestic industry. Also, the policy measures adopted under the 
ERP have tended to cancel out rather than complement each 
other. They have therefore generated their own contradictions 
which combine to work against the governments declared 
objective of self-reliant development. It is instructive to 
look at these issues more closely to see how costly the
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achievements of the ERP have turned out for the people and the 
economy of Ghana.
The policy measures adopted under the structural 
adjustment programme have largely depressed the economy and 
reinforced existing structural weaknesses, thereby leaving it 
with very little possibility of a self-generating and self- 
sustaining development. The much-desired diversification of 
the economy away from traditional commodity exports has not 
taken place. Instead, the ERP has succeeded in reinforcing 
this form of dependence as can be seen from the rise in export 
volumes of these commodities and the risk of falling commodity 
prices. For instance, cocoa, the main export commodity, has 
suffered constant fall in prices since the 1970s when it fell 
from £3,000 per tonne in 1977 to £600 per tonne in 1989. (9) 
Moreover, these exports are being increased at the expense of 
the environment as the level of timber exploitation clearly 
demonstrates. For instance, the wood processing industry 
recorded large increases in capacity utilisation from 28.1 per 
cent in 1984 to 32.5 per cent in 1985, 43.0 per cent in 1987 
and 70 per cent in 1988. Furthermore, non-traditional exports 
have performed very badly, bringing in only $25-30 million per 
annum or 3 per cent of overall exports. Thus, Ghana has 
continued to play its traditional role of exporter of raw 
materials to the industrialised world, only that this time it 
may be doing it more efficiently.
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While it is not realistic to expect Ghana to abandon 
export growth in traditional industries, it is difficult to see 
how the weak non-traditional export sector could grow as 
required because of the Western standard of competitiveness and 
efficiency imposed on it under the ERP. The reforms have 
either weakened or destroyed local industries which, after 
decades of being protected, have found it difficult to compete 
within the climate of structural adjustment. Therefore, if 
Ghana is to have a local industrial sector, some protection 
based on the infant industry argument has to be provided by the 
government while avoiding these industries remaining 
perpetually at the infant stage. The idea must be to ensure 
that local industries are not over-exposed to the strong 
competition from advanced industrial countries without giving 
them the same degree of protection which they had before.
The ERP has also heightened Ghana’s dependence on aid and 
worsened the debt situation which led to the adoption of the 
adjustment programme in the first place. At the time the ERP 
was introduced in 1983, Ghana’s debt was just over $1 billion. 
By 1989, this level of indebtedness had risen to over $3 
billion, thereby exacerbating the debt-service situation. The 
situation transformed Ghana into a net exporter of capital, 
especially between 1986 and 1988 when the debt-service was over 
50 per cent and even the IMF became a net recipient of capital 
from Ghana (Table 5.3).
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Table 5,3
Ghana’s debt service ratios, actual and estimated, 1984-9
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Excluding IMF 32.1 46.8 37.0 26.3 27.5 25.0
Including IMF 36.3 53.4 46.5 51.9 59.2 46.2
Including IMF 
and arrears 46.4 61.8 46.9 55.0 67.3 53.6
Source: World Bank, Report No. 6635GH, 30 March 1987, quoted In 
John Toye, "Ghana’s Economic Reforms, 1983-7: Origins, 
achievements and limitations" in James Pickett and Hans Singer 
(eds), Towards Economic Recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa. London 
(Routledge) 1990, p53.
Even though the situation was expected to ease somewhat 
from 1989 onwards, Ghana’s indebtedness could still rise 
further as the economy still needed massive inflows of aid if 
the economy was to improve. For 1989 alone, the World Bank 
estimated that Ghana needed a minimum of $800 million aid to 
sustain the recovery programme. This situation in addition to 
the concession given to exporters to retain part of their 
earnings in hard currency and also to repatriate profits, has 
had an adverse effect on domestic capital formation. This 
assumes critical importance especially because one of the
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ingredients required for African development is the generation 
of capital by the countries concerned. The success of 
structural adjustment should be measured among other things by 
the extent to which it aids the process of capital formation. 
In the case of Ghana, as in most other African countries, the 
liberalisation measures of structural adjustment have tended to 
promote capital flight. (10)
Another ingredient of recovery and development is high 
real income per capita. The structural adjustment programme 
has instead depressed incomes and living conditions generally. 
The large devaluations of the Cedi and price deregulations as 
well as the monetary and fiscal policies all combined to push 
down income levels below their 1970s levels. Again as a 
result, the economy was unable to generate the needed capital 
for development. Demand has been seriously eroded by 
devaluation which has not worked as expected. Devaluation has 
instead created inflationary problems which cannot be stopped 
even in Ghana where reforms were far-reaching. Inflation is 
still very high even through it has fallen from the 
exceptionally high levels of the period before ERP (Table 5.1). 
In 1989, for instance, inflation was still running at 25 per 
cent •
The interest rate policy and credit policy adopted under 
the ERP have not led to increased savings and investment. It
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appears that savings and investment have hardly responded 
positively to reform measures. In a situation of high interest 
rates and credit squeeze coupled with high inflation resulting 
from devaluation and price deregulation, people have found it 
difficult to save as all resources were expended on meeting the 
rising cost of living. Savings have also been discouraged by 
the activities of the banks in this area, where even the IMF 
has admitted:
... it appears that the commercial banks have seized the 
opportunity of the full liberalisation of interest rates 
to lower their deposit rates and increase their margins. 
Real deposit rates have thus become significantly 
negative, thereby constraining the role of the banking 
system in the mobilisation of financial savings, including 
long-term resources. (11)
The desired investment has also not been realised, both 
locally and especially from outside Ghana. Apart from the 
goldmining sector, oil exploration, tourism and cigarette 
manufacture which have attracted some level of foreign 
investment, the experience in the other areas of the economy 
has been very disappointing. This fact was bitterly lamented 
by the Finance Minister, Dr Kwesi Botchwey when he told the 
donor community at the 1989 Consultative Group for Ghana 
meeting that:
The generation of productive employment on the other hand 
depends very crucially on private investment, where our 
experience has been mixed at best... the reality is that 
private investments in manufacturing have been 
disappointing, in spite of some improvement in investment 
laws, in spite of the divestiture programmes, in spite of 
the vastly improved macro-economic environment, with 
better guarantees for profit and dividend repatriation, 
not to mention the actual record of arrears clearance, in
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spite of our subscription to MIGA, and in spite of
bilateral agreements on investment protection, (12)
This problem of lack of investment was clearly
demonstrated in 1989 when both local and foreign private
investment seemed to have fallen sharply. In fact, all
categories of investment, including 100 per cent Ghanaian
owned, joint ventures and foreign equity projects, fell in
1988. There was also a fall in the number of new projects and
in the number of capacity-increasing investments. (13)
Monetary control has also not been successful as much of 
the economy is in the unofficial and informal sector and has 
evaded control. The informal sector is thriving and expanding 
in spite of the measures taken to bring it under official
control, like the setting up of private Bureaux de change which 
amounted to a legalisation of the black market in foreign 
exchange. With most people engaged in various activities in 
this sector, and with other adjustment policies making it 
difficult to operate in the formal sector, there has been a 
voluntary opting out into the informal sector. This has meant 
the loss of vital revenues for the government from possible 
taxation that could have been levied. The extent to which the 
informal sector has defied control can be seen from the very 
large amount of currency outside the banks (Table 5.4). 
Smuggling has continued despite the efforts put in by the 
government to stop it. Also, many firms have continued to use
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the forex bureaux to remit capital abroad despite the
depreciated rate of the Cedi. (14) Furthermore, the monetary
policies have led to speculation rather than increase in
production through investment and the like. It was the high 
level of speculation which led to the legalisation of the forex 
bureaux in the first place, but now, even these have been
overtaken by a new crop of black-marketeers who carry out their 
business on the doorsteps of the recognised forex bureaux.
Table 5.4
Money Supply* in the Economy, 1982-1987 (Million Cedis)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 19*87
Currency outside 
banks 6,728 10,037 13,943 21,897 31,240 46,116
Total money supply 12,297 18,770 26,643 43,471 64,620 91,852
Quasi money supply 4,833 5,559 7,193 11,565 19,984 35,365
♦Includes the impact of secondary banks.
Source: Republic of Ghana, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, Vol.
IV Fo. 4, December 1988. P.2
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Trade liberalisation has been largely harmful to the 
economy because of the fact that the capacity to switch from 
imported to local products is very weak. While the export of 
traditional commodities has done well under the adjustment 
regime, domestic production and industry in particular, has 
suffered. Industries have had to lay off staff in order to 
make profit and capacity utilisation has not increased much, 
let alone expansion in production. Small businesses have 
suffered badly from a combined effect of the reform measures 
adopted under the ERP. The large devaluations of the Cedi 
raised the cost of foreign exchange beyond the reach of the 
small businessman as he could not often raise the amount of 
Cedi required in order to buy hard currency to meet his import 
needs. For instance, not many businesses could thrive under 
conditions where one needed C3 million to buy £3,000 in 1989. 
Coupled with this was the financial squeeze imposed by the 
government and the increased cost of borrowing.
The liberalisation of trade has therefore exposed the 
weaknesses of the industrial sector in the face of compeition 
from outside. This diminishing indeed lack of international 
competitiveness, can be seen, for instance, in the textile 
sector which has virtually ceased production because local 
products cost much more than imported textile materials. The 
situation has been made worse by importers of second-hand 
clothing from Europe and North America at prices easily
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affordable to the ordinary Ghanaian. (15) This competition 
from comparatively cheaper imports has forced manufacturers to 
call for limited protection, a call which the government, under 
the guidance of the IMF and World Bank, has resisted. High 
interest rates have prevented Ghanaians from investing in 
manufacturing or industry thereby threatening the survival of 
the sector.
The problem with industry is the infant industry syndrome 
which was further exposed by the harsh conditions under the 
ERP. Although the increased inflow of bilateral and 
multilateral assistance helped to raise overall capacity 
utilisation from 18.0 per cent in 1984 to 40 per cent in 1988, 
many industries eventually suffered closure or capacity 
underutilisation due to the constraints imposed on the 
industrial sector. The major constraint on industry was lack 
of liquidity resulting largely from Central Bank instructions 
to commercial banks to implement very tight credit ceilings. 
The exchange rate adjustments also raised the cost of importing 
raw materials, spare parts and equipment for plant 
modernisation. The Central Bank requirement that industries 
finance part of their imports by paying the full amounts (100 
per cent up front) and the strong competition from cheaper 
imports all helped to cause closures and similar problems. The 
decline in this sector became evident in 1989 when output 
dropped to 7.4 per cent from 11.4 per cent in 1988, and when a
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survey by the Association of Ghana Industries also revealed 
that the slow-down was considerable.
The worst affected industrial enterprises were in 
textiles, leather processing, cosmetics and plastics. As a 
result, the pressure by the industrialists on government for 
protection intensified. The government was finally forced to 
act in 1989, and it invited enterprises which were hard up to 
register with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning for 
possible assistance. The response overwhelmed the government so 
much that the exercise was quietly suspended. (16) But the 
situation did lead some members of the government to admit to 
policy errors in this sector. The adverse effects of trade 
liberalisation on the economy have been admitted as an error by 
the influential chairman of the PNDC Committee of Secretaries, 
P.V. Obeng:
We would certainly have avoided the over liberalisation of 
certain economic activities. We pursued a policy of trade 
liberalisation even though we had not put some of our 
local industry on sound footing... But we now appreciate 
that we brought in trade liberalisation at a time when our 
sectors of industry that were not yet on the priority list 
were not on their feet. So these sectors suffered anti­
dumping (sic) pressures, they suffered infant industry 
problems and in the end they were recovering at a pace 
that was far below expectation. They had lost their 
capital, the capacity of their planting equipment and 
their reserves. The banking system had also degenerated 
and lost its own loan portfolio and therefore could not 
boost their resurgence with appropriate credit to meet the 
competition from imports. Through liberalisation we are 
getting a lot of imports cheaper than our suffering 
industries could produce. (17)
What seems to have worked is the liberalisation of
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agricultural producer prices. Even then, its positive effects 
were felt only in export cash crop production. Thus, peasant 
cocoa producers benefited from higher cocoa prices. This has 
largely been the result of the export-oriented strategy and the 
need to pay debts or service interests. On the other hand, 
food crop production has suffered neglect and has therefore not 
done well. Thus, the food security situation is very worrying. 
There has been a number of programmes and improved extension 
activities to farmers; the provision of silos in the food 
producing areas, the rehabilitation of existing irrigation 
schemes, etc, as part of the process of increasing food 
production. However, while the price increases have centred on 
cash crops like cocoa, oil palm and cotton, government policy 
on food crops is that market forces should determine their 
prices as far as possible, though guaranteed minimum prices for 
maize and rice are to be administered for food security 
reasons.
Despite the reform measures directed at the agricultural 
sector under the ERP and exceptionally good weather for most of 
the time, the performance has been mixed. There have been 
production increases and food production has followed the trend 
of increases in the population. However, this level of food 
production has not kept up with that of the population, as 
Table 5.5 clearly shows. (18) The tendency for policy reform 
measures to undermine rather than complement each other, is to
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a very large extent responsible for the unsatisfactory 
performance of food agriculture. The IMF favoured demand- 
management measures such as monetary and fiscal policies, but 
these contradicted the supply-oriented measures such as 
improved efficiency, resource allocation, and expansion of 
productive capacity, favoured by the World Bank, In practice 
these measures have obstructed instead of complimenting each 
other, thereby seriously limiting the effectiveness of the 
reforms. Thus, the demand restraint measures favoured by the 
IMF have among other things led to a consistent decline over 
the years, of agriculture’s share of total public expenditure. 
(19) The persistent reduction in the size of the development 
budget which itself is the result of restrictive monetary 
policy, not only failed to bring down inflation, it could also 
not meet the agricultural sector’s growing need for funds.
Table 5.5
Demand for and supply of cereals (*000 mt) in Ghana, 1980-88
Demand Net pro- Imports Total Shortfall Percent-
duction supply age diff­
erence
1980 743.7 515.02 110.2 625.22 -118.48 15.9
1981 763.8 522.38 142.4 664.78 - 99.02 13.0
1982 783.9 386.22 150.8 537.02 -246.88 31.5
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1983 804.0 284.70 152.9 437.60 -366.40 45.6
1984 817.4 538.18 106.1 664.28 -173.12 21.2
1985 837.5 456.16 92.8 548.96 -288.54 34.5
1986 857.6 515.50 102.0 617.50 -240.10 28.0
1987 871.0 541.60 103.0 744.60 -126.40 14.5
1988a) 891.1 680.10 — 680.10 -211.00 23.7
Notes: Cereals include rice, maize, sorghum and millet •
Demand reflects that of household and feedmills.
a) Projected figures.
Source: Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Ghana, July 1988; and quoted in Kwame 
Asiedu-Saforo "Economic Reform Programmes and Agricultural 
Development: Macro-Policy Sequencing in Ghana, 1983-88"; in 
FOOD POLICY, November 1989, P.363
Other ERP measures such as devaluation, the removal of 
subsidies on services and the privatisation of agricultural 
inputs like fertilizer and petroleum products have served as 
disincentives to increased food production. This removal of 
subsidies on essential inputs and the privatisation of others 
such as fertilizers has reduced the relative profitability of 
these inputs to the farmer. As Asiedu-Saforo discovered in the 
case of the price ratio of fertilizer/maize (Table 5.6), the 
profitability to the farmer of the use of fertilizer in maize 
production declined since 1984. This has largely been the 
consequence of the increases in the price of fertilizer
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resulting from privatisation and devaluation. This has also 
reduced the demand for and the usage of fertilizer. (20)
Table 5•6
Relative Profitability of Fertilizer Use in Maize Production, 
Ghana 1983-88
Price of 
maize, 
100 kg 
(Cedis)
Price of 
fertilizer 
15-15-15 
(50 kg)
Relative
profita­
bility
Price of 
fertilizer 
S/A (50 kg)
Relative
profita­
bility
1983 3857.59a 53 72.78 38 101.52
1984 2337.82a 440 5.31 295 7.92
1985 2037.91a 440 4.63 295 6.91
1986 3291.71a 780 4.22 490 6.71
1987 7650.00b 1380 5.54 820 9.33
1988 9800.00b 2300 4.26 1600 6.13
a Average market prices
b Estimates of wholesale prices
Source: Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department 
and the Extension Unit, Ministry of Agriculture, Ghana, July 
1988; Quoted in Kwame Asiedu-Saforo, opcit, P.365
Another negative effect of the removal of subsidies such 
as on petrol, is that it hampered the activities of private
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traders in foodstuff and also led to low prices being paid to 
farmers. The rise in transportation costs resulting from 
higher petrol prices and the prices of spare parts has forced 
traders to restrict their trading to only those areas that are 
easily accessible. This has also resulted in low prices being 
offered to farmers for their produce, as well as a continuing 
high level of post-harvest losses in those areas that are 
relatively difficult to reach at the prevailing transport 
costs. In addition, the successive devaluations of the Cedi 
also became impediment to increased food production. Exchange 
rate policies have raised the prices of non-food consumer items 
faster than the increase in food prices, thereby turning the 
domestic terms of trade dramatically against the farmer.
The reliance on market forces to reverse the fall in per 
capita production of food did not materialise. The raising of 
the real producer price for cocoa, while encouraging increased 
production of the commodity, created a relative price 
disincentive to produce food. This, in addition to the removal 
of subsidies on inputs and other non-consumer items, worked to 
make the conditions of food-crop producers worse under the ERP 
as the case of the northern farmers suggests. (21) Food 
production did not do as well as expected in the circumstances 
as the levels of shortfall in Table 5.5 show.
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Meanwhile, the ERP has created winners as well as losers 
among the various social groups in Ghana. There has been a 
regressive redistribution of income and wealth towards the rich 
and powerful in the society. Thus, social groups such as the 
elite polititians, the top military brass, the business people, 
the owners of multinational corporations have benefitted 
immensely from the operation of the ERP. One business group 
which benefitted most from the ERP was the resident foreigners 
- Indians, Lebanese, Syrians, Taiwanese and Europeans. (22) 
This group was better placed than other local businessmen to 
benefit from the economic reforms because they had the 
resources, good personnel, access to technology and information 
about local and international markets, political ties with the 
local elite and other external connections, the ability to 
borrow, and they knew how to take advantage of the reforms. 
They were very aggressive in pressing home their advantages, 
and reaped enormous benefits. The prosperity of this group 
under the ERP caused considerable resentment among Ghanaians 
and embarrassed the government.(23)
As we have argued above, policy measures such as 
devaluation have led to increased currency speculation in which 
it is not uncommon to find the elite actively involved. Other 
areas of reaping immense fortunes by this ruling class have 
included the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, inflated 
contracts and other illegal activities. Also, the salaries of
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top public servants were raised and kept very high as a 
deliberate policy to keep the high calibre staff in the service 
as well as attract new ones. In spite of that, the government 
has found it difficult to keep the skilled people, because the 
salaries were eaten up by inflation, while the disparity in 
wages between the top echelon of the public service and the 
other lower level workers has continued to widen.
Big business has also benefitted from the ERP even though 
the small-scale businesses were badly affected by the 
liberalisation policies. The small-scale businesses affected 
included the garment, textile, leather, building and cosmetics 
industries. They have been unable to compete against foreign 
imports which are often much cheaper than goods produced by 
these local industries.(24) The generous concessions given by 
the government to encourage production and investment have 
provided avenues for the repatriation of capital. For 
instance, the freedom to retain a certain percentage of export 
earnings abroad for transacting business and even the 
repatriation of dividends and profit, have opened the way for a 
much easier transfer of capital abroad. The removal of 
administrative controls on foreign exchange transactions has 
been a further boost for multinationals and individuals to 
transfer money outside the country. The privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises has also immensely benefitted the rich
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and powerful as well as the multinational corporations 
operating In Ghana.
Thus under the ERP, Lonrho has emerged as the dominant 
actor In the gold mining sector as the UAC (United African 
Company) Is In the textile sector of the economy. These firms 
have continued their takeover of the economy by buying 
privatised enterprises in these sectors. Their profits have 
also risen dramatically in spite of the lean economic situation 
within the period of adjustment. Usually these huge profits 
have been made possible by the retrenchments of workers, 
sometimes by trading in money as the banks have done, as a 
result of foreign exchange auctions and devaluation. The UAC 
is a typical case of this phenomenon of huge profits and boom 
under the ERP even when the rest of the economy is still in 
crisis. For instance in 1988, the UAC almost quadrupled 
shareholders* dividends from the record sales and profits which 
grossed over Cl billion.(25) On the whole, these businesses 
and Ghana*s elite have grown richer under the ERP while the 
majority of the people have not been as successful.
For the rest of Ghanaians, the cost of adjustment has been 
very high economically, socially and politically. Those in the 
professions like doctors, teachers, etc, who could not bear the 
situation have had to vote with their feet and leave the 
country in search of greener pastures elsewhere. The exact
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figures on the scale of this exodus are not available, but the 
general impression is that the numbers large and growing. This 
exodus of people whose services are needed for the task of 
recovery and development has continued to worry the government. 
Those highly skilled people who were unable to leave the 
country have resorted to illegal ways of supplementing their 
incomes which have become inadequate to meet their living 
requirements. For the rest of the workers, unemployed, and 
peasants, life has been very difficult under the structural 
adjustment programme. Their story is also part of the impact 
of the structural adjustment programme in Ghana which can be 
clearly seen in the social and political life of the people, to 
which we now turn.
The Social Impact of the ERP
The decades of economic woes, a growing external debt and 
the reforms undertaken under the ERP have devastated the lives 
of the major social groups, like the workers, peasants, women, 
children and even small-scale businessmen. The reform policies 
have exacerbated the abuses of underdevelopment such as 
poverty, hunger, malnutrition, disease, etc. Incomes declined 
below their levels in the 1970s and there was a reversal of the 
progress recorded in the social sector like healthcare, 
education, etc, in the 1960s and 1970s (Table 5.7). The
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Table 5.7; Trends In social Indicators
1) E d u c a t i o n  ( P e r c e n t a g e  of age g r o u p  e n r o l l e d )
P r i m a r y  S e c o n d a r y
T o t a l  M a l e Fem a l e Total M a l e  F emale
1965 19 8 0  1986 1965 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 6 1965 1 9 8 0  19 8 6  1965 1980 1986 1965 19 8 0  1986 1965 1 9 8 0  1987
69 73 63 82 80 75 57 65 59 13 37 35 19 46 45 7 28 28
2) H e a l t h  a n d  n u t r i t i o n
1
P o p u l a t i o n  p e r  
P h y s i c i a n  N u r s i n g  P e r s o n
D a i l y  C a l o r i e  S u p p l y  
Per C a p i t a
Ba b i e s  w i t h  l o w  b i r t h  w e i g h t s  (X)
1965 1 9 8 4  1965 1984 1965 1980 1986 1985
1 3 , 7 4 0  1 4 , 8 9 0  3 , 7 3 0 6 40 1 , 9 5 0 1,795 1,79 17
3) S t a t u s  of Chil d r e n :
C h i l d r e n  u n d e r  a ge 5 as 
p e r c e n t a g e  o f  total 
p o p u l a t i o n
I n f a n t  M o r t a l i t y  
(per 1 0 0 0  live 
b i r t h s )
P e r c e n t a g e  of  age g r o u p  
g r o u p  a f f e c t e d  by: 
W a s t i n g  S t u n t i n g  
(12-23 m t h s )  (24-59 mths)
C h i l d r e n  u n d e r  5 s u f f ­
e r i n g  f r o m  m a l n u t r i t i o n  
1 9 8 0 - 8 6  a v e r a g e  
(p e rcent age group)
1965 19 8 0  1987 1965 19 8 0  1987 28 31 30
19 20 21 119 100 92
Source: W o r l d  Bank, 1989: Sub-Saharan Africa: Froa Crisis to Sustainabla Growth. PP 272,274,275 
& 276.
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general level of poverty and Inequality in the distribution of 
wealth has grown. The middle class has largely disappeared, 
either as part of the brain-drain or has been brought down to 
the level of the majority of poor people. By the mid-1980s, it 
was clear that about 7.3 million Ghanaians out of a population 
of 13 million, or 55 per cent of the population, were suffering 
extremes of poverty. (26) As the cost of living soared due to 
the combined effects of the reform measures, most people turned 
to other means to supplement their incomes, often illegal. As 
a result, the level of corruption, violent crimes, theft, 
cheating and embezzlement by public servants increased. (27) 
There have also been cases of pilfering of gold by workers as 
well as illegal mining of gold.
Another dimension to this crisis of adjustment is the 
persistence of regional imbalance in economic performance 
between the urban areas and the rural areas. Even though 
poverty is generally spread, the rural areas have fared worse 
than the towns. There is more malnutrition, illiteracy, etc, 
in the rural areas than in the towns. (28) And while the price 
increases resulting from such measures as the removal of 
subsidies have affected the majority of the people equally, the 
rural dwellers have suffered most under the ERP. Also, the ERP 
has not redressed the imbalance between the northern part of 
Ghana and the south. While the south continues to do better in 
terms of provision of amenities and economically, the north has
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still suffered neglect. The other vulnerable groups like women 
and children have borne the brunt of the hardship resulting 
from the reform programme. The degree of damage that the 
economic crisis and the economic recovery programme have done 
to people*s lives can be seen from the experience of workers 
and peasants under the ERP.
Workers and the ERP
The workers of Ghana have definitely suffered the worst 
consequences of adjustment as the social group on the frontline 
of the onslaught. The term workers is being used here in a 
general sense to refer to those in paid employment in both 
public and private sectors, the self-employed such as artisans, 
petty traders and the unemployed and their families in the 
major towns and cities. Workers have suffered massive 
retrenchments, falling living standards, price increases, 
higher taxes and higher costs of social services such as in 
education and health. Income distribution was also skewed in 
favour of the higher managerial and professional cadre. An 
oppressive and undemocratic industrial atmosphere was imposed 
on the working class movement throughout the period of 
structural adjustment.
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The retrenchments which followed the implementation of 
structural adjustment measures have greatly depleted the ranks 
of the working class movement. Over 100,000 workers are 
estimated to have lost their jobs following the imposition of 
structural adjustment. This represents a reduction of about a 
third of the public service which was estimated to be 300,000 
strong at the beginning of the ERP in 1983. The various unions 
fought and lost the numerous battles over retrenchments as 
large numbers of workers lost their jobs. From the very 
beginning of the ERP, it was clear that the majority of those 
to be retrenched would come from the lower levels of the civil 
service. It had been noted that the public services were 
heavily overstaffed at the lower levels, and it was this 
section of workers; poor, socially weak and politically 
powerless that bore the burden of the retrenchment exercise. 
This was clear from the official guidelines for staff reduction 
in the civil service and Ghana Education Service which directed 
the officials responsible for staff reduction to:
List together all personnel in the following grades for
each unit or organisation within the sector:
a) labourers, cleaners, charwomen, drivers, stewards, 
cooks, porters, sweepers, messengers, security 
personnel and analogous grades;
b) clerical officers, secretarial personnel, stores 
officers and analogous grades;
c) executive and analogous grades. (29)
Thus, contrary to the expectations of the government, the 
retrenchments simply reinforced the ranks of the unemployed. 
The government had hoped that the success of the ERP would
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enable the private sector to absorb some of the retrenched 
workers while agriculture and other avenues for self-employment 
would pick up the rest. In the event, as we have seen, the ERP 
did not produce the anticipated success and unemployment simply 
rose. Even the private sector had to resort to retrenchment in 
order to maintain their margins of profit. The whole exercise 
had damaging implications for the welfare of the extended 
family, since many people actually depend on one person*s 
salary. Another dimension to this problem was the inability of 
many public institutions to pay terminal benefits to their 
workers long after their retrenchment. For instance, the Ghana 
Broadcasting Corporation was reported to be still owing about 
C900 million to 580 of its former employees, while the near 
bankrupt State Housing Corporation owed its former workers C2.2 
billion. (30)
The situation of unemployment was exacerbated by the staff 
reductions which took place at the local government level. 
After the PNDC government decided to provide only 50 per cent 
of the wage bill of all local authorities, many of these 
councils were either forced to lay off their staff or they only 
paid half salary. The result was that many staff lost their 
jobs. The employment generation envisaged from the government’s 
Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment 
and Development (PAMSCAD) has not happened. In addition to the 
redeployment committee set up in 1987 to organise redeployment
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and retraining, PAMSCAD was launched in early 1988 to further 
ameliorate the situation of unemployment in the country, 
PAMSCAD aimed to create jobs and compensate for the loss of 
income by retrenched workers as well as the provision of basic 
needs and education in neglected areas and among vulnerable 
groups through community initiative. At a special donors 
conference in February 1988, donors pledged $85 million towards 
PAMSCAD, Most of this money was to be directed towards the 
creation of employment by encouraging public works and small 
scale enterprises. Thus, about 40,000 jobs were scheduled to 
be created under the programme; 4,000 workers were to be 
engaged in the food-for-work project; a further 10,000 jobs 
were to be created in infrastructural improvements in major 
towns in the south while another 23,760 jobs were expected over 
the two years of PAMSCAD, (31)
Workers1 wages have also remained low in real terms under 
the ERP. This is in line with the reform measures since wage 
freezes and restraints are seen as a concomitant of structural 
adjustment. The government has tried to keep wages down, so 
that in real terms, wages and salaries are still well below 
their 1975 levels. There have been numerous minimum wage 
increases by the government, the latest being the new national 
minimum wage of C218 announced on March 5, 1990. However,
these have all fallen far short of the living wage, necessary 
to sustain workers and their families in an atmosphere of
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rising inflation and cost of living. Indeed, in 1987 before 
the recent national minimum wage was fixed, the government had 
actually abolished the notion of a minimum wage and replaced it 
with the ability of employers to pay.
However, in a situation where the cost of living had risen 
too high due to the combined effects of the adjustment 
policies, the wages paid to workers were grossly inadequate to 
meet their most basic needs. The cost of education, health and 
other services continued to rise over the entire period of 
adjustment and put a severe strain on workers* wages. For 
instance, the price of petrol increased from C235 per gallon in 
1988 to C275 in 1989 and C360 per gallon in 1990. Over the 
same period, the price of kerosene rose from C170 per gallon to 
C190 and C270 per gallon respectively. (32) Rents and food 
prices have also gone up. The cost of food for a family of 
four for one day in 1989 stood at C2,000, while the landlord 
took as much as C100,000 rent in advance for a room. (33) 
Clearly, such a situation has made life very difficult for 
those still in employment and more so for those who are 
unemployed. This is a situation that is unlikely to change 
much in the short-term, or even in the longer term. Also, the 
general impression is that the purchasing power of the Cedi has 
weakened over the period, but as can be seen from Table 5.8, 
this situation seemed to improve by 1987 as workers were able 
to buy more of some of the essential goods than in 1983.
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Workers have also had to put up with heavy tax burdens and
various kinds of levies at a time when their incomes have
continually fallen. Under the governments policy of
attracting personnel to the higher echelons of the public
service, generous salary increases and tax reliefs were
undertaken. For those workers in the lower levels, tax reliefs
remained low. The metropolitan councils also raised their
property rates and even imposed arbitrary taxes in other areas
and this was generally resented by workers. For instance,
Makola market women marched in protest against arbitrary taxes
by the Accra City Council, while their counterparts in
Kotokraba in Cape Coast also went on strike for similar
reasons. The drive by the various councils to increase their
revenues often exposed people to the risk of paying the same
tax twice. This prompted a worker from Obuasi to complain in a
letter to a newspaper:
I want to find out whether the Amansie East District 
Council is right and by law has the power to collect such 
tax (basic rates) from anybody who passes or travels 
through the district, irrespective of whether you have 
already paid yours in the district of your residence. (34)
The atmosphere of industrial relations also deteriorated 
as a result of the implementation of the ERP. Workers had 
opposed the structural adjustment programme from the start 
because of the hardship that would follow from such IMF 
conditionalities as devaluation, price deregulation, 
privatisation and retrenchment. Since then, organised labour 
has teamed up with students and other groups opposed to the ERP
292
to demand its abandonment. This had put it on a collision 
course with the government, which on its part, was determined 
to implement the adjustment programme to the end. The 
government has therefore reacted to workers1 demands and 
opposition to the programme by buying over influential leaders 
who were willing to help the government and installing them in 
the leadership of the Trade Union Congress (TUC). (35) On the 
other hand, radical union leaders were constantly harassed, 
intimidated and even detained as the government sought to 
impose industrial peace in order to attract foreign investment. 
For instance, the radical secretary general of the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers1 Union (ICU), L.G.K Ocloo was 
continuously harassed by the government for his persistent 
opposition to the ERP and was finally forced into exile in 
1989. Many workers have also faced detention as the government 
tried to stamp out any opposition to its industrial policy 
under the ERP.
Table 5.8: Purchasing power of the Cedi for the unskilled urban 
worker. 1980-87
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987*
Monthly wage(C) 300 300 300 543 875 1750 2250 3000
Annual wage (C) 3600 3600 3600 6516 10500 21000 27000 36000
Kilos of gari
per month 66 25 21 10 26 79 39 33
lkg loaves of 
bread per month 50
Bottles of 
edible oil (pale 
oil) per month 21
Kilos of beef
per month 7,5
Kgs of granulated 
sugar per month 23
Bottles of beers 
per month A2
Cakes of Guardian 
Soap per month 66
Pairs of Rubber 
Sandals (Charlie 
Mote) per month 29
Yards of Cloth
Cotton print
per year 89
Minibus Distance 
of Taxi Service 
per week A3
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20 13 16 18 22
1A 7 A 6 16 20 25
6.0 3.5 A.O 3.5 6.0 7.0 6.5
19 - - - 19 18 22
17 25 26 1A 22 2A 2A
A8 A1 57 60 77
19 18 5 8 1A 18 19
55 26 70 6A 7A
17 25 3A 1A 26 20 25
* March figures
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Note: a dash (-) indicates that the commodity was virtually not 
on the market in the period.
Source: K. Ewusi, 1 Equity Implications of IMF stabilization1, 
quoted in Jeff Haynes, opcit, P.18
The Peasants and the ERP
The peasants, defined here as those who dwell and make a
living in the rural areas, form the majority of the more than 7
million Ghanaians whom the ERP has failed to lift from poverty.
The rural areas are home to about 69 per cent of Ghana’s
population, and contribute 51 per cent of the GDP and 78 per
export
cent of the country1 steamings. (36) Despite their contribution
to the national economy, the peasants have suffered neglect
even under the PNDC. As a Ghanaian academic has observed;
The peasants are indifferent politically but in spite of 
high cocoa prices they also suffer from subsidy removal 
such as cost cutting measures in the hospitals, since many 
small peasants produce very small cocoa per head. (37)
Ghana's rural dwellers have had to endure high charges for 
public services such as health care, education, etc. Yet only 
14 per cent of the rural population have access to portable 
water, 21 per cent to modern health care and just above 2 per 
cent to electricity. The rural areas are the poorest in the 
country, especially the savannah belt. Malnutrition and 
undernourishment of children is higher in the rural areas.
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Illiteracy rates are also higher in the rural areas, as much as 
74.5 per cent, while school attendance is lower. Many children 
in the rural ares simply stay out of school either because the 
schools are few, or they drop out of school because of the cost 
involved. The educational reforms carried out under the ERP 
have drastically raised the cost of education all over the 
country. Parents are increasingly unable to meet the cost of 
their children1s education as food alone takes up most of their 
income, with those in the lower income group spending as much 
as 71.4 per cent of their earnings on food alone, while even 
those in the higher income group spend up to 63.1 per cent. 
(38) At the same time, school fees have gone up, ranging from 
C600 - 3,000. The cost of educational materials like books, 
have gone beyond the reach of most parents who are also faced 
with numerous other levies in the schools such as Parents- 
Teachers Association levy, examination fees, capital fees etc. 
For parents with children in tertiary institutions, the cost 
has equally gone up and students in these institutions are now 
to be bonded to serve in the civil service or the armed forces 
for a five year period if called upon to do so. They are each 
bonded for C443,000, which the government says is "the total 
cost of tuition and the use of facilities plus interest of 30 
per cent." (39)
The whole question of the introduction or increase in 
tuition fees and other educational levies under the ERP has
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certain implications for access to qualitative education for 
all Ghanaians. As has already become evident in the number of
children dropping out of school from poor families, the high
cost of education will rapidly transform it into a commodity 
which only the rich in the society can afford. With education 
being the main route for upward social mobility, the new 
changes in the sector will turn it into a monopoly of the elite 
for its own reproduction. The present situation contrasts 
sharply with the Nkrumah period when education was free. The 
point is not that the elite did not have better access to 
education under Nkrumah, but that the poorer sections of 
society also had access under a system of merit. The new 
situation under the ERP threatens to exclude even the brightest 
from poor families.
The structural adjustment programme also unleashed a 
series of retrogressive taxes, especially from the District 
Assemblies 85 per cent of which are rural, on the peasants.
Some of the taxes are completely new and range from taxes on
food items to property rates. For instance, a cocoa surtax 
equivalent to 2 kilograms per bag of cocoa, was charged to 
farmers in districts such as Ahafo Ano. Asikuma-Odoben-Brakwa 
and Asunafo. For every tonne of palm fruit taken out of 
Adansi-West, a levy of C500 was charged; while Tema imposed a 
tax of C100 for every crate of fish leaving the harbour. In 
Jirapa-Lambussie, cattle owners were charged C20,000 for any
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non-indigenous herdsman they employed. There were also other 
taxes such as those on the carting of canoes and timber logs 
which were C6,000 and C3,000 respectively. And for each child 
sent to school, JSS (Junior Secondary School) construction and 
furniture fee of Cl,000 and C500 respectively, were paid, (40)
In addition to these, there were other pressures which 
combined to plunge the rural areas into more poverty in the 
period of structural adjustment. We have seen that even though 
most of the people are involved in agriculture and could have 
benefitted from the ERP, other policy measures implemented 
under the programme tended to turn the domestic terms of trade 
against them. The privatisation of fertilizer not only raised 
the prices but also made its use unprofitable. The increase in 
petrol prices also increased transport costs and the prices of 
agricultural inputs, thereby making it unprofitable for farmers 
to engage in agriculture other than on a subsistence basis. 
With the PAMSCAD projects like food-for-work yet to be 
effectively put in place, the people of the rural areas have 
remained helpless and vulnerable to the hardships brought by 
the ERP. Their position of political weakness like that of 
most Ghanaians, has not changed for the better under the ERP.
The political impact of the ERP
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The economic liberalisation that has been carried out 
through the structural adjustment programme has not been 
matched by political liberalisation in Ghana. Indeed, the 
political condition on which the implementation of the ERP was 
to be made possible was that of repression, dictatorship and 
the violation of human rights rather than political openness 
and democracy. The ERP as was the case elsewhere in Africa 
where structural adjustment has been implemented, had failed to 
command a broad-based political consensus from the people. 
Thus, in the absence of the necessary political support for the 
structural adjustment programme, the only way it could be 
implemented was through authoritarian and undemocratic rule. 
As it was also clearly demonstrated in Africa during the 1980s, 
the implementation of structural adjustment required the 
existence of a government that was undemocratic in both its 
constitution and actions. Furthermore, because structural 
adjustment was usually undertaken as a result of external 
pressure from Western creditors and supervised by the IMF and 
World Bank, its implementation required a government that was 
both undemocratic and receptive to these external pressures, 
interests and supervision. This has largely been the 
experience of Ghana since the imposition of the ERP in 1983.
However, both the IMF and the World Bank became advocates 
for democracy and good governance in Africa from about late
1989. In the case of the World Bank, this change was clearly
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brought out in its major long-term study entitled Sub-Saharan 
Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, published in
November 1989. In this study, the World Bank called, among 
other things, for greater democratisation and participation of 
the people in decision-making and implementation, as part of 
the strategy to achieve sustainable growth. The Bank has 
continued to put pressure on its clients in Africa to introduce 
political liberalisation, multi-party democracy and good 
governance. The Bank even went so far as to advocate that aid 
be made conditional upon the political reforms required.(41) 
It is arguable that this change in the Bank's position was 
influenced by the sustained opposition to structural adjustment 
within African countries. But it was probably the changes in 
Eastern Europe more than anything else which influenced the 
Bank. In Eastern Europe, the pro-democracy movements which 
overthrew the Communist governments were committed to multi­
party democracy and the move to a market economy. Most of 
these countries went on to embrace the market economy and 
implemented the kind of reforms which the Bank and the Fund 
have been doing in Africa for a decade. Thus, Eastern Europe 
was a refreshing example of the complementarity of political 
and economic liberalisation which Africa would do well to 
adopt•
The coup which brought the PNDC to power at the end of 
1981 was widely supported by the people. The PNDC therefore
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enjoyed popular support in the early part of its tenure. This 
was very much helped by its populist rhetoric and the 
mobilisation of the people by involving them in government. 
Thus, for the first time, the people were able to exert greater 
political influence through the Peoplefs Defence Committees and 
Workers Defence Committees, However, political consensus ended 
with the imposition of the ERP. Influential social groups like 
the workers, students, intellectuals were opposed to the ERP 
from the beginning because of the damage they understood it 
would inflict on them and the country. As the government 
became isolated even from its own allies, the workers, students 
and the radical political groups which were initially 
represented in the PNDC, it imposed a culture of silence and 
effectively forbade any open discussion of the adjustment 
policies at the national level. A de facto war was waged 
against all those who declared their opposition to the ERP.
The implementation of the economic recovery programme went 
hand-in-hand with the unleashing of a repressive and murderous 
reign of terror by the PNDC. Civil liberties have been 
attacked largely through arbitrary arrests and detentions of 
individuals by the PNDC. These acts were mainly done under 
PNDC Laws 4 and 91, which allow the PNDC to incarcerate 
'Ghanaians without any recourse to the due process of law. 
Thus, many people, workers, journalists, students, 
intellectuals, lawyers and other opponents of the PNDC were
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frequently arrested and detained. While in detention, many of 
them have been tortured and killed by agents of the government. 
Many individuals have also been killed outright by security 
agents while others were lucky enough to escape into exile. On 
the whole the number of people who were detained without trial 
as political prisoners was unprecedented. The violence and 
arbitrary rule of the PNDC was directed at the whole society 
including even the Church. The latest PNDC attack on the 
Church was the passing of a law in June 1989 (PNDC Law 221) 
forbidding the spread of new churches without state permission. 
The government justified this law on the grounds that certain 
churches were being used as meeting places to plan the 
overthrow of the government. The churches have also had some 
of their leaders murdered by agents of the government because 
of the churches' opposition to the economic policies of the 
government. (42)
The press has not survived the authoritarian rule of the 
PNDC. Not only were journalists harassed and intimidated, 
press freedom was also effectively liquidated. The government 
prevented any balanced and objective news presentation in the 
national media and went on to pass a law which allows it to 
determine what kind of newspapers it should allow to operate. 
The PNDC Law 211 gave the government the power to register the 
newspapers of its choice. Having stamped out criticism by and 
through the press, the government attempted to further tighten
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its hold on political opposition by using its power over the 
press to see that only its views on the economic reforms are 
heard.
Another consequence of the structural adjustment programme 
has been the militarisation of policies and the subversion of 
the democratic process in Ghana. Despite the rhetoric of the 
PNDC on coming to power about the necessity of establishing 
"true democracy" in Ghana, the government became more 
unaccountable and unwilling to return the country to a true 
democratic society and politics. The isolation of the 
government from the people and its war on groups and 
individuals opposed to it has forced it to resist the demands 
for a return to a freely elected representative democracy in 
the country. Even the establishment of the National Commission 
for Democracy under D F Annan, Vice-Chairman of the PNDC, has 
not resulted in any significant move towards democracy in 
Ghana. Also, the creation of elected District Assemblies on a 
no-party political basis has not brought democracy to the rural 
areas and the country.
Instead, the government has used the situation to tighten 
its grip on the rural population. The government appointed 
one-third of the members of the District Assembly and the 
District Secretary. The other two-thirds of the members had to 
be cleared to stand for elections by the National Commission
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for Democracy, and this provided the opportunity for only those 
who supported the government to be elected into office. 
Furthermore, the government’s control over this ’democratic1 
process at the grass roots level by the provision that the 
District Assembly shall in the discharge of its functions "be 
subject to the general guidance and direction of the Central 
Government as to national policy". (43) This failed to impress 
the people as they largely stayed away from both the 
registration of voters and the elections, encouraged also by 
the campaign of Teachers and other workers for the boycott of 
the elections. Thus, by resorting to these methods of dealing 
with opponents, the government has abandoned any intentions to 
move the country towards democratic rule altogether. The 
government is intent on staying in power for as long as 
possible and therefore, there is now less talk about 
establishing the foundations of a true democracy than when it 
came into office. Instead, the foot-dragging over the return 
to democratic rule is excused by the government on the over­
riding need to achieve economic recovery and development before 
undertaking any serious democratic reforms.
The structural adjustment programme has made the country 
more unstable politically, in spite of the fact that the 
government has been in power since the end of 1981. No doubt, 
the ability of the government to survive for over eight years 
has been instrumental to the continuing progress of the ERP and
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the large pledges of foreign aid by donors for the programme. 
However, the failure to attract foreign private investment can 
also be attributed partly to the unstable political situation 
in the country. Not only has the opposition to ^ adjustment 
programme and the government increased, the survival of the 
regime is constantly on the line. The government has had to 
put down several challenges to its legitimacy by striking 
workers, students, market women etc, with increasing use of 
violence. It has also faced over ten coup attempts since 1982, 
at least one of which almost succeeded in unseating it. This 
apparent lack of consensus within the military constituency of 
the government has remained a major source of instability. 
Hence the tightening of control over the military by the PNDC 
through the assumption of direct command of the armed forces by 
the PNDC Chairman, Fit. Lt. Rawlings, in September 1989, after 
another attempted coup which involved a close friend of 
Rawlings. (44) A further evidence of this instability is the 
disturbing frequency in which the composition of the PNDC is 
changed. Many members of the PNDC have been forced out of 
office by the decision of the Chairman, Flt.Lt. Rawlings. Most 
of them have fled into exile to escape possible harm from the 
government. At another level, other professionals who felt 
threatened by the political repression of the government also 
left the country to seek a better life elsewhere. This has 
added to the credibility problems of the government.
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Another consequence of the political fall-out resulting 
from the adjustment programme is that as domestic opposition to 
it mounted, the government was driven into a closer co­
operation with the IMF, the World Bank and Western creditors. 
This put the sovereignty of the government over the management 
of the economy into doubt, because it resulted in the IMF and 
the World Bank exercising greater influence in the running of 
Ghana’s economy. Foreign experts from the IMF and the World 
Bank are everywhere in the economy. They are in the Ministry 
of Finance where they oversee the budgetary process, they are 
also in the Central Bank where they supervise the 
implementation of monetarist and other ERP policies. They are 
also to be found in other sectors of the economy like 
agriculture, particularly the rehabilitation of cocoa and 
timber; they have been involved in rehabilitating the transport 
sector, industry, housing, education, and PAMSCAD. With this 
level of involvement in the economy at both the level of policy 
and implementation, it has been argued with some justification, 
that the structural adjustment programme has eroded Ghana’s 
sovereignty over the economy. It was therefore easy for policy 
reforms to be carried out beyond what was politically tolerable 
for the government because the levers of decision-making were 
largely out of its hands.
There is also the over-stretching of an over-burdened and 
thinly staffed public administration through numerous debt
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rescheduling meetings, negotiating loans with donors or dealing 
with IMF and World Bank missions on various aspects of the 
economy. Not only do public officers with the expertise get 
too involved in these endless meetings and negotiations instead 
of managing the economy, it also leads to waste of scarce 
resources that would otherwise have been used to revamp the 
economy, on meeting the expenses of foreign experts and travel 
expenses of public officers abroad. This is a form of resource 
drain that the economy can do without, especially in view of 
the dearth of high calibre officers in the right places. 
Although it is difficult to measure the extent of waste 
involved in this practice, it is something that a country like 
Ghana can ill afford.
This high degree of external influence over the management 
of the economy in the period under study has also clearly shown 
that the success of ERP was induced by the comparatively 
generous flow of Western aid. However, one thing that has 
clearly emerged from Ghanafs experience of structural 
adjustment is that its success depends very much on the 
continued inflow of significant levels of aid as well as the 
survival of the PNDC. The survival of the government also 
depends on the success of the ERP.
While there is no doubt that Ghana!s economy needed such 
reforms as financial discipline, keeping budgets in line with
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revenues, paying the farmers a fair price, eliminating 
corruption in the administration of foreign exchange, etc., it 
is difficult to see how Ghana can develop through the ERP as it 
was implemented in the 1980s. This is because the economy is 
not suited to the shock treatment of structural adjustment as 
we have seen. Structural adjustment has not integrated the 
economy nor is it likely to do so. And with the inherent 
tendency of the economy to generate crisis as well as absorb 
others from outside, the crisis will deepen at the slightest 
misfortune.
The Ghana economy will also become increasingly dependent, 
especially in the difficult and changing global economic 
environment of the 1990s and beyond. The international 
economic environment will continue to determine to a large 
extent whether Ghana will develop through this ERP strategy of 
export-oriented growth, economic liberalisation and openness. 
To that extent, Ghana’s future development is outside her 
control since the international dimension of the economic 
crisis has become more dominant. Thus, if as it is feared, 
donors and investors become more interested and involved in the 
East European market as a result of the recent changes there, 
the consequences for African countries will be serious. The 
loss of foreign aid and investment for a country like Ghana 
which has been favoured by donors will throw the recovery 
process into confusion. This is the power that the external
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economic environment has over weak African economies like that 
of Ghana.
There is growing concern among Ghanaians and observers 
alike that the ERP may in the end leave Ghana in the same 
condition of crisis that it first found it, and after nearly a 
decade in operation. (45) There is clear evidence that for 
most Ghanaians life in the decade of implementing structural 
adjustment has become a very desperate struggle. While this 
cannot be blamed entirely on the structural adjustment 
programme, it can be argued that the programme has not 
positively altered the situation in any significant way. The 
government has responded by pointing to the successes so far 
achieved while pleading for more time for the programme to 
produce all the desired results. The problem, however, is that 
time seems to be running out for Ghana as much as for the other 
African countries. Ghana faces the same problems in the 1990s 
as she did in the 1980s, and she will have to do more to break 
out of the cycle of crisis and move towards sustained 
development. There will have to be a change in direction 
towards production for the domestic market, emphasis on 
producing more food, reversing the capital flight and retaining 
it for re-investment, greater investment in human development, 
and working towards greater regional integration, especially 
within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
These, among others, may yet hold the key to sustained
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development In African countries in general, and Ghana in 
particular.
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CHAPTER 6
ECONOMIC CRISIS, STABILISATION AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN 
NIGERIA: 1982-89
Nigeria emerged at independence in 1960 (like Ghana before 
her) full of promise because of its size, potential wealth and 
a potentially large internal market as the most populous 
country in Africa.Its potential in natural wealth and market 
size was increasingly realised after independence. Not only is 
the country endowed with a large population (estimated to be 
103 milion in 1986), it is also well endowed with resources 
such as fertile land, marine and mineral resources.
Agriculture occupied, and still occupies a central place 
in the lives of Nigerians despite the dominance of petroleum in 
the economy. Agriculture still directly supports 65 per cent of 
the population. It was also the main stay of the economy before 
petroleum became dominant, partly causing an absolute decline 
in agriculture (Table 6.1). Nigeria is also well endowed with 
such energy resources as hydro electricity where the estimated 
capacity is 9,405 MWH,even though only about 10 per cent of it 
is being utilised. For coal the estimated reserves are placed
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at 350 million tons with further indication that this may be up 
to 1 billion; but current production stands at only 0.3 million 
tons. Crude oil reserves are put at 1.37 billion barrels while 
undiscovered reserves are estmated to be about 1.1 billion. 
Proven natural gas reserves are 85 trillion standard cubic feet 
and undiscoverd reserves are placed at about 65 trillion 
standard cubic feet(l). Uranium and other minerals are also 
found in Nigeria in varying quanties . With all these,
Nigeriafs potential for diversified development was assured.
Nigeriafs first decade of independence was taken up in
addressing the political crisis which eventually destroyed the 
new fragile democracy just five years after independence in
1966, and the civil war which broke out in 1967. The political
legacy left behind by the former colonial power was part of the
problem. The federal arrangement provided for a weak central
government and three very powerful regions which were large
enough to challenge and defy the central government. In
addition, the Nothern Region was given what amounted to a
political veto by the allocation of half of the seats in the
federal parliament. As a result, the centre was used by the
regions as an arena for rivalry which aimed at drawing
resources from the centre to them. The rivalry became
increasingly vicious and violent, ending in the overthrow of
the civilian government and civil war. In this situation,
national economic policy and planning inevitably suffered.
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After the political crisis and the civil war which began 
in 1966 ended in 1970, Nigeria witnessed a dramatic expansion 
in oil production and revenues throughout the 1970s and the 
early 1980s. This gratuitious windfall from oil enabled the 
Federal Goverment to expand its expenditure both domestically 
and externally, with a new found confidence. At home, there 
was massive spending in all sectors from social services to 
infrastructure, etc. Abroad Nigeria became more active in its 
foreign relations and even played a leadership role* in Africa 
during the 1970s. This was the era of * spraying diplomacy* in 
which Nigeria made generous financial support to liberation 
movements in Africa as well as to independent states. The large 
oil revenues made the government so confident that some leading 
functionaries triumphantly declared that Nigeria*s problem was 
not money, but how to spend it.
Like all good things, Nigeria’s dream prosperity ended in 
serious economic crisis. Though the warning signs came in 1978, 
it was not until the early 1980s that the country was engulfed 
by the crisis.Thus,like Ghana , Nigeria was thrown into a 
severe, though much milder economic crisis.The promise of 
prosperity which was evident at independence in 1960, was 
replaced 25 years later with deep economic crisis.The country 
had moved from food sufficiency to massive deficiency; the 
economy performed badly in all respects, there was rising 
inflation, unemployment, debt, etc. All this happened inspite
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of the fact that in these 25 years, the country earned #93,0 
billion from export of crude oil alone, of which #82.4 billion 
was earned sincel975 while #24.8 billion was actually earned 
between 1982 and 1984 when the crisis was acknowledged.(2)
There were also additional external pressures such as 
falling oil prices and volume of exports as well as the 
recession which had also hit the industrialised countries. Like 
Ghana and other African countries, Nigeria was forced to 
undertake stabilisation measures at first, and structural 
adjustment programmes, subsequently under the supervision of 
the IMF and the World Bank. Throughout the rest of the 1980s, 
Nigeria like the rest of Africa, was preoccupied almost 
exclusively with structural adjustment, debt service and 
rescheduling, and related matters. The national life as well as 
external relations of the country came to be dominated by the 
structural adjustment programme, debt negotiations, the IMF, 
the World Bank and Nigeria's external creditors. The aim was 
to turn the economy around through 'economic reconstruction, 
social justice and self reliance'.(3)
This chapter looks at the causes of Nigeria's economic 
crisis and discusses the stabilisation measures and structural 
reforms undertaken to resolve it. The policies pursued by 
successive governments since 1970 will be analysed in relation 
to the role they played in bringing about the crisis. The
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domestic political context of the adjustment process is also 
discussed. We identify the political coalitions involved and 
the role they played in the formulation of the adjustment 
measures adopted. The various arguments advanced in the 
adjustment debate and their proponents are also discussed. We 
raise the question of the extent to which the various 
governments have addressed the structural problems of the 
Nigerian economy to date.
Background to the Economic Crisis,1970-79
The Nigerian crisis like those of the other African 
countries, was the result of a constellation of forces ranging 
from structures of underdevelopment, dependence,excessive 
capital accumulation through the use of the state by the 
domestic ruling elite and the multinational corporations. Also, 
the Nigerian state did exhibit the tendencies which we 
identified with the post-colonial state in Africa in 
chapter 2. In this sense, the state has not been an agent of 
development as was the case in South Korea, for instance. The 
manner of its involvement in the economy was predatory and 
obstructive to national development. This was reflected in the 
inappropriate and distortionary policies which were undertaken 
by successive governments. It was these factors which combined 
to generate the crisis while the pressures from the external
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environment helped to reinforce it. So that even though the 
crisis became severe after 1980, its roots go further back than 
that.
A typical example of a post-colonial economy, Nigeria 
has always been inherently weak, vulnerable and dependent on 
external forces whose control over the economy remained 
strong.It is also characterised by extreme distortions and lack 
of complementarity between the various sectors,while at the 
same time it was being integrated into the world economy in 
such a manner that its capacity for independent developement 
has been severely limited. It also follows that the economic 
well being of the country is determined as much (if not more) 
by these external factors, as by domestic problems. For 
instance, even after independence in 1960, the Nigerian economy 
remained a monocultural outfit dependent at first on 
agricultural commodity exports for its foreign exchange 
earnings. And from 1970, it has relied entirely on crude oil 
export earnings.As it was in the colonial period, the country 
continued the role of a major primary commodity exporter and a 
large importer of manufactured consumer goods. This made the 
country extremely vulnerable to falling commodity prices which 
it did not determine, to the extent that the well being of the 
economy was directly dependent on the prices which these export 
commodities fetched. It is not surprising that for a country 
like Nigeria where oil export earnings account for over 90 per
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cent of the foreign exchange, literally everything is dep^nd^nt 
on price movements on the oil market. This is a serious form of 
dependence and weakness.
The industrial sector remained weak and very much an 
extension of the activities of multinational corporations vhc?se 
subsidiaries dominated activities in the sector. Moreover, 
industrial production was mainly of the assembly type and fof 
consumer items. This sector was also integrated into the world 
economy rather than the local economy especially through its 
dependence on its parent multinationals for most of its 
inputs.This was to intensify after the civil war when import” 
substitution policies were strenghtened. The activities in 
this sector have helped to aggravate the distortions in the 
economy. The industrial sector did not have any constructive 
relationship, which would have benefited the economy, with 
agriculture. This has partly left the agricultural sector in a 
primitive and unproductive state inspite of the huge amounts of 
money that have been spent in this sector since 1970.
It is the role of oil that perhaps provides the best 
example of the distorted nature of the structure of the 
Nigerian economy.Since oil production began in 1958, activity 
in this sector has remained
essentially a territorial enclave activity... 
in view of its special extractive bent and 
practically unrelated to the domestic economy
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except through payments into the coffers of the 
Federal Government-the dominant element of the 
so-called "fiscal linkages"-minor employment of 
"natives”, and minor but distortionary payments 
for local contract services.(4)
This lack of any effective real linkage of the oil enclave 
with the domestic economy meant that hardly any benefits were 
derived from the rapid and large increases in oil incomes. 
Instead, the massive oil revenues were highly inflationary and 
distortionary and led to unbalanced development in the economy. 
It increased economic rents both for the government and a few 
people, but it did not lead to increased demands for either 
local labour, or investment or indeed domestic production. The 
level of distortion which the oil enclave,mediated by the 
obstructive role of the state, promoted in the domestic economy 
has been summed up by Okongwu:
We have a technology - economic dualistic structure - 
a highly advanced and productive oil enclave which 
is in the territory in a purely geographical - legal 
sense, and a low productive domestic sector wich 
produces for the domestic market, which production 
is further supplemented by importables mediated 
through the export receipts of the enclave. Since no 
linkages exist between the two partitions of 
of the territorial economy, real growth impulses 
from the enclave cannot be imparted to the domestic 
economy through the economist's multiplier- accelerator 
coefficients because such coefficients are non­
existent. (5)
The point here is that the kind of investments generated by the 
oil enclave led to economic activities of a distorted nature, 
as we have discussed below.
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In addition to these structural weaknesses, the kind of 
policies adopted in the management of the economy since 1970 
has contributed to the crisis which the country later faced.
One of these was the intensification of import-substitution 
which was in turn based on massive importation of virtually all 
the inputs. This was made possible by the huge resources the 
government had from the rents on oil activity. The 
unprecedented increase in oil revenues enabled the government 
to play a leading role in the economy. This was clearly shown 
in the massive expansion of planned capital expenditure in 
subsequent national development plans. Whereas the second 
national development plan of 1970-74 was only #3 billion the 
third development plan (1975-80) was launched with a public 
investment programme of #30 billion, and revised one year later 
to #43.6 billion while the fourth plan (1981-85) was #82.5 
billion.
This massive increase in government expenditure did not 
stimulate domestic production activities since its main thrust 
was on the construction and service sectors (Table 6.2) fed by 
imports. With oil revenues accounting for an average of 73 
percent of total government revenues between 1970 and 1987, for 
example, imports became an easy option. With the major part of 
state revenues now derived largely independently of production 
activities in the domestic economy, the government felt secure 
enough to go into a spending spree. The government started a
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massive programme of construction and infrastructural 
development after 1970. These ranged from road, to sea 
ports,airports, etc and were based on the importation of 
inputs. This way, the contract system was expanded and the 
country was drained of its foreign exchange because of the high 
import content of the construction sector. The importance which 
government attached to this sector was underlined by the fact 
that transport and communication accounted for the largest 
share of capital outlay, with transport alone accounting for 
about one-quarter of all capital expenditures between 1970 and 
1980. (6)
The increasing role of the public sector role in the 
economy was further demonstrated by the government assuming 
control of the ’commanding heights' of the economy after 1970. 
With the coming into being of the indigenisation decrees of 
1972 and 1976, the government acquired commanding shares in the 
oil sector, banking and insurance, and to a lesser extent, in 
other industries. Through the same decrees, Nigerians acquired 
ownership or participation in various categories of industries 
and businesses. In addition, there was a dramatic rise in the 
number of parastatals set up by the government. These included 
refineries, the fertilizer complex, the iron and steel complex, 
vehicle assembly plants, banks, hotels, and virtually every 
sector or area of economic endeavour saw the involvement of the 
government at both the federal and state levels. All of these
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ventures involved the leakages of the resources of the 
country because of their very high import contents. Indeed, all 
the industries and parastatals were heavily dependent upon the 
import of their inputs such as machinery and increasingly, raw 
materials.Even though these economic activities created more 
employment for Nigerians,they had few linkages with the rest of 
the productive sectors of the economy,and thereby perpetrated 
the distortions in the economy.
TABLE 6.1
SHARE OF AGRICULTURE IN GDP AND EXPORTS: 1964-80
YEAR ALL SECTORS 
(# million)
AGRICULTURAL 
SECTOR 
(// million)
PERCENTAGE 
OF AGRIC.
AGRICUL­
TURE AS % 
OF TOTAL 
EXPORTS
1^64 2,745.8 1,673.8 60.96 70.80
1965 2,894.4 1,676.4 57.92 61.01
1966 3,110.0 1,691.6 54.59 51.50
1967 3,374.8 1,855.0 54.97 49.75
1968 2,752.6 1,527.8 55.50 57.75
1969 2,695.2 1,415.2 53.28 40.73
1970 3,549.3 1,711.7 48.23 32.38
1971 5,281.1 2,576.4 48.49 20.73
1972 6,650.9 3,033.7 43.61 13.54
1973 7,187.5 3,092.7 43.03 12.67
1974 12,118.0 3,352.1 27.66 5.31
1975 16,462.8 3,940.0 23.95 5.21
1976 19,431.7 4,579.5 23.96 3.87
1977 23,826.0 4,898.3 20.56 5.74
1978 26,758.5 5,143.4 19.22 7.32
1979 27,370.2 5,389.1 19.69 4.60
1980 31,424.7 5,656.8 18.00 *
Source: Liman,M. "Prospects and problems of Agricultural 
Development in Nigeria", ABU Public Lecture Series, 29/7/82; 
and quoted in, Abba,A. et al; The Nigerian Economic Crisis:
causes and solutions, Zaria (Gaskiya Corporation) 1985, p.18
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TABLE 6.2
COMPOSITION OF INVESTMENT FOR SELECTEDYEARS: PER CENT
1965 1970/71 1975/76 1979/80
Building and 
construction 60.2 53.0 66.5 63.6
Transport Equipment 10.4 18.5 14.1 16.5
Machinery
Equipment 29.4 28.5 19.4 19.9
ioO.u iud.0 100.0 lffO.O
Source: Ohiorhenuan,J.F.E;1989, Capital and the state in
Nigeria (Greenwood Press) p.184 
The growing tendency by the government to embark on 
massive public investment in what became white elephant 
projects was later carried over to agriculture. This began with 
the setting up of Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) in 
association with the World Bank in 1975/76.These were followed 
by the River Basin Development Authorities (RBDAs) and large 
irrigation projects. These projects were costly capital- 
intensive, large-scale mechanised ariculture which consumed huge 
sums of money. For instance, the World Bank projected that 
investment in the ADPs would reach $5 billion in the 1980s, 
while by 1985 the RBDAs had consumed #5.928 billion to irrigate 
only 240,000 hectares.(7) These projects drained the country of 
foreign exchange, which component was as high as 40 per cent of 
total investment. Most of this money went to the multinational 
corporations which supplied machinery, fertilizer, 
chemicals,etc,and the numerous experts whose remunerations were 
paid in foreign exchange.Moreover, these projects produced
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mainly wheat, rice, maize,and vegetables. Despite these huge 
expenditures (Table 6.3) agriculture stagnated throughout the 
decade as oil became dominant, while food imports rose from 
#1.00 billion in 1978 to #1.9 billion in 1983.
Another consequence of the oil boom was that it led to the 
liberalisation of external trade which had now become very- 
important, Thus, tariffs were liberalised between 1974 and 
1977. For instance, the 1974/75 budget granted further 
reductions in import duties; it abolished excises on twenty - 
five categories of goods and reduced excise rates on other 
excisable goods. Also in 1975, import duty on consumer goods 
were further reduced, in several cases to zero. The ban on some 
imports, especially food, was lifted. In 1977 there was further 
reduction of duty on raw material imports.(8) On the whole, the 
economy became more open as a result of the liberal policies of 
the government.
Table 6.3
PUBLC CAPITAL EXPENDITURE IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR:1962-85
(^’million)
YEAR
1962-68(1)'
1970-74(2)
1975-80
1981-85(3)
FEDERAL
EXPENDITURE
n r r m —
34.023
1,112.598
5,400.00
STATE
EXPENDITURE
41.3962
93.263
1,188.582
3,427.531
TOTAL
3T.TZ3--
127.286
2,301.18
8,827.531
328
notes:
(1) Actual Expenditure
(2) Estimate
(3) Including Local Government
Source: Yahaya A. Abdullahi, f,Comments on Press Briefing by 
Minister of Agriculture,11 in New Nigerian 18/2/85 p.2; and 
quoted in Abba, et al Ibid p36
The generally liberal tariff policies operating at the 
time led to the flooding of Nigeria with cheap imports. This 
situation was exacerbated by high rates of inflation and the 
appreciation of the naira. This era of boom saw the dramatic 
expansion in the volume of imports of goods and services, 
exceeding that of exports. Nigeria became virtually a dumping 
ground for all manner of goods. As Okongwu has observed:
The structure of merchandise imports is also 
instructive. In 1975 imports of consumer goods 
accounted for 32.3% of total imports,capital goods 
40.6%, and raw materials 27%; by 1980 consumer 
goods had slightly dropped their share to 30.3% 
while capital good, after peaking at 45.8% in 1978, 
comprised some 44% and raw materials 25.7%. The 
sub-class of food imports rose sharply from 9.5% 
(#353.7 million) of total imports in 1975 to 15.6% 
(1,417 million) in 1980.(9)
Also arising from the liberal tariff policies of the 
government was the fact that production was discouraged in 
favour of commercial activity.The flooding of the country with 
cheap imports made the industry uncompetitive as its production 
costs were increased due to the difficulty in obtaining import 
licences. This made commerce profitable since it required lower 
capital input,and as a result, capital was diverted away from
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productive activities into trade. This kind of distortion 
endangered any possibility of future self-sustaining 
development•
The oil boom was further misused by the government to 
expand the public service not only at the federal level but 
also in the states which were themselves increased to nineteen 
in 1976.Together with this, salaries and wages were increased 
in a rather inflationary way. For instance, through the Udoji 
awards of 1974, the government raised the minimum wage from 
#312 per annum to #720 and adjusted other levels accordingly. 
Moreover, these awards were back-dated by some nine months and 
arrears of about #859.3 million were paid to 700,000 civil 
servants in 1975.(10) The private sector was also forced to 
carry out wage increases of the same magnitude. This added 
pressure to the inflationary situation that was itself 
generated by the other government policies adopted at the time.
Another major factor behind the crisis which engulfed 
Nigeria in the early 1980s was the process and level of 
accumulation by the ruling elite after independence.This was 
effectively done by using the state as an instrument of 
accumulation of capital as well as through other corrupt means. 
The Nigerian ruling elite became confident and strong enough to 
use the state this way after 1970, when the civil war had ended 
and the country was deriving large amounts of revenue from oil.
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The first thing they did was to demonstrate this new power by 
using the state to increase their role in the economy. Before 
1970, Nigeria*s economy was largely under foreign control, 
mainly transnational corporations and middle-Eastern and Asian 
businesses. These effectively squeezed out the local ruling 
elite from any significant involvement in the economy. The end 
of the civil war was therefore an opportune time for the local 
elite to make their move.
The first evidence of this was the promulgation of the 
Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Decree (also Indigenisation 
decree) in 1972. The decree transfered certain businesses 
wholly, and others partially, to Nigerians. Meanwhile, the 
government itself took control of the banking and financial 
sector as well as the oil sector,by acquiring the majority 
shares.(11) The elite in government as well as those in the 
private sector (especially in the Lagos Chamber of Commerce) 
were united in pushing for this control of the economy . This 
was borne out by the fact that it was mainly to this group that 
businesses were transfered during the first indigenisation 
programme.The top eschelon of the civil service, the government 
and the military joined their colleagues in the private sector 
to acquire large shares in the businesses that were 
indigenised. To assist them in getting the capital to buy 
shares, the state set up institutions like the Nigerian Bank 
for Cormmerce and Industry, the Nigerian Bank for Agriculture
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and Cooperatives, the Capital Issues Commission, and the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board,
Also, through its control of the three large commercial 
banks (Barclays, Standard and United Bank for Africa) which 
were hitherto foreign owned, the government appointed Nigerians 
from among the elite to the boards of the banks to get them to 
give loans for the acquisition of businesses and shares. The 
local elite supplemented its enormous advantages by acquiring 
shares and businesses through 'fronting1. This was an 
arrangement in which the Nigerian assumed nominal ownership of 
the enterprise without paying anything to the owner,but with 
the guarantee that the payment for the shares would be redeemed 
from profits from the few shares that were actually transfered, 
while still leaving the expertriate owner in effective day to 
day control
Another strand in this accumulation process was the use of 
state policies to promote rent-seeking activities among the 
ruling elite. The contract system became the dominant 
expression of this tendency.lt found its fulfilment in the 
massive capital expenditure programmes of the military 
government. Infrastructural construction of roads, ports, 
schools, hospitals, industries,and the like,gave to the elite 
in government and the private sector the ability to extract 
economic rents. This is what the infamous '10 per cent' was all
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about, that is, the practice of inflating the costs of 
contracts so astronomically to enable the government officials 
get 10 per cent of the total cost of the contract while the 
contractors were guaranteed huge profit. It was usual for 
contract costs to be inflated by twice or three times what they 
should have been. This made contracts more costly in Nigeria 
than even some relatively rich African countries (Table 6.4). 
Thus, production was discouraged because it was not profitable 
and Nigerians became ’general' contractors,middlemen,and 
consultants. They were joined in these rent-seeking activities 
by foreign contractors, middlemen and consultants. It therefore 
became impossible to transact any business without some rent 
being paid out to the bureaucratic elite and middlemen and this 
became a standard requirement in concluding contracts or even 
foreign loans. The large budget provisions for all sectors, 
from defence to health ensured that the rent system prevailed.
Table 6.4
COMPARATIVE UNIT COST OF BUILDING AND CIVIL ENGINEERING
PROJECTS BETWEEN NIGERIA, ALGERIA AND KENYA: 1979
Project Type Nigeria Algeria Kenya
Residential Building 
iU m2 350.00 313.00 132.00
Multistorey office 
Block (#/m2) 450.00 - 207.00
Single Carriageway 
Road (2 lanes) # ’000/km 294.00 149.252 105.353
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Dual Carriageway 800,000-
Road(4 lanes)///km 1,200,000* 587,015 278,961
* 1977 figures
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria; Report of the 
Ministerial comitee on the causes of the Excessively High cost 
of Government Contracts in Nigeria,1981 Federal Government 
Press, Apapa; quoted in Abba et al p.62
The ruling elite also carried out its accumulation of 
wealth through the use of import licence and by importing food 
products, machinery,fertiliser, chemicals, and other types of 
consumer goods. This meant that the '10 per cent' and other 
forms of rent inevitably became part of foreign exchange 
transactions and the issuance of import licences, which were 
administered. The imports brought in often had their values 
manipulated to guarantee huge profits. Also, some of the items 
imported were often found to be unnecessary and wasteful, 
especially where government departments were involved. A 
typical example was the 1 cement armada1 which resulted from the 
decision by the ministry of defence to import massive 
quantities of cement which turned out to be both unnessary and 
wasteful. This cost the Nigerian economy a great deal of losses 
as the ports were choked up with cement and all other imports 
were blocked. Also, the country had to pay alot of money as 
demurrage on several kilometers of cement-carrying ships which 
were waiting to discharge their goods. Other losses were 
incurred through the activities of pirates and the fact that 
large quantities of cement were either destroyed at sea or
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became unusable. This, however did not prevent some people frou 
becoming millionaires instantly. The overall cost to the 
economy included the leakage of foreign exchange, the 
inflationary pressure brougt on the economy and the fact that 
Nigeria became one of the most costly places in which to do 
business.
Another background factor to the Nigerian crisis was that 
of capital flight which was also part of the accumulation 
process. Apart from what the local ruling class was able to 
take out,the multinational corporations were actively involved 
in the repatriation of capital.(12) This was commonly done as 
repatriated profits or as profits on imported components and 
raw materials. There was also the practise of transfer-pricing 
and under-invoicing which most of these multinationals were 
engaged in,as Biersterker discovered in his study of 
Nigeria.(13) The multinationals also made alot of money through 
their various joint-ventures with the government, such as in 
the vehicle assembly plants,etc, which continued to consume 
large amounts of resources even though they failed to achieve 
their objectives. They have given the multinationals control 
over these enterprises while causing the government massive 
losses.One other area where these multinationals have taken out 
alot of money was through their supply of machinery and 
equipment, raw materials, cereals, (particularly wheat and 
rice), and the like. There was also the lucrative construction
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sector where they dominated. The multinationals have, since 
1972, colluded with the Nigerian ruling elite to fleece the 
economy of the enormous resources generated since 1970.
The result is that things began to go wrong with the 
economy. The policies pursued during the oil boom contributed 
to the crisis that was to come. In the mean time, the excessive 
waste of the foreign earnings and the wastage and inefficiency 
internally, took the economy in the direction of severe crisis. 
The budget deficits grew as the state kept up with its massive 
expenditure programmes, foreign exchange began to get 
dangerously low and the government had to resort to borrowing 
to keep up with the expenditure programs. The cost of doing 
business in the country was intolerably high due to the waste 
and inefficiency and the poor state of infrastructure.Thus, 
despite the enormous amounts of money invested in 
infrastructural development this sector has remained weak and 
inefficient. This situation had to do with the diversion of 
much of the money meant for this work by the ruling elite into 
their pockets through various kinds of corrupt activities. 
Labour was also very expensive and not well-trained, thereby 
raising production cost far higher than those in other 
countries. So that while it was unprofitable to produce in 
Nigeria, foreign businesses still found it very profitable to 
trade with the country. To some extent, the oil revenues still
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continued to shield the country from the serious crisis that 
lay ahead.
However, the warning signs came in 1978 when the country 
faced balance of payments problems in addition to the problems 
at home. The Obasanjo -led military government was forced to 
undertake austerity measures including borrowing heavily from 
the financial markets. Thus, in 1978, Nigeria took its first 
'jumbo1 loan of about $1.50 billion from the Eurodollar market, 
s part of the austerity measures, the company tax rates was 
raised to 50 per cent while an excess profit tax of 10 per cent 
was imposed on banks earning more than a 40 per cent return, in 
1978. Some consumer imports were banned and many more were 
placed under licence. A 5 per cent surcharge was imposed on all 
imports. The wage freeze was continued while the practice of 
remitting 75 per cent of mobilisation fees in foreign exchange 
by companies in government contracts was discontinued.
Other forms of control were tightened up, and these 
measures were continued in the 1979/80 budget. These gave some 
respite as the overall performance of the macroeconomic 
variables looked respectable (Table 6.5). Also, by the time the 
military handed overpower to civilians in October 1979, foreign 
reserves were said to have been restored by them to $8.0 
billion, an amount accumulated,just within 15 months before the 
hand over. However, the crisis was by no means over, though the
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austerity measures applied by the military helped to delay the 
severe aspects of the crisis. But an economy as dangerously 
open as that of Nigeria, with all the structural weaknesses 
discussed above, always stood the risk of being thrown into a 
major crisis by a combination of adverse external and internal 
developments. This was the fate which befell the country during 
the 1980s.
Economic Crisis and the Crisis of Stabilisation: 1980-85
The decade of the 1980s began badly for most commodity 
exporting countries, including oil exporters . The recession 
which hit the major industrial economies led, amongst other 
things, to a slump in commodity market • Dependent and 
economically vulnerable countries like Nigeria whose well­
being was tied to that of the industrial economies, were 
immediately thrown into serious crisis. The recession induced a 
dramatic decline in their export earnings as foreign markets 
contracted. On the home front, these external developments were 
met by the unfortunate coincidence of an expensive farce in the 
form of the Second Republic which brought in civilian rule at 
the end of 1979. These forces combined to deepen the crisis 
which the country was already in.
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The civilian government formed by the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN) between October 1979 and December 1983 was 
probably the most irresponsible and profligate government the 
country ever had. The NPN took advantage of the weakness of the 
constitution to waste money. The constitution did not limit the 
number of assistants that the President or even the Governors 
could appoint. The constitution also allowed the legislators to 
fix their salaries and allowances as well as those of the 
executive arm of government.On coming to office, the civilians 
expanded the public service by rewarding party faithfuls with 
jobs in total disregard to the consequences for the economy.
The austerity measures imposed by military government between 
1978 and 1979 to curb public spending as well as imports, 
were dismantled by the NPN government. Imports were 
liberalised, tariffs reduced, and public expenditure was 
increased. There was a great resurgence of the rent-seeking and 
other harmful activities which were seen in the pre-1978 
austerity period.
There was again an explosion in the import of consumer 
goods encouraged by such measures as the approved user scheme 
and the allocation of import licences to party members. This 
mode of allocating import licences created problems for 
industries as they were forced to buy such licences on the 
black market from the NPN stalwarts. The frustrations which 
these industries faced in trying to obtain import licences was
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demonstrated by the threat by the Managing Director of the 
United Africa Company (the largest multinational in Nigeria) to 
close down the company unless the situation was changed.(14) 
Imports shot up and overtook exports, thus draining the country 
of scarce foreign exchange often in dubious circumstance. 
Ironically, the advent of the NPN government coincided with an 
all time rise in international price of oil from US$14.9 a 
barrel in 1978 to US$33 in 1979 and US$44.4 in 1980.
Thus, the government had alot of resources at the 
beginning of its term which it went on to squander. For 
instance, while the country earned US$26.73 billion in 1980 
from exports, US$23 billion was spent. In 1981, $17.9 billion 
was earned and $24.7 billion was spent,while in 1982 $12.93 
billion was earned and imports consumed $21 billion. Rising 
public spending by both the federal and state governments was a 
significant part of the reckless policies of Shagari's NPN 
administration. The large budget deficits which resulted were 
not curbed but rather financed through huge borrowing both 
internally and externally. For instance, government fiscal 
deficit was 18.31 per cent of GDP in 1981 and 23.93 per cent in 
1982. With oil prices falling from 1981 on, governments 
borrowed extensively to sustain their expenditure programmes.
As a result, many states became so indebted to commercial banks 
that they were unable to run the most basic services. In 1981 
alone the Federal Government borrowed about #3 billion from the
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Central Bank compared to //158 millon In the previous year. 
Table 6.5
GROWTH RATES OF SELECTED MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES FOR SELECTED 
PERIODS 1960-1981 (in %)(1)
1960-1970 1970-1979 1980-1981
GDP 5.1 7.5 4.5
Gross Domestic Investment 6.5 17.8 11.0
Government consumption 
Expenditure 10.6 12.4 11.0
Private consumption 
Expenditure 0.9 6.3 6.3
Exports (volume)(2) 6.5 -0.3 0.5
Imports (volume)(2) 1.7 20.6 17.8
Money supply 9.7 29.3 28.7
Average Annual Inflation 
Rate 2.6 19.0 14.2
notes:
1. All growth rates are in real terms except money 
supply
2. Derived from quantum (volume) indices.
Source: Ohiorhenuan, J.F.E., 1989 Ibid p.182
The level of external borrowing also went up, with both 
the Federal and state governments actively engaged. Investment 
and trade credits were obtained from the international capital 
market and multilateral institutions like the World Bank and 
the IMF, and even foreign governments. As the oil revenues and 
exports shrunk due to falling prices, governments became more 
desperate to borrow. Thus, the total external loans received by 
the public sector more than doubled between 1982 and 1983. The 
country1s external loans rapidly built up to #18.5 billion by 
the end of 1983 from #1.9 billion in 1978. All this further put 
the economy into trouble.
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However, even though the economic crisis was pointed out 
to the government by Chief Obafemi Awolowo in 1981, it spent 
most of 1980 and 1981 actually denying the existence of any 
crisis. It was only, the shrinking oil revenues and perhaps the 
failure to attract more loans from abroad which eventually 
pushed the government to do something about it. But in early 
1982, the crisis had hit the country in full force and the 
Shagari administration had to face the inevitable task of 
addressing the situation. While still insisting that the crisis 
was largely the result of the generalised world recession and 
the dramatic fall in the price of oil on the world market and 
with it, the fall of government revenues, the government set 
about the task of economic stabilisation.
The stabilisation process was begun by the Shagari 
administration on April 19th 1982. On that day an emergency 
joint meeting of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
was summoned to be addressed by the President. He acknowledged 
the seriousness of the economic situation which he admitted, 
needed urgent solutions and tabled before members the Economic 
Stabilisation (Temporary Provision) Act of April 1982. The Act 
was immediately passed by the National Assembly without any 
debate. The Act relied mainly on a combination of import 
restrictions, monetary control and fiscal policies. Thus, all 
unused import licences were recalled for review, capital 
projects which had not been started were put off, and the
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import licences for vehicles was suspended. The basic and 
business travel allowances were reduced from #800 to # 500, and 
#3,000 to #2,000, respectively. The government also imposed 
compulsory advanced deposits ranging from 50 to 250 per cent on 
a wide range of goods. Government decreed interest rates were 
increased by 2 per cent, government expenditure was reduced and 
restrictions placed on external borrowings by state 
governments.There were also monetary and credit guidelines for 
industries, development finance institutions and general 
commerce.(16) In addition to these, the government began talks 
with the IMF and World Bank for loans.
However, the implementation of these measures suffered and 
the result was a failure. The NPN stalwarts effectively made it 
difficult for the government to implement even the kind of 
measures it had prescribed for the economy. And by the end of 
1982, it was clear that the measures adopted to contain the 
crisis had failed and had instead deepened it. This was 
manifested in:
(i) the increasing rate of decline in the volume 
of production in almost all sectors of the 
economy, extending to the closure of factories 
and the halting of work on uncompleted projects;
(ii) the almost total freeze on new employment and 
large-scale retrenchment in all sectors of the 
economy leading to massive unemployment, in both 
rural and urban areas and for all levels of 
manpower;
(iii) the chronic and serious shortage of foodstuff, 
and all types of goods;
(iv) the high rate of price inflation;
(v) the rising burden of indebtedness on middle-levCt 
and petty traders, artisans, craftsmen and 
peasant farmers;
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(vi) the reduction in monetary and real value of wages 
salaries and allowances and the uncertain and 
irregular paymentsof these;
(vii) the drastic reduction and higher cost of the 
provision of essential public services like 
water, electricity, postal services, education, 
and health, and the regular breakdown in these; 
(viii) the rising wave of crimes of violence against 
persons and property,(17)
The worsening domestic situation put the government under 
a lot of pressure from strikes, retrenchment of workers, 
school closures and the like. From outside, there was also 
pressure from creditors and suppliers who were unwilling to 
keep the lines open to bail out the government. In addition to 
these, the IMF and World Bank were very critical of the April 
1982 Stabilisation measures of the Shagari administration. The 
World Bank insisted that the stabilisation measures did not go 
far enough. It therefore recommended that: additional 
incentives be given to domestic productive sectors through a 25 
per cent devaluation of the naira in 1983 and by appropriate 
tariffs and export subsidies; fiscal and monetary policies such 
as a sales tax of 1 per cent should be introduced, domestic 
prices of oil increased from US$20 a barrel to $30, interest 
rate should be unified and raised as should the private 
sector's share of credit, subsidies and quantitative 
restrictions should be phased out; and expenditure programmes 
should be thoroughly reviewed to bring down budget 
deficits.(18)
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The IMF also accepted the Bank’s policy recommendations 
during its negotiations with the Shagari administration. The 
IMF insisted that there should be an adjustment programme with 
devaluation as the corner stone. It called for the devaluation 
of the naira by an initial 25-30 per cent and on until the 
element of overvaluation was removed. The Fund also argued for 
a massive reduction in capital expenditure to not more than //4 
billion a year between 1983 and 1986, and projects which 
required #30 million or more to complete should be reviewed. 
Industrial projects which would not produce substitutes for 
imported raw materials or boost foreign exchange earnings were 
required to be shelved. There was to be substantial reduction 
of the budget deficit, the removal of subsidies on petroleum 
products and fertiliser, the curtailing of grants,subventions 
and loans to parastatals and state governments, the scrapping 
of the Approved User Scheme and the Nigerian National Supply 
Company. Furthermore, the Fund recommended the privatisation of 
commercial parastatals, review of customs tariff linked to 
exchange rate adjustment, upward review of interest rates, a 
vigorous export promotion drive for non-oil products, the 
abolition of the advanced deposit scheme and the liberalisation 
of external trade.(19)
In the face of these pressures, the beleaguered NPN 
administration was forced to do more to stabilise the 
deteriorating situation. At the end of January 1983, the
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National Economic Council which comprised the President Vice- 
President and Governors of the 19 states of the Federation, 
established the Odama Commission(20) to review the economic 
problems facing the country and propose immediate and long-term 
solutions. The Committee submitted its report in February and 
this formed the basis of the white paper issued in June 1983. 
Meanwhile, Nigeria formally applied for an IMF loan of #1.9- 
#2.4 billion, under a three year programme, on 18th April 1983.
This decision to take the loan was later announced by the 
President in his 1984 budget speech on 29th December 1983.
However, the clear signal to adopt a programme of economic 
reform along the lines recommended by the IMF and World Bank 
was given in the President’s national day broadcast on 1st 
October 1983 and the 1984 budget speech.
The policy measures set out by the President included the 
following: reduction in public expenditure; that only core 
capital projects were to be funded; revenue sources were to be 
diversified; the review of agricultural production strategy to 
attain self-sufficiency in food and raw materials; the 
privatisation of government parastatals and companies; the 
imposition of new fees and/or charge higher fees for public 
services; the payment of rescheduled short-term debts. The 
government’s determination to carry out the reform programme 
was also demonstrated by its setting up of the Onosode 
Commission to review all government projects and bring them in
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line with Fund and Bank positions. The government limited the 
capital expenditure in the 1984 budget estimates to #4.64 
billion that is #0.64 billion over what the IMF had demanded. 
The government also agreed to remove the subsidy on fertilizer 
as the Bank had said. It agreed to privatisation and had even 
allowed a 29 per cent depreciation of the naira in relation to 
the dollar.
However, the government was unable to satisfy the IMF and 
the World Bank and by implication, the creditors, since it did 
not accept the centrality of exchange rate adjustment programme 
in its reform. The business community was also not happy 
especially with the Fund's insistence on devaluation and the 
abolition of the approved user scheme, and because of their 
external dependence on raw materials and spare parts. At the 
same time the crisis worsened as foreign banks refused to 
confirm letters of credit and demanded direct payments for 
imports. The debt situation also worsened as the reserves were 
depleted. The industrial situation deteriorated in 1983 as 
companies either closed down, reduced working days, imposed 
compulsory leaves or declared redundancies. This, however, did 
not mean that the companies suffered in the same way the 
majority of Nigerians did. For instance, companies like the 
United Africa Company (UAC) recorded a turn-over of #719.1 
million and a net profit of #13.6 million in 1982/83 financial 
year; and in 1983/84 a net profit of #30.9 million was
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recorded. The situation was the same with other major companies 
in the industrial, commercial, oil and banking sectors.(21)
The governments austerity measures hit most Nigerians 
hard with shortages, unemployment, non-payment of salaries, 
higher prices,etc. The government therefore faced a general and 
popular opposition to its economic programme. It then became 
more reppressive and clamped down on all opposition and even 
the other political parties by using the Police, the notorious 
’kill and go*(22) to harrass its opponents. The scandalous 
manner in which the 1983 elections were held spelt the doom of 
the Shagari administration. It was returned to power by an 
overwhwelming majority in the elections which were widely seen 
as fraudulent,and it did not remain in office for long enough 
to complete negotiations with the IMF . It was overthrown by 
military coup on 31st December 1983. The coup-makers cited the 
massive rigging of the elections as one of the justification 
for the take over.(23)
The new military regime of Major-General Muhammadu Buhari 
renewed the Economic Stabilisation Act enacted by its civilian 
predecessor,in January 1984. Indeed, from the policies this 
regime later implemented, it can accurately be described as a 
government of the nationalistic wing of the Nigerian 
bourgeoisie. The Buhari regime defined the crises fundamentally 
in the same way as its civilian predecessor. It blamed the oil
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boom of 1970s since this led to a shift in the pattern of 
investment to construction and services;it increased 
importation of luxury consumer goods; led to neglect of 
agriculture; large-scale rural-urban migration, and government 
commitment to provide everything free to the people. Other 
reasons for the crisis were low productivity in agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors, especially over-dependence on imported 
inputs. The regime blamed the mismanagement and indiscipline of 
the previous civilian government for the crisis. The military 
rulers argued that this mismanagement and indiscipline by the 
civilian government could be seen in the commitment to provide 
education and health free as well as starting projects that 
could not be completed; the inflation of contracts; 
proliferation of political appointees;over-reliance on oil as a 
source of revenue and the abolition of some fruitful source of 
revenue; incuring huge budgetary deficits even when revenues 
were declining; resorting to heavy internal and external 
borrowing; smuggling and illegal currency trafficking across 
the borders. Also, the Buhari regime believed that the last 
straw which precipitated the economic crisis was the oil-glut.
The regime immediately set about the task of reducing 
public expenditure by revising the 1984 budget announced by the 
ousted civilian administration. Business travel allowances were 
abolished, the basic travel allowance which had been reduced to 
#500 by the civilian administration was now reduced to #100;
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while the home remittance of expatriates was reduced from 50 to 
25 per cent. The regime also abolished the compulsory advanced 
deposit scheme; put all invisible items of import under 
licences; terminated external borrowing by state governments; 
raised interest rates for deposits and lending except for 
agriculture. While imposing a wage-freeze on workers, it under­
took to pay all arrears of salaries, allowances and bonuses.
The Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Decree was amended to allow 
non-Nigerians to own up to 80 percent of large farm 
projects.This move resulted in many companies like the UAC, 
SCOA, UTC, and the various breweries acquiring farms all over 
the country to produce their raw materials. However, the regime 
shelved the issue of privatisation and the reduction in 
subsidies on petroleum products.
These measures were further supported by others such as 
large-scale retrenchment of workers; the imposition of 
different forms of levies and taxes by state governments; 
increasing the debt service ratio to 44 per cent in 1984 and 57 
per cent in 1985. Counter trade was adopted and loans from non­
western sources were sought, especially the Saudi loan of #1.6 
billion which it applied for in February 1984. It was expected 
that western creditors would be convinced by these efforts to 
reschedule debts and open lines of credit without an IMF 
approval. The military regime also carried out a sudden change 
of the currency, and this led to a severe naira-squeeze between
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25th April and 6th June 1984, The intention was clearly to cut 
the naira taken out of Nigeria and those held outside banks 
within the country. However, this led to bottlenecks, 
bureaucrdtisation and massive corruption in the banks as the 
Central Bank printed more money than was already in 
circulation. This put further hardship on individuals and 
businesses, as they could not withdraw their money on demand.
To impose discipline on the society in support of its 
recovery programme, the regime threw former politicians, 
contractors,middlemen, civil servants and others who had 
swindled public funds into gaol. Many were investigated, tried 
by military tribunals, convicted and detained. Others were 
held in detention without trial. The borders were closed, and 
economic crimes such as smuggling, oil-bunkering, drug- 
trafficking and currency-traficking, among others, were 
severely punished sometimes by death. The Miscelleneous 
Offences Decree covered a very wide range of offences which 
included examination malpractice by secondary school children, 
requiring severe punishment. Indiscipline among workers was 
tackled by banning strikes. Most of the decrees could not be 
challenged in any court of law and some had retroactive 
effects.
The Buhari regime also resumed talks with the IMF in 
February 1984. The government made it clear that negotiations
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with the IMF would not be easy in view of the Fund's insistence 
on a 25 per cent devaluation and the liberalisation of imports. 
The government was opposed to both conditions because, as it 
argued, devaluation would lead to an increase in the cost of 
production, force workers to agitate for wage increases, and 
would not have any appreciable impact on the country1s foreign 
exchange earnings since the pricing of its export commodities 
were fixed in foreign currencies. It agreed to implement 
policies on budgetary discipline and cost-cuts, and abolish the 
Approved User Scheme.(24) However, it refused to remove 
subsidies on petroleum, rejected privatisation of parastatals 
in favour of commercialisation, retained the Nigeria National 
Supply Company, and resisted the idea of linking the customs 
tarriff review to an adjustment of exchange rates. The 
government strongly defended the existing exchange rate of the 
naira, defended the import licence scheme, and was in favour of 
trade rationalisation as opposed to liberalisation.(25)
The negotiations stalemated as a result of these 
disagreements. The IMF then increased pressure on Nigeria. It 
condemned the government’s economic policies and performance. 
The loan application to Saudi Arabia was blocked,negotiations 
with creditors failed, forcing the government to rely 
increasingly on counter trade. The government on its part, went 
public with its criticism of the IMF in mid-1985. It pushed on 
with its economic programme without IMF or external support and
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paid dearly for it. The Buhari regime had alienated all 
sections of the population, through its policy of repression, 
and therefore lacked the social support for its economic 
programme at home. The government’s harsh policy of 
retrenchment without compensation saw 250,000 state workers 
lose their jobs .In addition, it had violated the people's human 
rights through excessive levies, draconian decrees, harrasments 
through the War Against Indiscipline campaign (WAI)(26), 
detention without trial, the banning of popular organisations
opposed to it, and the like. Meanwhile the economic situation 
worsened and the regime became more repressive.
All these developments helped to strenghten the position 
of the pro-IMF wing of the ruling elite in the government and 
outside it. However, this distinction between pro- and anti-IMF 
wings of the ruling elite is rather impressionistic. This is 
because the Babangida regime which replaced Buhari's comprised 
most of the officers who served in the previous one, with the 
exception of Buhari, General Idiagbon, and a few others. The 
impression of the division within the Buhari regime was given 
by General Babangida in his maiden address to the nation on 
assuming office. He revealed that "irreconcilable differences" 
within the was one the reasons for the coup. He also blamed 
Buhari and Idiagbon for these differences, especially on the 
management of the economy and the negotiations with the IMF. It 
is in the light of these comments that we make this
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distinction. This pro-IMF group succeeded in dislodging the 
Buhari group from power on 27th August 1985. From then on, 
Nigeria was to have a structural adjustment programme designed
and supervised by the IMF and World Bank.
Structural Adjustment In Nigeria, 1986-89
The coup on 27th August 1985 brought the pro-IMF group to
power, under the leadership of Major-Genral Ibrahim Babangida 
as the new President. In his maiden broadcast, President 
Babangida promised that the government would * break the 
deadlock1 in the negotiations with the IMF. The new regime was 
clearly unhappy with the inability of the Buhari regime to 
tackle the economic problems facing the country. Despite the 
measures adopted by the Buhari regime, the economy was in no 
better shape by the time of their overthrow in 1985. By 1985, 
GDP was about 15 per cent lower than at the beginning of the 
decade, real per capita GDP and consumption were below the 
levels achieved in the early 1970s and public investment 
dropped to 14 per cent of GDP between 1981 and 1985. Debt 
service on the US$ 25 billion extenal debt now amounted to 
between 70 and 80 per cent of total export earnings. The debt 
was badly bunched and mostly in arrears, the London and Paris 
Clubs refused to reschedule any of their loans, and no new
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money was coming in. And in choosing to deal with the IMF, 
Babangida knew that he was walking a tight rope politically 
because Nigerians were not fans of the IMF. The President 
therefore approached the political minefield ahead with what 
Thomas Callaghy called clever political statecraft.(27) 
Nigerians likened this with the dribbling skills of the 
Argentine football star, Diego Maradona, and nicknamed their 
President fthe Maradona of Nigerian Politics*.
The unpopularity of the Buhari regime with the majority of 
Nigerians did not mean that Babangida and his group were 
necessarily welcome. The coup which brought him to power was 
received with indifference by the people since it was seen 
essentially as a palace coup, a mere change of guards. The 
Babangida regime therefore had to cultivate the support of the 
people if it was to succeed in carrying out its policies. If 
the Buhari regime ruled without such support, the Babangida 
regime would need all the support the people could give it in 
view of its declared intention to deal with the IMF on the 
economy. The regime began to sell its structural adjustment 
programme by a series of confidence-building measures. This 
involved capitalising on the weaknesses of the Buhari regime 
and attacking its reppressive policies which were hated by the 
people.
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On the first day of coming to power, the regime repealed 
the hated decree 4 (DN4) which prevented the press from 
publishing embarrassing facts about top public officers. The 
two journalists jailed by the Buhari regime under DN4 were also 
immedietely released by the new regime. This was naturally 
welcomed by Nigerians who had opposed DN4 • The new regime also 
declared its commitment to upholding human rights, unlike the 
one it replaced. Accordingly, the death penalty was abolished 
for offences under Decree 20 (DN20) the Miscelleneous Offences 
Decree. This was also well received especially since Buhari 
had executed three convicted drug traffickers against public 
outcry. There were also many people facing the death penalty 
for other economic crimes like smuggling and oil-bunkering, 
these were also saved by the regime. Many political detainees 
who had been jailed without trial were released. Even those 
who were convicted and jailed by the military tribunals had 
their cases reviewed and the sentences reduced to mere 
fractions of what they were before. Many of those convicted and 
jailed were released earlier, as a result and others were never 
charged • This again, was in line with public opinion on the 
matter.
The anger of the people against the Federal Electoral 
Commission (Fedeco) for bungling the 1983 elections was also 
exploited by the Babangida regime. It ordered an inquiry into 
the affairs of the defunct Fedeco, to the delight of most
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Nigerians. President Babangida also launched a national 
political debate to be organised by a 17-member political
Bureau which was to submit a report on the views of Nigerians 
on the kind of political system they wished to live under. This 
process led to a commitment to return the country to 
democratic rule by 1992. The Buhari regime had refused to even 
discuss the question of return to democratic rule. The 
commitment of the Babangida regime and its design and 
implementation of a programme of transition to democratic rule, 
gave it a political advantage which its predecessor had not 
enjoyed.
On the economic front, Babangida declared a national 
debate on the IMF on 2nd September 1985. This turned out to be 
a clever move which took the heat out of the question of 
IMF-sponsored structural adjustment. Even though such a 
debate had been on since 1982 when Shagari introduced 
stabilisation measures,the official declaration of the debate 
helped to give the impression that the government had nothing 
to hide and that the decision of the people would be 
respected. Nevertheless, Nigerians used the opportunity to 
engage in a sustained debate on structural adjustment and its 
effect on the country. Throughout the debate, the government 
concealed its preferred option, except for the comments of Kalu 
Idika Kalu and Chu Okongwu, ministers of Finance and Economic
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Planning respectively, who both urged Nigerians to accept an 
IMF-sponsored structural adjustment programme.(28)
The IMF debate clearly revealed that the vast majority of 
Nigerians were opposed to the IMF, its loan and 
conditionalities. This opposition cut across classes as a 
section of the elite, labour, students, civil servants, 
intellectuals, market women, farmers,all opposed any IMF 
programme. The elite, the group thrown out of power with the 
Buhari regime, continued to favour the measures he had adopted 
• They favoured internal solutions such as public expenditure 
cuts, local sourcing of raw materials, wage freeze, allocation 
of import licences, etc. They actually saw the IMF as an 
instrument of recolonisation which would displace them from the 
economy.(29) They felt that measures like devaluation would 
favour the big multinationals and their allies, while they 
would be maginalised.
On the other hand, the largely urban petit-bouigeoisie of 
traders,road transport workers, mechanics and the like were 
opposed to the IMF programme because it would harm their 
interests. They argued that an IMF programme would lead to 
increased prices and fares which would in turn weaken the 
purchasing power of the consumer and thereby adversely affect 
their businesses. They were more enthusiastic about a 
substitute programme to the IMF: the market women were even
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ready to levy their members while the transport workers 
actually announced a levy of 50k per day on members towards an 
economic recovery fund. The socialists who comprised the 
student and labour movements, intellectuals and the like,called 
for a structural transformation away from the exploitative 
system which created the crisis. They favoured a centralised 
planning system. Opposed to these groups were the big 
multinationals and their local allies who saw the introduction 
of an IMF structural adjustment programme as the only way to 
resolve the Nigerian crisis.
While the debate was still on, the government promulgated 
a National Economic Emergency Decree which led to a 15-month 
state of economic emergency on 1st October 1985. The measures 
adopted to help towards economic recovery included (i) a 
general pay cut for both military and civilian employees, 
ranging from 2 per cent to 20 per cent, (ii) the surcharge of 5 
to 15 per cent on after-tax profits, dividends, rent and fees,
(iii) a levy of 30 per cent on all imports for domestic 
production, (iv) a withdrawal of 80 per cent general subsidy on 
petrol and diesel, (v) withdrawal of 50 per cent non-statutory 
transfer to parastatals.(30) The government also used the media 
to narrow the debate to a question of whether or not the IMF 
loan should be taken, but ignored the anti-conditionalities 
content of the arguments put forward. Even though the committee 
on IMF debate submitted a report in November 1985 which
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concluded that the people had overwhelmingly rejected the IMF, 
the government insisted that there were no winners and no 
losers in the debate.The rejection of the IMF loan was 
announced by the government on 12th December 1985. Again, this 
was a clear political move by the government since it went on 
to introduce an IMF structural adjustment programme which it 
had been putting together while the national debate was going 
on. This programme was sold by the government as home-grown and 
had nothing to do with the IMF or any external body.
Perhaps a more important factor in the process of adopting 
a structural adjustment programme, was the role of the World 
Bank in the formulation of SAP. The intense dislike which 
Nigerians had for the IMF (31) meant that the World Bank would 
have to play a significant role instead, because of its long 
presence in Nigeria. The World Bank was suitably placed to 
play this role because it was a politically less sensitive 
target and it had also done alot of recent studies on the 
Nigerian economy.(32) Even then, the involvement of the Bank 
had to be concealed from the public as the government tried to 
give the impression that the SAP was its own baby. It was all 
part of Babangidafs political dribbling .
The level of World Bank involvement in Nigeria's SAP was 
personified by its Lagos resident representative, Israt Husain. 
Mr Husain became a central figure in the design and
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implementation of SAP, Along with other senior Bank officials, 
they joined Nigerian officials on the interministerial 
committee created by President Babangida to design SAP. The 
outcome was a package of economic reforms which could only have 
pleased the IMF more because of their far-reaching nature. This 
was approved by the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), 
subsequently informally presented by the Foreign Minister, 
Professor Bolaji Akinyemi to creditor and donor countries and 
institutions; and eventually announced by Babangida as 
Nigeria's homegrown solution, in June 1986. It was given the 
palatable title Structural adjustment programme for economic 
reconstruction, social justice and self-reliance*. It was a 
two-year programme expected to run from June 1986 to July 1988. 
On the basis of this programme, a team from the IMF quietly 
slipped into Lagos to negotiate a stand-by agreement. The 
Nigerian government equally quietly signed a letter of intent 
with the IMF on 5th September 1986 and this was ratified by the 
IMF Executive Board on 12th September 1986. This IMF agreement 
was like any other, and carried the usual conditionalities even 
though this was not made public. However, the Nigerian 
government decided not to use the SDR650 million loan from the 
IMF.
The Structural Adjustment Programme, whose guiding 
philosophy was economic reconstruction social justice and self- 
reliance, set out to achieve the following major objectives:
(i) to restructure and diversify the productive
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base of the economy in order to reduce 
dependence on the oil sector and on imports;
(ii) to achieve fiscal and balance of payments 
viability over the period;
(iii) to lay the basis for a sustainable non­
inflat ionary or minimal inflationary growth;
(iv) to lessen the dominance of unproductive 
investments in the public sector, improve the 
sector’s efficiency and intensify the growth 
potential of the private sector.(33)
Also, the government spelt out the main elements of SAP as:
(i) strenghtening of the hitherto strong demand 
management policies;
(ii) adoption of measures to stimulate domestic 
production and broaden the supply base of the 
economy;
(iii) adoption of a realistic exchange rate 
policy;
(iv) further rationalisation and restructuring 
of the tariffs in order to aid the promotion 
of industrial diversification;
(v) move towards improved trade and payments 
liberalisation;
(vi) reduction of complex administrative 
controls simultaneously with a greater reliance 
on market forces;
(vii) adoption of appropriate pricing policies 
especially for petroleum products and public 
enterprises; and,
(viii) encouragement to rationalisation and 
privatisation of public sector enterprises.(34)
The implementation of SAP began before the announcement by 
General Babangida in June 1986, to coincide with the 1986 
budget. The budget endorsed most of the demands by the IMF for 
adjustable exchange rate-based SAP, through removal of 
subsidies on petroleum products, privatisation, export 
promotion, the scrapping of the NNSC and the liberalisation of 
the economy. The budget went some way in preparing the grounds 
for the implementation of SAP later in the year. For instance,
the decision to promote non-oil exports was confirmed by the
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budget provision of ft990 million to be given as subsidies to
those engaged in the export of non-oil products even though
these exports were themselves not likely to exceed the ft 1.5
billion earned in 1985, More incentives were announced by
Finance Minister, Dr Kalu Idika Kalu on 2nd January 1986:
•.• besides the direct subsidy of about one 
billion naira, to pay exporters to export, 
other lucrative incentives for exports include 
(i) refund of oil import duty on raw materials
used for exports, (ii) refund of excise duty
on all manufacture exported, (iii) exemption 
from the import levy of 30%.(35)
The centre piece of the structural adjustment programme 
announced by President Babangida in June 1986 was the second- 
tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) introduced on 29th 
September, 1986. This was backed by a decree (SFEM Decree) 
which abolished the system of import licencing. Under SFEM, the 
value of the naira or its exchange rate, was determined by 
market forces of demand and supply (i.e. by auction). After 
studying the operation of the Zambian auction system, the 
government was able to launch it well. Also, there was assured
financial support from the World Bank for the auctions as well
as oil revenues, expected foreign investment, and the 
domiciliary accounts which individuals and companies were 
encouraged to open, as sources of funding for the market. 
However,SFEM was not a free market in practice as the Central 
Bank continued to intervene in auctions mostly in order to prop 
up the naira which began by depreciating rapidly. The naira 
fell from 1.6 to the dollar to 4.62 to the doller at the first
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auction. At the second auction, the naira dropped even further 
to 5.08 to the dollar, and this led to strong intervention by 
the Central Bank to prop it up thereby raising it to 3.5 to the 
dollar at the third auction. The government maintained the 
first tier at 1.6 to the dollar and it used this mostly for 
debt service and payment of dues to international 
organisations. By early 1987 the SFEM rate of the naira had 
settled in the 3.5 to 4.0 range.
The expected supply of foreign exchange to fund the market 
did not materialise as demand for foreign exchange continued to 
outstrip the supply. This kept the black market rate higher 
than the SFEM rate. In July 1987, the government merged the 
non-auction exchange rate into the SFEM rate resulting into a 
single currency market known as the Foreign Exchange Market 
(FEM). About one year later, this was itself replaced by the 
merger of the autonomous and auction segments of the market 
into the new Interbank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM). Under 
this system, the exchange rate of the naira was determined on a 
daily basis in an interbank system supervised by the Central 
Bank. The pressure on the naira continued leading to a farther 
depreciation to 7.58 to the dollar in April 1989. Since then, 
the rate has fluctuated around that level, forcing the 
government to give recognition to the black market by allowing 
individuals to operate Bureaux de change (as was done in Ghana) 
in 1989.
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By making this the centre piece of SAP, it was expected 
that market determined exchange rates would discourage imports 
of finished goods, promote agricultural production, encourage 
local sourcing of raw materials and diversification of exports, 
especially non-oil exports. It was also hoped that foreign 
capital investment would flow in easily as a result of the 
rationalisation of the exchange rate.The various 
reorganisations of the market between 1986 and 1989 were geared 
towards achieving these aims. In addition to this, other
measures were also adopted under SAP to attain the objectives 
of the programme. For instance, the export promotion incentives 
introduced with the 1986 budget were further strengthened. The 
SFEM decree allowed exporters to retain 100 per cent of their 
foreign exchange earnings in form of domicilliary accounts 
which they could convert into naira. The government abolished 
export prohibitions except for grains.
The manufacturing sector was also encouraged to export by 
the introduction of a Duty Drawback Scheme. This allowed 
producers and exporters to import raw materials and 
intermediate products for use in the manufacture of export 
products, free of import duty and other indirect charges and 
taxes. Other measures included the establishment of an Export 
Credit Guarantee and Insurance Scheme to insure exporters from 
political and other risks; and also Export Development and 
Export Expansion Funds. An interim review of customs and Excise
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Tariff was undertaken in 1986, leading to the introduction of a
more comprehensive tariff structure in 1988, The new structure
to
made import and excise duty rates^last for seven years so that 
industrialists could undertake long term decisions. The number 
of excisable products was reduced from 412 to 182 and a 
harmonised comodity coding system was put in operation.
To tackle inflationary pressures and aid financial 
development and efficient allocation of resources, monetary 
policy under SAP was initially largely restrictive. In 1987, 
the growth in money supply was curtailed to 11.8 per cent and a 
ceiling of 4.4 per cent was placed on the expansion of 
aggregate bank credit to the economy. Also, the ceiling on 
commercial bank credit expansion was revised from 8.0 to 7.4 
per cent, and all controls on interest rates were removed. The 
minimum rediscount of the Central Bank was fixed at 15 per 
cent, in line with the SAP emphasis on the deregulation of the 
economy.
In agriculture, SAP objectives were to improve domestic 
food production and eliminate external dependence; increase 
domestic supply of agricultural raw materials and reduce 
dependence on imported raw materials; and raise rural 
employment and income, among others. As a result,the 
Agricultural Commodity Boards were abolished and the prices of 
agricultural items, especially cocoa, cotton, oil palm,
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rubber, maize were freed to find levels in the market. The 
River Basin Development Authorities were rationalised, their 
number reduced from 18 to 11 and they were now barred from 
involvement in direct agricultural production. They were now 
limited to carrying out water resources development and other 
related services. The government also established the 
Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI) in 
1986 as part of the reforms in the agricultural sector. DFRRI 
was the rural development component of SAP, and it was designed 
to open up the rural areas. This became evident in such 
activities as the construction of rural feeder roads, 
boreholes,rural electrification and the like. DFRRI was also 
fairly well funded by the government to enable it carry out its 
activities.
Other incentives to industry apart from those in the 
context of the foreign exchange market, have been geared 
towards improving the investment climate through the 
introduction of relevant legislation. For instance, the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree was amended in such a way 
that the three schedules of businesses were reduced to one. 
Also, all other unscheduled businesses except in banking, 
insurance, petroleum prospecting and mining in which the 
Federal Government will continue to have equity shares, were 
open to 100 per cent Nigerian or foreign participation either 
separately or in partnership. A new Industrial Coordinating
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Committee (IDCC) was set up to serve as a one-stop agency for 
issuance of the initial approval for the establishment of 
industries. Responses to applications was also considerably 
shortened to 30 days by the decree setting up the IDCC. There 
was a further incentive of special income tax rebates and 
concessions for entrepreneurs investing in economically 
disadvantaged parts of the country.
Other features of SAP included the removal of price 
controls which led to price rises for petroleum products, 
electricity, water, health care, education, fertilizer, etc.
The government also undertook to commercialise or privatise the 
over 100 industries and parastatals owned by it. A technical 
Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation was 
established by the government in 1988 to carry out this task. 
The committee commenced the sale of government equity holdings 
in these companies in 1989, beginning with the privatisation of 
the Flour Mills of Nigeria Limited and African Petroleum. Since 
then, the privatisation programme has stumbled along. Another 
measure the government undertook under SAP was that of debt- 
equity swap by which the government hoped to reduced the debt 
burden.
However,SAP itself was costantly under review, sometimes 
as part of the political manuevres which the government had to 
undertake, for the programme to survive. For instance, because
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the measures adopted between 1986 and 1987 led to very low 
aggregate demand, the 1988 budget was designed to relax the 
situation. Thus, monetary policies were relaxed, the salary 
structure of the public sector was revised favourably and other 
allowances were increased. The measures adopted under the 1988 
reflationary budget had to be reviewed midway into the year. 
Apart from the additional inflationary pressures which the 
budget generated, the reform programme was threatened by the 
government's inability to remove the subsidy on fuel. This 
removal of fuel subsidy was an integral part of the 
reflationary package to generate the necessary funds to meet 
increased expenditure commitments. However, inspite of the 
pressure which the IMF put on the Nigerian government to carry 
out the removal of fuel subsidy,the enormous social and 
political opposition of the people stopped the government from 
the removal of subsidy on fuel.
The 1989 budget was intended to correct some of the 
adverse developments brought about by the failure of the 1988 
budget. The 1989 budget tried to put SAP back on track by 
furthering the process of deregulation and decontrol of the 
economy. Its objective was to consolidate the adjustment 
programme by continuing to implement reform policies. The 
reform process is also expected to last beyond 1992 when the 
military government is expected to hand over power to a 
democratically-elected civilian government. Thus, in 1990, the
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government announced its Economic Consolidation and Expansion 
Programme (ECEP) 1990-1992 which aims to build upon the 
achievements of SAP. The ECEP hopes to attain a compound annual 
growth rate of 4.5 per cent during the period, with the aid of 
#144 billion. Even the two political parties formed by the 
government as part of the planned transition to democratic 
rule, have been committed by the government in the 
constitutions given to them, to continue with the adjustment 
process. The SAP has therefore come to dominate the lives of 
Nigerians during the 1980s. However, the key question to ask in 
the light of the pervasiveness of SAP is: what is its impact on 
the Nigerian political economy? This is the issue which we 
address in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN NIGERIA.
The structural Adjustment Programme(SAP), which was 
formally launched in 1986 became the most dominant feature of 
life in Nigeria in the 1980s, in the same way the ERP has been 
in Ghana. Every facet of life has been profoundly affected by 
SAP because it has been the most serious and comprehensive 
attempt yet at addressing the structural problems of the 
Nigerian economy since independence in 1960. As in Ghana, the 
government has shown a high level of commitment to implementing 
the various reform measures required. Also, a lot of effort was 
put into the programme by the government so as to achieve the 
stated programme objectives. The adjustment programme was 
therefore made the centre-piece of government policy in Nigeria 
throughout the second-half of the 1980s.
Another feature of SAP in Nigeria as was also the case in 
Ghana was the intense controversy it generated and the 
hostility with which it was regarded by the population 
throughout the period of implementation. The rejection of the 
IMF/World Bank-sponsored reform programme which came out 
clearly in the national debate on the IMF reform package in 
1985, remained throughout the period of implementation. The 
expected success has not only eluded the government, such 
little improvement that is claimed is strongly contested by
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those groups which had opposed the adoption of the reform 
programme from the very beginning. Even the external supporters 
of the programme have agreed that the experiment so far has not 
been a success. Not even the kind of qualified success which 
was initially claimed for Ghana could be pronounced for 
Nigeria. The general consensus is that the programme is yet to 
achieve its objectives.(1)
In this chapter, we discuss the impact of the structural 
adjustment programme on the Nigerian political economy, with 
regard to its objectives. We also look at the developments 
induced in the economy since these measures came into 
operation, and their impact on the society. The political 
struggles waged by the various sections of the society as they 
responded to these reforms are discussed. The appropriate 
conclusions are drawn from the analysis and we point out what 
actions will need to be taken in the future in order to achieve 
the goals of recovery and development.
The Economic Impact of the Structural Adjustment Programme.
The impact of SAP on the economy has been mixed at best, 
otherwise, the various reform measures adopted have failed to 
transform the economy in the direction envisaged by the 
government in the reform objectives. As we saw in the case of
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Ghana, the reform measures proved to be largely contradictory 
and obstructive of each other instead of being complementary, 
in their impact on the economy. In contrast to Ghana, and
inspite of the commitment of the government to the reform
programme, implimentation has not matched the level of
commitment. This did not help the process of reform even for an
economy that is comparatively more open than that of Ghana. The 
performance of the economy with regard to domestic production 
has been low and inconsistent since 1984 when stabilisation 
measures began to be seriously implemented (Table7.1). For a 
country with an annual population growth rate of about 3.5 per 
cent, the GDP growth has been disappointing. For instance, 
percentage change in real GDP which was -6.7 per cent in 1984
rose to 7.9 in 1985, declined to 3.2 and 1.8 per cent in 1986
and 1987 respectively, before rising to 4.1 in 1988 and an 
estimated 4.0 per cent in 1989. (2)
The industrial sector also did not on the whole, do as
well as expected during the reform period. The results have
been mixed, with certain sub-groups showing evidence of growth 
while others declined in terms of capacity utilisation. The 
introduction of SAP not only encouraged the development of a 
maintenance culture and the adoption of cost-effective measures 
in business, it also encouraged a switch to local sourcing of 
raw materials. There were clear signs of backward and forward 
integration, especially in agro-industries. Some industries
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TABLE 7.1
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
(Million Naira)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Gross Domestic Prod. 
% Growth
78.3
7.0
78.3
0.0
78.8
(5.7)
70.0
(5.1)
75.5
7.9
77.9
3.2
79.3
1.8
82.5
4.0
Index of Indu.prod. 
(1972=100)
% Growth
185.5
(2.8)
197.2
6.3
154.6
(21.6)
147.0
(4.9
169.4
15.2
166.0
(2.0
197.6
19.0
220.0
11.3
Index of Man..Pro. 
% Growth
% Capacity Utility
394.9
14.6
73.3
447.0
13.2
63.6
319.0
(28.6
49.1
280.8
(12.0
42.0
336.5
19.8
37.1
323.5
(3.9)
38.2
432.3
33.6
40.4
491.6
13.7
40.7
Index of Agric. 
Prod.(1975=100) 
% Growth
90.1
0.5
92.1
2.2
83.9
(8.9
91.4
3.5
95.8
4.8
102.1 
6.6
100.3
(1-8)
103.3
2.9
Index of food Prod. 
% Growth
71.6
5.9
73.8
3.1
72.6
(1.6
81.5
12.3
88.9
9.1
89.6
10.9
93.3
(8.8)
104.9
12.1
Index of Cash 
Crop Production 
% Growth
124.1
13.4
122.2
(1.5)
108.0
(11.6)
115.1
6.5
126.3
9.7
125.9
5.3
128.7
2.2
130.6
1.5
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic And Financial Reviev Vol.27
No.l March 1989 p.54.
379
have been able to source 50-70 per cent of their inputs 
locally. The big ones among them like the UAC of Nigeria have 
invested in backward integration such as the cultivation of 
their raw materials, in order to enhance their operations.
Thus, it was mostly those sub-groups which sourced a 
greater proportion of their inputs locally that were able to 
operate at higher capacity utilisation rates. These included 
leather products, drugs and medicines, paper manufacture and 
products, soap and perfumes, cement and cement products, 
textiles, vegitable and grain milling, tyres and tubes, 
printing and publishing, wood and cork products, soft
drinks, plastics beer and stout. They generally performed 
within the average range of 30-50 per cent of their
capacities.(3)
However, for the industrial sector as a whole, performance 
was not impressive. The average capacity utilisation declined 
from a peak of 73.3 per cent in 1981 to 37.1 per cent in 1985, 
rose to 38.2, 42.0, and 44.5 in 1986, 1987 and 1988,
respectively, before falling to 31.0 per cent in 1989. Also, a 
significant part of the industrial sector still relied heavily 
on the import of inputs to keep their production going. Such
industries operated at less than 30 per cent of their installed
capacities. They included the motor vehicle assembly plants, 
fabricated metal products, paints, radio, television and
\
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communication equipments, meat and dairy products. This was due 
largely to increased cost of imported inputs, limited supply of 
foreign exchange and the credit squeeze which limited access to 
working capital.
The SAP policies of trade liberalisation, exchange rate
deregulation and high interest rates among others, have had
adverse effects on this sector. The falling value of the naira
made foreign exchange very expensive, as the credit squeeze and 
high interest rates also made borrowing very expensive. Many 
industries therefore, had severe shortage of working capital 
and had to cut back on production and raise prices. As a result 
of this, many small-scale industries were forced to close down 
because they had cash flow problems and were unable to borrow 
money to operate. Many of these small-scale enterprises were 
re-possesed by the banks because they could not keep up with 
payments of the debts owed to these banks.
Furthermore, the erosion of purchasing power by high
inflation rates and the falling per capita income adversely 
affected consumer demand for industrial products. As a result 
of this weak consumer demand, industries were left with huge 
inventories of finished goods which they were unable to sell. 
The high cost of production made their finished goods too 
expensive for people to buy. This has increased the opposition
\
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of small-scale Industrialists to SAP and also intensified their 
pressure on the government to protect local industries by 
banning the imports of competing goods. The industries with a 
high degree of dependence on the importation of inputs have 
been most vocal in seeking this protection. The motor assembly 
plants have been waging a two-prong attack on the importation 
and smuggling of new and, especially, used cars from Europe. On 
the one hand, they have continued to put pressure on the 
government to ban such imports, and on the other, they have 
launched a major media campaign of convincing the public of the 
advantages of buying home-made cars as against imported ones 
for which spare parts are usually not available. Other 
manufacturers have used advertisements with the skull and bone 
logo to appeal to the government to save them from extinction 
in the face of this foreign competition.
The situation in the industrial sector during SAP has 
badly affected the initial progress achieved in the local 
sourcing of raw materials. The high cost of production has 
served as a disincentive to the sourcing of raw materials 
locally, and has thereby helped to defeat the SAP objective to 
move towards significantly sourcing inputs locally. The 
unemployment situation has also deteriorated as a consequence 
of many of the problems discussed above. Most industries had to 
cut down on their production levels and on the work force, in 
order to maintain their margins of profit. The problems created
\
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in the industrial sector by the reform policies were also bound 
to affect other programme objectives adversely.
The agricultural sector has not done any better,despite 
the policy reforms. Agriculture is a very important sector of 
the economy and, its performance is therefore critical to the 
success or failure of the reform programme. Its importance is 
underlined by the fact that it employs over 60 per cent of 
Nigerians and also contributes about 30 per cent of the GDP. 
However, agricultural production continued to lag behind 
population growth even during the period of reform(Table 7.2). 
The index of agricultural production only managed a modest 
annual growth rate of 2.6 per cent under SAP, from an average 
annual growth of 0.4 per cent between 1981 and 1985.(4) Even 
the modest performance recorded under SAP seemed to have had 
more to do with favourable weather conditions than the positive 
impact of adjustment measures. For instance,good weather was 
largely responsible for the total output growth of 6.5 per cent 
in 1986, and low rainfall in 1987 led to a fall of 1.8 per 
cent •
There was also the initial modest gain of an increased 
movement of people into agricultural activities. This included
both those who were retrenched from their jobs in the towns as
well as those who were still in employment and were engaged in
agricultural activities on a part-time basis. It became a
\
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TABLE 7.2
ESTIMATED OUTPUT OF MAJOR AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES. 
(■000 Tonnes, Except Otherwise Stated)
1986 1987 1988+ Percentage change
between
Commodities (1)
(2) (3) (1) and(2) (2) ;
1. CROPS 1,336 1,202 1,370 -10.0 14.0
Maize 4,111 3,905 4,170 -5.0 6.8
Millet 5,455 5,182 5,534 -5.0 3.8
Sorghum 283 297 307 4.9 3.4
Rice 732 688 690 6.0 0.3
Beans 1,564 1,486 1,587 -5.0 6.8
Cassava 46 45 44 -2.2 -2.2
Potato 5,209 4,886 5,042 -6.6 3.2
Yam 373 354 300 -5.1 -15.3
Cocoyam 1,127 1,071 1,549 -5.0 26.0
Plantain
Vegetables Other Crops
1,293 1,241 1,354 4.0 9.1
Groundnut 640 657 706 2.7 7.5
Palm Kernel 350 353 545 0.9 13.3
Palm Oil 650 715 786 10.0 9.9
Cocoa 100 105 200 5.0 72.4
Rubber 60 51 81 -15.0 19.6
-3.6
cotinued
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Table 7.2 continued
2. LIVESTOCK 
Poultry 67 56 54 -16.4 -3.6
Goat Meat 192 206 209 5.1 1.4
Lamb/Mutton 68 75 81 10.2 8.0
Beef 223 232 260 4.0 12.1
Milk 180 182 188 1.1 3.4
Eggs 399 332 260 16.8 -21.6
3. FISH
Artisanal Coastal and 
Brackish Water Catches 137.2 145.8 171.6 4.3 17.7
Inland Lakes/Rivers 107.0 103.2 50.9 -3.6 -50.7
Fish Farming/ 
Inshore Fishing 37.2 21.4 27.2 -42.5 27.1
Distant Water Catch 65.2 209.1 105.3 220.7 -49.6
+Provisional
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria/Economic And Financial Reviev
Vol.27, No.3 September 1989. p.145
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common feature to see civil servants resorting to growing food 
even in their own backyards in an attempt to protect their own 
living standards. Despite these developments, domestic food 
production did not satisfy the growing demand, and the 
government had to prohibit the export of some food items to 
alleviate the situation. The structural adjustment period also 
witnessed sharp increases in food prices, due largely to the 
effects of the reform measures. The adjustment programme 
induced sharp increases in food prices partly by shifting 
demand to local foodstuffs,from industrial processors. For 
instance, the breweries were forced to use maize,a staple 
food,as a substitute for barley in making beer. This
immediately pushed up the price of maize beyond the reach of 
the low income groups in the urban areas.
The food shortages and price increases were also partly 
encouraged by the prohibition placed on the importation of food 
items like rice,maize,and wheat,as part of the reform policies. 
The policy of export promotion and the devaluation of the naira 
also encouraged price increases and food shortages. These 
measures led to the diversion of food products for export. This 
was done largely to earn foreign exchange in the face of a very 
weak naira,even in relation to the CFA used in neighbouring
Francophone countries. The export of food was a highly
profitable business which attracted a large number of
speculators, increased the volume of food leaving the country
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and resulted in the government ban on such exports. The excess 
liquidity in the economy particularly as a result of the 
reflationary budget of 1988,also helped to push up prices 
offoodstuff.
The poor performance of food agriculture was also related 
to the escalating cost of inputs which resulted from the 
deregulation of exchange rates and other reform measures. This 
pushed up prices and limited the capacity of farmers to afford 
the necessary inputs. Other areas of food production such as 
fish and poultry production also fared badly under SAP. The 
problems here were mainly the cost of new outboard engines, gas 
oil and lubricants for fishing,and feed inputs and disease 
control drugs for poultry; all of which have to be imported.
In the agricultural sector, some significant and 
consistent improvement was recorded in the production of cash 
crops. Cash crops, like cocoa and cotton, recorded significant 
increases in production. The price incentives offered to 
farmers in this subsector with the abolition of the Marketing 
Boards and the deregulation of prices induced the farmers to 
diversify into the production of cocoa, cotton, and groundnuts 
in order to supply raw materials to industry. Export crop 
prices rose 100-200 per cent over the period 1986-1988 (Table 
7.3). However, this situation was not sustained for very long 
and prices began to fall dramatically in 1989. For instance,
38
7
TABLE 7.3
PRODUCER PRICES OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
(Naira per tonne )
Crops 1982/83* 1983/84* 1984/85 1985/86* 1986 1987 1988
Benniseed 315 360 360 360 360 2,295 2,000
Cocoa 1,300 1,400 1 500 1, 500 3,500 7,500 1 1,10 oo
Coffee
Arabica 1,155 1,255 1,405 1,450 4,000 5,00 6,000
Copra 245 245 300 --- --- --- ---
Cotton 510 560 700 850 1,000 4,000 4,500
Groundnuts 450 450 650 750 1,000 2,075 2,250
Palm kernel 
Palm oil 
(special) 495 495 600 600 1,000 1,200 1,500
Rubber (top 
quality % 
dry lumps) 700 700 750 750 1,200 1,000 .1,500
Soyabeans 175 230 300 500 550 1,500 2,000
+_ Commodity Boards Price*3 
* Market Prices
Source: Same As Table 7.2 P.146
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cocoa prices rose from a fixed Commodity Board price Of #1,500 
per tonne in 1985/86 to a peak of #24,000 per tonne in 1988, 
before collapsing to #8,500 per tonne in the third quarter of 
1989. The prices of other crops like cotton, groundnuts, 
rubber, etc also declined over the same period. (5) However, we 
cannot deduce much from this except that it is the kind of 
volatility associated with the commodity markets which will 
hurt in the short-term.
The deteriorating commodity prices on the world market no 
doubt played a significant role in the collapse of domestic 
prices. However, other factors internal to the economy were 
equally important. These included the introduction of tighter 
monetary policies which made export credits difficult, and the 
oligopolistic practices of such dominant interests as the Cocoa 
Association of Nigeria and the textile industries. These groups 
have cornered the market and imposed the kind of restrictive 
practices which characterised the era of Commodity Boards. 
Other adjustment measures like high interest rates also made 
the situation worse. The initial gains made in this area are in 
danger of being reversed unless some of the adverse effects of 
the SAP measures are removed. This would require a review of 
the reform policies away from the direction in which they are 
now moving.
In the same vein, the increases in the export of 
agricultural products is less significant than the face value
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suggests. The volume of export of agricultural products 
increased by 19.4 per cent in 1986, and by 30.7 and 9.6 per 
cent in 1987 and 1988 respectively. The value of these exports 
also increased by an average of 65.4 per cent a year during
1986-1988, as a result of the depreciation of the naira
exchange rate.(6) In dollar terms however,export performance in 
this sector was rather disappointing, even lower than the level 
recorded in the first half of the 1980s.
The cardinal objective of the reform programme to
restructure the economy away from the over dependence on oil
has remained unattained. Even though serious efforts were made 
to diversify exports by encouraging the non-oil sectors,the 
goal has remained elusive. No doubt, some improvement has been 
recorded in this area with the growth of the non-oil GDP on 
average by 3.8 per cent between 1986 and 1988. However, the oil 
sector still dominates the export sector in much the same way 
as cocoa dominates the export sector in Ghana inspite of the 
adjustment policies (Table 7.4) The ratio of oil to total 
export earnings and revenue has remained much higher than other 
exports. For instance, during the first half of the 1980s,that 
is before the Babangida government introduced SAP in 1986,it 
averaged 97.4 per cent. Since 1986 the ratio has averaged 91.7 
per cent. The situation has remained the same with the 
contribution of the oil sector to government revenue. The 
yearly average was 70.8 per cent between 1981-1985,while it
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TABLE 7.4
VALUE OF MAJOR EXPORT GROUPS BY S.I.T.C. SECTIONS
(Million Naira)
Year Food
(1)
Beve­
rages
&
Toba
cco
(2)
Crude
Mate­
rial
Ined­
ible
(3)
Min­
eral
Fuels
(4)
Ani­
mal
&
Veg. 
oils
(5)
Chem­
icals
(6)
Man- 
uf ac 
Gds
(7)
Mach­
inery
&
Trans
port
Equip
ment
(8)
Mise.
Mfd
Gds
(9)
Misc-
Trans
action
(10)
Total
1983 273.9 - 22.3 7,304,0 3.9 - 8.7 - 0.3 138.7 7,751.8
1984 234.7 - 15.4 8,685.4 4.7 1.0 12.4 0.9 - 184.3 9,138.8
1985 243.8 - 15.2 11,335.8 0.4 1.4 6.3 0.8 - 114.2 11,720.8
1986 442.5 0.5 55.9 8,425.8 1.0 1.7 1.7 - 0.0 118.3 9,047.2
1987 871.0 1.8 228.0 28,208.6 2.0 64.7 70.6 2.2 0.8 138.5 29,577.9
1988+ 133.9 0.3 33.6 2,157.2 0.4 41.4 6.6 0.2 0.1 12.4 2,385.9
1989+ 108.1 - 134.7 3,060.0 - 24.8 8.6 11.2 1.5 19.7 3,369.1
+ March Figures
Source: Same as Table 7.3, p.126.
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was 72,8 per cent between 1986 and 1988, (7) Thus, it is clear 
that for quite some time to come, the oil sector will continue 
to be the lifeline of the economy, especially because of the 
volatility in the prices of non-oil exports such as cocoa which 
accounts for 80 per cent of non-oil exports.
The SAP policies of devaluation,trade liberalisation and 
high interest rates, among others, adversely affected the 
export sector generally. These measures have rendered 
manufactured exports uncompetitive because of the high cost of 
production resulting from expensive foreign exchange, the 
liquidity squeeze, high interest rates and increased domestic 
cost of production. Domestic cost of production was always 
unnecessarily high in Nigeria and this has contributed to the 
enormous problems in the economy. In the past, the lack of 
adequate infrastructure forced industries to provide their own, 
often pushing up the cost of production and made Nigerian 
export manufactures uncompetitive. For instance,it was common 
for industries to have to install their own stand-by generators 
because the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) could not 
guarantee adequate supply of the power needs of industries. The 
situation did not improve under the structural adjustment 
programme,it was even made worse by some of the reform measures 
introduced. Not only have infrastructures available remained 
inadequate,the price hikes induced by the adjustment measures,
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the high interest rates and liquidity squeeze have all worked 
to defeat the objective of diversifying exports away from oil.
The centre-piece of SAP in Nigeria was monetary policy 
which involved the extensive devaluation of the naira,the 
deregulation of foreign exchange allocation and of interest 
rates. This was so important to the reform package that the 
success of the whole programme was dependent on these measures 
yielding the required results. The whole question of 
efficiently allocating resources to productive sectors of the 
economy was considered to be the evidence of the success or 
failure of the adjustment programme. Therefore,the failure of 
the reform measures to turn the economy around and set it on 
the course of a non-inflationary(even low) growth can be traced 
to the failure of the policies adopted in this area.
The continuing devaluation of the naira,first through SFEM 
and then the Inter bank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM),has led 
to instability in the naira exchange rate. The naira continued 
to fall since exchange rate deregulation was introduced in 
1986. Inspite of attempts by the Central Bank of Nigeria to 
influence the process,and the several changes which were made 
in the operation of the exchange market by the government,the 
naira has fallen from 1.5 to the dollar in the first half of 
1986 to 10 naira to the dollar in late 1990. Also,attempts to 
unify the foreign exchange markets have failed and the black
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market has continued to flourish at exchange rates much lower 
than those on IFEM.
The unstable state of the naira exchange rate has been a 
source of agony for the business sector. Some industrialists 
have called for the naira to be revalued upwards, on the 
grounds that it is significantly under valued. For instance,one 
prominent industrialist has argued that while the naira was 
over valued against the dollar by 23 per cent in 1984,by 5 per 
cent in 1985 and 4 per cent in the first quarter of 1986;it was 
under valued by between 68.1 per cent and 70 per cent between 
the last quarter of 1986 and 1987 and this has continued. (8) 
Also,another industrialist re-echoed the same sentiments,but in 
rather more nationalist terms
With two billion pounds,Britain can come and buy almost 80 
per cent of Nigeria's productive sector of the economy 
because we have devalued to such an extent that our goods 
are now very cheap. We have lost the basis of capital 
formation. Banks such as Union,UBA and First bank that 
used to have assets base like five billion dollars,with 
devaluation,they are saying our assets base is now ten 
billion. But in real terms, ten billion naira today is 
only one billion dollars. So the banks have lost over four 
billion dollars with the stroke of the pen because of SAP 
or the effect of the devaluation.(9)
The failure of exchange rate reform to create a viable and 
stable exchange rate of the naira has intensified the problem 
of resource misallocation. It was this problem and the need to 
ensure efficiency in resource allocation that reforms in this 
area became necessary and central to the success of SAP. As a
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result, the distortions in the economy remained.This was 
reflected for instance,in the pattern of imports during the 
period(Table 7,5), The foreign exchange available was for the 
most part not directed to the productive sectors alone. This 
problem was admitted to by President Babangida when he lamented 
that:
Observed utilisation of foreign exchange to date is 
unsatisfactory as it has exacerbated distortions in the 
economy. For example, during 1987,only 0.45 per cent of 
FEM allocations went to agriculture,at the same time that 
27.92 per cent was allocated for the importation of 
finished goods. The corresponding figures for the January 
to June period were only 0.6 per cent for agriculture and 
26.8 per cent for finished goods.(10)
Another significant factor in the instability of the naira 
exchange rate was the scarcity of foreign exchange. The 
expectation that the market would be assisted by the supply of 
foreign currency from external institutions such as the World 
Bank, did not materialise. The Federal government resorted to 
the harmful policy of funding the foreign exchange market.
Thus, before IFEM was introduced in 1989, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) was funding the exchange market by an average of 
US$120 million every fortnight. This was done ostensibly to 
ensure the necessary supply of imported raw materials and spare 
parts to keep industries operating, to maintain the production 
of goods and services, and increase employment. The CBN even 
went to the extent of buying foreign currency from the 
autonomous market at the ruling rate and sell at FEM-determined 
rate to the banks.(11) This practice has continued with IFEM.
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TABLE 7.5
IMPORTS BY MAJOR GROUPS
(Million Naira)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Consumer
Goods 5,736.3 4,480.5 3,700.8 2,656.7 2,069.3 1,757.8 4,304.7 7146.4
Durable
Non-
Durable
1,576.2
4,160.1
861.6
3,618.9
858.8
2,842.0
632.5 
2,o42.0
247.2
1,822.1
302.9
1,454.9
839.5
3,465.2
249.0
6897.4*
Capital 
Goods 
Raw Mat- 
rials
4,018.0
3,152.4
3,532.7
2.703.4
2,886.3
2,307.7
2.307.2
2.133.3
2.486.0
2.493.1
2.22.9
1.751.9
7,568.0
5,983.7
7957.4
9785.9
Miscel-
leneous 12.9 53.9 8.9 81.1 14.2 6.0 5.3 10.7
Total 12,919.6 10,770.5 8903.7 7178.3 7062.6 5938.6 17861.7 24,900«4
* Provisional
Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos; quoted in Central Bank of Nigeria,
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW Vol.27,No.1 March 1989 P.54.
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The encouragement which the government gave to private
companies and individuals by assisting the supply of foreign
exchange through measures like the domiciliary account did not
yield the results desired. Instead, the private sector added to
the problems by way of companies and individuals engaging in
the old habits of corruptly taking advantage of the system. In
the case of companies,some of them involved in exports
...fail to repatriate their export earnings,preferring 
instead to keep such earnings in fixed deposits abroad 
with a view to earning interest thereon which are then not 
declared if and when the principal sums are finally 
repatriated.(12)
Many of these companies have simply used the liberalised 
environment under SAP to repatriate capital. The initial rush 
to export products such as the various cash crops ,was mainly 
to serve as cover for the transfer of capital abroad,a 
situation that was not possible under the highly restrictive 
conditions during the Buhari regime. This was reflected in the 
dramatic upsurge in the domestic prices of cash crops like 
cocoa especially between 1987 and 1988. Some of the companies, 
including multinationals,engaged were involved in the practice 
of buying foreign exchange from FEM for imports which they 
often did not declare. This was another source of leakage of 
foreign exchange. The misuse of FEM by companies was eventually 
addressed by the authorities when 112 of them were barred from 
trading in FEM,for failling to show shipping documents within 
the 90-day deadline in March 1990. Among these companies were
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big names like Federated Motors,CFAO,Bata,Lever Brothers, 
A.J.Seward and Nigeria Hoescht.(13)
The banks, it was widely claimed, also cornered the 
foreign exchange market and used it to make huge profits. 
Their monopoly over FEM enabled them to create scarcity by 
diverting the foreign exchange which they were expected to sell 
at a reasonable profit,to the black market where profits are 
higher. The sale of foreign exchange therefore became a 
lucrative business for the banks and they made more profit from 
it than from their other operations. Encouraged by the 
government's policy of liberally giving licences to more banks, 
the number of banks rose dramatically to take advantage of the 
lucrative market in foreign exchange. Thus, the number of banks 
operating in the country rose from 40 at the end of 1985 to 105 
by the middle of 1990. Most of the new banks which were owned 
mainly by wealthy Nigerians, are hardly any better than the 
Bureau de change and they operate largely in rented offices in 
Lagos. Their incomes and profits are derived almost exclusively 
from their operations in the foreign exchange market.
The point is that most of these new banks would not have 
been given licences to operate because they were evidently 
ilequiped to operate as banks like all those which in operation 
before SAP was introduced. Their ill-preparedness was 
demonstrated by their inadequate resources which limited them
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to operate only in Lagos, in rented offices, which serve as 
both administrative headquarters and operational branches, in 
much the same way as a corner shop. They are also unable to 
compete successfully in the traditional banking activities, 
against the more established banks. That is why they depend 
almost entirely on the foreign exchange market for their income 
and profit. This raises an important issue which explains how 
these banks were able to obtain licences and the operation of 
the foreign exchange market by the banks. The issue involves 
the role of political favours in economic policy under SAP. If 
the new economic reforms were intended to make the state a more 
efficient manager, this is one area where the failure is 
evident. The old ways of the state persisted under SAP, with 
the government compensating the elite for the loss of income 
and wealth from the operation of import licence controls, the 
contract system, and the like. One form which this compensation 
took was the reforms in the banking sector which made it easier 
for the elite to set up their own banks and operate the foreign 
exchange market. The government supplies these banks with the 
foreign exchange to sell through the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
This arrangement partly explains the problems which have beset 
the foreign exchange market, and the huge profits which these 
new banks have made.
All the banks recorded higher profits during the reform 
period, and this had much to do with some of the policies
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pursued at the time. For instance, the foreign exchange market 
has been highly subsidised by the government and most of the 
subsidy went to the banks. The banks usually bought the foreign 
exchange cheap at FEM and sold it at exhorbitant rates. As one 
banker put it,"All a bank does is get a licence and its foreign 
exchange allocation is there for the asking".(14) The banks 
have also benefited from the credit system under SAP as they 
have made huge profits from interest income. The credit policy 
of the government forced interest rates up and subsidised bank 
earnings. Thus, the three giant commercial banks led the rest 
in declaring record profits. The First Bank of Nigeria saw its 
profits rise from # 53.4 million in 1985 to # 86.6 million in 
1986, and # 106 million in 1989. For the Union Bank, profits 
after-tax rose from # 41.5 million in 1985 to # 53.8 million in 
1986,#83.5 million in 1987, #112.3 million in 1988 and #152.4 
million in 1989. While the United Bank for Africa recorded 
profits of #34.1 million in 1985, #42.0 million in 1986 and 
#73.6 million in 1987.(15)
The new banks which began operating during SAP also made 
huge profits. For instance, the Alpha Merchant Bank was not 
only able to break even in the first month of operation, it 
made profit after tax of #7.3 million in the first year and 
earned #19.5 million from interests on loans and advances, and 
foreign exchange transactions. By April 1989, just three months 
into its operation, the total assets of the Commerce Bank rose
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to #127 million and deposits stood at #108 million. The Nigeria 
International Bank which was incorporated in May 1987 declared 
a record after tax profit of #82 million.(16) Even though the 
Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) was reporting in 
August 1990 that 23 banks were in serious difficulties, with 
many of them undercapitalised and operating below solvency 
level,they were still able to record more profits in 1989 than 
in 1988.(17)
Another problem with the exchange rate deregulation was 
the role of financial speculators in the foreign exchange 
market. President Babangida himself identified them as "The 
particular class of Nigerians who were engaged in the old 
import licencing racket..."(18) These financial speculators 
were middlemen who usually obtained foreign exchange with the 
collaboration of officials, to whom they paid a percentage of 
the profit. Many of these people make more money from their 
dealings in foreign exchange than in most other productive 
areas of the economy. For instance,while small-scale industries 
are collapsing the harsh climate of SAP,the speculators in 
foreign exchange are making alot of profit. The speculation has 
involved acquiring foreign exchange from the official IFEM and 
then selling it on the black market where the naira exchange 
rate is much lower.Others have also engaged in the practice of 
exporting commodities and selling the foreign currency earned 
on the black market for alot of profit. This circle of buying
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from the official market and selling on the autonomous market 
has been possible with the collusion of the banks. The 
legalisation of black market activities through the setting up 
of the Bureau de change in 1989 did not squeeze out these 
activities. The banks and the speculators have monopolised the 
market and are reaping windfall profits from the depreciation 
of the naira.(19)
The instability of the naira exchange rate has generated 
very high domestic inflation and inturn has induced the further 
depreciation of the naira. Another source of inflationary 
pressure has been the persistent budget deficit,especially 
since the reflationary budget of 1988. Thus, instead of the low 
inflationary growth envisaged to result from the structural 
adjustment programme, inflation has consistently risen since 
1985. In 1985, it had fallen to 5.5 per cent from 39.6 per cent 
the previous year, and remained low in 1986 at 5.4 per cent. 
But in 1987,it rose to 10.2 per cent, and in 1988 and 1989 it 
stood at 38.2 and 47.5 per cent respectively. The situation in 
1990 was expected to be much worse, especially since informed 
observers have asserted that the actual figures for 1987 and 
1988 could have been as high as 55 and 65 per cent.(20)
The high inflationary situation created during the 
adjustment period became a major obstacle to economic recovery 
and growth. All sectors of the economy were severely affected
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by this rising inflation and performance was generally 
disappointing. Since production and consumption activities were 
still critically dependent on imported inputs,production costs 
and prices were bound to rise very sharply. The result was that 
the adjustment programme became unattainable in the prevailing 
environment. The poor performance of the industrial and 
agricultural sectors is in part a consequence of the prevailing 
high inflation under SAP.
The impact of adjustment-related monetary policies was 
also not beneficial to the economy. The liberalisation of 
interest rates initially freed banks to charge competitive 
rates. The demand for loans was also high at the begining, 
especially because businesses needed more naira to buy foreign 
currency. This pushed interest rates up, particularly since the 
second half of 1988 when the reflationary budget added to the 
inflationary pressure. Interest rates rose from their average 
rate of 20 per cent in September 1988 to 30 per cent in October 
1989. At the end of 1990, average rates of interest had reached 
the 35 per cent level. This development hit businesses very 
hard because it made borrowing too expensive and created cash 
flow problems for many businesses, especially the small ones.
Another problem which distorted monetary and credit 
developments in the economy was the excess liquidity which 
followed the 1988 budget and the inflationary pressure it
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generated. The government took drastic measures to soak up the 
excess liquidity in the economy and fight inflation. In 1989, 
the government directed all parastatals to transfer their 
accounts from commercial and merchant banks to the Central Bank 
of Nigeria(CBN). This move was expected to result in the 
transfer of about #10 billion to the CBN. Consequently, there 
was a severe liquidity squeeze and banks had to increasingly 
resort to using their treasury bills and other instruments in 
order to purchase their foreign exchange allocations, having 
lost most of their deposits.
Interest rates rose even higher and businesses were again 
hit hard.This policy of curbing excess liquidity was continued 
in 1990 through the introduction by the CBN,of Stabilisation 
Securities which required all banks to deposit money with the 
CBN over a 90-day period. This intensified the pressure on the 
banks and there was an outcry against it from the banks. Even 
though this directive was later withdrawn,the banks lost many 
of their deposits. For instance,total deposits dropped from 
#33.2 billion to #27.6 billion in May 1990 alone. (21) The 
impact of this on industries,particularly small-scale 
industries,was that they were increasingly unable to finance 
their operations or even repay their loans and many had to fold 
up.
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Despite these measures, there was little sucess in 
controlling monetary supply and credit expansion (Table 7.6). 
Associated with this was the problem of rising budget deficit. 
In 1988, there was a deficit of #8.6 billion in the #24.3 
billion budget. The 1989 deficit was #12.8 billion out of the 
estimated #30.1 billion.While in the first half of 1990 the 
government had over-spent its revenue by #14.895 billion, that 
is #895 million more than the projected deficit for the whole 
year. (22) This has also increased the level of the governments 
domestic debt,since it has had to borrow internally to finance 
these deficits. The task of curbing inflation therefore became 
more difficult as a result of the deficits.
A related problem was the failure to remove the persistent 
pressure on the country1s external sector inspite of the reform
measures. The external reserves continued to be inadequate,
much below the minimum international convention for reserve
adequacy. For instance, between 1981 and 1989, the country*s
reserves could only finance an average of 1.8 months of imports
against the international convention requirement of a minimum
of four months.(23) The balance of payments position also
worsened during the period. From the surpluses recorded in 1984
and 1985, there were deficits of #784.3 million and #2,294.1
million in 1986 and 1988 respectively. The situation was even
mildly veiled by the deferment of repayments due on external
debt commitments since 1988.
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TABLE 7.6
MONETARY AND CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS (END DECEMBER)
(Million Naira)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1986 1987 1988
Credit to
Domestic
Economy 16268 21906.8 28182.1 31141.6 32680.3 36820.3 41390.8 52201.6
% Growth 50.8 36.7 28.6 10.5 4.9 8.7 12.4 26.1
% Target - - - - - 8.7 4.4 8.1
Credit to
Private
Sector 9654.2 11371.5 12353.9 12942.0 13700.2 17365.8 19125.8 23247.4
% Growth 34.3 17.8 8.6 4.8 5.9 26.7 10.1 21.5
% Target - - - - - 12.8 8.4 13.3
Credit to
Gov.
Sector 6614.3 10535.3 15828.2 18199.6 18980.1 19455.3 22265.0 28954.2
% Growth 83.9 59.3 50.2 15.0 4.3 2.5 14.4 30.0
% Target - - - - - 5.9 1.5 2.5
Money
Supply
(Ml) 9744.9 10048.5 11282.4 12204.1 13267.8 12728.3 14905.9 21446.4
% Growth 5.6 3.1 12.3 8.2 8.7 -4.1 17.1 43.9
% Target - - - - - - 11.8 15.0
Money
Supply
(M2) 15548.1 16893.9 19368.9 21600.5 23818.6 24216.0 29994.6 39843.5
% Growth 8.0 8.7 14.7 11.5 10.3 1.7 23.9 32.8
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, sane as table 7.5.
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Foreign exchange flows through the economy were another 
problem during the period. Even though total inflow rose by 
45.1 per cent a year between 1986 and 1988 compared with a 
decline of 2.5 per cent between 1981 and 1985,total capital 
outflow also increased by 47.2 per cent over the same period 
compared with a decline of 8.2 per cent in 1981-1985.(24) An 
important factor in this massive outflow of capital is the debt 
service burden. Inspite of the rescheduling arrengements 
concluded between Nigeria and her creditors, debt service 
commitments continued to consume a large part of her earnings. 
In 1988, debt service took $1.90 billion, in 1989 it was $2,004 
billion or 37 per cent of the budget while in the 1990 budget, 
$2,114 billion or 30 per cent was commited to debt service.
Another reason for the high outflow of capital is that 
there was very little foreign private investment in the economy 
during the period. The little that came in was directed at the 
trading and business services sectors where profits were high 
and could be easily repatriated, as the foreign companies have 
been doing since 1987. Thus,instead of foreign private capital 
being attracted as a result of the various reform measures 
adopted, the tendency has been to keep away. Even the bilateral 
and multilateral sources of external finance tended to dry up 
since the reforms were instituted. The problem with most 
bilateral and multilateral sources had to do with Nigeria's 
failure to meet the performance criteria set by the IMF, since
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all these sources of finance are invariably tied to IMF
conditionalities. This unfavourable response to Nigeria's
resource needs led President Babangida to complain that
We notice that a number of creditors keep on shifting the 
goal post; and this has resulted in some net flow of 
resources out of the country. On the other hand, we have 
observed that some other countries which have done far 
less in reforms have ended up with more credit flows than 
Nigeria.(25)
Not only was financial assistance to Nigeria very limited, 
the little that was given was tied to IMF performance criteria. 
For instance in 1987, total external assistance was $356.6 
million compared to $593.4 million in 1986. The bulk of this 
was from the World Bank which provided 90.5 per cent or $273.4 
million,and Japan was the second largest contributor with $28.6 
million or 9.4 per cent.(26) Also,when Britain gave Nigeria 
$100 million aid in 1989,its use was made conditional on 
meeting agreed IMF performance criteria. Thus, unlike Ghana 
which was treated rather favourably with the flow of more than 
$3 billion from the IMF and World Bank alone, Nigeria continued 
to be shunned.
Another source of pressure on the external sector of the 
economy during the reform period was the worsening debt 
position of the country. Debt management as we have seen,has 
imposed a heavy burden on national resources which could have 
been commited to more productive use. The debt outstanding has 
also risen rapidly during the period(Table 7.7), from $19.32
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TABLE 7.7
EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT (END OF PERIOD)
(Million Naira)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Total Com­
mitments 8043.9 14714.5 17759.4 20982.7 29337.8 57029.0 142302.6 182857.8
Total
Drawings 5188.3 10187.1 12845.0 17703.5 23195.0 48871.3 123522.2 164582.0
Total Re­
payments 682.5 1367.7 2267.3 3166.9 5904.4 7710.4 22734.6 30626.0
Total Out­
standing 2331.2 8819.4 10577.7 14536.6 17290.6 41160.9 100787.6 133956.3
Debt/Exp­
ort Ratio 
(%) 22.3 101.1 141.0 160.0 154.0 486.9 333.3 404.2
Debt/GDP
Ratio(%) 4.5 16.1 17.4 21.2 21.9 52.8 127.3 162.2
Debt Ser­
vice/Exp­
ort Ratio % 5.0 8.0 17.6 29.1 33.2 29.4 11.9 24.7
Source: same as Table 7.6
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billion in 1985 to $23.18 billion in 1986. In 1987 and 1988 it 
stood at $30.04 billion and $30.72 billion repectively, while 
in 1989 it was estimated to amount to $33.22 billion. (27) The 
burden of debt also exacerbated during the period when measured 
in relation to exports, GDP and service. Between 1986 and 1988, 
the debt/export ratio rose to 408.1 per cent from 115.7 per 
cent between 1981 and 1985. The debt/GDP ratio increased from 
16.4 per cent to 114.0 per cent over the same periods, for the 
debt/service ratio, it increased from 18.6 per cent to 22.0 per 
cent.(28) Clearly the structural adjustment programme has 
failed to relieve the economy of the poor performance of the 
external sector.
However, if the economy as a whole did not perform well 
under the structural adjustment programme, others did very well 
as a result of it. These were the multinationals, the local 
bourgeoisie in both government and business, and the army of 
speculators which has dominated the black market. They have 
been the winners in terms of the distributional effects of 
structural adjustment. While most small-scale industries were 
collapsing because the reforms, the subsidiaries of the 
multinational corporations were like the banks, still making 
huge profits. Almost without exception, this category of 
companies performed very well. They were greatly assisted by 
their external connections with their parent multinationals
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which made them better equiped to take advantage of the liberal 
conditions under SAP.
Apart from the conducive atmosphere for the transfer of 
resources abroad, the profits made by these companies actually 
went up during the period. The UAC, which is the largest 
company in Nigeria and a subsidiary of Unilever, is a typical 
example of the winners under SAP. From its businesses in 
manufacturing, technical, trading and services, the UAC turned 
in profit after-tax of #31.0 million in 1984. In 1985 profits 
stood at #38.6 million, then #40.1 million in 1986, #51.0
million in 1987, and a pre-tax profit of #247 million in 1989. 
For John Holt, another big company involved in agriculture and 
fisheries, manufacturing, assembly and processing, distribution 
and services, profits were consistent at #23.1 million in 1985, 
#22.3 million and #21.9 million in 1986 and 1987 respectively. 
The Nigerian Breweries Ltd turned in profits of #26.5 million 
in 1985, #27.5 million and #48.6 million in 1986 and 1987
respectively. (29)
Another source of benefit for these companies and 
individuals was the privatisation of state-owned companies. The 
privatisation exercise became a virtual handover of public 
companies to private interests.(30) The privatisation programme 
has gone on together with the implementation of the debt-equity 
auctions. Both measures have made it easier for foreign and
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domestic private capital to take over then economy. Thus, many 
enterprises in agro-food, transport, hotel, cement, iron and 
steel, insurance, petroleum and even the highly profitable 
banking sector were put up for privatisation.
As we indicated in the last chapter, a major reason for 
the overwhelming rejection of the structural adjustment 
programme by Nigerians during the IMF debate in 1985, was the 
fear that public enterprises and wealth would simply be 
transfered to a few private interests, both foreign and 
domestic. There was also the fear that privatisation would 
widen the gap between the few rich and the majority of deprived 
Nigerians. There was more sympathy with the idea of 
commercialising public enterprises. Therefore, the decision by 
the government to privatise as well as the reasons it advanced, 
did not go down well with many Nigerians. The government had 
justified privatisation on the need to infuse efficiency; to 
hand over to Nigerians the control of their investments and the 
need to reduce state involvement in the economy.
The opportunity to test the positions of both the 
government and those opposed to privatisation came with the 
first exercise which involved the sale of Flour Mills of 
Nigeria and African Petroleum in 1989. The exercise seemed to 
confirm the fears of critics of privatisation, and heightened 
the controversy on the danger that foreign investors would
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eventually take over productive state enterprises. The
government was unable to guarantee its undertaking to spread
ownership widely to the public. From the beginning of the
exercise, most people who wanted to acquire shares were unable
“to
to get even the application forms^ fill. Most rural bank 
branches, post offices and local government offices did not get 
the application forms in good time to distribute to people and 
that ruled them out of the privatisation process.
Also, the public did not have access to the necessary 
funds to buy shares. Not only were most people too poor to 
afford shares, with per capita incomes having fallen to $370 in 
1987 as a result of adjustment measures. They were also unable 
to obtain loans from the banks to acquire these shares. Even
the local governments complained that they did not have the
funds, expertise or the authority to buy shares. The federal 
government had merely advised the banks to make available 
special funds to their customers to buy the shares easily. The 
banks were too scared to risk lending to Nigerians this way. 
Moreover, things were made more difficult when, on the eve of 
the share sales, the CBN increased its re-discount rate from
12.75 per cent to 13.25 per cent. This meant that interest on 
bank loans rose from between 17-20 per cent to between 20-23 
per cent. These high rates pushed up the cost of borrowing
beyond what ordinary Nigerians could afford, and cleared the 
way for the rich to take over these enterprises. Thus, while
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the few gained more wealth, the majority suffered more losses 
as can be seen from the social impact of adjustment.
The Social Impact of SAP
One thing on which both the government and the critics of 
SAP are agreed is that the impact of the programme on the rest 
of society has been damaging. The disagreement has been on 
what to do to remedy the situation. While most Nigerians and 
critics of the adjustment programme have called for its 
abandonment as the way out of the social crisis, the government 
has taken the view that the reform programme is good for the 
economy in the long run and should therefore be continued. The 
social consequences it argues, only need to be addressed by 
implementing appropriate policies on the social dimension of 
adjustment(SDA)• However, the point needs to be made that while
the structural adjustment programme did not cause these social
crisis, it certainly did exacerbate the situation especially
with the economy failing to respond to the structural reforms.
The implementation of the various reform measures,
particularly the depreciation in the exange rate of the naira, 
immediately pushed down the purchasing power of most Nigerians 
and their standard of living with it. For instance, Nigeria's 
GNP per capita was twice the average for Sub-Saharan Africa,
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estimated at $760 in 1985. With the sharp depreciation of the 
naira following the introduction of SFEM in 1986, per capita 
GNP fell to $640, and $370 in 1987. This decline continued in 
1988 to $280 and $230 in 1989, with projections up to 1995 
putting it at less than $300.(31) Thus, within three years, 
Nigeria*s fortunes were transformed from that of a rich country 
to being an IDA-eligible country.
The inflationary pressure induced by the reforms severely 
weakened the purchasing power of the majority of the 
population. High inflation sent prices soaring and most people 
found it difficult to survive since even the most basic 
necessities of life were priced out of their reach (Table 7.8). 
The prices of food, housing, transport, electricity and other 
basic items rose several times more than the wages and earnings 
of most Nigerians could meet. The result was that most families 
were forced to face severe hardships, and those who were high 
wage and salary earners became as poor as the low income 
groups. The middle class which had emerged and become a 
significant section of the society in the 1970s, virtually 
disappeared under the impact of the reforms. There emerged a 
clear situation of extremes of wealth and poverty in the 
society as fewer people became richer and the majority became 
poorer.
TABLE 7.8
ANNUAL AVERAGE RETAIL PRICE INDICES 
(Base: Nov.1975=100)
------------- '-1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
1. Food 468.3 510.3 614.2 850.7 870.6 944.1 1,037.7 1,445.8
A.Staples 535.6 586.4 650.0 841.2 788.8 682.3 792.2 1,382.2
B. Meat, v-- 
Fish & Eggs 421.3 486.1 584.8 917.7 1,073.9 1,249.9 1,389.9 1,690.4
C. Oils & 
Fats 276.8 267.0 612.9 982.8 792.9 754.9 601.6 1,061.7
D. Veg. , 
Fruits & Nuts 385.4 456.8 545.3 646.2 676.9 890.7 931.9 975.9
2. Beverages 
& drink 278.5 287.7 311.6 452.1 576.8 644.9 640.5 858.3
3. Tobacco 186.3 209.4 210.8 234.3 261.9 300.1 358.3 537.8
4.Fuel &Light 274.3 302.9 343.0 340.6 359.7 719.1 591.9 684.6
5.Clothing 335.5 364.1 467.9 629.4 777.3 1,046.7 1,457.1 1,505.8
All Items 401.5 426.4 505.4 696.9 762.3 867.6 931.5 1,250.4
Source: Same as Table 7.7 p.57
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The rising incidence of poverty among even the middle 
class elements was exacerbated by stagnant incomes. Salaries 
and fringe benefits in the public sector had remained frozen 
since 1982, when the government began to apply stabilisation 
measures to tackle the enfolding crisis. Since the government 
is the main employer of labour in Nigeria, it meant that most 
of the workforce remained poorly paid. Even when the federal 
government granted moderate wage increases through the 
Enlongated Salary Structure in 1988, these were very much lower 
than the increased cost of living up to that point. Since 1988 
inflation has continued to eat up wages and incomes without a 
corresponding upward review of wages.
Nigerians have responded to the situation in different 
ways. The most common response particularly from even the high 
salary earners, is to engage in moon-lighting. Many people took 
on other part-time jobs to earn enough money to balance the 
family's budget. Most public servants resorted to using office 
working hours to engage in these unofficial activities, many of 
them undeclared or often illegal. The problem of corruption 
also became acute as officials at all levels and in all sectors 
took bribes in the process of their official work in order to 
top up their earnings. Even though corruption is endemic to the 
Nigerian system, it has grown worse during SAP. For instance, 
it became common practice for the police personnel to take 
bribes from armed robbers in return for the freedom of these
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criminals to operate without being caught. The rampant nature 
of corruption in the country is such that accusing fingers have 
even being pointed at leading functionaries of the military 
government at both federal and state levels.(32)
Another consequence of the adjustment programme is the 
increase in unemployment. Even though available statistics do 
not tell the true story of the state of unemployment in Nigeria 
(33), one estimate put the number of unemployed people at 10 
million in 1989.(34) Apart from the many workers who lost their 
jobs due to the rationalisations in the public and private 
sectors, a growing number of the unemployed are young school 
leavers. A significant number are graduates of the colleges and 
universities which have turned out more graduates in the 1980s
than in the previous decade. Thus, Nigeria's graduate
unemployment rate is the highest in Africa.
The increased level of unemployment has worsened the 
problem of poverty in the country. Because the unemployed 
persons have had to depend on relatives who have themselves 
suffered reduced real incomes, survival has become more 
difficult. In the urban areas, an increasing number of people
have been forced into living from the dust bins. They are
mostly unemployed, young men and women and even school-age 
children, who scavenge the refuse dumps for scrap metals, 
wires, empty cans, waste paper and scraps of electronics, and
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then sell these to recorverers in order to make a living. A 
related problem to the deepening crisis is the increased rate 
of crime including violent crimes, against person and property 
in both urban and rural areas since 1985. Many of those 
involved are often young unemployed people. Even in work 
places, cases of theft by staff have increased. A notable 
example is the theft of letters by postal staff for money and 
other valuables.
The hardship generated by SAP has also led to a 
significant exodus of qualified manpower in critical areas like 
medicine, education, engineering, and other professions. For 
instance, a large number of Nigerian doctors, nurses,pilots,and 
engineers have been attracted by higher pay and better 
condition os service in the oil-rich Gulf states. The exodus to 
Europe and North America has also been considerable. The 
federal government was forced to acknowledge the seriousness of 
the problem of brain drain in 1988. In a typically Nigerian 
approach, the government appointed a Task Force on Brain Drain 
to look into ways of stemming the flow of highly talented 
Nigerians to other countries. The Task Force was expected to 
come up with a package of incentives enough to bring back those 
who had left and keep the others who yet to leave, at home. 
Meanwhile, there was a directive requiring all officers in the 
public sector to obtain written permission from their ministers 
before travelling abroad. After undertaking an extensive study
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tour of Europe and America, the Task Force could not find an 
affordable package of incentives attractive enough to keep the 
professional people at home and the federal government was 
forced to let the brain drain continue.
Another consequence of structural adjustment was the 
deteriorating state of social services and utilities. The 
services supplied have been insufficient and inefficiently 
rendered. One ofthe factors responsible for this situation has 
been the decline in the volume of services provided, due to 
reduced spending on social services (Table 7.9). Thus, services 
in areas like health, education, transportation, water supply 
and electricity supply actually declined because of these 
reforms. In the health sector, hospitals lack even the basic 
facilities and many of them are inadequately staffed by 
doctors. The situation is so bad that patients have to provide 
most of the medical items needed for their treatment. In the 
education sector, student intakes were progressively reduced, 
libraries and laboratories were without books and equipment 
even in the universities. The situation was the same in the 
other sectors.
The gradual removal of subsidies also increased the cost 
of services provided. Transportation fares have increased each 
time the price of petroleum products was raised. This has 
inturn raised costs in other areas such as the prices of food 
and other essential commodities. Water rates, medical charges,
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TABLE 7.9
RECURRENT EXPENDITURE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(Million Naira)
Function 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 +
ADMINISTRATION 2,433.2 2,677.3 2,638.2 2,675.7 6,046.3 5,777,8
General Admin.; 
Defence & Internal 
Security 2,433.2 2,677.3 2,638.2 2,675.7 6,046.3 5,777.8
ECONOMIC SER­
VICES 412.8 326.9 315.4 513.7 1,092.9 1,221.2
Agriculture 42.7 41.7 41.1 38.1 72.6 83.0
Construction 211.2 202.5 184.9 282.7 643.6 693.6
Transport &Com- 
munication 52.2 46.1 57.7 94.8 284.1 227.2
Other Econ.serv. 106.7 36.6 31.7 98.1 92.6 217.4
SOCIAL & COMM­
UNITY SERVICE 828.5 768.0 1,132.2 862.0 469.0 2,114.2
Education 588.8 657.9 697.2 483.8 354.0 1,458.8
Health 161.5 87.0 164.3 247.0 65.0 422.8
Other 78.2 23.1 270.7 131.2 49.1 232.6
TOTAL 3,664.5 3,772.2 4,085.8 4,051.4 7,608.1 9,113.2
+ Provisional
Source: Adapted from, CBN; ECONOMIC AND FINACIAL REVIEW,VOL.2 7, NO.3
September 1989 p.154.
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education levies and fees have been increased as part of the 
adjustment process. For instance, in 1989, the National 
Electric Power Authority (NEPA) was permitted to raise its 
tariff from 6 kobo per kilo watt hour to 24 kobo kwh. This was 
the result of considerable pressure from the World Bank for the 
price increase as a condition for the release of a credit 
facility of #4.2 billion to NEPA. Inspite of this price rise, 
the performance of NEPA has not significantly improved.
In educational institutions fees were re-introduced, as 
were other forms of levy which parents had to pay. In all the 
states, parents had to show evidence of payment of 
education/development levy before their children could enroll 
into primary schools. The cost of education rose drastically, 
with charges levied on such items as admission forms, 
examination fees, PTA development levy, etc. In addition to 
these, students were now responsible for their feeding and 
acconjjpdation arrengements• The bursaries and scholarships which 
students used to enjoy were nolonger available, yet they have 
also suffered the full impact of the increase in the cost of 
food, transport,housing, medical care and the like. All these, 
combined with the fact that most students graduate only to 
swell the ranks of the unemployed, have led them into running 
battles with the federal government for the imposition of SAP.
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The hardships brought about by the reform measures have 
affected the population across the urban-rural divide almost 
equally. For instance, even though unemployment was higher in 
the urban areas, inflation was felt more in the rural areas. 
The peasantry also had to endure the same shortages and high 
cost of education, health care, transportation, as well as 
development levy. Poverty has increased among these groups, 
inspite of the policies put in place by the government in order 
to tackle the social dimension of adjustment. The various 
programmes such as the Mass Transit programme, the National 
Directorate of Employment (NDE) and DFRRI, have not achieved 
any significant results. Thus, for most people the hardship has 
persisted, and the poverty intensifies.
The Political Impact of SAP
The introduction of the structural adjustment programme 
has intensified the political conflict between the government 
and its coalition partners who have supported economic reform 
on the one hand, and those opposed to the reforms from the 
beginning, on the other. Despite the efforts of the federal 
government to gain the support and commitment of Nigerians to 
the reforms,most of the people remained uncommited or even 
hostile to it. The emphasis on rural development through the 
activities of DFRRI did not lead to any substantial rural
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support for the government. Even the indigenous businessmen who 
had initially supported SAP backed away as soon as its negative 
consequences began to cripple their businesses.
The economic reform programme lacked the necessary 
political support of most Nigerians partly because they bore 
the brunt of the hardship which the reforms led to. There was 
also the general view that the economic crisis in which the 
country was immersed was caused not by most Nigerians but by 
the few rich and powerful in government and the private sector 
as well as their foreign associates. This view was reinforced 
by the detention of many politicians of the Second Republic for 
the part they played in bringing about the crisis. Similar 
views were strongly articulated by the highly influencial 
Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), the National 
Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), and the Nigeria Labour 
Congress (NLC), both under the Buhari regime as well as the 
Babangida regime.
These groups along with the general urban 
population,continued to put pressure on government to abandon 
the structural adjustment programme. The pressure was part of a 
political campaign which took the form of 
strikes,demonstrations, riots, and the like. The first serious 
confrontation came with the April 1988 riots over the increase 
in the prices of petroleum products. The students had always
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been in the forefront of the opposition to many of the reform 
measures adopted. From the time the Babangida regime introduced 
SAP formally in 1986, the students have maintained a sustained 
political opposition to it. As a result, the colleges and 
universities have suffered sudden closures every year since 
1986. Some of the institutions were closed down several times 
within the same session, thereby causing disruptions to 
academic life in the higher institutions.
The labour groups and the growing army of the unemployed 
have often coordinated their activities in opposition to the 
adjustment programme. Often, the workers acted or threatened to 
act in solidarity with the students who would usually have had 
their campuses invaded by the police and then subsequently 
closed down indefinitely. Overtime, and as the SAP-induced 
hardships intensified, this coalition of groups also grew and 
became more effective. For the NLC, the first major 
confrontation with the Babangida regime came in 1987 in 
response to the package of reforms in labour relations 
introduced by the government. Through them, the government 
shifted power in favour of employers. The most significant of 
these measures was the National Minimum Wage Amendment Order 
which exempted employers with less than 500 workers from paying 
the minimum wage.(35)
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As a result of this measure, many workers had their wages 
cut by their employers. This was mainly because as many as 80 
per cent of enterprises employed less than 500 workers, and 
employers were also permitted to meet wage bills according to 
their ability to pay. State governments were also empowered by 
law to deduct development levies from workers’ salaries. 
Another issue of conflict between the government and the NLC 
was the removal of petroleum subsidy. The NLC successfully 
waged a propaganda campaign against it in coordination with 
students and other groups. This NLC-led campaign was so 
effective that the government put labour leaders in detention 
in December 1987 for alleged sedition. The government was 
forced to put off any price increases for petroleum products.
In early 1988, labour unrest gathered momentum among 
public sector workers at both federal and state levels,as they 
were pressing for the implementation of the new pay structure 
announced in the 1988 budget. Private sector workers also 
joined in the demand for commensurate wage rises, and this set 
wages rising. The government moved swiftly on the labour 
movement and dissolved the national executive of the NLC in 
February 1988, and subsequently, the executives of the 19 state 
councils. This was done ostensibly to the conflict between 
’socialist1 and 'democratic' factions within the NLC. From then 
on, the government appointed an administrator to run the 
affairs of the Congress until a new leadership was elected in
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1989. However, this did not stop the unions from continuing 
with their campaigns against the adjustment programme. The 
presence in the country, of IMF and World Bank teams at the 
time, only stengthened the resolve of the unions to fight the 
government•
The flashpoint came in the form of the cut in subsidy for 
a wide range of petroleum products by between 6 and 500 per 
cent in April 1988. Public response was immediate and violent. 
It all began with the demonstrations organised by university 
students against the price increases and then spread to involve 
workers, self-employed people like traders, road-side mechanics 
and the unemployed and school children, who were then on 
holidays. The violence led to significant destruction of 
property and loss of life in places like Jos, Lagos, Calabar, 
and other university towns. The government promptly closed down 
all colleges and universities and moved on to confront the 
unions when they planned a nation-wide action in solidarity 
with students for June 4, 1988. Public demonstrations were
banned, union secretariats were sealed off, and security forces 
were put on alert with tanks patrolling the streets.
The violent rioting and demonstrations continued as 
students and other urban groups sustained their pressure on 
government for the reform-induced hardships. The most violent 
confrontation yet was the anti-SAP riots which took place
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between 25th and 30th May 1989. It was as widespread as it was 
destructive to life and property. It took a major security 
action by the government to control the situation. But it 
sufficiently threatened the government so much that some senior 
members openly called it a civilian coup attempt. From this 
point, the government was fighting for its survival as much as 
that of the structural adjustment programme .
Lacking the essential political support for its reform 
package, the government became more repressive and violated 
human rights as it sought to stamp out opposition to the reform 
programme. The government increased its surveillance of 
university campuses and trade unions. Many student and union 
leaders were thrown into detention without trial under Decree 
no.2. Other opponents were also harrassed and detained for 
organising public lectures and conferences to discuss SAP. This 
was demonstrated by the arrest and subsequent detention of 
Lagos lawyer, Gani Fawehinmi and veteran labour leader, chief 
Imoudu for organising an anti-SAP public lecture.(36) The 
government responded ruthlessly to any actions it considered a 
threat to its policies of economic reform. For instance, in 
late 1988, 11 union officials from NEPA were tried by a
military tribunal and sentenced to life imprisonment for their 
roles in a nation-wide strike which left the country without 
power supply for several days. The Babangida regime totally
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abandoned its self-styled image of a human rights-respecting 
government and became very much like its predecessor.
The result was an increase in social tension and political 
instability as the government tried to carry out the reforms 
demanded by the IMF and World Bank in the face of serious 
domestic political opposition. The country became more
polarised along religious lines and ethnic rivalry intensified 
mainly because the government tried just about anything that 
would bring it the much-needed political support. The almost 
secretive manner in which the government took the country into 
the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) was a clear 
political manuevre which left the country bitterly divided. 
These divisions were clearly reflected in the constant 
reshuffling in the government and the highly publicised 
disagreement between General Babangida and General Dorakat Bali 
in early 1990. The government became even more vulnerable and 
the President had to concentrate power in his own hands. He 
became the defence minister, and brought all security services 
under his personal control.
When a group of army officers staged a bloody coup attempt 
on April 22, 1990, few Nigerians were surprised by it. In many 
cities in the southern part of the country, there was 
jubilation and demonstration of support for the coup in the 
streets in the initial stages. The bloody nature of the coup
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was evidenced by the scale of damage done to the official 
residence of the President, the many casualties including the 
killing of the Aid de Camp (ADC) to the President, as well as 
the Presidents narrow escape. The aftermath of the coup left 
the country openly divided and the government hanging on by the 
skin of its teeth. The coup was also followed by the 
predictable executions of over 60 people and the massive purge 
of the armed forces which surprised most people but left the 
President seemingly in control of the government. However, the 
damage done by the prevailing atmosphere of instability with 
respect to the flow of foreign investment is very enormous. The 
government has been doing its best to use the process of 
transition to democratic rule to send the right signals to 
foreign investors.
The government's control over the process of transition to 
democratic rule has been so tight that the impression has been 
created that the government is either intending to continue in 
power or at the very least succeed itself by choosing the next 
government. The government not only interfered continuously in 
the work of the Constituent Assembly, it also extensively 
amended the constitution after the work done by the constituent 
assembly. It imposed two parties on the country by refusing 
registration to all the political groups which were formed, on 
the grounds that they did not meet the impossible criteria 
which the government set for them. The government also drew up
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the constitutions of the two parties it had created and 
commited them to continuing with the economic reforms 
introduced by it. It has gone on to manage both parties by
providing funds and administrative staff. On the whole,it is an 
experiment that is being keenly watched by the skeptical public 
because of its profound implications for the future of 
democracy and the country.
The introduction of the adjustment programme has also 
severely limited the independence of the government over the 
choice of policies and the management of the economy. The IMF
and the World Bank have to a significant extent determined what
policies the government should adopt. The issue of performance 
criteria has been a very useful instrument of this form of
influence over the management of the Nigerian economy. The
increasing political isolation of the government from the 
people has also helped to push it into closer cooperation with
the external sponsors of SAP in the hope of achieving the
seemingly elusive economic reco very and prove the necessity of 
the programme. Meanwhile, on the external front, this weakness 
of the government was veiled by the strategy of * economic
diplomacy* which was essentially a euphemism for the struggle 
to re-negotiate debts on favourable terms. Not only has this 
involved spending large amounts of scarce resources on endless 
foreign travels by officials on debt rescheduling talks, but
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also the pursuit of a less independent foreign policy than in 
the 1970s.
Conclusion
From the foregoing, it will be correct to conclude that 
the adjustment programme has been an even less successful 
exercise in Nigeria than in Ghana. Not only did the various 
reform measures not complement each other in creating an 
atmosphere favourable to recorvery and growth, they tended to 
deepen the crisis. The country is not in any significantly 
better state than it was before SAP, and the task of economic 
reco very has been made more difficult. There is no doubt that 
programme implementation lacked the consistency required, but 
it did not make the programme fail. The factors responsible are 
more fundamental than poor programme implementation.
The inappropriateness of the reform package adopted for an 
African economy like that of Nigeria is best illustrated by the 
failure of the private sector to perform well under SAP. Even 
before the introduction of the programme, the private sector 
was always free to operate in any area of the economy. 
However, inspite of this openness, the private sector avoided 
the productive sectors like agriculture and manufacturing 
industry without heavy government subsidy. Even when this
432
subsidy was given, the domestic private capital seemed to 
abandon the field to foreign capital, which in turn prefe^jed to 
be in the most immediately profitable areas like assembly 
plants in consumer goods. The orientation of the private sector 
was to use the state as a lever to create wealth for the 
indigenous and expatriate capitalists. It was not intended to 
expand itself through its own surpluses, that was why the state 
sector was made to expand its role in the economy. The private 
sector has therefore always corruptly used the state this way, 
and the same situation prevailed under SAP as the privatisation 
exercise clearly demonstrated.
Thus, the economic and growth of the country will depend 
on a number of factors some of which are outside its own 
control. For instance, the success of any measures in Nigeria 
will depend on the greater support of her creditors in terms of 
increased flow of resources into the economy. We have seen that 
unlike Ghana which actually received more external funding than 
the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria received very little 
funding. Instead, foreign private investors continued to shun 
Nigeria partly because of the unfavourable assessment of her 
performance by the IMF and the World Bank. Not only will 
increased flow of resources be necessary, the heavy burden of 
debt service will also have to be significantly reduced. In 
addition, the international development community and the 
economic powers in particular, have to be more flexible and
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supportive to the needs of countries like Nigeria. All these 
requirements are not within Nigeriafs control. Nor are the 
required favourable changes in the international environment 
with regard to commodity prices, access to markets, debt 
negotiations and the like.
On the domestic front, there will have to be a fundamental 
re-orientation of policy objectives and direction away from the 
present situation which causes more misery, to something much 
more people-oriented. There will also be the need to sequence 
the policies in such a way that the objectives can be attained. 
Along with this must be the democratic participation of the 
people in the development process. This is necessary not only 
for the attainment of the political consensus needed on 
policies adopted by the government, but also to put the 
interest of the people first. These are some of the issues 
addressed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 8
Beyond the Politics of Adjustment: The Future of African 
Recovery and Development
The decade of the 1980s witnessed a dominant tendency for 
external forces to prescribe solutions to Africa. The 
prescription which dominated the scene was orthodox structural 
adjustment, implemented in Africa under the supervision of the 
IMF and the World Bank. Over the period, African affairs were 
also dominated by the politics of adjustment. African 
governments had to contend with the domestic pressure of 
populations opposed to the implementation of these reform 
programmes. On the external front, they struggled to meet the 
performance criteria and conditionalities set for them by the 
London and Paris Clubs of creditors and the IMF and the World 
Bank. This form of crisis management became the major pre­
occupation of African countries.
Yet the decade of the 1980s has also been described as a 
lost one for Africa, in terms of development. During this 
period African countries lost any capacity which they might 
have had, to raise the quality of life of the people on a self- 
sustaining basis. Instead, these countries witnessed a 
deepening economic crisis, political instability and social 
disintegration. The 1980s for most of them, was a decade of 
development in reverse and a worsening of the prospects for 
future development , despite the implementation of Structural
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Adjustment programmes. As Sir William Ryrie has also 
concluded,
• ••the overall result of all the efforts by- 
African governments and their overseas helpers during 
the years 1980 - 1988 was that standard of living in 
Sub-Saharan Africa fell on average by 1.2% a year 
••• the overall record can only be characterised as 
one of failure.(1)
There is consensus that the various programmes of economic 
reforms and restructuring which were implemented under the 
supervision of the IMF and the World Bank have failed to yield 
the desired results. The point must be made that the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes implemented by African countries during 
the 1980s did not cause the African crisis, a process which 
began in the late 1970s, The point being made here and on 
which there is agreement even by Bretton Woods institutions is 
that these programmes have not been successful in arresting the 
crisis, instead, the situation has become worse. Thus, inspite 
of all the programmes of reform, Africa’s situation at the 
beginning of the 1990s is much worse than it was at the 
beginning of the 1980s.
In this concluding chapter of the study, we summarise the 
experience of African countries with structural adjustment and 
draw some conclusions from this experience. We also look at 
the prospects for Africa’s recovery and development in the 
future. This is done by discussing the changing international 
environment and its implications for Africa. The domestic 
constraints are also analysed and a strategy, based on the
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findings of this study as well as the experiences and debate 
over the last decade is proferred.
The African Experience With Structural Adjustment.
The general experience of African countries which adopted 
structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s is that they 
failed to generate recovery and growth in these economies. The 
evidence of this failure is clearly reflected in the 
performance of these economies over the period. The situation 
has, for instance, led to considerable frustration on the part 
of the World Bank. As a development institution, the World 
Bank has done more studies on Africa’s development problems and 
has been more actively involved in promoting development in the 
region than any other institution. Yet inspite of these 
credentials, the Bank admitted to the failure of reform 
measures at the close of the 1980s.(2)
Africa entered the 1980s as the weakest region in the 
world where growth in the relevant sectors was either in the 
negative or negligible compared to other parts of the world.
For instance, while other regions of the Third World were 
recording rising growth rates in agriculture, Africa recorded 
consistent decline. Between 1965 and 1989, East Asia’s 
agricultural sector grew by 3.2 per cent during 1965-73, 2.5 
per cent in 1973-80 and 5.3 per cent in 1980-89. South Asia’s 
agriculture grew by 3.1 per cent in 1965 -73, 2.2 per cent in
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1973-80 and 2.7 In 1980-89. Sub-saharan Africa!s performance 
in this sector was 2.2, -0.3 and 1.8 per cent respectively over 
the same period. In industry, while Sub-Saharan Africa 
recorded growth rates of 13.9 per cent in 1965-73, 4.2 in 1973- 
80 and 0.2 per cent in 1980-89; the other regions were doing 
better. East Asia’s industry grew at the rates of 12.7 per 
cent in 1965-73, 9.2 in 1973-80 and 10.3 per cent in 1980-89; 
while South Asia's rates were 3.9, 5.6 and 7.2 per cent 
respectively over the same periods. For services, the rates of 
growth were 4.1, 3.1 and 1.5 per cent for Sub-Saharan Africa; 
10.5, 7.3 and 7.9 per cent for East Asia; and 4.0, 5.3 and 6.1 
per cent for South Asia over the respective periods.(3)
The severe external imbalances which afflicted African 
economies in the 1980s and which structural adjustment reforms 
were expected to remove, have persisted into the 1990s. The 
measures adopted to achieve these external and internal 
balances such as exchange rate adjustment; monetary control; 
fiscal adjustment; the removal of price distortions; credit and 
interest rate policy reforms; and trade liberalisation, have 
not worked as intended. As a result, African economies 
experienced the worst external shocks during the 1980s compared 
to the other regions of the developing world(Table 8.2)
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Table 8.1 Balance of Payments, 1963-1988
Current accounts balance before official transfers
Country 1965-73 1973-80 1980-88
Cameroon —
00• -4.7
Congo 25.2 23.6 -13.8
Cote d ’Ivoire - -12.3 -11.5
Ethiopia -1.8 -2.5 -7.1
Ghana -3.5 -1.8 -5.1
Kenya -5.5 -9.8 -7.0
Liberia - -1.2 8.1
Malawi - 19.0 -11.1
Niger - -14.1 -14.3
Nigeria -4.5 -1.6 -1.6
Senegal - -13.3 -15.8
Sierra Leone -4.0 -15.1 6.3
Sudan 0.9 6.6 -
Tanzania 2.6 10.0 8.8
Zaire 15.6 6.4 9.8
Zambia 2.4 8.6 14.0
Source: Adapted from World Development Report 1990, p.167
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Table 8.2 External Shocks in the 1980s, by region(% of GDP)
Terms of Trade 
shock*
Region/Country
Interest rate 
shock+
Total
Sub-Saharan Africa -10.1 -4.4 -14.4
East Asia(excluding
China) - 3.9 -4.3 i 00
 
. (—
*
China - 0.6 -0.6 1 . to
South Asia(excluding
India) - 7.9 -2.3 -10.2
India - 4.6 -1.0 - 5.6
Latin America and
the Caribbean - 6.3 -4.0 i o • 00
Note: Numbers may not sum to totals because of rounding. The 
table shows changes in external conditions for 1985-88 compared 
with the average for 1970-80; it thus gives a measure of those 
shocks that persisted into the second half of the decade. 
Aggregations by region are not weighted.
* The difference between changes in export prices and changes 
in import prices between the two periods. Prices are in dollars 
and are weighted by the share of exports or imports in GDP.
+ Calculated from changes in the real interest rate weighted by 
the debt-to-GDP ratio. The real interest rate is derived from 
the implicit nominal interest rate (the sum of public and 
private payments less interest receipts on reserves divided by 
total debt) and from U.S. inflation.
Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 1990, p.107
The devaluations carried out by most African countries did 
not have the effect that was theoretically suggested. Instead,
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in all the countries concerned devaluation generated 
inflationary spiral which has defied all efforts to manage it 
even in countries like Ghana where the implementation of 
adjustment reforms have been more consistent. The failure of 
the battle against inflation jeopardised the chances of other 
reform measures succeeding as was clearly brought out in the 
case studies of Ghana and Nigeria. For instance, the 
productive capacity of the various economies was severely 
weakened by the inflationary situation.
The fiscal and monetary environment continued to be highly 
unstable inspite of reforms. Attempts to eliminate deficits 
have failed and in countries like Nigeria the level of deficit 
remained very high. Also, monetary control has remained 
elusive because much of the African economy is operating in the 
unofficial informal sector. This sector has become 
increasingly dominant in most economies as a result of the 
large-scale speculative activities taking place. These range 
from smuggling to currency dealings on the black market and 
forms of moon-lighting for which taxes were not paid. Very 
often the strength of the informal sector in resisting control 
is the result of the active involvement of a politically 
influential section of the society. This is often the case 
with those dealing in foreign currencies on the black market.
In Nigeria, it is the same group which was influential enough 
during the second Republic to obtain import licences and sell
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on the black market that also ended up controlling the market 
in foreign currencies outside the official one.
Another area of failure is with interest rate policy and 
credit policy under structural adjustment. These have not had 
the effect of raising the levels of investment and savings. In 
fact, of all the other areas, investment and savings are the 
two factors which did not respond to the adjustment measures at 
all (Table 8.3).The experience was that interest rates were 
usually too high, that borrowing became very expensive even for 
businesses, and as a result, investment remained very low. A 
combination of high interest rates, high inflation and the 
continuous devaluation of local currencies led to declining 
industrial output, under-utilisation of capacity and the 
collapse of small-scale enterprises. The lack of growth in 
savings was caused by the high inflation, falling incomes and 
the large informal market sector.
The existence of the informal sector and its expansion, 
reflect both the resourcefulness of the society and the crisis 
of the state in Africa. As we have argued earlier in this 
study, the modern state has not established its roots in 
Africa. The relationship between state and society in Africa 
has remained turbulent, with the state seeking to dominate 
rather than accommodate society, while the society has sought 
to escape state control. The state has extended its dominance 
through taxation and the oppressive rule of the bureaucratic
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system. The escape this, the society has usually found refuge 
in the informal sector to avoid taxes through smuggling, the 
hoarding of money outside the banking system, and the use of 
many other ingeneous ways to meet economic needs which the 
formal sector has failed to provide. Thus, the informal sector 
has tended to expand when the formal sector is in crisis. It 
can, therefore, be argued that the persistence of the informal 
sector is an indication of the extent of crisis in a given 
country in the region.
Table 8.3 Investment, Saving, 1965-1988
Gross domestic investment Gross national saving
Country 1965-73 1973-80 1980-88 1965-73+ 1973-80 1980-88
Cameroon 16.6 21.8 21.6 • • 17.0 16.9
Congo 29.3 34.0 38.2 4.2 10.3 24.5
Cote d'Ivoire 22.8 29.1 19.4 • • 16.8 8.0
Ethiopia 12.8 9.5 12.7 11.0 6.9 5.6
Ghana 12.3 8.7 7.8 8.7 • • 2.7
Kenya 22.6 26.2 25.7 17.2 16.4 18.7
Liberia 19.1 28.7 15.0 • • 27.5 6.9
Malawi 20.0 29.7 18.3 • • 10.7 7.2
Niger 9.7 23.8 16.3 • • 9.7 1.9
Nigeria 16.3 22.8 13.9 11.8 24.4 12.3
Senegal 14.7 17.5 16.0 • • 4.2 0.2
Sierra Leone 13.8 14.1 14.2 9.8 -1.0 7.8
Sudan 11.9 16.2 13.4 11.0 9.6 • •
Tanzania 19.9 23.9 19.0 17.3 13.8 10.2
Zaire 13.7 15.0 15.2 29.3 8.6 5.4
Zambia 31.9 28.5 18.2 34.3 19.9 4.3
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+ Excludes transfers, 1965-69
Source: World Development Report 1990, p.167
Trade liberalisation has equally not worked largely 
because of the extremely weak capacity to switch from imported 
products to local products. Dependence on imported inputs 
remains high and continues to add to the pressure on the 
external sector. The export-oriented strategy which was an 
aspect of the trade reforms also failed to improve export 
performance and diversification of exports remained very low. 
For instance, the region recorded a consistent decline in 
export volume from the mid-1970s right through the 1980s. In 
1965-73 the export volume stood at an average annual percentage 
of 15.1. Between 1973-80 there was a dramatic decline to an 
annual average of 0.2 per cent and a negative rate of growth o£ 
-2.0 per cent was recorded between 1980-86. This trend 
continued with a growth of -0.1 per cent in 1986 and —1.8 per 
cent in 1987 before recovering to 1.2 per cent in 1988.(4).
Futhermore, the structural reforms carried out in Africa 
did not attract foreign investment as was expected. For the 
region as a whole, foreign investment has been almost 
negligible, not more than one half of one per cent of GDP or a 
mere $2 per capita. The new foreign investments that have 
taken place in Sub-Saharan Africa are mostly in a few large 
mineral projects such as gold in Ghana and oil in Nigeria and
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Gabon, for example. There has been very little Investment in 
manufacturing by foreign companies. Thus, for most countries, 
foreign investment was virtually at a standstill.(5), A 
related problem is that the funds flowing into Africa during 
the period of adjustment has resulted in the continent becoming 
heavily indebted instead of raising living standards and 
strengthening the economies as was expected. Africa entered 
the 1990s with a debt that is about 100 per cent of its GNP and 
more than 350 per cent of its export earings. About 70 per 
cent of this debt is at market rates,(6). The rising debt 
continues to be a major obstacle to reform measures.
The structural adjustment programmes have deepened the
crisis on the social front. The reform measures have caused
more hardship and poverty to the populations of Africa. As the
World Bank has observed,
The crisis is taking a heavy toll in human 
terms. In several countries expenditure 
on social services is sharply down, school 
enrollments are falling, nutrition is worsening 
and infant mortality continues to be high.
Often unemployment in the towns, especially of 
educated youth, is also on the rise.(7).
For most of the 1980s , Sub_Saharan Africa continued to record 
falling per capita incomes. Within the same period countries 
such as Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Sao Tome 
and Principe and Zambia all slipped from the Middle-income to 
the low-income group.(8).
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The impact of structural adjustment programmes on 
vulnerable groups has been documented and tackled within the 
framework of the Social Dimension of Adjustment (SDA). Inspite 
of the consensus on the need to mitigate the SDA, the measures 
adopted have resulted in failure. The SDA policies have not 
worked because they have not been integrated into the 
structural adjustment programmes, they have remained after 
thoughts. Thus, these projects were starved of funds as the 
World Bank and the IMF applied conditionalities in disbursing 
the funds set aside for this purpose. This additional funding 
was therefore with-held from those countries implementing 
structural adjustment programmes as a result for instance, out 
of the $7 billion voted for disbursement under the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), only about $1.5 billion 
had been disbursed by May 1990 and yet ESAF ended in 1990.(9).
Another issue which has not received as much attention as 
the economic and social impact, is the political impact of 
structural adjustment programmes on Africa. The failure of 
governments, whether military or civilian (usually one-party) 
regimes, to resolve their economic problems often had the 
political effect of generating pressure on such governments to 
be replaced with multi-party democracy. This was demonstrated 
in the fall of governments in the Sudan in 1985, Nigeria in 
1983 and 1985, and Benin in 1989 when they failed to resolve 
the economic decay in their countries. The structural 
adjustment programmes have also deepened the political crisis
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in Africa. The governments have lost the authority or the free 
hand to make economic policy, or to operate as an economic 
force. The close supervision to which African countries are 
subjected under structural adjustment by the IMF and the World 
Bank has left them little room to manoeuvre as a result of the 
conditionalities and performance criteria imposed on them.
This surrender of the economy to the rule of market forces as a 
result of external forces, has cost the governments legitimacy 
in their countries. Most Africans have come to credit economic 
policies adopted under structural adjustment to the IMF and the 
World Bank. This has reinforced the popularly held notion that 
the structural adjustment programmes amounted to a surrender of 
sovereignty over the economy and natural resources by the 
countries concerned.
The reform measures have also put much pressure on the 
African ruling elite in other respects. The limiting of the 
role of the state in the economy and the dwindling amount of 
resources now available to it meant that the ruling elite was 
denied the resources which they could have employed to stave 
off growing domestic opposition to structural adjustment. The 
welfare programmes and subsidies which most African governments 
had used to gain and maintain political support in the past 
were now virtually unavailable because they were forced to cut 
back public sector spending. In the absence of this carrot the 
ruling elite has generally resorted to the use of the stick by 
unleashing reppressive and dictatorial rule on their people.
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Because structural adjustment could only be Implemented by 
means of coercion, it has destroyed whatever was left of 
democracy In Africa, increased military dictatorship and the 
militarisation of politics. As a result, human rights 
violations have increased over the period as governments became 
increasingly intolerant of any form of dissent. Most 
governments resorted to the use of draconian laws to detain 
people without trail, and to torture and even kill in the name 
of national security. The press and other social organisations 
like trade unions, students unions, and churches, which 
opposed the implementation of the reform measures were often 
harrassed and emasculated.(10)
The adjustment process has also deepened the political 
instability in these African countries. The continual use of 
the state as an instrument of accummulation of wealth through 
corruption by the ruling elite has intensified public 
resentments towards the governments. Often, policies were 
adopted to aid the elite in their accumulation of material 
resources even if such policies were harmful to the adjustment 
programme. A good example is the operation of the foreign 
exchange market and the licencing of many new banks as well as 
the privatisation exercise in Nigeria which gave the elite 
enough opportunity to increase their wealth at the expense of 
the rest of society. Corruption is so pervasive inspite of 
public sector reforms which were carried out as part of 
structural adjustment that public institutions have
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deteriorated very badly. The situation has led to many 
incidents in demand for a return to multiparty democracy. The 
World Bank has described this political crisis as a problem of 
good governance and has also joined the ranks of forces in 
favour of democra tic political reforms in Africa.
Within Africa, there are many organised groups which are 
now working for democratic change and they are already making 
an impact. In countries where governments have resisted demands 
for democratisation, mass movements have emerged and forced the 
issue of democracy on their governments. For instance, the 
activities of the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) in 
Ghana, and the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in 
Zambia, have forced their respective governments, however 
reluctantly, to move towards the restoration of the multi-party 
system. The experiences of both Ghana and Zambia have been 
repeated all over the content. This movement towards democratic 
change in Africa has been influenced by the crisis in the 
region and external developments such as the political changes 
in Eastern Europe. The impact of external developments on 
Africa is also clearly reflected in the African Charter for 
Popular Participation in Development.(11) This Charter emerged 
from the International Conference on Popular Participation in 
the Recovery and Development Process in Africa, held in 
February 1990, in Arusha, Tanzania. Participants at the 
conference were drawn from various Non-Governmental 
organisations representing Farmers, Women, Youth, and Workers
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in Africa, African governments, the OAU, ECA, and Northern Non- 
Governmental organisations. The Charter, sets out an agenda for 
the attainment of democracy and popular participation in 
Africa. Already, this pressure has resulted in the removal of 
the Presidents of Benin and Guinea Bissau through elections.
The political impact of structural adjustment in Africa 
manifested itself in the varous ’IMF riots’ throughout the 
1980s. These riots were usually in response to the hardships 
and the growing inequalities in the distribution of wealth 
resulting from the structural adjustment programmes. Most 
Africans do not want to suffer unduly from the hardship of the 
structural adjustment programmes. The common attitude among 
the African populations is that they do not see themselves as 
contributing to the crisis for which adjustment programmes were 
put in place.
Instead, the blame for the crisis and the unpopular 
measures of reform is squarely placed at the doorstep of the 
African ruling elite and their external collaborators, usually 
the multinational corporations. The continuing high level of 
corruption, the increased prosperity of the ruling elite under 
adjustment, as well as the repression occasioned by SAP are 
seen as evidence of the responsibility which the elite bear for 
the crisis and the hardship which has followed adjustment.
This division between the governments and their people has led
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to the mass pro-democracy demonstrations in many countries as 
part of the attempts to seek alternatives to SAP.
These experiences with SAPs have been felt by all the 
countries in which they were implemented • This is clearly 
demonstrated in the experiences of Ghana and Nigeria which 
inspite of their different economic structures recorded similar 
failures with the adjustment measures. Nigeria is a more open 
economy with a comparatively large private sector and is a rich 
oil exporting country. Ghana on the other hand, has had a very 
strong and dominant state sector, a much smaller private sector 
and is much poorer than Nigeria.Yet both economies not only 
experienced severe crisis from the late 1970s,they have also 
not been particularly successful with their structural 
adjustment programmes. But on a comparative basis the more open 
Nigerian economy has performed worse than the more state- 
controlled economy of Ghana. This general experience of failure 
by economies with different characteristics leads us to draw a 
number of conclusions and lessons from the failure of orthodox 
SAP.
A significant issue in the failure of SAP in Africa is 
that it was essentially a strategy of crisis management in the 
short-to-medium term. It has been concerned mainly with 
achieving recovery through the use of competitive market forces 
and the achievement of internal and external financial 
balances, measures which Adedeji has described as "narrow,
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economistic and mechanical".(12) This orthodox strategy, we 
have argued, is not suited to the African crisis which is 
fundamentally structural and long-term. It is not a purely 
economic crisis, it is also a political and human crisis and 
needs to be tackled by attacking the root causes. Therefore, 
achieving balances does not necessarily lead to recovery and 
development. Even if the desired balances were to be achieved, 
it would not necessarily mean that other sectors of the economy 
such as industry, agriculture, the diversification of exports, 
and the like, would do well. In the African situation, orthodox 
adjustment has largely proved to be inappropriate.
Another problem with orthodox adjustment is the absence of 
real knowledge or experience of its consequences, especially in 
the low-income economies. Therefore, SAP was more of an 
experiment than a prescription of remedies which had been 
successfully tried under African circumstances. For instance, 
there was a failure to understand that the fundamental 
institutional and political weaknesses in these countries could 
jeorpardise the adjustment process or even reverse it. Thus, 
attention was not paid to the need to build a political 
consensus which could sustain the programmes. This can be seen 
in the widening inequalities in the distribution of wealth and 
the reppression used by governments to implement SAP. In the 
end, the losers have been the majority of the people who have 
shown their determination to derail the adjustment process 
through mass political action and other forms of protest.
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Furthermore, orthodox SAP is mainly designed to align 
African economies to a world economy run by market forces, SAP 
is attempting to cause a fundamental change in the development 
paradigm in Africa and not adjustment in the classical 
experience of the West.(13) It does fit into the strategy of 
the major capitalist powers such as the USA, Britain, West 
Germany and Japan from the early 1980s. This is the strategy of 
creating and expanding a world economy operated by market 
forces with little or no government intervention. The IMF and 
the World Bank have been merely instruments in this strategy. 
These two institutions have been trying to convince African 
governments under the guise of adjustment of the superiority of 
the market system over the African form of mixed economy and 
state interventionism which they argue is unworkable. Indeed, 
they attribute the crisis to the failure to introduce the 
market system.
This position of the Bretton Woods institutions has 
clashed with the African view as expressed in documents such as 
the LPA, APPER, and UN-PAAERD, which advocate self-reliance and 
state intervention in the economy. Also, because the African 
ruling elite have benefited materially and politically from 
state intervention in the economy, they have not been too keen 
to assist in abandoning it for the unregulated rule of the 
market. It is not surprising that some sections of the ruling 
elite have often attacked certain aspects of the reforms such 
as devaluation, liberalisation of trade and interest rate
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policy. Even among the populations, a commanding role for the 
state in the economy along socialist and mixed economy lines is 
accepted as a means of exercising national sovereignty over 
resources and social justice in the distribution of wealth.
From this perspective, it can be seen that SAP was implemented 
defensively rather than with enthusiasm. Hence, reform measures 
often faced half-hearted implementation by officials who did 
not necessarily share in the conviction of the IMF and the 
World Bank or their governments on SAP.
However, despite its failure , SAP has succeeded in 
nudging African economies in the direction of the market 
system. The culture of the market place enjoys a higher profile 
now than before SAPs were introduced. The evidence is seen in 
the commitment to observing free market norms and practices in 
business dealings both domestically and externally. For 
instance, some African countries have established stock 
exchanges, are more strongly committed to honouring debts and 
other obligations, emphasise efficiency and cost-saving 
measures, and the like. Africa is therefore being fully 
integrated into the global market economy through SAP, but on 
terms not determined or even influenced by Africans. Moreover, 
Africa has come out of the 1980s much weaker and faces the 
future with much reduced prospects for recovery and 
development. The changing global situation presents formidable 
obstacles to African recovery and development, thus raising 
serious questions on the prospects for the future.
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Prospects for AfricaTs Recovery and Development
Despite the experiment with structural adjustment over the 
past decade, most countries have continued the adjustment 
programmes into the 1990s, With the support of the IMF and the 
World Bank, in some countries such as Ghana and Nigeria SAPs 
are now well into their next phases and extend to 1992, There 
is now a general consensus on the need to promote growth as an 
integral part of any recovery measures in the future. This 
position is also clearly endorsed by the World Bank which now 
advocates the necessity of rebuilding capabilities at 
institutional, infrastructural and human levels • However, the 
prospects for Africa continue to be bleak largely because of 
the international economic environment which is becoming 
increasingly hostile. Any serious attempt to address the crisis 
in the present manner is likely to be jeopardised by the 
limitations of the external environment on Africa.
First, . j Africa remains marginalised and vulnerable in
the international economy and in world affairs. Africa lost
much ground in the 1980s on almost all fronts and is therefore
not strong enough to meet the challenges to its own advantage.
This situation has forced one African leader to lament that
Africa is suffering through this without credible ability 
to influence the course of events or the direction of the 
world. Africa is not consulted on how the world is run or 
worse still on the prices of her commodities. We are not 
consulted when the interest rates are manipulated to suit 
domestic financial and monetary policies though we are the 
victims of that manipulation.(14)
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The ideological triumph of the market globally as the 
ideal solution to economic problems, imposes limitations on 
efforts at recovery in Africa. We have seen how the rigid 
application of market forces under SAP was partly responsible 
for the failures recorded. Yet, the Western creditors and the 
Bretton Woods institutions continue to insist on the market 
strategy and the limiting of the role of the state in the 
economy even when this is not appropriate to their economies. 
This imposition of the market solution has curtailed the 
freedom of these economies to manuoevre and will further weaken 
them.
Another issue is that since market forces will continue to 
determine the flow of investment globally, most of Africa will 
be by-passed in the process. This will not be a conspiracy or a 
deliberate act by the rich countries to hurt Africa. The fact 
is that market forces will allocate investment only to areas 
that are more profitable and therefore attractive. Africa is 
bound to lose out because it is not an attractive area to 
invest in despite the reforms carried out. But areas like 
Eastern Europe will attract more investment than Africa because 
they present better prospects for higher returns. Other parts 
of the Third World are also better placed than Africa to 
attract foreign investment. In such a situation, Africa’s 
recovery will be severely constrained since there is dire need 
for massive flow of investment into the region.
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Another obstacle to recovery In the 1990s Is the 
deteriorating terms of trade. Primary commodity exports 
collapsed In the 1980s and prices fell dramatically, with the 
prices of coffee and cocoa falling to their 14 year low. Sub- 
Saharan Africa is most affected by the continuing decline in 
the terms of trade than other regions of the developing world. 
For instance, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced average annual 
change in terms of trade of -8.5 per cent in 1965-73, 4.8 per 
cent in 1973-80, -4.0 per cent in 1980-86, -21.5 per cent in 
1986, it improved in 1987 to 2.9 per cent and fell again to -
4.4 per cent in 1988. By comparison, East Asia experienced 
average annual change of -0.6 per cent in 1965-73, 1.2 per cent 
in 1973-80,-1.3 per cent in 1980-86, -6.1 per cent in 1986, 
and improved to 0.5 per cent in 1987 and 1.1 per cent in 1988. 
While South Asia performed even better with average annual 
growth of 3.7 per cent in 1965-73, -3.4 per cent in 1973-80,
1.5 per cent in 1980-86, 3.1 per cent in 1986 and 1.2 per cent 
and 2.0 per cent in 1987 and 1988 respectively.(15)
In addition to the deteriorating terms of trade and 
declining levels of export earnings, Africa’s trade dependence 
on a few primary exports and manufactured imports as well as 
concentration on a few export destinations will continue into 
the 1990s. And, with Africa’s share of world exports estimated 
to have declined from barely 2.2 per cent in 1988 to 2.0 per 
cent by 1990, there is a desperate need for the region to 
improve its performance in this area in the years ahead. Here
461
too, Africa faces enormous problems of access to advanced 
country markets. These problems will result from the growing 
tendency towards the formation of large trading blocs and 
unified markets by the developed countries. The most notable 
examples are, the Single European Act of 1987 which commits the 
countries of the European Community to the creation of a single 
market by 1992, and the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement of 1987. 
There are signs that these two economic groups will expand in 
the future to include other countries in their respective 
regions.
From these developments, the signs are that Africa’s 
exports will face severe restrictions in the two most important 
markets for her commodities. Already, the Lome Convention has 
proved to be an unsatisfactory arrangement since it offers only 
limited compensations on commodities that are within the Stabex 
scheme.The conditions for enjoying such compensatory schemes 
have been further tightened by the EC to include economic 
reforms which the ACP countries have to implement before they 
can draw funds from Stabex. The EC is also advocating the 
selective application of safeguards or temporary import 
barriers so as to protect local industries. In addition, the EC 
is demanding protection for intellectual property such as trade 
marks, patents, and other fees, by nationals or companies of 
member states.(16)
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Another set of obstacles to Africafs recovery and 
development is the implication of the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations for access of exports from developing countries to 
advanced country markets. Apart from the restrictions placed on 
developing countries such as the Multi-Fibre Arrangement on 
textiles and clothing, Voluntary Export Restraints and Orderly 
Marketing Arrangements; the advanced countries have included 
non-trade issues in the GATT negotiations. These issues cover 
foreign investment, intellectual property rights, and services. 
The aim of the advanced countries is to apply GATT rules on 
trade in goods, to these three areas. For the developing 
countries, GATT is being used in this way to abolish the 
development priciple and further increase the power of the 
developed countries in the global economy to the detriment of 
the interests and aspirations of the developing countries.
To the developing countries, the application to trade in 
services of the rules traditionally applied to trade in goods 
will destroy their ability to develop their service industries. 
It will mean that there will be an excessive dependence on 
imported services, which will further increase the proportion 
of value added being transferred abroad. It will also increase 
the dominance of multinational corporations in the services 
sector and seriously weaken the development process. There is 
also resentment of the fact that the proposals for liberalising 
trade in services relate only to capital-or technology-related 
services in which the developed countries have comparative
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advantage, and to the exclusion of labour-related services in
which the developing countries have comparative advantage. The
position of the developing countries on this is that:
To be consistent with the objective of promoting 
development, any multilateral framework for services must 
provide for adequate and increasing opportunities for the 
growth of a strong producer-services sector in developing 
countries... Simultanuosly, the new regime must also 
facilitate the growimg participation of developing 
countries in the world export trade in services.(17)
The inclusion of trade-related investment measures(TRIMs) 
on the agenda of the Uruguay Round of negotiations is also 
harmful to developing countries such as those in Africa. This 
attempt to establish new rules for private foreign investment 
is designed to promote the interests of capital-exporting 
countries and their multinational corporations. The implication 
for the capital-importers is that they will not be able to 
regulate such investment to promote their own development 
priorities. In a situation where the multinationals operate as 
monopolies and engage in restrictive business practices, 
market-sharing arrangements, restrictions on the free flow of 
technology, and the like. It is necessary for developing 
countries to regulate foreign investments so as to maximise the 
advantages to their economies. If the developed countries have 
their way on this, multinational corporations will operate 
freely and thereby exacerbate the inequalities of the existing 
system against which the developing countries have fought 
without much success.
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Finally, the advanced countries are trying to strengthen 
and expand their monopolistic rights over technology by getting 
the developing countries to change their national laws to 
respect these interests. They are currently doing this through 
the GATT negotiations on the trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights(TRIPs) in the Uruguay Round, Since 
the developing countries are almost entirely buyers of 
technology on the world market in which the developed countries 
as sellers are in a oligopolistic position, the possibility of 
technological advancement in the developing countries will be 
adversely affected if the developed countries succeed in 
imposing these restrictions through GATT, Even though the GATT 
talks had not been concluded at the time of writing, the fact 
that the talks have been essentially between the advanced 
countries of the EC, North America and Japan, means that they 
are likely to have their way. Also, the determination of the 
U.S.to press home its advantage in these three sectors means 
that regions like Africa will not derive any gains from 
international trade and this will jeopardise their prospects 
for future development. For instance, even with respect to 
agriculture where EC policy on subsidies has come under severe 
attack from countries like the USA and Australia with obvious 
advantages for developing countries, Africa is expected to lose 
from it. It has been indicated that African countries would 
experience a net loss of between $2 billion and $3 billion a 
year from the current GATT round of negotiations.(18)
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By far the most serious problem and challenge to Africa*s 
recovery is its huge external debt. In 1989, the region*s 
external debt stood at US$256.9 billion and still rising. The 
total debt represents 93.3 per cent of GDP and 328.4 per cent 
of total exports of goods and services.(19) Africa is now the 
most idebted region in the world, a situation underlined by the 
frequent rescheduling of debts which the African countries 
undertook with the Paris and London Clubs of creditors. For 
instance, out of a total of 64 countries which signed debt
rescheduling agreements with these clubs between 1980 and 1989,
31 were from Africa. Furthermore, many African countries have 
signed rescheduling agreements between 7 and 14 times over the 
same period.(20) Another dimension to this problem is that 
about 70 per cent of the debt is at market rates. This level of 
indebtedness has made recovery very difficult to attain and as 
long as it persists, it will remain a formidable obstacle to 
the recovery effort.
In addition to the worsening debt situation, Africa is 
also a net exporter of capital to the richer and more 
prosperous parts of the world and the multilateral financial 
institutions. The share of the IMF and the World Bank in the
total debt of Africa is now 24 per cent, while 40 per cent of
debt service payments on non-concessional debt goes to these 
institutions. The extent of capital flight, largely through the 
net outflow of resources from Africa was estimated at about 
US$6 billion in 1989. This reverse flow of resources from
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Africa to the IMF and the World Bank amounted to about US$1.0 
billion in 1986 and 1987, US$1.2 billion in 1988 and US$1.5 
billion in 1989. This activity has denied Africa the resources 
needed to finance the recovery and development. The future 
prospects for Africa will remain bleak for as long as the 
factors discussed above persist. And in the light of this, 
African countries will have to redefine the strategy for 
effectively resolving the crisis and promoting growth.
Towards African Recovery and Development.
The experience with SAPs across Africa (especially our 
case studies)has clearly shown that they are inappropriate to 
the African situation. The main lesson is that the process and 
direction of reforms need to change to give countries in the 
region the chance to rebuild their economies in a way that will 
meet the needs of their populations. The solution has to go 
beyond the current short-to-medium term SAPs which have 
concentrated on balancing the books. As we have argued in this 
study, the African crisis is fundamental and structural, and 
will therefore need a fundamental long-term strategy of 
structural transformation and development. The strategy must 
link the future growth and transformation of African economies 
to structural reforms in a way that SAP has not done.
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It will mean that orthodox adjustment should be abandoned 
and reform measures be selectively implemented to the extent 
that they are appropriate to Africa’s economic and social 
milieu. In addition, there is a need to concentrate on meeting 
domestic consumption needs in the most basic items, instead of 
the present strategy of outward-oriented growth. This in no way 
means that African countries should delink from the 
international economy. What it involves is the need to pay more 
attention to areas which the SAPs have neglected but are very 
necessary for the creation of an enabling environment for 
balanced domestic growth. The increasingly hostile 
international economic environment leaves Africa with no other 
choice but to address those fundamental and structural problems 
in the domestic sector which have inhibited transformation and 
development.
One area which should receive greater emphasis within this 
long-term strategy is the need to increase food production with 
the aim of attaining self-sufficiency. While SAPs have improved 
production of cash crops, food agriculture did not enjoy the 
same degree of support because of the emphasis on increased 
exports. The food crisis in Africa worsened in the 1980s with 
food output growing on average by a mere 1 per cent, and the 
number of severely hungry and undernourished people rising to 
well over 150 million from 80 million in the mid-1970s. This is 
a situation which can be reversed only by introducing policies 
which will make food production cheaper and profitable for the
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farmer as well as reforms In food related sectors. Thus, while 
adjustment-induced price Incentives In agriculture should be 
retained, the removal of subsidies on agricultural Inputs 
should be reversed. Instead,the small-and-medium-peasant sector 
should be modernised to Include making technical inputs and 
knowledge as well as capital and credit easily accessible to 
farmers.
The specific measures required to modernise the small-and- 
medium peasant sector and raise food production have generally 
not been adopted by either Ghana or Nigeria. For instance, the 
producer prices of food crops did not rise significantly in 
these countries compared to the price rises witnessed in the 
cash crops sector. The emphasis on export-led growth induced 
higher price increases as well as expansion in the production 
of crops like cocoa in Ghana and Nigeria. As we have shown in 
our case studies, the food sector did not perform well enough. 
The strategy for the future must be to raise producer prices 
for food producers even if it means buying the surplus for the 
strategic storage. There should also be an expansion in the 
distribution of inputs to farmers at prices they can afford. In 
both Ghana and Nigeria, farm inputs remained very expensive 
under SAP as the reform measures induced price rises in the 
cost of inputs such as fertilizers, insecticides and machinary. 
As was shown in the case of Zimbabwe, there is need to raise 
the ratio of the price of food crops to fertilizer by up to 50 
percent to guarantee increased output.(21) The distribution of
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fertilizers, insecticides, and farm equipment should also be 
widened to reach farmers in remote villages.
Another measure which needs to be taken is to increase the 
access of farmers to credit. The introduction of People’s and 
Community banks in Nigeria by the government has already made 
some impact in the urban areas where they were first started. 
But there is a need toexpand their operations to the rural 
areas where 70 percent of the people live. In addition, the 
women need to be given priority of access to credit because of 
their marginal position in society even though they form the 
majority of farmers. The Better Life For Rural Women programme 
introduced in Nigeria under the adjustment programme is 
potentially viable if it is stripped of its bureaucratic 
overtones and left in the control of the women themselves. A 
general point to be made for all African countries is the need 
to encourage the people at the grass-roots to organise 
themselves and participate fully in the management of their 
affairs. The experience so far even in countries such as 
Nigeria where this has been attempted, this has merely tended 
to serve as a means of extending government control over the 
rural dwellers.
Other measures required to promote food security include 
reforms of the land tenure systems to ensure more equitable 
patterns of ownership. In this regard, the position of women in 
agriculture needs to be fundamentally reappraised with a view
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to redressing all the inequities and exploitation to which they 
are subjected. Even though women constitute the bulk of the 
labour force in the agricultural sector in Africa, they do not 
enjoy such rights as the ownership of land, control over the 
products of their labour, the freedom to acquire credit, and 
other forms of discrimination. As a result, agricultural 
production has suffered due to lack of incentives given to such 
an important section of the population. The strategy for the 
future must involve the release of the productive forces in the 
rural areas by giving the people greater freedom and control 
over their lives and their environment.
The food security problem has to be tackled also by 
redressing the population growth in Africa. Africa has the 
fastest population growth rate in the world, estimated to have 
grown from 257 million in 1960 to 628 million by mid-1989. 
Furthermore, about 45 per cent of Africa’s population is under 
the age of 15. The socio-economic consequences of the 
population growth are serious especially in the lean economic 
environment existing today. The demand on resources is great, 
because even to maintain the very low standards of living at 
present, the region will have to attain an annual GNP growth of 
over 3 per cent. It also means producing enough food for an 
estimated additional 15-20 million people each year. Secondly, 
it requires that 200 million additional jobs be created, about 
10 million annually between 1990 and the year 2000. Thirdly, 
primary and secondary education will have to be provided for
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about 137 million and 70 million respectively, by the year 
2000. Other services such as water,housing, health care, 
transport, and the like, will have to be provided to the same 
degree; all these at a time when conditions are getting 
worse.(22)
Another element in the reform of agriculture in the long­
term is the urgent need to shift emphasis to environmental 
management and sustainability. The environment in Africa has 
been deteriorating rapidly, as a result of drought, soil 
erosion, deforestation, desertification and other forms of 
degradation occasioned by forced migrations of victims of war, 
drought and famine. Desertification constitutes a major 
environmental threat in Africa, as it claims some 70 square 
kilometers of territory a year. Over two-thirds of the 
continent is arid or semi-arid, and around 40 countries face 
the constant threat of desertification and/or drought.(23) 
These conditions have been re-enforced by the impact of 
structural adjustment which has further weakened African 
countries and rendered them incapable of protecting the 
environment even if they wanted to.
The long-term strategy on the economy should be to break 
away from the inherited colonial economic structures. The SAPs 
have not altered these structures, instead they have been re­
inforced. The African economy today is still characterised by 
lop-sided development with the predominance of commercial and
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traditional activities based mainly on imports and exports. 
Domestic production still plays a secondary role, and sharp 
contrasts still exist between urban and rural areas. There is a 
need to develop a mass internal market for basic goods, and 
forward and backward linkages within the national economy, 
particularly the links between industry and agriculture.
In this regard, a major lesson from the implementation of 
SAPs is that African countries are most unlikely to recover 
from this crisis or survive within their national boundaries. 
There is a growing awareness of the need by African countries 
to integrate their economies, especially their production 
structures and markets, at sub-regional levels. Even among the 
major external aid donors, there are calls for structural 
adjustment to incorporate a regional dimension and harmonise 
macro-economic and reform policies.(24) The fragmentation of 
the African product and factor market makes regional 
cooperation a necessity. Most of these countries have small 
markets, with 24 of them having a population of less than 5 
million each and 11 of these have a population of less than 1 
million each. Regional integration allows for economies of 
scale, internal competition between them to the beneficial 
effect of encouraging regional self-reliance, and limiting 
their external dependence. Also, the growing tendency towards 
regionalism in the world economy has rekindled interest and 
consensus on the issue in Africa.
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In the export sector, there is also an urgent need for a
change to policies of selective intervention rather than the
neutrality of incentives adopted within the context of the SAP
strategy of export-oriented growth. The experience of the
export sector in the 1980s has been disappointing as reform
measures harmed the export sector as well. The strategy in the
long-term should be to diversify exports and focus on
industries which are more likely to become internationally
competitive. Diversification is the only way out for African
countries because the demand for primary commodities will
remain depressed in the 1990s. The factors responsible for this
situation include technological advances and their increased
efficiency in energy and raw material use per unit of
manufactured output; the development of synthetics and
substitutes; the recent concentration of growth in sectors such
as services and electronics in the industrialised countries;
and the declining role of comparative advantage in primary
products. As a result of this,
African countries need to develop new products, stimulate 
the processing of commodities, and increase their 
participation in, and returns from, the marketing and 
distribution of their exports.(25)
There is also a need to diversify African export trade in 
the long-term. At present there is a high degree of export 
dependence on particular markets. For instance, around 80 per 
cent of Sub-Sahara African agricultural and other natural 
resource product-based raw exports go to the EEC, the United 
States and Japan. Also, Africa is a major supplier to these
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markets only In a limited number of commodities such as cocoa 
beans, bauxite, refined copper, phosphate rock and preserved 
tropical fruits. This structure of export trade is harmful to 
African countries because it ties their progress to conditions 
in the three markets,
African countries must also lay emphasis on rebuilding 
their human resources if they are to recover from the current 
crisis. The society in Africa suffered the worst impact of 
structural adjustment because of the cuts carried out in social 
services such as health, education and the like. Despite the 
palliative measures taken to cushion the impact of the reforms 
on the people, conditions continued to deteriorate. The health 
delivery system is in the state of collapse in most countries 
as are the educational institutions. Not only did health care 
delivery and training deteriorate under SAP, the majority of 
the population became too poor to contribute to the recovery 
process. There was also a mass exodus of Africa’s professionals 
to other parts of the world, thus creating serious manpower 
shortages. Since the development of a society depends partly on 
the quality of its human resources, there is an urgent need to 
reverse the process of decline. Even the World Bank has become 
active in getting African countries to rebuild their human 
resources. African countries will therefore need to increase 
spending in this in this sector in the long-term.
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The socio-political environment also has to be transformed 
as part of the long-term process of recovery and development. 
The culture of imitation which has dominated Africa’s drive to 
modernise must be discarded to make recovery and development 
possible. Unlike the experience in places such as Japan and 
South Korea which borrowed Western technology but rejected 
western culture, the African experience was to embark on the 
expensive process of copying western Europe with the aim of 
’catching up’ with it. The result has been the fetish for 
foreign experts, foreign models, standards, tastes, goods and 
values. This fostered the tendency towards consumption of what 
is not produced in Africa where it would have been better to 
follow the Asian example of self-reliant development. 
Furthermore, the cost of this policy to Africa can be seen in 
the financing of 80,000 expatriate advisers each year through 
technical assistance and the loss of some 70,000 of its trained 
and educated people to Europe between 1985-87. Part of the 
strategy of recovery and development must include the 
abandonment of this culture of imitation and dependence. This 
is an adjustment that has to be made internally rather than 
imposed from outside. Moreover, the process will also have to 
fully involve the people who are the custodians of culture.
The transformation of the political environment in Africa 
is imperative to the process of recovery. There is an urgent 
need for the political process and the institutions of state to 
be democratised to allow for the full participation of the
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people. For the three decades of Independence, the political 
environment has been a constraint on development. The state is 
often alienated from the people and governments lack 
legitimacy. Most people see the state as an institution hostile 
to their interests, therefore, it has to be cheated, confronted 
and evaded through tax evasion, illegal activities such as 
smuggling and the like. The oppressive character of the state 
denied it legitimacy among the people. Yet it is clear that for 
the state to attain its goals of development, there is a need 
for a national consensus on the goals and purposes of 
development, and on how the costs as well as the benefits of 
development are to be shared.
The only way forward is by instituting democracy which 
enables the full participation of the people. This 
democratisation must give the power of decision-making at all 
levels of the society, to the people themselves. This 
participation in the political process must go beyond the 
simple act of voting. It means that dissent must become a 
welcome part of the political process and not merely tolerated. 
Political opposition must be seen as a right to be exercised by 
all. Other freedoms such as those of the press, speech, 
association, information and the like must be put in place. 
These freedoms have been the casualties of the political 
process, as people could often be sent to jail for using 'bad1 
language against their head of state, not to talk of openly 
discussing corruption. This situation must be reversed if
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people are to participate actively and meaningfully in the 
development process.
At the institutional level, a number of important changes 
are required in line with the need for greater democratisation. 
The rule of law should govern all conduct, of both the 
government and the governed in place of the arbitrariness that 
pervades all levels of government in Africa. Governments must 
also be made accountable and transparent in their activities. 
The judiciary must also be independent and honest enough to 
guarantee the rule of law. Other institutional reforms should 
include the destruction of the bureaucratic power of government 
officials to make them more service-oriented in their dealings 
with the people. Also, the responsibilities and functions of 
government bodies must be clearly stated and made easily 
enforceable to enable people to know what to expect of 
government and its institutions.
With regard to the economy, the state must continue to 
play a leading role in macro-economic management, and as a 
regulator and promoter of economic activity. In the African 
situation, the excessive use of market forces creates 
concentration of economic power in a few hands, widens the gap 
in income and wealth, resource under-utilisation and 
unemployment. It will mean as we have argued, the selective 
intervention of the state to promote growth, even if sometimes 
the state has to be an entrepreneur as well. Certainly, the
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state should create an enabling environment in which 
entrepreneurship in both the public and private sectors can 
flourish. However, the variation in local circumstances could 
decide the manner of state involvement in the economy, but it 
must continue to play an important role in the economy in 
Africa. Thus, the issue of privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises should be looked at without ideological bias. In 
most African countries where SAPs were implemented, there was 
usually the indiscriminate privatisation of even the most 
profitable state-owned companies. While some privatisation is 
necessary in those areas where the state is ill-equiped there 
are areas where state-ownership must remain. This is necessary 
so as to avoid turning public monopolies into private ones.
Another critical factor in the process of Africa1s 
recovery and development in the long-term is the external 
support from the international development community. This 
external support is as important as the internal reforms which 
have to be carried out. This external support should involve 
the IMF, the World Bank and the western creditor nations 
abandoning their insistence that African countries continue to 
implement orthodox SAPs, almost as a matter of dogma. There is 
a need for them to support the integration of adjustment into 
the African position as set out in the African Alternative 
Framework of Structural Adjusment Programme(AAF-SAP). The 
experience of a decade of implementing orthodox structural 
adjustment and the mounting evidence of failure, clearly
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demonstrates the need for such an approach as it will also 
enjoy the input and support of Africans, The World Bank and the 
IMF have also accepted much of this while still remaining 
committed to the central goal of orthodox adjustment.
The most important area where this external support is
required is the need to relieve Africa of the huge burden of
debt, the need for a continuing flow of official concessional
aid and, stopping the leakages of resources through capital
flight. The debt burden which African countries have borne in
the decade of economic reforms has severely weakened the
foundations for their future growth. Basically, these countries
had to forego investments in the development of infrastructure,
maintenance and human resources, in order to service their
debts. As Percy Mistry has observed:
The economic structures of most debtor economies have not 
"adjusted" but been dangerously distorted to maximise 
foreign exchange earnings for debt service. In short, the 
prospects of future generations have been seriously 
compromised. Worst of all, the burden of "adjusting" to 
the crisis in almost every debtor country has fallen most 
heavily on those least able to cope(and least responsible 
for the crisis)- the poorest.(26)
It is within the power of the international community to 
deal with this debt burden because Africa's debt is owed mainly 
to governments and official agencies. The decision to relieve 
this burden is therefore a political one which can be taken by 
the Western governments if the political will is there. From 
the African position, the only way out of the debt crisis is 
for them to be written-off, as most of these countries could
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never possibly pay up their debts. So far, Africa’s debt crisis 
has been handled in a piecemeal manner and in a way that does 
not offer a long-term solution. For a long time, the debt 
problem was tackled through a process of rescheduling agreed 
with the Paris Club of official creditors. Rescheduling is 
negotiated by each Club member individually with the debtor, 
with agreement being reached only upon the debtor’s acceptance 
of IMF conditionalities.
In 1988 the 6-7 introduced the concept of debt relief into 
the rescheduling process in the Toronto Accord. The Accord 
committed creditors to reduce the debt burden of the poorest 
countries either by cancelling a third of the debt service due, 
by setting lower interest rates, or by extending the period of 
repayment of rescheduled debt. Other measures to relief 
Africa’s debt burden included the limited cancellation of debt 
undertaken by a number of Western countries. In all, the total 
amount of cancellations are put at about $3.5 billion or around 
5 percent of the total outstanding debt of low-income Africa, 
between 1975 and June 1989.(27) However, this effort is very 
small relative to Africa’s needs, and it did not result in the 
flow of new money to Africa even though this was what the 
region needs. Besides, Paris Club creditor such as the USA, 
Belgium, Holland and Spain have consistently adopted "the 
agreed option to extend maturities rather than reduce principal 
or interest rates".(28) There is also an urgent need for large 
amounts of aid for many years to come, and this can only come
481
from official sources. By World Bank estimates, the need for 
official development assistance will rise from about US$15 
billion in 1990 to $22 billion in the year 2000 without 
allowing for inflation.(29)
It is necessary for this high level of official 
development assistance to flow to Africa for a number of 
reasons. First, the region will remain unattractive to foreign 
investment to the magnitude required for a long time to come. 
Second, much of the public investment needed by these economies 
will not produce any short-term pay-offs to enable debts to be 
serviced, hence the need for highly concessional funds.
Thirdly, there is the need to avoid a situation where the aid 
given creates more indebtedness. Finally, unless such a level 
of aid is supplied on grant or near-grant terms, the reform 
process in Africa as much as the economies, will be in real 
danger of collapse.
However, it is obvious by now that Africa cannot and 
should not be given a blank cheque or funds without conditions. 
Our discussion of the causes of the African crisis in chapter 
two clearly showed that some conditional grant of assistance 
will help resolve these problems. But such conditions must be 
constructive in the sense that they help to build up 
capabilities rather than weaken them, as we have seen with some 
of the reform measures in Ghana and Nigeria. Thus, aid should 
be given on the conditions that social and economic
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infrastructures are rehabilitated. African governments should 
also be helped to ensure greater democratisation, popular 
participation, efficient functioning of the institutions of the 
state, human rights and the rule of law, by making aid 
conditional upon these measures being taken. This will help 
create the stable conditions necessary to generate recovery and 
development. Unfortunately, however, given their record in the 
past, it is doubtful whether the Western donor countries will 
be more committed to persuading African governments to 
undertake greater democratisation in their countries.
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a p p e n d i x a
ECA Classification of African countries 
adopting IMF and World Bank-supported stabilization and structural adjustment programmes
(SAPs)
Country Arrangement1
Starting
year
Amount 
approved 
(million SDRs)
Burundi SBA 1965 4.00
SBA 1966 5.00
SBA 1967 6.00
SBA 1968 6.00
SBA 1969 4.00
SBA 1970 150
SBA 1976 650
SBA 1986 2150
SAL 1986 5050
SAA 1986 27.11
SBA 1987 -
Chad SAA 1987 19.43
Central African Republic SBA 1980 450
SBA 1981 10.40
SBA 1983 1850
SBA 1984 1550
SBA 1985 15.00
SAL 1985 3050
SBA 1986
SAA 1987 -
SBA 1987 850
Congo SBA 1977 4.70
SBA 1979 450
SBA 1986 22.40
SBA 1987 -
Cfite d'Ivoire EFF 1981 48450
SAL 1981 150.00
SAL 1983 250.00
SBA 1984 82J5
SBA 1985 66.20
SBA 1986 100.00
SAL 1986 250.00
SBA 1987 -
SBA 1988 9450
For footnote *ee end of table
ECA classification of African countries... (continued)
Amount
Starting approved
Country Arrangement year (million SDRs)
Egypt SBA 1962 42.40
SBA 1964 40.00
SBA 1977 125.00
EFF 1979 600.00
SBA 1986
SBA 1987 25.00
Equatorial Guinea SBA 1980 550
SBA 1985 9.20
SAL 1986
SBA 1986
SAA 1988 1158
Gabon SBA 1978 1550
EFF 1980 3450
SBA 1986 98.69
Gambia SBA 1977 253
SBA 1979 150
SBA 1982 16.90
SBA 1984 1253
SBA 1986 5.13
SAL 1986 2150
SAA 1986 1056
SBA 1987
ESAA 1988 2050
Ghana SBA 1966 36.40
SBA 1967 2550
SBA 1968 1250
SBA 1969 550
SBA 1979 5350
SBA 1983 23850
SBA 1984 180.00
SBA 1984
SBA 1985
SAL 1986
SBA 1986 8150
SBA 1987 368.10
SAL 1987 11450
ExtA 1987 245.40
ESAA 1988
For footnote tee end of table
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ECA classification of African countries... (continued)
Country Arrangement1
Starting
year
Amount 
approved 
(million SDRs)
Guinea SBA 1982 25.00
SBA 1986 33.00
SAL 1986 8420
SBA 1987 11.60
SAA 1987 36.77
Guinea Bissau SAL 1985 .
SAL 1987 10.00
SAA 1987 4.76
Kenya EFF 1975 67.20
SBA 1978 17.25
SBA 1979 122.48
SBA 1980 241.50
SAL 1980 55IX)
SBA 1982 151.50
SAL 1982 130.90
SBA 1983 175.95
SBA 1985 85.20
SBA 1988 85.00
SAA 1988 90.17
Liberia SBA 1963 5.70
SBA 1964 4.40
SBA 1965 4.00
SBA 1966 6.00
SBA 1967 4.40
SBA 1968 320
SBA 1969 2D0
SBA 1972 4.00
SBA 1973 4.00
SBA 1974 4D0
SBA 1976 5.00
SBA 1979 925
SBA 1980 65.00
SBA 1981 55D0
SBA 1982 55IX)
SBA 1983 55D0
SBA 1984 -
SBA 1985 -
Far footnote tee end of table
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ECA classification of African countries... (continued)
Country Arrangement1
Starting
year
Amount 
approved 
(million SDRs)
Madagascar SBA 1977 9.43
SBA 1980 10.00
SBA 1981 76.70
SBA 1982 51.00
SBA 1984 33.00
SBA 1985 2950
SBA 1986 30.00
SBA 1987 -
SAA 1987 42.16
SBA 1988 1330
Malawi SBA 1979 2634
SBA 1980 4938
SAL 1981 45.00
SBA 1982 22.00
EFF 1983 100.00
SAL 1983 55.00
ExtA 1983 81.00
EFF 1984 -
EFF 1985 -
SAL 1985 109.10
EFF 1986 ■ _■
SBA 1988 1332
ESAA 1988 553
Mali SBA 1964 9.90
SBA 1967 650
SBA 1968 530
SBA 1969 530
SBA 1971 450
SBA 1982 3038
SBA 1983 4050
SBA 1984 -
SBA 1985 2236
SBA 1986 -
SBA 1987 -
SAL 1987 1530
SBA 1988 1270
SAA 1988 3236
For footnote aee end of table
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ECA classification of African countries... (continued)
Country
Starting 
Arrangement year
Amount 
approved 
(million SDRs)
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
SBA 1977 4.71
SBA 1980 29.70
SBA 1981 26.00
SBA 1985 12.00
SAL 1985 -
SBA 1986 12.00
SAA 1986 21.53
SBA 1987 10.00
SBA 1978 7.97
SBA 1979 73.03
SBA 1980 35.00
SAL 1981 15.00
SAL 1981 -
SBA 1981 30.00
SAL 1983 40.00
SBA 1983 4950
SAL 1984 -
SBA 1985 49.00
SAL 1985 -
SBA 1986 -
EFF 1980
SBA 1982 -
SBA 1983 -
SBA 1984 -
SBA 1985 200.00
SBA 1986 230.00
SBA 1987 -
SBA 1988 210.00
SAA 1987 38.74
SBA 1983 18.00
SBA 1984 16.00
SBA 1985 13.48
SBA 1986 10.11
SAL 1986 60.00
SAA 1986 21.40
ESAA 1988 5055
SBA 1986 •
SBA 1987 650.00
For footnote see end of table
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ECA classification of African countries... (continued)
Country Arrangement1
Starting
year
Amount 
approved 
(million SDRs)
Rwanda SBA 1966 5.00
SBA 1967 2.00
SBA 1968 3.00
SBA 1969 2.00
SBA 1979 5.00
Sao Tome and Principe SAL 1986 -
Senegal SBA 1979 1050
EFF 1980 184.80
SAL 1980 60.00
SBA 1981 63.00
SBA 1982 4725
SBA 1983 63.00
SBA 1985 7650
SBA 1986 34.00
SAL 1986 71.00
SAA 1986 54.04
SBA 1987 2128
SAL 1987 45.00
ESAA 1988 144.67
Sierra Leone SBA 1966 750
SBA 1968 350
SBA 1969 350
SBA 1977 9.02
SBA 1979 17.00
EFF 1981 163.70
SBA 1984 5020
SBA 1986 23.16
SAA 1986 36.77
SBA 1987 -
Somalia SBA 1964 4.70
SBA 1965 550
SBA 1966 250
SBA 1967 550
SBA 1968 750
SBA 1969 650
SBA 1970 3.98
SBA 1980 1150
SBA 1981 43.13
For footnote we end of table
506
ECA classification of African countries... (continued)
Country Arrangement1
Starting
year
Amount 
approved 
(million SDRs)
Somalia (continued) SBA 1982 60.00
SBA 1985 22.10
SBA 1986 -
SAA 1987 28.07
SBA 1987 33.15
Sudan SBA 1966 2850
SBA 1967 1050
SBA 1968 12.00
SBA 1972 4050
SBA 1973 2450
SBA 1974 24.00
EFF 1979 427.00
SBA 1982 198.00
SBA 1983 170.00
SBA 1984 9050
SBA 1985 -
Tanzania, United Republic of SBA 1975 1050
SBA 1980 179.60
SAA 1987 67.95
SBA 1987 64.20
Togo SBA 1979 1550
SBA 1981 4750
SBA 1983 2138
SAL 1983 4050
SBA 1984 -
SBA 1985 1536
SAL 1985 6730
SBA 1986 2354
SAL 1986 -
SBA 1987 -
SBA 1988 1350
SAA 1988 2438
Tunisia SBA 1964 1435
SBA 1965 530
SBA 1966 930
SBA 1967 931
SBA 1969 650
SBA 1970 750
For footnote see end of table
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ECA classification of African countries... (continued)
Country Arrangement1
Starting
year
Amount 
approved 
(million SDRs)
Tunisia (continued) SBA 1986 103.65
SBA 1987 -
ExtA 1988 20730
Uganda SBA 1971 10.00
SBA 1980 1250
SBA 1981 112.50
SBA 1982 11250
SBA 1983 95.00
SAA 1987 6335
Zaire SBA 1967 2730
SBA 1976 40.96
SBA 1977 45.00
SBA 1979 118.00
EFF 1981 912.00
SBA 1983 228.00
SBA 1984 -
SBA 1985 162.00
SBA 1986 21430
SBA 1987 100.00
SAL 1987 5530
SAA 1987 124.79
Zambia SBA 1973 1930
SBA 1976 62.00
SBA 1978 250.00
EFF 1981 800.00
SBA 1983 21150
SBA 1984 225.00
SBA 1985 -
SBA 1986 229.80
SBA 1987 -
Zimbabwe SBA 1981 3750
SBA 1983 300.00
Note: EFF ■ Extended Fund Fadlity
ESAA ■ Enhanced Structural Adjustment Arrangements
ExtA a Extended Arrangements
SAA a Structural Adjustment Arrangements
SBA a Stand-by Arrangements
SAL a  World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans
(which Indude IBRD or IDA loans for adjustment, the Special Fadlity for Africa and Special Joint 
Financing; but exdudes Sectorial Adjustment Loans)
Source: Peter Keener et aL The IMF and the Debt Qisls; IMF Surveys; IMF Annual Reports; World Bank Directory of
Structural Adjustment Loans and World Bank Annual Reports;
IMF, International Finandal Statistics, Vol. XLU, Number 8, February 1989
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aaraga 
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-0 .5 0 .0 - i . i 0.1 -0 .6 14.7 25.6 15.4 20.6 16.6 -0 .4 -0 .3 -1 .3 2 .6 -2 .4 23
CO
OID
1 Banin
2 Botaaana
4 Burkina
4 Burundi
5 Caaaroon
4 CAM 
7 Chad
5 Congo
9 Cota d'Iroiro
10 Ethioaia
11 Cabon
12 Caakia
13 Chana
14 Kanja
15 Laaotho
16 Uibaria
17 Madagaacar 
IB Halaai
19 Mali
20 Mauri tani a
21 Mauritiua
22 Nigar
23 Nigaria
24 Raanda
25 Sanagal
24 Siarra Laona 
27 SoaaIia
26 Sudan
29 Saaiiland
30 Taniania
31 Togo
32 Uganda
33 Zaira
34 Zaabia
35 Ziakakaa
.0.3
9.2
0.6
2.1
4.4
-0.7
-0.7
4.3 
-0.1  
-0.4
3.3 
-0 . 1  
-1.7
1.4 
3.2
-2.1
-2 . 1
1.4 
0.5 
0.0 
1 4
-2.0
1.5 
1.0 
0.1 
0.7 
0.1
-0.3
0.6
-0.5
-0.1
-3.4
-2.2
-1.6
1.7
2.7
10 .0
2.9
7.3
1.5
3.4
1.4
53 
9.1
3.6
5.6
4.5
3.0
5.9
2.7 4 6
4.7
5.0
3.3
4.3 
-0.3 
-0.4
7.1
7.4 
2.0
5.1
4.0 
0.4
4.1 
.4 5
4.7
5 4
3.6
1.4
9.2
1.4 
16.3
3.1
0.7
4.4 
2 2 
0.9
a.i
6.4
2.a
14 1
а.i 
o . o  
10.0
5.6
1.4 
0.7
7.6
3.5 
0.2
б.9 
- 1.9
7.7
1.7
2.5
2.4
4.5
3.9 
7.0
4.5
3.7 
-0.2
2.5
2.5
4.9
4.1 
12.4 
'3.6
4.9
10.9
0.9
-4.5
5.2
7.7
3.0 
0.4
3.5
1.0
5.9 
11.0
2.2
1.5
5.0
5.5
3.0
4.3
6.4
4.2
6.4
1.3
1.6 
0.4
4.5
3.4
2.7
5.1 
-4.7 
-1.5
0.4
1 .0
I.B
-7.7
2.7
-2.4
B.l
-12.0
2.2
0.2
3.9
2.6
5.7 
-4.9 
-4.4
4.3
3.3
1.1
4.5
2 .0
4.0
2.7 
-0 .20.0
Total SSA 0.1 4.9 5.4 3.5 0.0 1.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 2.2 15.4 20.4 23 6 16.2 -0.4 -0.4 2 2 3.4 IS
Laaa Ni gar ia 0.1 4.0 4.0 2.9 2.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.3 -0 3 -1.0 15.9 14.7 20.4 16.4 -1.1 2.4 6.2 5.4
Big Si■ 0.6 5.5 6.4 3.6 -1.4 -1.3 15.9 1.6 6.5 16.1 24.4 14.6 14.6 24.4 17.1 -1.4 -2.4 0.6 3.3
Adjuating -0.1 3 1 4.5 3.1 1.4 1.6 -5.6 -0.1 -3.7 -4.4 -4.1 16.7 20.7 20.6 17.4 14.0 •6.2 0.4 3.6 4.5 1.0
South Aaia 2.3 5.0 2.1 5.9 5.9 -2.0 -2.4 •1.6 -2.0 -2.6 14.4 11.4 16.6 17.6
Notaa: Big S■ a Includaa Ethiopia, Kanya, Nigaria, Sudan, Taniania, and Zaira. Adjuating countriaa ara Cota d'lvoirn, Kanya, Halaai, Mauritiua. Somalia, Bud
Bangladuah, Buraa, Nuyal. and Sri Lanka. "  a
aabia. South Aaia includaa
Sourcaa: World Bank data filaa (raluaa in USI). and World Davaioyaant Rayort, 1986. 21-0ct 12;1J
SOURCE: World Bank, “Beyond Adjustment: Toward Sustainable Growth with Equity in Sub-Saharan
Africa", November 1988
